Post on 07-Apr-2018
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Engaging with
armed groupsDilemmas & options or mediators
Mediation
Practice SerieS
ts Whfl
ob 2010
2
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The Centre or Humanitarian
Dialogue ( HD Centre ) is anindependent mediation organisation
dedicated to helping improve the
global response to armed conict.
It attempts to achieve this by
mediating between warring parties
and providing support to the
broader mediation community.
Copyright Henry Dunant Centre
or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010
Reproduction o all or part o this
publication may be authorised
only with written consent and
acknowledgement o the source.
The Mediation Practice Series is a project o the
Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre).We value the eedback o mediation practitioners
and researchers on the ormat and content o this
publication. I you have any suggestions or impro-
vement, please write to the editors, Luc Chounet-
Cambas and Katia Papagianni, at
mediationsupport@hdcentre.org
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Engaging with armed groups
1
Foreword
th M
P Ss vvw
The Mediation Practice Series (MPS) was initiated in 2008 as
part o the HD Centres eorts to support the broader mediation
community. This series draws on eedback rom mediators who
tell us they and their teams oten rely upon networks and ad hoc
measures to assemble resources to support increasingly com-
plex processes. They work on the basis o their own experience
but lack insight into other peace processes. Their sta, both inthe feld and at their headquarters, also fnd themselves without
adequate reerence material, which hampers the improvement
o mediation practice.
Based on the shared view that mediators oten conront similar
dilemmas although mediation diers widely across peace
processes, the HD Centre has decided to produce a series o
decision-making tools that draw upon the comparative expe-
rience o track one mediation processes.
Each publication in the series will give readers a concise and
user-riendly overview o the relevant issues, key dilemmas and
challenges that mediators ace. It will also provide examples o
how these dilemmas were addressed in the past, with a view to
helping others prepare or the potential demands o ongoing and
upcoming mediation processes.
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Mediation Practice Series
2
Although these publications cannot replace practical experience,
it is our hope that they can contribute to a more systematic lear-
ning process. The orthcoming publications in this series will be
made reely available on the HD Centres website and will be
disseminated through our network and those o our partners.
Each publication is subject to a thorough peer review by practi-
tioners and support sta with expertise in the relevant topics.
Engaging with armed groups is the second publication in this
series. The author would like to thank the three anonymous peerreviewers or their helpul observations and suggestions. She
would also like to thank the ollowing individuals, whose comments
and advice she drew on in the preparation o this paper : Barney
Aako, Hiruy Amanuel, Luc Chounet-Cambas, David Gorman,
Romain Grandjean, Tom Gregg, Martin Grifths, Priscilla Hayner,
Nicholas Haysom, Theo Murphy, Katia Papagianni, David Petrasek,
Jonathan Powell, Kieran Prendergast and Francesc Vendrell. She
remains responsible or any errors the text may still contain.
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Engaging with armed groups
3
1. iu
2. Why gg ? Casestudy:TheFMLNandtheUNinElSalvador
Casestudy:DilemmasoftalkingtotheTaliban
3. eggm by whm?
Casestudy:PrivatemediatorsandtheGAM
in Aceh
4. iyg hllgs sks
Casestudy:Copingwithpre-conditions
on Hamas
Casestudy:TheICCandtheLRAinconictat the peace table
Casestudy:NorwayandtheLTTE
5. ops
Casestudy:EngagingtheMaoistsinNepal
6. cluss
Fuh g
5
78
13
14
15
18
20
23
28
29
31
35
38
Contents
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Engaging with armed groups
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Engaging witharmed groupsDilemmas & options for mediators
iu
As mediators consider engagement with armed groups they
ace a variety o challenges and options including whether it is
wise to engage at all. This contribution to the Mediation Practice
Series addresses engagement by those working toward peace
processes which involve ormal interaction between leaders.
The ocus is on the dilemmas, challenges and risks involved in a
mediators early contacts with an armed group and subsequent
engagement as interlocutor, message-carrier, adviser and/or
acilitator all roles that may precede and accompany ormal
negotiation between parties to a conict.1
The armed groups considered are those whose rebellion orresistance explicitly challenges the authority o the state, rather
than the ull spectrum o non-state armed groups (which would
include criminal organisations and gangs, as well as paramilitary
actors accountable to the state). The ormer claim their violence
is rooted in legitimate sel-deence against the inringement o
their rights. Political in its origin i at times criminal in its conduct
armed action is pursued as a means to a political end. While
military pressure, or other actions by security orces, may be
1
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necessary to counter it, in almost all cases a lasting resolution to
the conict will depend on some orm o political accommodation
or agreement.
Even within this defnition, armed groups are characterised by
their great diversity as well as the varied degree o threat which
they represent to the state. Rebel orces organised as an army
and capable o holding territory (the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army or the Peoples Liberation Army in Nepal) are distinct rom
broad political-military resistance movements such as Hamas and
Hezbollah (the ormer, o course, has controlled Gaza since it wonelections in 2006). Dierent again are smaller groups, such as the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), or the Basque separatist group ETA,
organised in cell structures to acilitate the planning o targeted
acts o violence but with links to political surrogates ; the broad
range o ethnic-based armed groups in Arica and Asia struggling
to assert control over populations, territory and/or resources ; or
interlinked groups such as Islamist militants active in Somalia and
Yemen, Aghanistan and Pakistan, in some instances with ties to
the international network o Al Qda.
Such diversity accentuates the need to be wary o over-
simplifcation or o relying too easily on general principles. With
this in mind, the ollowing fve sections address the arguments
or engagement with armed groups. They consider the question
o who should engage, the challenges and risks involved, and
the options available to mediators, beore oering some brie
conclusions. All acknowledge that the issue o engaging with a
specifc group will almost certainly turn on the particularities o
that group, the nature o its insurgency and the context in which
it operates.2
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Engaging with armed groups
7
Why gg ?
Mediators considering involvement in eorts to prevent, resolve
or mitigate the worst eects o armed conict must frst consider
whether to engage with a particular armed group and, i so, how
to do it eectively.
The intense period o peacemaking that accompanied the
unravelling o the Cold War was characterised by mediators
open engagement with non-state armed groups. Engagement
was acilitated by several actors : the relative coherence o thegroups and entities that had emerged to contest the Cold Wars
proxy conicts ; patterns o state sponsorship which ensured
that outside powers retained access and leverage over insurgent
orces ; a broad acceptance that it was the prerogative o
the UN Secretary-General or other
peacemakers to establish contact with
groups ormerly considered pariahs
but now acknowledged as potential
partners or peace ; and the relativeneglect o issues o accountability
which acilitated peace processes
even with actors such as the Khmer
Rouge. An additional actor enabling
engagement was the marked decline,
ater 1990, in opposition to intervention rooted in the rhetorical
deense o sovereignty. This was a consequence both o the loss
o such oppositions Soviet sponsor and the act that China and
other states sensitive on this issue were less vocal in this period
than either beore, or ater.
AlQdasattacksontheUnitedStatesinSeptember2001com -
plicated the environment or peacemaking. Individual states and
multilateral organisations dramatically increased their propensity
to label or legally proscribe armed groups as terrorist organi-
sations. States directly challenged by armed groups drew on
international condemnation o terrorism to boost the legitimacy
2
I cannot think o an armed
group with which I would
not engage with in principle,
although many in practice.
Martin Griths,
Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue
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The FMLN andthe UN in El SalvadorIn November 1989 the largest oensive o the civil war betweenthe broadly Marxist-Leninist Farabundo Mart National Libera-tion Front (FMLN) and the Government o El Salvador revealeda military stalemate that orced the parties into UN-mediatednegotiations. Tese were acilitated by earlier contacts the UN had
established with the FMLN through a highly capable individualwho represented the organisation on human rights issues. Heencouraged discussion with FMLN commanders in the margins oa meeting o the non-aligned movement held in Harare in 1988. Inurther consultations UN ocials oered assurances to the FMLNo the Secretary-Generals impartiality as a mediator, and distinc-tion rom the UN Security Council.
Te United States did not question the UNs contacts with theFMLN but subsequently raised concern that the mediator, Alvarode Soto, was partial to it. He countered by encouraging the US tomeet with the FMLN itsel. In time it did. A US Congressman andthe US Ambassador travelled to a guerrilla camp within El Salva-dor beore the conicts end, and the US Ambassador to the UNquietly attended a meeting with the FMLNs General Commandduring the nal stages o negotiations held in New York in late1991. Te US put important pressure on the Salvadoran Govern-
ment to accept the peace agreement and became a rm supportero its implementation.
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Engaging with armed groups
9
o their eorts to quash them. The question o engagement grew
more controversial, even as globalisation and a ready access to
the media ensured that, at an operational level, armed groups and
their representatives have never been easier to fnd or contact.
Arguments or engagement today are rooted in principle and
pragmatism. They can be broadly summarised as ollows :
Thepersistenceofarmedconictandabeliefthatggg
m gups s h p ms bg
, not least because military options against insurgentson their own rarely succeed in creating conditions that will
oster sustainable peace.3 Despite an overall trend toward a
reduction o violence since the end o the Cold War, there
were 36 active armed conicts in 2009, all o them involving
the state and one or more non-state armed groups a rise o
nearly one quarter since the early 2000s.4
The imperative top ll ppuls m -
ug vl. Even in circumstances in which engagementmay not lead to a resolution, it can address human rights and
other humanitarian concerns, secure a presence in a conict
zone to monitor humanitarian conditions, and save lives.
Theneedtoensure thatthosearmedactors (or theirrepre-
sentatives) who have had primary roles in pursuing the conict
and have the capacity to reach or undermine agreements
that will acilitate its end, are included in processes towards
peace and are present at the peace table. Armed groups may
represent sizeable constituencies ; when they have grievances,
and the ability to sustain armed action, they will have the ability
to spl y slm m whh hy l u.
Anopportunitytodevelop hl mmu to
an armed group. This has various benefts, even in circums-
tances in which a peace process seems remote. A channel
may prove useul to deuse a crisis or emergency, or address
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You can talk to terrorists,
but you dont have to agree
with them.Jonathan Powell, ormer Chie o Sta
to UK Prime Minister ony Blair
an issue such as a kidnapping, with discretion. I maintained
by a third party rather than a government it also oers the
possibility o deniability. Over time such a channel might be
activated or the pre-negotiation o terms or meetings between
the parties.
Ameans to acquireg usg o the armed
group and its motives and capacities or engagement. Greater
understanding will provide the basis or analysis o the
challenges and risks specifc to engagement with each
particular group. It may also allow the mediator to identiy thegroups interests as opposed to its public platorms and thus
the issues on which the group and government might fnd
common ground.
Theopportunity bul us with the armed group. The
mediator may be able to encourage the group to reect on
entrenched positions and/or prevent its immersion in a logic
that is a consequence o its isolation and pursuit o armed
struggle. Such trust may allow themediator to build an armed groups
py g, both in
advance o, and in parallel to, peace
talks something that even govern-
ments will admit can contribute to the
quality o any resulting agreement.
Yet engagement is not easy. There may be no such thing as a
bad conversation, as was observed within a 2009 workshop held
at theU.S. Institute ofPeaceonthe subjectofmediationwith
proscribed groups.5 However, any conversation with an armed
group is laden with implications. Reasons gg there-
ore cannot be dismissed lightly.6 Dierent potential mediators will
have dierent legal and political red lines, but the most common
arguments against engagement revolve around the ollowing :
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Engaging with armed groups
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That m ggm wll hv mp upon the
behaviour o a group that is bent on violence and determined
to maintain positions o implacable hostility to its enemies. This
is a proposition that requires serious consideration. However,
engagement need not constitute appeasement. There is no
need to agree with an armed group and there are other benefts
to be gained rom exploratory contacts.
Thatanyformofggm wh hs wh us vl
hllg s pw sks sghg hm
wll h h lgmy with their own constituentsand on the international stage. This line o thinking received
reinforcementinaJune2010rulingoftheU.S.SupremeCourt
which upheld the constitutionality o a ederal law that makes
it a crime to provide material support defned to include
expert advice or assistance, training and services and
embracing the advocacy or human rights or peace to those
identifed as oreign terrorist groups.7
Conversely,thatm gvms my hpps h ggm wh m gups,
whether through proxies or directly. It is difcult or govern-
ments to justiy talks with those who are killing their citizens.
It is also embarrassing, or worse, i the existence o talks
emerges ater a government has denied them. A government
will not want to be perceived to be rewarding an armed group
or its past violence, or give it perverse incentives or carrying
on killing.
Thatw s b slu. A number o governments
have drawn encouragement rom what has been termed the
Sri Lanka option : a tough military response, the reusal to
countenance a political solution, and instead a conscious
decision to wage war to destroy an armed group. As the
International Crisis Group has argued, the model sets a
dangerous precedent, not only or its violation o the most
basic laws o war, but also or its ailure to address most
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drivers o Sri Lankas conict, and its contribution to new
sources o resentment.8
Thatsome armedgroups such as theLordsResistance
Army (LRA) inUganda, orDemocratic Liberation Forces of
Rwanda (FDLR) in the eastern Democratic Republic o Congo
(DRC) disregard human rights and employ practices against
civilian populations which mediators may fnd busv
u. However, there are many conicts in which
state actors are also culpable o human rights violations (as
was clearly the case in Sri Lanka), and curbing, or halting,such practices must be the priority. For a mediator, it is pro-
bably neither possible nor useul to quantiy acceptable or
unacceptable levels o violations that might open the way
to, or preclude, engagement.
Thatarmedgroupsfactorinthepossibilityofinternationalen-
gagement and may either s m sll
mvg ws w p accordingly. Frequently
cited examples o this include the Kosovo Liberation Army in1998-1999 and rebel movements in Darur whose attitudes to
the 2006 negotiations in Abuja (and in some instances since
then) were arguably conditioned by their varying expectations
o the benefts that could accrue to them rom international
engagement.
Third parties who advocate engagement with rebel and resistance
groups do so on the basis that the risks arising rom engaging
armed groups are outweighed by the prospects o achieving
an end to the armed conict. Their engagement is nevertheless
predicated on a number o dierent assumptions. Some most
critically that the armed group has an interest in a substantive
exchange with an external actor will be quickly tested. The
validity o others that the armed group will actually negotiate
(that is, articulate demands that lend themselves to rational,
or at least reasoned, debate) ; or that the armed group can be
encouraged to moderate its behaviour and demands, and through
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Dilemmas otalking to the TalibanBy mid-2010, talking about talking to the aliban had becomecommonplace as doubts about the success o US-led counter-insurgency eorts mounted. But dierences regarding what shouldbe talked about, who should do the talking, how it should relate tothe military logic o international engagement in Aghanistan and abroader process o regional reconciliation, remained rie. Since late2001, when the aliban were driven rom power and established asae-haven in Pakistan, they had neither been engaged in ormalpolitical terms nor developed a coherent set o political demands.
Yet individual contacts rom the Aghan Government and by othersincluding representatives o Saudi Arabia, the UN, the ICRC andNGOs (in addition to Pakistan) had multiplied.
Challenges to the initiation o a political process stem rom a lacko consensus on its objective. Persistent corruption continues to bea source o conict. Distrust and dierences on policy are presentwithin, and between, the Aghan Government, the aliban, the
United States, and critical regional actors such as Pakistan, India,Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Issues that divide them include :opposition to engagement with the aliban by non-PashtunAghans ; a combination o intensied military pressure rom theUS and wavering support o its NAO allies, aecting the alibanscalculations o when to engage and how seriously ; the continuingpresence o aliban leaders on the UN sanctions list ; Pakistansrole ; and the whole question o pre-conditions. Te aliban wantsanctions lists lifed, prisoners released and Western troops out ;
the US and Saudi Arabia insist that the aliban should break all tiesto Al Qda. Tese issues could conceivably be addressed withinnegotiations, but not in advance o them.
Te situation calls or a graduated approach to sustained engage-ment with the aliban and other insurgent groups, i not by theUS then by others trusted by the US, the Aghan Government andthe aliban. In the absence o clarity on a desired end state orAghanistan (or the process to reach it) more limited goals could
include improved understanding o the aliban and deepeningengagement on humanitarian issues.
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international exposure as well as expertise become more
amenable to pursuing its goals by peaceul means will only be
ascertained in the course o an engagement.9
The complexity o these issues demands a clear-eyed assessment
o the mediators own capacity and comparative advantages ;
careul analysis o the armed group (including its motives in con-
templating engagement with an external actor) ; the challenges
and risks involved in engaging it ; and a detailed understanding
o the varied options to do so. As Aghanistan demonstrates, the
options beore a potential mediator may be limited.
eggm by whm ?
The United Nations, regional organisations, individual states
and private mediators engage with rebel and resistance groups
with dierent capacities, visibility and leverage.10 Their work may
complement the channels that governments themselves maintain
to armed groups they publicly hold to be pariahs (as was the case
oftheUKGovernmentandtheIRA).Inothercaseseithernosuch
channels exist, or domestic political sensitivities regarding talking
to terrorists prohibit their utilisation or substantive or sustained
engagement. In these cases, third party intermediaries will be
required to establish contact between two or more parties and
help explore whether conditions or a negotiation exist.
The asymmetry o conict involving a government and one omore non-state armed groups as well as a state-centric inter-
national system have an impact on questions o which mediators
may be best placed to engage with amed groups. This is parti-
cularly evident in the early stages o a process. The prolieration
o terrorist lists maintained by individual states and multilateral
organisations represents one set o constraints or engagement
(this is not to deny positive impacts in some cases, including
the pressure under which armed groups have been placed
3
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Private mediatorsand the GAM in AcehTe HD Centres involvement in Aceh dated back to late 1999 andits early ocus on the prevention o humanitarian crises in theprovince. It conducted initial meetings with representatives othe Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Malaysia and Sweden, whileconsulting key stakeholders in Jakarta and Aceh. Te GAM was
reluctant to meet ace-to-ace with representatives o the Govern-ment o Indonesia, but a rst meeting eventually took place inearly 2000 (Te GAM was assured by the HD Centre that it wasnot ormally talking to the Government, but just discussinghumanitarian issues). Te ensuing negotiations broke down vemonths afer the signing o a Cessation o Hostilities Agreement(COHA) in December 2002, but had contributed to substantiveshifs on the part o the GAM. Perhaps none was more signicantthan the GAMs recognition o the Government o Indonesia and
acceptance that autonomy could be implemented in the COHA.
Te GAM had welcomed the legitimacy which internationalinvolvement in its peace process, through the HD Centre, oered(even as the Indonesian Government had accepted the HD Centreonly because its private status minimised the same legitimacy).However, it never hid its interest in a more high prole acili-tator. Te second engagement on Aceh was given impetus bothby Indonesias rst direct elections or president in 2004, andthe devastating tsunami that struck that December. Facilitatedby Martti Ahtisaari and the Crisis Management Initiative, talksheld in Helsinki began in early 2005. Te GAM welcomed bothAhtisaari, as a ormer President o Finland, and the access to theEuropean Union he brought to the process. Upon Ahtisaarisrecommendation, it also accepted capacity-building romSwitzerland. In these circumstances, the GAM dropped itsdemand or Acehnese independence, perhaps the critical element
in allowing a peace agreement to be concluded in August 2005.
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to abandon the military struggle). The lists impose no uniorm
limit on contacts with listed groups or individuals. However, as
isdiscussedbelow,UScitizensorthosewhocomeunderUS
jurisdiction (including non-US nationals)may beprosecuted if
they provide unds or other material support which can be
construed to include mediation to
groupsidentiedbytheUSGovern -
ment as terrorist. Meanwhile, even
those mediators who do not ear
prosecution may fnd the question
o their engagement with an armedgroup inhibited by the existence
and incoherence o the proscription
regimes.11
States, and multilateral bodies com-
posed o states, have a bias towards
power and in-built sympathies towards
other states that long pre-date the
existence o terrorist lists. They tendto assume that use o orce by a non-
state actor is illegitimate (particularly
i, like India or Russia, they have active
conicts within their borders). They will
understand that many governments
will reuse to engage directly with
insurgent groups unless the latter frst agree either to abandon
the armed struggle, or at least to a cessation o hostilities.
Non-state armed actors, meanwhile, struggle to gain access to
the ora in which their conicts will be discussed (such as the
UN Security Council) and differwidely in their familiarity with
the norms and practices o international diplomacy.
As a variety o mediators may be involved in a given peace
process over a number o years, this places emphasis on
the importance o sequencing. Dierent mediators will have
dierent advantages at dierent stages o a peace process.
Dierent kinds o
mediation suggest dierent
kinds o institutions ;
some require the resourcesand leverage that only
governments or multi-
lateral institutions
can bring to bear, while
in others powerlessness
can be an asset, a basis
or condence and trust
building.Nicholas Haysom, Executive Oce o the
UN Secretary-General
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Engaging with armed groups
17
Similarly, questions o precedent and concerns about terrorism
carry widely diering weight in dierent political contexts.
U ns : The UN Secretary-General and Security
Council have dierent roles and responsibilities with regard to
peacemaking.TheUNSecretary-Generalengagesinmedia -
tion and good ofces whose legitimacy and impartiality are
rootedintheUNCharter.Thesecharacteristicscontributeto
thefactthatUNmediationremainsattractivetomanyarmed
groups (others will question a Secretary-Generals ability to
act independently o powerul states on the Security Council).State actors may shy away from the UN out of concern
or issues o sovereignty and/or the difculties inherent in
involvingtheUNinacondentialprocess.Inacasesuchas
Nepal,however,discreetpoliticalworkenabledUNofcialsto
engage early with an insurgent group. In other circumstances,
such as the eastern Democratic Republic o Congo, they have
been called upon to acilitate complex talks between states
and a variety o armed groups.
rgl gss : Regional and sub-regional orga-
nisations have the advantages o proximity to the conict as
well as knowledge o, and sometimes leverage over, conict
parties. However, their engagements may be subject to pressure
rom their larger member states ; limited by issues o mandate
and/or capacity ; or distorted by the sponsorship o some
armed groups by one, or more, o
their members (sponsorship o an
armed group by a neighbouring
state is all too common and can
render that group a tool o the
oreign policy o its patron, and
thus a orce or regional, as well as
local, instability).
States, and multilateral
bodies composed o states,
have a bias towards
power and sympathies
towards other states that
pre-date the existence o
terrorist lists.
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ivul ss :IndividualstatemediatorsfromtheUnited
States to prominent regional actors such as Nigeria, South
Arica, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
Qatar are able to wield relative power and inuence over
conict parties. However, their own interests in a conicts
outcome, or concerns with the issue o terrorism, may inhibit
their engagement with armed groups. In Europe, peacemaking
has ourished in two states Norway and Switzerland that
arenotmembersoftheEuropeanUnionandarethereforenot
conditioned by its listing o terrorist entities.
Pv ms : Independent international mediators
include both private organisations and prestigious individuals.
Although weak mediators, to the extent that they have to
borrow leverage rom others, private mediators engage with
armed groups with particular advantages. They are small,
exible and independent, and can engage early (and with
discretion) with groups others might consider pariahs, or not
yet meriting attention. Their involvement is inherently less threa-
tening to a government than that o an ofcial actor, and carrieswith it the important attribute o deniability. However, they can
also be dismissed rom a process with no great political cost
and will need to link up to ofcial actors as mediation advances.
iyg hllgs sks
For a mediator or acilitator decisions regarding whether, and how,to engage will be rooted in detailed analysis o the armed group as
well as the broader context within which it is active. Is the struggle
to take part in (or take over) the national government, secession,
or or control o territory and resources within existing borders ? Is
the composition o the group determined by ethnicity, or in religious
terms ? To what extent are structures o command and control
identifable and accessible ? (In some cases, as in Aceh, this may
involve relations between feld commanders and a more distant,
4
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Engaging with armed groups
19
perhaps even exiled, leadership). Does the mediator understand
a groups constituency and support base, the role played by
women within the armed group, and its economic sustenance and/
or interaction with the diaspora ? (This is a critical issue in contexts
as diverse as Somalia and Sri Lanka). What are the groups
relations to other actors (sustainers and spoilers) active inside the
conict system and beyond it ? Is there an outside state or states
supporting/controlling the armed group ? Particular attention will
need to be paid to the strategic choices the group may be acing.
Where does armed action ft in to a groups broader goals ? What
calculations will be involved in abandoning the military aspects oits struggle ? What costs will it incur by engaging in talks ?
Among the numerous issues that are likely to present themselves
as hllgs, the ollowing stand out :
ilus s-mkg : A mediators task will
be greatly acilitated i his or her prospective interlocutor is an
eective armed group, with good command and control and
clear procedures o political decision-making (as the FMLN inEl Salvador) or a charismatic leader with recognised authority
(such as John Garang o the Sudanese Peoples Liberation
Army, or indeed Gerry Adams o Sinn Fein). However, this
will requently not be the case. A
mediator should thereore consider
i he or she is able to develop an
understanding o decision-making
processes within the armed group
and the extent to which interlocu-
tors are legitimate representatives
o its leadership. Do those at the
negotiating table have authority, or at least report directly
to those who do ? (This was a concern regarding the Lords
Resistance Army team present at the negotiations in Juba,
or example).
Do those at the negotiation
table have authority, or at
least report directly to whosewho do ?
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20
Coping with pre-conditions on HamasHamas decision to take part in legislative elections or the Pales-tinian Authority in early 2006 represented a historic shif as wellas an end to its suicide bombing campaign. Its victory took theWest by surprise and initiated a period o economic and politicalisolation intensied by Israels blockade o the Gaza strip aferthe collapse o the unity Government in June 2007 that has haddisastrous economic and humanitarian consequences and jeopar-dised eorts towards peace.
Te Quartet o the European Union, Russia, the UN and the USconditioned uture assistance to a Palestinian Government uponthat Governments commitment to the principles o nonviolence,recognition o Israel, and acceptance o previous agreements andobligations.12 Tese conditions were unacceptable to Hamas. TeQuartet introduced no explicit pre-conditions on contacts withHamas (and Russia has always maintained them), but both theUS and the EU list Hamas as a terrorist group. While the EU list
does not proscribe contacts (only unding), afer Hamas electoralvictory in 2006 the European Council took the political decisionto isolate Hamas urther by cutting contact with it. In deerenceto pressure rom the US, and in stark contrast to a traditionaldisposition to engage with any party deemed necessary or peace,the UN Secretary-General restricted political contact by the UNSpecial Coordinator or the Middle East Peace Process with Hamas.However, contact was allowed at the working level.
Since 2006, engagement with Hamas has remained in limbo.Te Quartet position and that o the United States within it is unchanged (and Hamas is still there). A variety o mediatorsand/or would be mediators rom the West including Norwayand Switzerland, ormer diplomats and NGOs have pursuedcontact and opened channels to Hamas leadership in Gaza andDamascus. Regional mediators, including both urkey and Egypt,remain involved. Yet while the red lines o the major internationalplayers still hold, and without eective channels back to the
United States and/or Israel, orward movement remains a distantprospect.
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Engaging with armed groups
21
Fgm : Fragmented groups, those groups without
a recognised leader or command structure, present obvious
challenges, not least because as in the case o the multiple
rebel movements in Darur one group may claim greater
legitimacy than others and seek to veto participation.
Fragmentation complicates the issue o regular access by
the mediator as well as decision-making, and can invalidate
theprospectofaceasere.Unsuccessfulattemptstounify
the groups in Darur point to a need or alternative processes
(such as the 2010 initiative to engage civil society) and
a unifcation eort that combines support rom a major powerwith detailed contextual knowledge o the various move-
ments internal dynamics.
S us : Deciding when, and where, to inorm
a government o early engagement with an armed group within
its territory will be a delicate matter (except in circumstances,
suchas theUNfound inColombia from19992002,when
engagement with rebel groups is directly solicited by the
Government). Are there other states (neighbours or regionalpowers) whose consent or support or engagement will be
required ? (As Norway secured rom India during its involvement
in Sri Lanka). I so, at what point to inorm them and how ?
In cases with a particularly weak state actor such as the
Transitional Federal Government in Somalia concerns about
its ragility impact directly upon decisions regarding whether to
engage with the armed resistance (Al Shabaab in this instance).
Gg us : Winning the trust o an armed group may be
a slow and difcult process, but is an essential element o a
third partys involvement. Broad cultural and/or religious di-
erences between the mediator and the armed group may
constitute particular challenges. Anti-terrorist rhetoric, the per-
ceived hostility o the West toward Islam, the invasion o Iraq
and continuing conict in the Middle East all, or example,
may hinder engagement with Islamist groups by Western
mediators conditioned or perceived to be conditioned - by a
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22
secular and internationalist approach. (The peace jirga held in
Aghanistan in June 2010 concluded with a call or help rom
Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey).
P-s : Rigid pre-conditions may not be an obstacle
in the early phases o engagement (pre-negotiation), but will
become so as parties move into talks about talks. Frequently
such conditions whether they are or an end to violence,
a ceasefre, recognition o an occupying power, or the
renouncing o secessionist goals touch upon either the
armed groups primary source o leverage upon the process(its arms), or the core issue in contention. It should not surprise
a potential mediator, or the armed groups adversary, that the
group in question will not be prepared to concede such issues
at the beginning o a process.
abs l ls g : A lack o clarity
on what is wanted rom a political process by the armed group,
or the reiteration o maximalist but impossible goals (such as
Al Qdas demands or the establishment o a new caliphate)both present obstacles to negotiations. Such obstacles need
not necessarily preclude other orms
o engagement that might help shit
an armed groups positions, or reach
out to afliates o the group in ques-
tion with more localised concerns
(such as Al Shabaab). However, in
practice, the perception that there is
nothing to talk about with an armed
group represents one o the most
requent deterrents to engagement.
cmp : The presence, or interest, o other potential
mediators can complicate engagement with an armed group
and overcrowd the mediation. In some cases such as Darur
at dierent moments it has not been just the rebels who do
the orum shopping. There have been external actors, some
You can negotiate
with someone who has a
political agenda. Te LRA
does not have one.Salva Kiir, First-Vice President o Sudan,
President o the Government o Southern
Sudan13
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23
The ICC and theLRA in confict at the
peace tableFor many years the international community neglected the conictbetween the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), led by the enigmaticJoseph Kony, and the Government o Uganda with devastatingconsequences or the people o Northern Uganda. Peacemakingwas pursued by the Ugandan politician Betty Bigombe, whoreceived discreet support rom the UN and a number o states. Hereorts ended in early 2005. By then, at the request o the Ugandan
Government, the International Criminal Court had initiated aninvestigation into the situation. In July 2005, ICC judges issuedsealed warrants or the arrest o Kony and our LRA commanders.Tey were unveiled in October that year.
A new peace process began in mid-2006 in Juba, at the instigationo the Government o Southern Sudan, acilitated by its Vice-President, Riek Machar, and actively supported by UN envoy,
ormer President Joachim Chissano o Mozambique. Tis processrepresented a conrontation between two dierent orms oengagement with an armed group : one driven by peace and theother by justice. Te parties reached agreement on the text o acomprehensive peace agreement, but the ICC arrest warrants hungheavily over them as Kony, and the other indicted commanders,reused to attend ormal talks in Juba. Te LRA was insteadrepresented by exiled Acholi in the diaspora and others whoseability to speak or Kony was never ully validated.
Konys reusal to sign the peace agreement ended the process.Te experience demonstrated the challenges o a peace processin which personal incentives cannot be oered. Te agreementproposed Ugandan criminal justice processes as an alternativeto the ICC. However, with Konys rejection o the deal andrenewed military activity by the LRA, regional and internationalactors increasingly saw the LRA not as a legitimate political orce,but as an armed band led by war criminals. In his nal brieng
to the Security Council in mid-2009, Chissano recommended atwo-pronged strategy involving military action against the LRAas well as negotiations.
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perceived as hostile, pursuing engagement with rebels in ways
that have suggested that they have been shopping too
(as some rebel groups have complained). Coordination o the
various third parties may be possible. I not, hard choices
regarding how to develop complementary roles, or even
whether to persist in a mediation eort, may have to be taken.
Mgg fly : Confdentiality is oten a condi-
tion or engagement with an armed group or reasons o both
security and political sensitivity, particularly in the early stages
o a process. A government may also be reluctant to have itknown that it has opened a channel to an armed group or that
it has involved an external actor to do so. (Both were the case
during the HD Centres acilitation o talks between the
Spanish Government and ETA between 2005 and 2007,
details o which the parties subsequently leaked to the press).
Maintaining confdentiality can be a challenge but moving into
a public process can be difcult too, especially in situations
in which a governments contacts with an armed group are
contested by its political opposition and/or public opinion.
Quss lus : Mediators may fnd an armed group
reluctant to countenance the involvement o others it ears may
dilute its inuence. The presence o a wide array o civil society
and other stakeholders in negotiations is rarely practical, but
a mediator can encourage a group to consider other orms
o consultation. The mediator can also undertake them him
or hersel i the parties are unable to do so. Gender may be
a particular challenge, not least because the great majority o
leaders o armed groups are men. As trust is built, the mediator
can inquire about the role o women and emphasise the
importance o addressing gender issues in a peace process.
aubly : New demands or accountability or non-
state actors as well as state representatives - derive rom the
evolution o the international legal ramework since the end
o the Cold War. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and
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Engaging with armed groups
25
anumberofadhoctribunalshavebeenestablished.TheUN
Secretary-GeneralintroducedguidelinesforUNmediatorsthat
rule out their encouragement, or endorsement, o agreements
that provide amnesties or those guilty o war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide and gross human rights violations.14
Otherinstitutions,suchastheEU,havealsogenerallyfollowed
a policy o shunning amnesty or serious international crimes,
in line with ICC obligations. These developments represent
normative progress towards peace and justice, but, with
amnesty a critical bargaining chip, they bring added respon-
sibilities and challenges to those mediating between armedactors responsible or human rights abuses and atrocities.
Engagement also involves at least fve areas o real sk. Two relate
to impacts on the armed group : the risk o its legitimation, and the
unoreseen operational impacts that engagement may trigger.
A urther three involve possible consequences or the mediator
or mediating organisation. Security is an obvious risk, but legal
liability is now another. The third is the more nebulous question
o partiality, which can have consequences or the mediatorscontinuing engagement in a particular conict and, more generally,
or the proessional reputation o his or her organisation.
Lgmy : The act that engagement with an armed group
involves a degree o recognition that the group is a valid
interlocutor is perhaps the primary political objection raised
by many governments. Yet the only recognition explicitly
given by a mediator is that the armed group is responsible
or violence and ending violence thereore means engaging
with it. The sensitivity o legitimising
an armed group has been inated
by the war on terror and its atten-
dant proscription regimes. Even in
this environment, dierent media-
tors may be able to engage with
dierent levels o visibility and
resonance (a ormal representative
Te sensitivity o legitimising
an armed group has been
infated by the war on terror
and its attendant proscription
regimes.
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oftheUNSecretary-GeneralorSpecialEnvoyoftheUnited
States has dierent connotations than a diplomat rom a small
state,morejuniorUNofcialorarepresentativeofanNGO).
More regular engagement with a wide variety o armed groups
would help shit the argument away rom the question o tal-
king to terrorists to the more substantive issue o what it will
be possible to talk to them about.
Us mps : Mediators embark on engagement
with armed groups with large gaps in their knowledge o
them and no control over a wide range o variables that mayimpact upon their behaviour. It is thereore not surprising that,
on occasion, their engagement has unoreseen and undesirable
impacts (o course, in other instances unoreseen impacts
including encouraging greater exibility on the part o the
armed group than was expected may also be desirable).
These may involve contribution to a spike in violence as rebel
groups seek to increase military leverage over the political
process. They also could include provocation o internal debates
that reinorce hardliners, contributing to the splintering ogroups, and/or acilitating a process that advances little in
political terms but provides cover or the group to re-arm and
re-position itsel or a new military oensive.
Suy : Mediators interested in engaging with armed groups
involved in hot phases o armed conict, or living clandestinely,
are initiating an activity with obvious security risks both or
themselves and their interlocutors. Dierent organisations will
have dierent security protocols and conditions, but will need
to calculate what constitutes an acceptable level o risk or
their sta, as well as the responsibility they may be assuming
or the travel and security o their interlocutors. Crossing inter-
national borders presents obvious challenges with regard to
visas and border security, and will generally require assistance
rom the states concerned. Threats to non-state groups include
security orces which may not be aware that a confdential
political process is underway or o the movements requiredto acilitate it.
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Engaging with armed groups
27
Lgl ssus : Mediators ace legal risks in two broad areas.
The frst relates to the post 9/11 counter-terrorist legislation
upheldbytheUSSupremeCourtinJune2010.Abroaddeni-
tion o material support (to include expert advice, assistance,
services and personnel) opens up the possibility o prosecution
or a wide range o activities consistent with engagement with
anorganisationdesignatedasterroristbytheUSGovernment,
or with one that the individual concerned knows has engaged,
or still engages, in terrorist activity. The material support statute
isbroadinitsjurisdiction,applyingtoUScitizensandresidents,
but also tonon-US individuals brought intoor found in theUnitedStatesafteranoffenseoccurs.15 A related issue is that,
through engaging with armed groups, mediators are oten
dealing with actors who have been
involved in major crimes. It is logical
that prosecutors (including the ICC)
may one day try to subpna
mediators. Mediators may be asked
to testiy, or to provide various kinds
o inormation in relation to thearmed group (such as cell phone
numbers, structure and hierarchy).
Alternatively, deense counsel might
ask or inormation i a member o
the armed group is charged and
the mediator is deemed likely to
have inormation relevant to the
case. In neither circumstance have
mediators so ar aced legal consequences, but with nothing in
the law to provide protection, the vulnerability is real.16 Looking
ahead, there may be grounds or arguing that mediators, like
lawyers, might rely on the privileged nature o their conversa-
tions with armed groups as a bar to a subpoena or demand
or disclosure.
Ply : Mediators who work to develop the trust o armed
groups risk being perceived as, or actually becoming, partial totheir cause. This is in part a structural issue, in that mediators
Mediators interested in
engaging with armed
groups involved in hot
phases o armed confict,or living clandestinely, are
initiating an activity with
obvious security risks,
both or themselves and
their interlocutors.
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28
Norway and the LTTEAs acilitator o the peace process between the Government oSri Lanka and the Liberation igers o amil Eelam (LE), theGovernment o Norway struggled to counter the asymmetrybetween the parties. Te violence o the methods pursued by theLE, in particular their mastery o suicide bombing and assassi-nation o prominent political gures, led them to be excoriated bythe international community as well as by the Sinhala-dominatedSri Lankan Government. Tey were also included on the US list
o oreign terrorist organisations rom 1997.
Many hours spent with the LE by Norways special envoy, ErikSolheim, built their trust in Norway. A ceasere was agreed in 2002.However, as progress stalled rom mid-2003, the Norwegians cameunder increasing criticism or what was perceived as their partialitytoward the igers. Over time they lost the condence o the SriLankan Government. Norway regretted that other internationalactors were reluctant to engage with the LE because o the oppor-
tunity lost to develop mutual understanding. It argued against theEUs listing o the LE as a terrorist group in 2006 on the groundsthat it would damage the peace process (EU monitors within themission established to monitor the ceasere were withdrawn romthe country afer the LE indicated that it no longer consideredthem to be neutral).
Overall, the proscription o the LE had mixed eects. Te post9/11 climate had arguably helped bring the igers to the table ; italso drew attention to their oreign unding, allowing space ormoderate diaspora amils to engage in a helpul ashion. However,it complicated the involvement o a Co-Chair group o donors (theEuropean Union, Japan, Norway and the United States) which wasestablished in 2003. Despite Norways eorts, the other membersbias against a conict party they primarily identied as terroristproved counter-productive (a notable example was the exclusiono the LE rom a donor conerence held in Washington 2003)
and uelled dierences between them.
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Engaging with armed groups
29
who assume the role o a channel to the armed group are
likely to develop a nuanced understanding o its grievances and
demands. They may be called upon to explain them to ofcial
actors who do not engage with the armed groups themselves
and can thereore risk appearing as their spokespersons.
Beyond maintaining scrupulous attention to their own honesty
as a broker and seeking to illustrate to the state party that
they are not partial to the armed groups cause mediators
can encourage other actors to meet with an armed group to
hear rom its representatives directly.
ops
A mediator has a wide variety o options available as he or she
considers engagement. These will vary according to the nature
o the armed group in question, as well as the context within
which it is operating. Some groups have quasi-diplomatic repre-
sentation abroad and are relatively straightorward to contact.
Others operate clandestinely, or only in remote, dangerous and
shiting locations and are much more difcult to engage. In some
caseshumanitarianactors,orUNpeacekeepers,haveoperational
contacts with members o armed groups in ulfllment o their
mandates. However, they may not be in a position to advise,
or acilitate, the development o political engagement in case
it compromises their own work. In other, less internationalised,
contexts a mediator may be working in greater isolation, with
his or her team tightly limited to interaction with group andgovernment representatives.
In most, but not all, cases mediation will involve three distinct
steps. These include establishing a confdential channel to
exchange messages and inormation, and to build trust ;
beginning negotiations, perhaps still in secret talks, and esta-
blishing the idea o compromise in order to allow the parties
to articulate their real, achievable goals ; and a public process
5
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towards a lasting agreement, requently involving an increasingly
broad and complex array o other actors. At dierent moments,
the varied options or engagement will include :
il s : Initial contacts with an armed group take
a wide variety o orms. In some contexts a group may reach
outtoamediatordirectly.(TheUNisapproachedbyarmed
groups with some regularity, requently in circumstances in
which it knows that its involvement would be unacceptable to
the government concerned). In others, external actors have
approached armed actors through intermediaries. These mightinclude local journalists, human rights activists or religious
leaders, as well as political actors or members o civil society
who may have local level contacts with the group concerned.
In some instances, the intermediaries develop into trusted
partners in the mediation, in others the mediator (and inter-
mediary) may fnd a sustained relationship too complex to
maintain. Beyond the contacts themselves, early encounters
with an armed group provide an opportunity or the mediator
and armed group to explore the motivations and capacities othe other. The armed group may be vetting the mediator no
less deliberately than the mediator is trying to build his or her
understanding o the armed group.
Pxs, s ms, k w : In some
contexts it is possible to identiy ormal or inormal proxies
through whom engagement can be pursued. In Northern
Ireland, the British Government had long maintained a conf-
dential channel to the IRA, but engaged in direct negotiations
with Sinn Fein (which also represented the Republican
movementinthetalkschairedbyformerUSSenatorGeorge
Mitchell). This was acilitated by the authority wielded by Sinn
Feins leaders, sympathy or the IRA among the Irish diaspora
andincertainquartersintheUS,andtheBritishGovernments
realisation o the benefts o strengthening Republicanisms
political expression. (It stands in contrast to policies adopted
by the Spanish Government, which banned ETAs political
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31
Engaging
the Maoists in NepalNepals peace process was led and driven by Nepalis, althoughheavily conditioned by the inuence o India. However, it alsoinvolved external actors who oered support to dialogue andnegotiation. Tese included the HD Centre (2000 2006); theUnited Nations, which provided good oces rom 2003, andwhose presence grew in 2005 into an Oce o the UN High Com-missioner or Human Rights and, rom 2007, a special political
mission, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN); theCarter Center (2004 2006); and a Swiss special adviser on peace-building rom mid-2005.
All pursued initial contacts with the Communist Party o Nepal(Maoist) through a Nepali human rights activist and national peaceacilitator. Once trust was established, external actors ound theMaoists open to engagement and eager to learn rom experienceelsewhere. Tey particularly welcomed the early attention rom
the HD Centre and the involvement o the UN or the legitimacythey saw it giving their struggle. External engagement, althoughsubordinate to national initiatives and decision-making, helpedpromote acceptance o dialogue in Nepal. It also prepared the wayor UNMINs assumption o responsibilities or the monitoring oarms and armies, as well as support to the electoral process.
Elections held in April 2008 propelled the Maoists into governmentas the largest party in Nepals new Constituent Assembly. Tis was asurprise or many o the external actors involved (including India)and challenging in legal terms or the United States, which hadincluded the Maoists on its terrorist exclusion list since 2003. TeUS Ambassador was precluded rom direct meetings with Maoists,but was able to secure a waiver that allowed US ocials to meet withMaoists holding public oce. She also took measures to ensure thatthe US did not knowingly provide Maoists with material support.As this could be construed to include tea and coee, breakast
meetings were held at the residence o the Norwegian ambassador.
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surrogateBatasuna,andencourageditsinclusionontheEUs
terrorist list). Other orms o proxy engagement include insider
mediators individuals with the capacity to mediate among
dierent actions within the conict parties or track two
actors, who may meet quietly with delegates or associates
o an armed group in advance o, and in parallel to, a more
ormal process. In some circumstances (Burundi, or example)
extended contacts by NGOs contributed to the decision o
an armed group to engage in a ormal peace process.
cpy-bulg : Negotiations are necessarily high-risk,and their chances o success are improved by a level o sel-
confdence on the part o the parties. This is particularly true
o armed groups, or whom capacity-building and training
can be critical. They need to be comortable with the process
o negotiation, but also have know-
ledge o the issues to be negotiated
(such as cease-fres), and their impli-
cations. Addressing root causes will
almost always have constitutionaldimensions. A mediator or acilitator
can provide texts and materials or
the parties consideration, or bring in
experts on human rights, autonomy
or other issues. However, sustained
capacity-building (through meetings,
workshops, acilitated dialogues and
other methods) is requently best
perormed by other actors and, at
times, in locations other than that o
the conict theatre. In Sri Lanka, or
example, Bergho Peace Support and
Switzerland, working at the request o the Norwegian acilitator,
were both involved in eorts to strengthen the capacity o the
major conict stakeholders. In the Basque Country, the South
Arican lawyer Brian Currin has worked with Batasuna to
encourage its transition to the pursuit o its goals throughpurely political and democratic means.
Negotiations are
necessarily high-risk, and
their chances o success
are improved by a level
o selcondence on the
part o the parties.
Tis is particularly true o
armed groups, or whom
capacity-building and
training can be critical.
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Engaging with armed groups
33
Hum ggm : There are dierences and
tensions, but also similarities and synergies, between political
and humanitarian mediation. Humanitarian mediation can
open doors to armed groups not yet prepared to contemplate
a political process. It can also create common ground on the
basis o universal humanitarian norms (since 2008, or example,
theHDCentre and the UNsOfce for theCoordinationof
Humanitarian Aairs have held a series o workshops or
Darurs opposition movements to address issues such as
sae humanitarian access, the protection o civilians and the
rights o internally displaced persons). In a best case scenario,agreements reached can directly contribute to the alleviation
o suering whilst also building confdence in negotiation as a
means to resolve dierences. However, humanitarian mediation
carries with it inherent risks. These include that humanitarian
principles will be subordinated to political ends, or that an
armed group will embark on a humanitarian process but
either stall on commitments it undertakes within it and/or delay
embarking on political engagement.
Pll m gs : Mediators aspire
to the acilitation and support o negotiations aimed at the
political settlement o armed conict. Such negotiations will be
most eective when a mediator is entrusted with a clear lead o
the mediation process, while the parties, o course, determine
the negotiations substantive outcome. But clearly a mediators
role may vary greatly, according to the trust and confdence he
or she has been able to develop with representatives o the
conict parties in the pre-negotiation phase ; the support sought
by conict party principals ; and his or her own perception o
the best needs o the process. In all cases the parity in status
o the conict parties will be delicate. It will generally be best to
hold talks outside the state in conict, even though the logistics
involved in acilitating the travel and security o representatives
o the rebel group are likely to be demanding.
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th pl -lsg : During 2010 a gradual process
ofreformwithinUNsanctions regimes,aswellasrequests
rom the Aghan Government, contributed to the de-listing
o some ormer Taliban ofcials, and
others associated with the Taliban
and Al Qda, rom the consolidated
sanctions list established in 1999 pur-
suant to Security Council resolution
1267. Looking ahead, more attention
could be given to the use o listing
and de-listing mechanisms as incen-tives to dialogue. This would require a
shit away rom the conception o the
terrorist lists in purely punitive terms
as well as the introduction o practical
steps to improve the transparency o
designation processes. In particular,
clear criteria and procedures or periodic review and de-listing,
that take into account the evolution o conict dynamics and
actors, would need to be developed.17
Pullg u : Among the options or engagement is disen-
gagement pulling out. Inevitably an option o last resort,
a credible threat o withdrawal is nevertheless a source o
considerable leverage (conversely a mediator who will never
leave may undermine the integrity o a mediation process).
Reasons or disengagement might include an overcrowding
o the mediation feld ; the mediators analysis that a process
is taking shape in which his or her continued involvement is
no longer required ; a loss o confdence in the mediator by
one, or more, o the conict parties ; or the mediators own
assessment that the peace process is being used by the
conict parties or purposes other than the pursuit o peace
(or example, re-arming or re-grouping or a new military
oensive). Though disengagement may be difcult, a mediator
should not fnd him or hersel in the position o needing to
sustain a ailing process more badly than the conict partiesthemselves.
More attention could be
given to the use o listing
and de-listing mechanisms
in particular clear
criteria and proceduresor periodic review and
de-listing as incentives
to dialogue.
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Engaging with armed groups
35
6 cluss
There are ew areas o a mediation in which so many variables
come into play as engaging with armed groups. A mediators
willingness and capacity to establish contacts and work with
armed groups will be a question o both art and opportunity.
An ability to do so may be rooted in the identity o the mediator
some will be more aected by concerns regarding engaging
with those perceived or listed as terrorists than others but will
also encompass other elements. These include the unpredictable
and, at times, opaque nature o the armed groups and theircapacity or, and interest in, engaging with external third parties,
as well as the positions and attitudes adopted by the state
actors concerned.
Engagement with armed groups carries with it a variety o
challenges and risks. Yet, when managed careully and responsibly,
its potential benefts ar outweigh the costs o not engaging
and letting the conict take its toll on civilian victims. The variety
o options or engagement militates against a rejection o initialcontacts solely because the maximum demands o a group are
unacceptable. At the point o initial contact what is relevant is not
so much what these end-stage demands might be, but whether
engagement may lead to a substantive exchange on the issues
at hand, opening the door to the possibility o uture peace.
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es
1 A number o the dilemmas, challenges and risks encountered by mediatorswho seek to engage with armed groups also apply to humanitarian actors and
organisations such as Geneva Call (dedicated to engaging non-state armed
groups towards their compliance with the norms o international humanitarian
and human rights law), whose work is not addressed within this publication.
2 This conclusion emerges strongly rom previous publications on this issue,
notably Robert Ricigliano (ed.), Choosing to engage : armed groups and
peace processes , Accord 16 (London : Conciliation Resources, 2005)
3 Interviewed by The Guardian in May 2008, Sir Hugh Orde, then head o the
Police Service in Northern Ireland, commented, I somebody can show me
any terrorism campaign where it has been policed out, Id be happy to read
about it, because I cant think o one. Vikram Dodd, Time to talk to al-Qaida,
senor police chie urges, The Guardian, 30 May, 2008
4 A little over a fth o 2009s armed conicts saw more than one rebel group
challenging the government. Lotte Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, Armed
Conicts, 1946-2009,Journal o Peace Research, 47/4, (2010)
5 Vronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups,
UnitedStatesInstituteforPeace,SpecialReport239,(Washington:2010)
6
See, or example, arguments put orward in John Bew et al., Talking to Ter-rorists : Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, (London :
Hurst and Company, 2009), and Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil : When
to talk to Terrorists, (E-book : Open Road Integrated Media, Brussels : 2010)
7 SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,Ruling77,DocketN08-1498,Holder,
Attorney General, et al. v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., 21 June 2010
8 International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Crisis Group Asia Report
N191,(Brussels:2010)
9 On the question o assumptions see David Petrasek, Armed Groups and
Peace Processes Pondering and Planning Engagement, Background paper,Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue Asian Mediators Retreat, (Geneva : Centre
or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005)
10 The distinct role played by national mediators, and the real challenges and
risks they assume are not addressed within this paper. On this subject see, or
example, Simon Mason, Insider Mediators : Exploring Their Key Role in Inormal
Peace Processes, (Berlin : Bergho Foundation or Peace Support, 2009)
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Engaging with armed groups
37
11 Oliver Wils and Vronique Dudouet, Challenges Facing PeacebuildersEngaging with Listed Groups, (Berlin, Bergho Conict Research and Bergho
Peace Support, 2010) ; Andy Carl, Viewpoint : Ending Civil Wars Just Got
Harder, accessed rom the BBC World Service website, 29 June 2010
12 Quartet Statement, London, 30 January 2006
13 Speaking at the International Peace Institute, New York, 22 September 2010
14UnitedNationsPressRelease,SG/SM/7257,Secretary-GeneralComments
on Guidelines Issued to Envoys, 10 December 1999
15UnitedStatesCode,Title18,2339B,Providingmaterialsupportorresources
to designated oreign terrorist organizations, (d) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
16IntheUnitedStatesthemoreimmediateeffectispolitical;indeedthereare
several examples o individuals who have ailed to receive congressional
confrmation or political appointments because o their prior engagements
with designated terrorists.
17 See Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, on possible
steps to reorm proscription regimes.
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Mediation Practice Series
38
Andy Carl, Viewpoint : Ending Civil Wars Just Got Harder,
accessed rom the BBC World Service website, 29 June 2010
Vronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed
Groups(Washington:UnitedStatesInstituteforPeaceSpecial
Report 239, 2010)
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Ends and Means :
human rights approaches to armed groups (Geneva : International
Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000)
Deborah Mancini-Grioli and Andr Picot,Humanitarian Negotiation :
A handbook or securing access, assistance, and protection
or civilians in armed confict (Geneva : Centre or Humanitarian
Dialogue, 2004)
Gerard McHugh and Manuel Bessier, Humanitarian Negotiations
with Armed Groups : A Manual or Practitioners and Guidelines
on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups (New York :
UnitedNations,OfcefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,
2006)
David Petrasek, Armed Groups and Peace Processes
Pondering and Planning Engagement, Background paper,
Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue Asian Mediators Retreat
(Geneva : Centre or Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005)
Further reading
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Engaging with armed groups
39
Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil : When to talk to Terrorists
(E-book : Open Road Integrated Media, 2010)
Robert Ricigliano, (ed.), Choosing to engage : armed groups and
peace processes, Accord 16 (London : Conciliation Resources,
2005)
Oliver Wils and Vronique Dudouet, Challenges Facing Peace-
builders Engaging with Listed Groups (Berlin : Bergho Conict
Research and Bergho Peace Support, June 2010)
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ts Whfl
HDCentreSeniorAdviserandUnitedNationsliaisoninNewYork;SeniorFellowattheCenteronInternationalCooperation(CIC),NewYorkUniver-
sity ; Member o the Board o Trustees, Conciliation Resources ; Member
o the Advisory Board, Conict Prevention and Peace Forum ; Director o
Conict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science Research Council,
helping UN ofcials access expertise on countries in conict or crisis,
20052008;UNDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,19952000.MsWhiteld
has published extensively on peacemaking and mediation. Her most re-
cent book is Friends Indeed ? The United Nations, Groups o Friends and
the Resolution o Confict,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,2007.
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