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ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS

CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadora: Vera Thorstensen

OS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE

SOLUÇÃO DE CONTROVÉRSIAS:

Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional

Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio 1994 (GATT 1994)

Coordenadora

Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin

Autores

Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira

Carina Costa de Oliveira

Clarita Maia Simon

Daniel Pezzutti Ribeiro Teixeira

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

Frederico Meira

João Henrique Ribeiro Roriz

José Guilherme Moreno Caiado

José Luiz Pimenta Jr.

Lucas da Silva Tasquetto

Marina Pantoja

Vera Kanas

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INTRODUÇÃO

Análise do texto do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio de 1994 (GATT 1994) e da

jurisprudência consolidada pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC

ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMÉRCIO (GATT 1994)

Artigo 1

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Artigo II

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article II

Schedules of Concessions

2.1 (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting

parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the

appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.

(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting

party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on

their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to

the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from

ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such

products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind

imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on

the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be

imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.

(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting

party which are the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive

preferential treatment upon importation into the territory to which the Schedule

relates shall, on their importation into such territory, and subject to the terms,

conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary

customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that

Schedule. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of

any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those

imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly or mandatorily required

to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that

date. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from

maintaining its requirements existing on the date of this Agreement as to the

eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty.

2.2 Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time

on the importation of any product:

(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions

of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect

of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or

produced in whole or in part;

(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions

of Article VI;

(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.

2.3 No contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of

converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for

in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.

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2.4 If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a

monopoly of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule

annexed to this Agreement, such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that

Schedule or as otherwise agreed between the parties which initially negotiated the

concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of

protection provided for in that Schedule. The provisions of this paragraph shall not

limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to domestic producers

permitted by other provisions of this Agreement.

2.5 If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another

contracting party the treatment which the first contracting party believes to have been

contemplated by a concession provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this

Agreement, it shall bring the matter directly to the attention of the other contracting

party. If the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated was that claimed by the first

contracting party, but declares that such treatment cannot be accorded because a court

or other proper authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved cannot be

classified under the tariff laws of such contracting party so as to permit the treatment

contemplated in this Agreement, the two contracting parties, together with any other

contracting parties substantially interested, shall enter promptly into further

negotiations with a view to a compensatory adjustment of the matter.

2.6 (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to

contracting parties members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of

preference in specific duties and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are

expressed in the appropriate currency at the par value accepted or provisionally

recognized by the Fund at the date of this Agreement. Accordingly, in case this par

value is reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International

Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, such specific duties and charges and

margins of preference may be adjusted to take account of such reduction; provided that

the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the contracting parties acting jointly as provided

for in Article XXV) concur that such adjustments will not impair the value of the

concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this Agreement,

due account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for, or urgency of,

such adjustments.

(b) Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a member of the

Fund, as from the date on which such contracting party becomes a member of the Fund

or enters into a special exchange agreement in pursuance of Article XV.

2.7 The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of

this Agreement.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo II

Listas de Concessões

2.1 (a) Cada Parte Contratante concederá às outras Partes Contratantes, em matéria

comercial, tratamento não menos favorável do que o previsto na parte

apropriada da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

(b) Os produtos das Partes Contratantes, ao entrarem no território de outra Parte

Contratante, ficarão isentos dos direitos aduaneiros ordinários que

ultrapassarem os direitos fixados na Parte I da lista das concessões feitas por

esta Parte Contratante, observados os termos, condições ou requisitos

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constantes da mesma lista. Esses produtos também ficarão isentos dos

direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza, exigidos por ocasião da

importação ou que com a mesma se relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos

ou encargos em vigor na data do presente Acordo ou os que, como

consequência direta e obrigatória da legislação vigente no país importador,

na referida data, tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente.

(c) Os produtos enumerados na Parte II da lista relativa a qualquer das Partes

Contratantes, originários de território que, em virtude do Artigo I, goze do

direito de tratamento preferencial no tocante à importação, ao serem

importados, estarão isentos no território correspondente a essa lista, da parte

que exceder dos direitos aduaneiros ordinários fixados na Parte II dessa Lista.

observados os termos, as condições ou requisitos constantes da mesma. Esses

produtos também ficarão isentos dos direitos ou encargos de qualquer

natureza, exigidos por ocasião da importação ou que com a mesma se

relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do

presente Acordo ou os que, como consequência direta e obrigatória da

legislação vigente na referida data, no país importador, tenham de ser

aplicados ulteriormente. Nenhuma disposição do presente Artigo impedirá

que qualquer Parte Contratante mantenha exigências existentes na data do

presente Acordo, quanto às condições de entrada dos produtos sujeitos às

taxas dos direitos preferenciais.

2.2 Nenhuma disposição do presente Artigo impedirá que, uma Parte Contratante, a

qualquer tempo, aplique no tocante à importação de qualquer produto:

(a) encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido, de conformidade como o

disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III, sobre um produto nacional similar ou

uma mercadoria com a qual o produto importado tenha sido fabricado ou

produzido no todo ou em parte;

(b) direitos destinados a contrabalançar ou a compensar o dumping quando,

aplicados de conformidade com o disposto no Artigo VI1;

(c) taxas ou outros encargos que guardem proporção com os custos dos serviços

prestados.

2.3 Nenhuma Parte Contratante modificará seu método de avaliação, para fins aduaneiros,

ou de conversão de moedas, de maneira a diminuir o valor das concessões constantes

da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

2.4 Se uma das partes estabelecer, mantiver ou autorizar, de direito ou de fato, um

monopólio da importação de qualquer produto descrito na lista correspondente, anexa

ao presente Acordo, tal monopólio, ressalvadas as disposições em contrário constantes

dessa lista ou que, de outro modo, tenham sido acordadas entre as partes que

inicialmente negociaram a concessão, não deverá ter por efeito assegurar proteção

média superior àquela que é prevista nessa lista. As disposições do presente parágrafo

não limitarão o recurso das Partes Contratantes a qualquer forma de auxílio aos

produtores nacionais, permitida em outros dispositivos do presente Acordo.

2.5 Quando uma Parte Contratante considerar que um produto não está recebendo de uma

outra Parte Contratante tratamento que a primeira acredita ter sido atribuído por uma

concessão constante da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, poderá levar a

1 A versão original da Lei 313 de 30/07/1948 estabelece erroneamente “... no Artigo IV”.

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questão diretamente à consideração da outra Parte Contratante. Se esta última

concordar em que o tratamento reclamado é o que estava previsto, mas declarar que tal

tratamento não pode ser concedido por haver um tribunal ou outra autoridade

competente decidido que ao produto em questão não pode ser classificado, consoante a

legislação alfandegária respectiva, de modo a permitir o tratamento previsto no

presente Acordo, as duas partes constantes, juntamente com outras interessadas de

modo substancial, iniciarão, o mais depressa possível, novas negociações com o fim de

alcançar um ajuste compensatório.

2.6 (a) Os direitos específicos e encargos incluídos nas listas relativas às Partes

Contratantes que sejam membros do Fundo Monetário Internacional e as

margens de preferência nos direitos específicos e encargos mantidos por

essas Partes Contratantes são representados, nas moedas respectivas, dentro

da paridade aceita ou reconhecida provisoriamente pelo Fundo na data do

presente Acordo. Consequentemente, no caso de ser esse valor for reduzido,

de conformidade com as cláusulas estatutárias do Fundo Monetário

Internacional em mais de vinte por cento, tais direitos específicos e encargos

e as margens de preferência podem ser ajustados de forma a levar em

consideração essa redução; desde que as Partes Contratantes (isto é, as Partes

Contratantes quando em ação conjunta, nos termos do Artigo XXV)

convenham em que esses ajustamentos não importem em diminuir o valor

das concessões constantes da lista respectiva ou de qualquer outra parte desse

Acordo, levados em conta todos os fatores que possam influir quanto à

necessidade ou urgência de tais ajustamentos.

(b) A qualquer Parte Contratante que não seja membro do Fundo, serão

aplicáveis disposições análogas a partir da data em que a mesma passe a ser

membro do Fundo ou conclua um acordo especial de câmbio, na

conformidade do que dispõe o Artigo XV.

2.7 As listas anexas ao presente Acordo passam a constituir parte integrante da Parte I do mesmo.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo II

1. Artigo II Geral

O DSB identificou a importância das concessões tarifárias seguirem os objetivos e propósitos do

Acordo da OMC e do GATT 94, no que se refere à segurança e previsibilidade.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen

Boneless Chiken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/R, paras. 7.328 e

7.427

Para. 7.328. “In the Panel's view, the lack of certainty associated with the application of the

criterion of long-term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the

EC Schedule runs counter to one of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the GATT

1994, namely that the security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous

arrangements must be preserved. Therefore, the Panel concludes that an interpretation of the term

“salted” in that concession to include the criterion of long-term preservation could undermine the

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object and purpose of security and predictability, which lie at the heart of both the WTO Agreement

and the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.427. “(…) the Panel recalls that a fundamental object and purpose of the WTO Agreement

and the GATT 1994 is that the security and predictability of reciprocal and mutually advantageous

arrangements must be preserved. In the Panel's view, a Member's unilateral intention regarding the

meaning to be ascribed to a concession that Member has made in the context of WTO multilateral

trade negotiations cannot prevail over the common intentions of all WTO Members as determined

through an analysis undertaken pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of

Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R e

WT/DS286/AB/R, paras. 239 e 249

Para. 239. “Having said this, we caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the purported

“object and purpose” of specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO agreements,

or tariff headings in Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the whole.

Even if, arguendo, one could rely on the specific “object and purpose” of heading 02.10 of the EC

Schedule in isolation, we would share the Panel's view that “one Member's unilateral object and

purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot form the basis” for an interpretation of

that commitment, because interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention

must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the parties.”

Para. 249. “In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in

paragraph 7.328 of the Panel Reports, that “the lack of certainty associated with the application of

the criterion of long-term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of

the EC Schedule ... could undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which

[underlie] both the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of

Certain Information Technology Products (EC - IT Products), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R e WT/DS377/R, para. 7.1327

Para. 7.1327. “On this basis, we consider that tariff concessions made by WTO Members should be

interpreted in such a way to further the objectives of preserving and upholding the “security and

predictability” of “the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the

substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers to trade”. This includes consideration of the

general objective of the expansion of trade and the substantial reduction of tariffs. However, a panel

should take care not to disturb the balance of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions

negotiated by parties.”

2. Artigo II.1(a)

a) “Geral”

O Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu que as concessões devem ser consideradas no contexto do

resultado de um entendimento recíproco, conforme estabelecido na Convenção de Viena e em

contraposição à visão unilateral das expectativas de apenas uma das partes.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain

Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/R,

WT/DS67/R e WT/DS68/R, paras. 8.23-8.24, 8.26-8.27 e 8.45

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Para. 8.23. “The meaning of a particular expression in a tariff schedule cannot be determined in

isolation from its context. It has to be interpreted in the context of Article II of GATT 1994 -- a

provision that gives the rationale for the specification of products and duty rates in tariff schedules

in the first place: i.e., they constitute a binding commitment arising out of a negotiation. It should be

noted in this regard that the protection of legitimate expectations in respect of tariff treatment of a

bound item is one of the most important functions of Article II. (…)”

Para. 8.24. “(…) Although Article II:5 is a provision for the special bilateral procedure regarding

tariff classification, not directly at issue in this case, the existence of this provision confirms that

legitimate expectations are a vital element in the interpretation of Article II and tariff schedules.”

Para. 8.26. “In our view, it may, as a matter of fact, be the case that in nearly all instances, the

ordinary meaning of the terms of the actual description in a tariff schedule accurately reflects and

exhausts the content of the legitimate expectations. It is clearly the case that most descriptions are to

be treated with the utmost care to maintain their integrity precisely because, on their face, they

normally constitute the most concrete, tangible and reliable evidence of commitments made. In our

view, however, this cannot be the case a priori for all tariff commitments. It must remain possible,

at least in principle, that parties have legitimately formed expectations based on other particular

supplementary factors.

Para. 8.27. “To deny this a priori would be to reduce the nature and meaning of commitments

under Article II to a purely formal and mechanical task of noting descriptions in schedules. This

would be to rob such commitments of the reality of the context in which they clearly occur in

Article II.”

Para. 8.45. “We now turn to the examination of whether the actual tariff treatment of LAN

equipment entitles the United States to legitimate expectations in this regard sufficient to establish

its claim of a violation of Article II of GATT 1994 by the European Communities. In our view, an

exporting Member's legitimate expectations regarding tariff commitments are normally based, at a

minimum, on the assumption that the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product at the

time of the negotiation will be continued unless such treatment is manifestly anomalous or there is

information readily available to the exporting Member that clearly indicates the contrary. The

existence of such expectations in tariff negotiations can be seen in the fact that negotiators normally

use actual trade data to calculate the effect of “requests” and “offers”, and to evaluate the resulting

tariff reductions in terms of trade-weighted average. In other words, they work on the general

assumption that the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product as traded is the relevant

item for the purposes of negotiations.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of

Certain Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R e WT/DS68/AB/R, paras. 81 e 84

Para. 81. “Second, we reject the Panel's view that Article II:5 of the GATT 1994 confirms that

“legitimate expectations are a vital element in the interpretation” of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994

and of Members' Schedules. It is clear from the wording of Article II:5 that it does not support the

Panel's view. This paragraph recognizes the possibility that the treatment contemplated in a

concession, provided for in a Member's Schedule, on a particular product, may differ from the

treatment accorded to that product and provides for a compensatory mechanism to rebalance the

concessions between the two Members concerned in such a situation. However, nothing in

Article II:5 suggests that the expectations of only the exporting Member can be the basis for

interpreting a concession in a Member's Schedule for the purposes of determining whether that

Member has acted consistently with its obligations under Article II:1. In discussing Article II:5, the

Panel overlooked the second sentence of that provision, which clarifies that the “contemplated

treatment” referred to in that provision is the treatment contemplated by both Members.”

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Para. 84. “The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to

ascertain the common intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on

the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined “expectations” of one of the parties to a

treaty. Tariff concessions provided for in a Member's Schedule - the interpretation of which is at

issue here - are reciprocal and result from a mutually-advantageous negotiation between importing

and exporting Members. A Schedule is made an integral part of the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of

the GATT 1994. Therefore, the concessions provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of

the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a concession

are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention.”

b) “Tratamento Não Menos Favorável (treatment no less favourable)”

O Órgão de Apelação definiu que a variação no tipo das tarifas aplicada e consolidada,

consideradas as modalidades ad valorem e específica, não justifica a violação do Artigo II, mas

depende da análise da equivalência entre essas.

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Appares and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R,

paras. 6.31-6.32 e 6.65

Para. 6.31. “We note that the past GATT practice is clear: a situation whereby a contracting party

applies one type of duties while its Schedule refers to bindings of another type of duties constitutes

a violation of Article II of GATT, without any obligation for the complaining party to submit

further evidence that such variance leads to an effective breach of bindings. The fact that Argentina

claims that it is simply following its past practice of using specific duties would not seem to be

relevant, since it made ad valorem tariff concessions on the products in question and thus created an

obligation for itself to impose such type of duties. As a guarantee for predictability and to ensure

the full respect of the negotiations under Article II, GATT practice has generally required that once

a Member has indicated the type(s) of duties in specifying its bound rate, it must apply such type(s)

of duties. Accordingly, faced with such a variance in the type duties applied by Argentina from that

reflected in its Schedule, we consider that we do not have to examine the effects of that variance on

possible future imports. Indeed, such a variance undermines the stability and predictability of

Members' Schedules.”

Para. 6.32. “We, therefore, find that Argentina, in using a system of specific minimum tariffs

although it has bound its tariffs at ad valorem rates only, is violating the provisions of Article II of

GATT and that the United States does not have to provide further evidence that the resultant duties

exceed the bound tariff rate. Such a variance between Argentina’s Schedule and its applied tariffs

constitutes a less favourable treatment to the commerce of the other Members than that provided for

in Argentina’s Schedule, contrary to the provisions of Article II of GATT.”

Para. 6.65. “In the light of the foregoing, we find that the United States has provided sufficient

evidence that Argentina has effectively imposed duties on imports of textiles and apparel above 35

per cent ad valorem, that indeed the total amount of duties collected annually on these items leads

to the conclusion that duties above 35 per cent ad valorem on the average transaction value have

been imposed on the same items, and that in any case, as we found in paragraph 6.47 above, the

very nature of the minimum specific duty system imposed in Argentina on the items at issue will

inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the imposition of duties above 35 per cent ad valorem. In

addition, the fact that Argentina is using minimum specific duties while they bound their tariffs

according to an ad valorem type of duties, is inconsistent with its Schedule and with the

requirements of Article II of GATT. Therefore, we consider that minimum specific duties imposed

by Argentina on textile and apparel imports constitute a treatment of those imports that is less

favourable than that provided for in Argentina’s Schedule and contrary to Article II of GATT.”

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Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,

Textiles, Appares and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS56/R, paras. 56 e 62-63

Para. 56. “We modify the Panel's findings in paragraphs 6.31 and 6.32 of the Panel Report

accordingly.”

Para. 62. “As noted above, the Panel stated that “... the very nature of the minimum specific duty

system imposed in Argentina on the items at issue will inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the

imposition of duties above 35 per cent ad valorem.” (emphasis added) This reference to “in certain

instances” indicates that the Panel did not conclude that there was infringement “in all cases”. We

recall our finding that the DIEM regime, by its structure and design, results in the application of

specific duties with ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per cent for all textile and apparel

products imported at prices below the relevant “break-even” prices in the relevant tariff categories.

At the same time, products imported at prices above such “break-even” prices will be subject to a

duty equivalent to 35 per cent or less ad valorem. This proposition holds for all relevant tariff

categories relating to textile and apparel products to which the DIEM are applied. It is the result of

Argentina requiring its customs officials to collect the higher of two values: the applicable ad

valorem duty or the DIEM. It follows that, under such a system, the rate of duty applicable to any

import transaction depends on the position of the imported product within the prevailing price range

in any relevant tariff category. Thus, some transactions will fall within a price range where the

application of the DIEM results in ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per cent. Other

transactions, on the other hand, will fall within a price range where the application of the DIEM

results in ad valorem equivalents less than, or equal to, 35 per cent. We agree with Argentina,

therefore, that the application of the DIEM does not result in a breach of Article II for each and

every import transaction in a given tariff category. At the same time, however, we agree with the

Panel that there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the structure and design of the DIEM will

result, with respect to a certain range of import prices within a relevant tariff category, in an

infringement of Argentina's obligations under Article II:1 for all tariff categories in Chapters 51 to

63 of the N.C.M.

Para. 63. “For these reasons, we find no legal basis on which to reverse the Panel's findings in

paragraph 6.65 of the Panel Report.”

3. Artigo II.1(b)

a) “Ao entrarem no território de outra Parte Contratante” (on their importation into the

territory)

O DSB identificou na expressão “ao entrarem no território” um elemento temporal que faz com que

a obrigação de pagar direitos aduaneiros ordinários se constitua no momento em que a mercadoria

ingressa no território de outra Parte Contratante.

Relatório do Painel no caso China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China –

Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.184-7.185

Para. 7.184. “We therefore conclude that the ordinary meaning of “on their importation” in

Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994, considered in its context and in light of the object

and purpose of the GATT 1994, contains a strict and precise temporal element which cannot be

ignored. This means that the obligation to pay ordinary customs duties is linked to the product at the

moment it enters the territory of another Member. If the right to impose ordinary customs duties –

and the importer's obligation to pay it – accrues because of the importation of the product at the

very moment it enters the territory of another Member, ordinary customs duties should necessarily

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be related to the status of the product at that single moment. It is at this moment, and this moment

only, that the obligation to pay such charge accrues.”

Para. 7.185. “In contrast to ordinary customs duties, the obligation to pay internal charges does not

accrue because of the importation of the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another

Member but because of the internal factors (e.g., because the product was re-sold internally or

because the product was used internally), which occurs once the product has been imported into the

territory of another member. The status of the imported good, which does not necessarily

correspond to its status at the moment of importation, seems to be the relevant basis to assess this

internal charge.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile

Parts (China – Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R,

paras. 153 e 158

Para. 153. “The other terms contained in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) shed some light on the

scope and meaning of “ordinary customs duties” and indicate, for example, that an ordinary

customs duty is a charge imposed on products, on their importation. The Panel recognized both of

these elements as immediate context for the term “ordinary customs duties” in the first sentence of

Article II:1(b), and attached particular significance to the second of these elements. Thus, the Panel

emphasized the temporal limits of the first sentence of Article II:1(b), and underlined that a key

criterion for a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty under Article II:1(b) is that it accrue at

the moment of importation”.”

Para. 158. “(…) The right of a WTO Member to impose a customs duty, and the obligation of an

importer to pay such a duty, accrue at the very moment the product enters the customs territory of

that Member and by virtue of the event of importation. In contrast, the classification rules according

to which customs authorities determine under which tariff heading the “product” concerned falls,

depending on its “status” or “condition”, are not relevant to the nature of the “duty” itself because

they do not determine the moment at which the obligation to pay accrues, but only the amount of

that duty. Similarly, as all of the participants agree, the moment at which a charge is collected or

paid is not determinative of whether it is an ordinary customs duty or an internal charge. Ordinary

customs duties may be collected after the moment of importation, and internal charges may be

collected at the moment of importation. For a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty,

however, the obligation to pay it must accrue at the moment and by virtue of or, in the words of

Article II:1(b), “on”, importation.”

b) “Direitos aduaneiros ordinários” (ordinary customs duties)

Segundo o DSB, os “direitos aduaneiros ordinários” consistem nos direitos que recaem sobre bens

exclusivamente no momento de sua entrada no território de outro Membro.

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to

Certain Agricultural Products (Chile – Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina,

WT/DS207/R, para. 7.104

Para. 7.104. “We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure “other than an

ordinary customs duty”, which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We

have also found that “ordinary customs duties” must have the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the

Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties

not constituting ordinary customs duties, their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed

under the first sentence of that provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties.”

12

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures

Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile – Price Band System), Demandante:

Argentina, WT/DS207/R, para. 147

Para. 147. “The Panel's reasoning and findings under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 may be

summarized as follows. The Panel began by finding that the first sentence of Article II:1(b) is not

applicable to the Chilean price band duties, because the Panel had already found that they are not

“ordinary customs duties”.”

Relatório do Painel no caso China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China –

Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.192,

7.204 e 7.210

Para. 7.192. “In sum, based on its ordinary meaning and its context, we conclude that “ordinary

customs duties” within the meaning of the first sentence of Article II:1(b) refer to duties imposed on

goods at the moment of their “importation” into the customs territory of an importing Member and

must be interpreted more narrowly than “other charges and duties” under the second sentence of

Article II:1(b), which are imposed on goods “on or in connection with importation”.

Para. 7.204. “(...) if the obligation to pay a charge does not accrue based on the product at the

moment of its importation, it cannot be an 'ordinary customs duty' within the meaning of Article

II:1(b), first sentence of the GATT 1994: it is, instead, an 'internal charge' under Article III:2 of the

GATT 1994, which obligation to pay accrues based on internal factors.”

Para. 7.210. “In sum, based on the above elements considered as a whole, in particular the fact that

the charge under the measures relates to the internal assembly of auto parts into motor vehicles, we

conclude that the charge is an internal charge within the meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT

1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile

Parts (China – Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R e

WT/DS342/AB/R, paras. 141, 166, 171-172

Para. 141. “It seems to us that an examination of whether a particular charge is an internal charge

or a border measure involves consideration of all three types of charges, that is: ordinary customs

duties under the first sentence of Article II:1(b); other duties and charges under the second sentence

of Article II:1(b); and internal charges and taxes under Article III:2. This should assist a panel in

understanding the relationship among these fundamental GATT provisions.”

Para. 166. “(…) The Harmonized System does not provide context that is relevant to the threshold

question or to the assessment of the respective scope of application of “ordinary customs duties” in

the first sentence of Article II:1(b) and “internal charges” in Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 that

must be undertaken in answering that question. It follows that the Panel did not err in interpreting

the term “ordinary customs duties” in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 without

relying on the rules of the Harmonized System, in general, or GIR 2(a), in particular.”

Para. 171. “We consider that a panel's determination of whether a specific charge falls under

Article II:1(b) or Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 must be made in the light of the characteristics of

the measure and the circumstances of the case. In many cases this will be a straightforward

exercise. In others, the picture will be more mixed, and the challenge faced by a panel more

complex. A panel must thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in its design and in its

operation, and identify its principal characteristics. Having done so, the panel must then seek to

identify the leading or core features of the measure at issue, those that define its “centre of gravity”

for purposes of characterizing the charge that it imposes as an ordinary customs duty or an internal

charge. It is not surprising, and indeed to be expected, that the same measure may exhibit some

13

characteristics that suggest it is a measure falling within the scope of Article II:1(b), and others

suggesting it is a measure falling within the scope of Article III:2. In making its objective

assessment of the applicability of specific provisions of the covered agreements to a measure

properly before it, a panel must identify all relevant characteristics of the measure, and recognize

which features are the most central to that measure itself, and which are to be accorded the most

significance for purposes of characterizing the relevant charge and, thereby, properly determining

the discipline(s) to which it is subject under the covered agreements.”

Para. 172. “We understand the Panel to have adopted just such an approach to the measures at issue

in this case. The Panel identified the following characteristics of the charge as having particular

significance for legal characterization purposes: (i) the obligation to pay the charge accrues

internally after auto parts have entered the customs territory of China and have been

assembled/produced into motor vehicles; (ii) the charge is imposed on automobile manufacturers

rather than on importers in general; (iii) the charge is imposed based on how the imported auto parts

are used, that is, not based on the auto parts as they enter, but instead based on what other parts

from other countries and/or other importers and/or domestic parts are subsequently used, together

with those imported parts, in assembling a vehicle model; and (iv) the fact that identical auto parts

imported at the same time in the same container or vessel can be subject to different charge rates

depending on which vehicle model they are assembled into.”

Relatório do Painel no caso India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the

United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, para.

7.246, 7.249

Para. 7.246. “The AD, as its statutory name makes clear, is a “duty”. It applies to goods (articles)

which are imported into India (in our case, alcoholic liquor). It does not apply to domestic goods.

The AD is assessed at the time and point of importation by India's Customs authorities. The good

which is imported and subject to the AD is cleared through customs for entry into India's customs

territory once the AD has been paid. The AD is payable by the importers of the subject goods or

their agents. Furthermore, as imposed through CN 32/2003, the AD on alcoholic liquor took the

form of either an ad valorem duty or a specific duty.”

Para. 7.249. “Judging exclusively by the above characteristics of the AD on alcoholic liquor as in

force on the date of establishment of this Panel, we would agree with the United States that the AD

on alcoholic liquor could, in principle, have qualified as an “ordinary customs duty”, or an “other

duty or charge”, within the meaning of Article II:1(b). However, these same characteristics are also

consistent with India's view that the AD on alcoholic liquor qualified as a charge imposed on the

importation of a product and equivalent to an internal tax imposed in respect of the like domestic

product within the meaning of Article II:2(a). In this regard, to mention only a few elements, the

AD being a “duty” imposed on a product, it can be considered a “charge” imposed on a product as

that term is used in Article II:2(a). Also, as we have explained, the AD is a duty imposed “on the

importation of a product”. And finally, as is already clear from its name, the AD is imposed in

addition to India's basic customs duty (BCD) which the United States does not dispute is an

“ordinary customs duty” within the meaning of Article II:1(b). Article II:2 implies that

Article II:2(a) charges may be imposed on a product subject to a tariff binding in addition to the

ordinary customs duty levied on that product.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on

Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS360/R, paras. 156-157 e 164

Para. 156. “The Panel acknowledged that the phrase “'other duties and charges of any kind' could

conceivably support the interpretation argued for by the United States”, but considered that

customary rules of treaty interpretation require that the terms of the treaty also be read in their

context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. As “immediate context”, the Panel noted

14

a “parallelism” between the two sentences of Article II:1(b) and concluded that this parallelism

“strongly suggests that ... the charges intended to be covered by the two provisions are charges of

the same kind”. In addition, the Panel reasoned that OCDs “inherently discriminate against, or

disadvantage, imports”, and that there is a “readily apparent rationale” — that is, avoiding the

circumvention of tariff concessions — for subjecting ODCs that are “of the same kind” as OCDs to

the same disciplines. Finally, the Panel considered that the charges referred to in Article II:2 differ

from OCDs and ODCs because they do not “inherently discriminate against, or disadvantage,

imports”, and inferred from this that charges falling under Article II:2 are therefore outside the

scope of Article II:1(b).”

Para. 157. “We do not agree with the Panel that Article II:1(b) “strongly suggests” that OCDs and

ODCs are “of the same kind”. As the Panel itself observed, the two sets of charges are described

and disciplined in separate sentences of Article II:1(b), and may, by their terms, not pertain to the

same event of importation. While both sentences of Article II:1(b) relate to duties or charges

applied “on the importation” of certain products, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) also

uniquely covers charges imposed “in connection with the importation” of such products. Moreover,

the second sentence of Article II:1(b) refers to duties or charges “of any kind”, which suggests that,

while in some instances ODCs may be of a similar kind to OCDs, in other instances they may be of

a different kind. Accordingly, we do not find the language of Article II:1(b) read in its context to be

conclusive as to whether OCDs and ODCs are necessarily of a similar or dissimilar kind.”

Para. 164. “For these reasons, we find that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article II:1(b) as

covering only duties or charges that “inherently discriminate against imports”, and of Article II:2(a)

as covering only charges that do not “inherently discriminate against imports”.”

c) “Observados os termos, condições ou requisitos constantes” (subject to the terms,

conditions or qualifications set forth)

Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo II do GATT permite que as Partes Contratantes incorporem

concessões em seus cronogramas, mas não é possível reduzir os compromissos assumidos.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, paras. 5.2-5.7

Para. 5.2. “The Panel first examined the issue in the light of the wording of Article II. It noted that

in Article II:1(b), the words “subject to the ... qualifications set forth in that Schedule” are used in

conjunction with the words “shall ... be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set

forth in [the Schedule]”. This suggests that Article II:1(b) permits contracting parties to qualify the

obligation to exempt products from customs duties in excess of the levels specified in the Schedule,

not however to qualify their obligations under other Articles of the General Agreement. The Panel

further noted that the title of Article II is “Schedules of Concessions” and that the ordinary meaning

of the word “to concede” is “to grant or yield”. This also suggests in the view of the Panel that

Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts yielding rights under

the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement.”

Para. 5.3. “The Panel then examined the issue in the light of the purpose of the General Agreement.

It noted that one of the basic functions of the General Agreement is, according to its Preamble, to

provide a legal framework enabling contracting parties to enter into “reciprocal and mutually

advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to

trade”. Where the General Agreement mentions specific types of negotiations, it refers to

negotiations aimed at the reduction of barriers to trade (Articles IV(d), XVII:3 and XXVIII bis).

This supports in the view of the Panel the assumption that Article II gives contracting parties the

possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement commitments

15

additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional

commitments, not however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.”

Para. 5.4. “The Panel then examined the issue in the context of the provisions of the General

Agreement related to Article II. It noted that negotiations on obstacles to trade created by the

operation of state-trading enterprises may be conducted under Article XVII:3 and that a note to that

provision provides that such negotiations “may be directed towards the reduction of duties and

other charges on imports and exports or towards the conclusion of any other mutually satisfactory

arrangement consistent with the provisions of this Agreement (See paragraph 4 of Article II and the

note to that paragraph).” (emphasis added). (…)”

Para. 5.5. “(…) it does support, in the view of the Panel, the conclusion that the CONTRACTING

PARTIES did not envisage that qualifications in Schedules established in accordance with Article

II:1(b) could justify measures inconsistent with the other Articles of the General Agreement.”

Para. 5.6. “The Panel finally examined the issue in the light of the drafting history. It noted that the

reference to “terms and qualifications” was included in a draft of the present Article II:1(b) during

the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and

Employment. The original draft had referred only to “conditions”. This amendment was proposed

and adopted “in order to provide more generally for the sort of qualifications actually provided in

the form of notes in the specimen Schedule. A number of these notes are, in effect, additional

concessions rather than conditions governing the tariff bindings to which they relate” (E/PC/T/153

and E/PC/T/W/295). Schedule provisions qualifying obligations under the General Agreement were

not included in the specimen Schedule nor was the possibility of such Schedule provisions

mentioned by the drafters. (…)”

Para. 5.7. “For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel found that Article II:1(b)

does not permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General

Agreement (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, para. 154

Para. 154. “The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay

Round of multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the

Marrakesh Protocol, and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh

Protocol, the Schedules are “Schedules to the GATT 1994”, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994

provides that “Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of

this Agreement”. With respect to concessions contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT

1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar (“United States - Sugar

Headnote”) found that:

... Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their

Schedules acts yielding rights under the General Agreement but

not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement.

This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions

and commitments for agricultural products contained in the

Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The ordinary meaning of

the term “concessions” suggests that a Member may yield rights

and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations.

We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure

“other than an ordinary customs duty”, which is prohibited under

Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We have also found

that “ordinary customs duties” must have the same meaning in

Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of

GATT 1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not

16

constituting ordinary customs duties, their consistency with

Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of that

provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties.

(emphasis added)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European

Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas

III), Demandantes: Equador e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA,

para. 416-418 e 432

Para. 416. “While it is unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member's Schedule would be

limited in time, such limitation does not appear to be precluded by the wording of Article II:1(b),

which refers to “terms, conditions or qualifications” set forth in a Member's Schedule. The parties

agree in principle that Article II:1(b) allows WTO Members to subject tariff concessions to the

“terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in [their] Schedule”. (…)”

Para. 417. “In GATT and WTO jurisprudence, it has been recognized that there are limits to the

terms, conditions, or qualifications that may be incorporated in a Member's Schedule of

Concessions. In EC – Bananas III, the Appellate Body stated that “the ordinary meaning of the term

'concession' suggests that a Member may yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its

obligations” under the WTO covered agreements through an entry in its Schedule. The GATT panel

in US – Sugar found that:

Article II gives Members the possibility to incorporate into the

legal framework of the General Agreement commitments

additional to those already contained in the General Agreement

and to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce

their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.

Para. 418. “Insofar as a temporal limitation does not diminish obligations or reduce commitments

under other provisions of the covered agreements, scheduling a temporal limitation to a tariff

concession does not seem incompatible with the findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas

III and the GATT panel in US – Sugar.

Para. 432. “The Panel relied on the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT

1994, as reflected in the preambles of these two Agreements. It noted that “concessions made by

WTO Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of expanding trade in

goods and services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and

mutually advantageous arrangements.” At the same time, the Panel considered that “this general

object and purpose is consistent with the more specific object and purpose of Article II:1(a) and

(b).” It referred, in particular, to the “objective of promoting security and predictability in

international trade, through the exchange of concessions”, which is subject to conditions and

qualifications in Members' Schedules. According to the Panel, its finding that the tariff quota

concession had expired was consistent with the specific objective of promoting security and

predictability in international trade through the exchange of concessions, because it gave effect to

the terms and conditions incorporated into the European Communities' Schedule, including the

temporal limitation provided for in the Bananas Framework Agreement. The Panel considered that

the general object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 of expanding trade and

reducing barriers to trade through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous

arrangements had to be reconciled with the specific objective of respecting scheduled concessions

including the terms and conditions inscribed in Schedules. (…)”

Relatório do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities –

Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante:

Equador, (WT/DS27/RW2/ECU), paras. 7.496 e 7.501

17

Para. 7.496. “(…) The Panel has already noted that it would follow the approach indicated by the

Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, and begin its analysis with

consideration of the first sentence of Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.501. “The Panel recalls the words of the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina –

Textiles and Apparel:

It is evident to us that the application of customs duties in excess of

those provided for in a Member's Schedule, inconsistent with the

first sentence of Article II:1(b), constitutes 'less favourable'

treatment under the provisions of Article II:1(a) …

d) “Direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza” (other duties or charges of any kind)

O DSB concluiu que o termo “direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza” compreende qualquer

taxa ou encargo relacionado à importação, mas que não corresponde a um direito aduaneiro

ordinário, imposto ou direito listado no Artigo II:2.

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to

Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina,

WT/DS207/R, paras. 7.105-7.108

Para. 7.105. “The next question is whether the Chilean PBS duties could be considered as “other

duties or charges of any kind” imposed on or in connection with importation, under the second

sentence of Article II:1(b). We have already indicated that all “other duties or charges of any kind”

should in our view be assessed under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). Pursuant to the

Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b), such other duties or charges

had to be recorded in a newly created column “other duties and charges” in the Members'

Schedules. Paragraph 1 of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b)

of the GATT 1994 (“the Understanding”) reads:

(…) [i]n order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and

obligations deriving from paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature

and level of any 'other duties or charges' levied on bound tariff

items, as referred in that provision, shall be recorded in the

Schedules and concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the

tariff item to which they apply. It is understood that such

recording does not change the legal character of 'other duties or

charges'.

Para. 7.106. “According to the second paragraph of the Understanding:

(…) [t]he date as of which “other duties or charges” are bound, for

the purposes of Article II, shall be 15 April 1994. 'Other duties or

charges' shall therefore be recorded in the Schedules at the levels

applying on this date.

Para. 7.107. “Other duties or charges must not exceed the binding in this “other duties and charges”

column of the Schedule. If other duties or charges were not recorded but are nevertheless levied,

they are inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b), in light of the Understanding on

the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). We note that Chile did not record its PBS in the “other duties

and charges” column of its Schedule.”

Para. 7.108. “We therefore find that the Chilean PBS duties are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of

GATT 1994.”

18

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures

Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System) Demandante: Argentina,

(WT/DS207/AB/R), paras. 153, 165, 168 e 177

Para. 153. “The question before us in this appeal is whether the claim that Argentina actually

made before the Panel was limited to the first sentence of Article II:1(b), or whether that claim

also included the second sentence of that provision.”

Para. 165. “For all these reasons, we conclude that, although Argentina's request for the

establishment of a panel was phrased broadly enough to include a claim under both sentences of

Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, a close examination of Argentina's submissions reveals that the

only claim made by Argentina was under the first sentence of Article II:1(b).”

Para. 168. “Contrary to what Argentina argues, given our finding that Argentina has not made a

claim under the second sentence of Article II:1(b), the Panel in this case had neither a “right” nor a

“duty” to develop its own legal reasoning to support a claim under the second sentence. The Panel

was not entitled to make a claim for Argentina, or to develop its own legal reasoning on a provision

that was not at issue.”

Para. 177. “For these reasons, we find that, by making a finding in paragraph 7.108 of the Panel

Report that the duties resulting from Chile's price band system are inconsistent with Article II:1(b)

of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the second sentence of that provision, which was not part of the

matter before the Panel, and also by thereby denying Chile the due process of a fair right of

response, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we reverse that

finding.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

International Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras,

WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.113-7.115

Para. 7.113. Although there is no definition of what constitutes an “other duty or charge” in the

GATT 1994 and in the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, the ordinary meanings of Article II:1(b) and Article II:2

make it clear that any fee or charge that is in connection with importation and that is not an ordinary

customs duty, nor a tax or duty as listed under Article II:2 (internal tax, anti-dumping duty,

countervailing duty, fees or charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered) would

qualify for a measure as an “other duties or charges” under Article II:1(b).”

Para. 7.114. “The travaux préparatoires concerning the Understanding confirm such interpretation.

The Secretariat note on “Article II:1(b) :OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT” stated:

‘4 The definition of ODCs falling under the purview of Article II:1(b) can only be

done by exclusion -i.e. by reference to those categories of ODC not covered by it.

It would be impossible, and logically fallacious, to draw up an exhaustive list of

ODCs which do fall under the purview of Article II:1(b), since it is always

possible for governments to invent new charges. Indeed, an attempt to provide an

exhaustive list would create the false impression that charges omitted from it, or

newly invented, were exempt from the II:1(b) obligation’.

Para. 7.115. “The foreign exchange fee is imposed on imported products only and it is not an

ordinary customs duty. It is computed on the value of imports, not on the cost of the services

rendered by the customs authorities. Consequently, it is not a fee or charge that falls under

Article VIII of the GATT. It is obviously not an anti-dumping or countervailing duty. Therefore, it

is a border measure in the nature of an ODC within the meaning of Article II:1(b).”

19

4. Artigo II.2 (a)

a) “Encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido” (charge equivalent to an internal

tax imposed)

O Órgão de Apelação avaliou que o termo “equivalente” só pode ser determinado por meio de

comparação qualitativa e quantitativa, incluindo elementos de efeito e valor.

Relatório do Painel no caso India – Additional and Extra – Additional Duties on Imports from

the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras.

7.194, 7.198, 7.273 e 7.283

Para. 7.194. “(...) As we will explain further below, if a border charge is determined to be

equivalent to an internal tax, it is caught by the provisions of Article III:2, first sentence. Article

III:2, first sentence, sets out a strict national treatment obligation. Indeed, as the United States itself

has reminded us, under Article III:2, first sentence, even a de minimis tax burden differential

disfavouring the product being imported would put the importing Member in breach of Article III:2.

Thus, we do not believe the interpretation which we consider should be given to the term

“equivalent” in Article II:2(a) diminishes the value of tariff concessions.”

Para. 7.198. “The foregoing considerations lead us to the view that, in an Article II:2(a) inquiry, it

is only if a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax that it can (ever) be concluded that – to use

terms similar to those appearing in the chapeau of Article II:2 – “nothing in Article II would

prevent” the imposition of such a charge. Or to put it another way, for the purposes of an Article

II:2(a) inquiry, “equivalence” is a necessary condition for a charge to fall outside the scope of

Article II:1. It is important to recall, however, that “equivalence” is a necessary condition for the

purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry only. To explain, even if a border charge is not equivalent to

an internal tax and thus does not fall within the scope of Article II:2(a), it may still fall within the

scope of, e.g., Article II:2(b). If it meets the conditions of Article II:2(b), it falls outside the scope of

Article II:1. Hence, in cases where a border charge is not equivalent to an internal tax, it may or

may not fall outside the scope of Article II:1.”

Para. 7.273. “In our view, even if, as appears possible, the form (ad valorem vs. specific duties,

etc.) and structure of the rates of AD for alcoholic liquor were different from the form and structure

of the rates of State excise duties on alcoholic liquor, this would not demonstrate that the AD on

alcoholic liquor was not equivalent to State excise duties on domestic alcoholic liquor. The concept

of “equivalence” as it appears in Article II:2(a) does not imply that a border charge and an internal

tax need to have the same form (ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and/or rate structure. Rather, it

implies that they need to have the same function of imposing a charge on a product qua product.

We do not see why a border charge and an internal tax having a different form (ad valorem vs.

specific duties, etc.) and/or rate structure could not nonetheless fulfil the same relative function

within the customs duty and tax system of the Member concerned.”

Para. 7.283. “Nevertheless, the design of the AD on alcoholic liquor could not, in any event, be

determinative, on its own, of whether it was equivalent to State excise duties. As we have pointed

out, the outcome of an “equivalence” inquiry under Article II:2(a) is context-dependent. Depending

on the context, one and the same border charge may be equivalent, or not equivalent, to an internal

tax. As a result, we also need to examine the AD on alcoholic liquor in its relevant context.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on

Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 167, 170-172 e 175

Para. 167. “The Panel considered several dictionary definitions of the term “equivalent” and

concluded that whether a border charge and internal tax are “equivalent” is determined by whether

they “have the same function”. The United States argues that the Panel erred by “incorrectly

20

focus[ing] on a single attribute to determine whether the charge and the internal tax are

'equivalent'“. We agree that all relevant attributes or definitions need to be considered in ascribing

to a treaty's terms the ordinary meaning given to those terms in their context and in the light of the

treaty's object and purpose. However, we note that the Panel considered various definitions in

interpreting the meaning of the term “equivalent” in Article II:2(a), and we do not find the fact that

the Panel settled on one attribute of that term to be in error per se.”

Para. 170. “In our view, these two concepts — “equivalence” and “consistency with Article III:2”

— cannot be interpreted in isolation from each other; they impart meaning to each other and need to

be interpreted harmoniously. By contrast, the Panel's interpretation was predicated on its

understanding that, because the term “equivalent” refers to the border charge, and the phrase

“imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” refers to the internal tax,

Article II:2(a) draws a distinction between the two concepts. We are not persuaded that the phrase

“imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” relates exclusively to the

words “internal tax”. Determining whether a charge is imposed consistently with Article III:2

necessarily involves a comparison of a border charge with an internal tax in order to determine

whether one is “in excess of” the other. Yet, the Panel's statement that the “term 'imposed' in Article

II:2(a) relates to the internal tax and not the border charge” leaves nothing with which the internal

tax can be compared.”

Para. 171. “Moreover, we disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the term “equivalent” does not

require any quantitative comparison of the charge and internal tax. This would mean that a border

charge that is significantly greater in amount than an internal tax could still be deemed “equivalent”

under Article II:2(a), provided that the two were functionally equivalent. We find that such a result

would be incompatible with a proper interpretation of Article II:2(a).”

Para. 172. “To give meaning and effect to the phrase “imposed consistently with the provisions of

paragraph 2 of Article III”, we consider it necessary, in the light of the structure and context of

Article II:2, to read this phrase in a manner that imparts meaning to the assessment of whether the

charge and internal tax are “equivalent”. We disagree with the Panel that understanding the term

“equivalent” as requiring a quantitative comparison would make redundant the reference to

consistency with Article III:2. Indeed, as we see it, the reference in Article II:2(a) to consistency

with Article III:2 suggests that the concept of equivalence includes elements of “effect” and

“amount” that necessarily imply a quantitative comparison.”

Para. 175. “We thus consider that the term “equivalent” calls for a comparative assessment that is

both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Such an assessment is not limited to the relative function

of a charge and an internal tax, but must also include quantitative considerations relating to their

effect and amount. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Panel erred in attributing an overly

narrow meaning to the term “equivalent”.”

b) “De conformidade como o disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III” (consistently with

the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III)

O Órgão de Apelação considera que o ponto central do termo é estabelecer um elo com as provisões

do Artigo III:2, não sendo necessário o reclamante mencionar explicitamente este Artigo para que o

Painel verifique sua consistência.

Relatório do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the

United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras.

2.212-2.215

Para. 2.212. “We do not think it is possible to draw particular inferences from the reference to

consistency with Article III:2 regarding the GATT 1947 negotiators' intentions in respect of those

21

cases, discussed above, where a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax, but the tax is imposed

inconsistently with Article III:2. Indeed, as we have suggested, Article II:2(a) in our view refers to

an internal tax imposed “consistently with” Article III:2 because this is what the GATT 1947

prescribed (and the GATT 1994 still prescribes today). Where a border charge is equivalent to an

internal tax, it is subject to Article III:2, and so the internal tax to which the border charge is

equivalent must be imposed consistently with Article III:2. If a reference to other requirements to

be complied with – specifically, those contained in Article III:2 – was to be included in

Article II:2(a), it stands to reason that the text of Article II:2(a) would do so in a manner that

reflects, and is consistent with, what the GATT 1947 prescribed and, hence, would contemplate an

internal tax imposed consistently with Article III:2. In the light of this, the fact that the text of

Article II:2(a) contemplates an internal tax imposed “consistently with” Article III:2 in our view

does not support the conclusion that the GATT 1947 negotiators considered that if a contracting

party subsequently imposed an internal tax inconsistently with Article III:2, the border charge

equivalent to that internal tax would be subject to the provisions of Article II:1.”

Para. 2.213. “Additionally, we note that the relevant context of Article II:2(a) includes

Article II:2(b) which makes clear that Article II does not prevent the imposition, on the importation

of a product, of an “anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of

Article VI”. In our view, similarly to what we have said in respect of the concept of “consistency

with Article III:2” in Article II:2(a), the concept of “consistency with Article VI” in Article II:2(b)

is not to be regarded as a necessary condition, for the purposes of an Article II:2(b) inquiry, for an

“anti-dumping or countervailing duty” imposed on the importation of a product to fall outside the

scope of Article II:1. Accordingly, we consider that our interpretation of the phrase “an internal tax

imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” in Article II:2(a) is

consistent with the provisions of Article II:2(b).”

Para. 2.214. “As to whether our interpretation of the phrase “an internal tax imposed consistently

with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III” is consistent with the object and purpose of the

GATT 1994, we recall our view that a border charge equivalent to an internal tax which is imposed

inconsistently with the provisions of Article III:2 would fall outside the scope of Article II:1.

However, we have also indicated that such a border charge would be caught by the strict obligations

contained in Article III:2. In the light of this, we do not consider that our interpretation of the

aforementioned phrase could be said to undermine the value of tariff concessions negotiated by

exporting Members. As our interpretation does not threaten to undermine the value of tariff

concessions, we do not consider that it runs counter to the object and purpose, expressed in the

preamble to the GATT 1994, of substantially reducing “tariffs”.”

Para. 2.215. “A final point should be made. In keeping with our view that the reference in

Article II:2(a) to “consistency with Article III:2” is not intended to stipulate an additional

requirement to be met for a border charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1, we would not

proceed, in an inquiry under Article II:2(a), to examine the consistency of an internal tax with

Article III:2 after having determined that a particular border charge is equivalent to that internal tax.

It is important to keep in mind, in this connection, that if the complaining party wishes a panel to

examine the internal tax and an equivalent border charge in the light of the requirements of

Article III:2, it is open to the complaining party to include in its panel request an independent claim

of violation of Article III:2, and to develop such a claim in its submissions to a panel.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on

Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 179-181

Para. 179. “We note, however, the Panel's statement that “for the purposes of an inquiry under

Article II:2(a) ... consistency of the internal tax with the provisions of Article III:2 is not a

necessary condition”. The Panel added that “the reference in Article II:2(a) to ‘consistency with

Article III:2’ is not intended to stipulate an additional requirement to be met for a border charge to

22

fall outside the scope of Article II:1.” Given these unequivocal statements, we do not consider that

the Panel preserved a role for evaluating “consistency with Article III:2” in the context of Article

II:2(a).”

Para. 180. “We consider that Article II:2(a) should not be interpreted in a manner that reads out the

significance, for purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry, of the element of “consistency with

Article III:2” or, at most, ascribes to it the purpose of “acknowledg[ing], and call[ing] attention to,

the existence of relevant requirements stipulated elsewhere in the GATT 1994.” Rather, as we have

indicated, we believe that the requirement of “consistency with Article III:2” must be read together

with, and imparts meaning to, the requirement that a charge and internal tax be “equivalent”. We

recall that Article II:2(a) refers to “a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with

the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product”. We also recall

that the first sentence of Article III:2 prohibits the imposition on imported products of “internal

taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like

domestic products”. We therefore consider that whether a charge is imposed “in excess of” a

corresponding internal tax is an integral part of the analysis in determining whether the charge is

justified under Article II:2(a). Contrary to what the Panel suggests, a complaining party is not

required to file an independent claim of violation of Article III:2 if it wishes to challenge the

consistency of a border charge with Article III:2.”

Para. 181. “We thus find that the element “imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2

of Article III” forms an integral part of the assessment under Article II:2(a) of whether a charge and

an internal tax are “equivalent”. Accordingly, we believe the Panel erred in its interpretation that the

element of “consistency with Article III:2” is not a necessary condition in the application of

Article II:2(a).”

5. Relação com outros Dispositivos

a) “Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura”

As qualificações dos compromissos tarifários não podem reduzir as obrigações contidas no GATT.

Ademais, as regras do GATT aplicam-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercados para produtos

agrícolas, exceto quando o Acordo sobre Agricultura dispuser de modo contrário.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/ABR, paras. 153-155

Para. 153. “The European Communities raises the question whether the market access concessions

for agricultural products made by the European Communities pursuant to the Agreement on

Agriculture prevail over Article XIII of the GATT 1994. (…)”

Para. 154. “The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay

Round of multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the

Marrakesh Protocol, and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh

Protocol, the Schedules are “Schedules to the GATT 1994”, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994

provides that “Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of

this Agreement”. With respect to concessions contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT

1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar (“United States - Sugar

Headnote”) found that:

... Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their

Schedules acts yielding rights under the General Agreement but

not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement.

This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions

and commitments for agricultural products contained in the

Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The ordinary meaning of

23

the term “concessions” suggests that a Member may yield rights

and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations. This

interpretation is confirmed by paragraph 3 of the Marrakesh

Protocol, which provides:

The implementation of the concessions and commitments

contained in the schedules annexed to this Protocol shall, upon

request, be subject to multilateral examination by the Members.

This would be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of

Members under Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.

(emphasis added)

Para. 155. “The question remains whether the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture allow

market access concessions on agricultural products to deviate from Article XIII of the GATT 1994.

The preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture states that it establishes “a basis for initiating a

process of reform of trade in agriculture” and that this reform process “should be initiated through

the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the establishment of

strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines”. The relationship

between the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Agriculture is set out in Article

21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture:

The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade

Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply

subject to the provisions of this Agreement.

Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article

XIII, apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural

products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture

contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same

matter.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/R, paras. 7.113-7.114

Para. 7.113. “The panel in the Sugar Headnote case found that qualifications on tariff bindings do

not override other GATT provisions after an analysis of the wording of Article II, its object,

purpose and context, and the drafting history of the provision. Although it made no mention of the

Vienna Convention, it seems to have followed closely Articles 31 and 32 thereof. (…)”

Para. 7.114. “We agree with the analysis of the Sugar Headnote panel report and note that Article

II was not changed in any relevant way as a result of the Uruguay Round. Thus, based on the Sugar

Headnote case, we conclude that the EC’s inclusion of allocations inconsistent with the

requirements of Article XIII in its Schedule does not prevent them from being challenged by other

Members. We note in this regard that the Uruguay Round tariff schedules were prepared with full

knowledge of the Sugar Headnote panel report, which was adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING

PARTIES in the middle of the Round (June 1989). (…)”

b) “Artigo XXVIII do GATT”

Um Membro da OMC permanece vinculado à lista de concessões prevista no Artigo II do GATT

até o término do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT.

Relatório do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities –

Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III),

Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.454

Para. 7.454. “The examination of a claim relating to a possible breach of GATT Article XXVIII of

the GATT 1994 would be outside the terms of reference of this Panel. Nevertheless, in light of the

specific matter before this Panel and because of the numerous references made to Article XXVIII in

the Doha Waiver, the Panel cannot totally disregard this provision. The combined reading of

24

Articles II and XXVIII of the GATT 1994 implies that, until negotiations under the latter provision

are formally concluded, a Member continues to be bound by the concessions contained in its

Schedule. (…)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European

Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas

III), Demandantes: Equador e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA,

paras. 378, 382-385 e 395

Para. 378. “We begin by noting three different methods that Members may use to interpret or

modify WTO law provided for in the WTO Agreement: (i) waivers (Article IX:3); (ii) multilateral

interpretations (Article IX:2); and (iii) amendments (Article X). (…)”

Para. 382. “In our view, the function of a waiver is to relieve a Member, for a specified period of

time, from a particular obligation provided for in the covered agreements, subject to the terms,

conditions, justifying exceptional circumstances or policy objectives described in the waiver

decision. Its purpose is not to modify existing provisions in the agreements, let alone create new

law or add to or amend the obligations under a covered agreement or Schedule. Therefore, waivers

are exceptional in nature, subject to strict disciplines and should be interpreted with great care.”

Para. 383. “Multilateral interpretations of provisions of WTO law are the next method identified

above. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement sets out specific requirements for decisions that may be

taken by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council to adopt interpretations of provisions of

the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Such multilateral interpretations are meant to clarify the

meaning of existing obligations, not to modify their content. Article IX:2 emphasizes that such

interpretations “shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in

Article X”. A multilateral interpretation should also be distinguished from a waiver, which allows a

Member to depart from an existing WTO obligation for a limited period of time. We consider that a

multilateral interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement can be likened to a

subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions

pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, as far as the interpretation of the WTO

agreements is concerned.”

Para. 384. “The third method mentioned above is amendments to the WTO agreements. Article X

of the WTO Agreement sets out rules and procedures to amend the provisions in the Multilateral

Trade Agreements. Article X specifies the process and quorum required to amend particular

provisions or covered agreements. Amendments, unlike waivers, are not limited in time and create

new or modify existing rights and obligations for WTO Members. Special rules on acceptance and

entry into force apply, depending on the provisions that are being amended and on whether the

amendment “would alter the rights and obligations of the Members”. Amendments to the WTO

Agreement and to a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1 enter into force following a formal

acceptance process pursuant to Article X:7.”

Para. 385. “The modification of Schedules of Concessions, which are an integral part of the GATT

1994, does not require a formal amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, but is

enacted through a special procedure set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 or through

multilateral rounds of tariff negotiations. Pursuant to Article XXVIII, a Member may modify or

withdraw a concession annexed to the GATT 1994 by negotiation and agreement with other

Members that are “primarily concerned”, and in consultation with Members that have a substantial

interest in the concession. Article XXVIII:2 provides that, in an agreement on the renegotiation of a

concession, which may include compensatory adjustment, WTO Members “shall endeavour to

maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to

trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations”. If an agreement cannot be

reached, the modifying Member is free to modify or withdraw the concession, while other Members

that are primarily concerned or have a substantial interest in the concession are free to withdraw

substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the modifying Member.”

25

Para. 395. “Moreover, while it is true that pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 Members'

Schedules of Concessions are integral parts of the covered agreements, Schedules are usually not

modified by means of an amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement: special rules

and procedures that Members are required to follow when they wish to modify their Schedules

unless they enter into tariff commitments by means of the conclusion of multilateral rounds of trade

negotiations are provided in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. In our view, if the duration of the

tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule had to be modified or extended,

negotiations under Article XXVIII would be the proper procedure to follow.”

III. Comentários

José Luiz Pimenta Júnior

1. Artigo II Geral

Os dispositivos que regulam os compromissos assumidos pelas partes quanto à liberalização de seus

mercados estão expressos no Artigo II do GATT 1947 e GATT 1994. O Artigo mencionado visa,

sobretudo, a prover segurança e previsibilidade ao processo de consolidação de tarifas de

importação das Partes Contratantes no âmbito do Sistema Multilateral de Comércio. Segundo a

própria instituição, o processo de consolidação tarifária foi intensificado, principalmente, a partir da

Rodada Uruguai (1986-1994), na qual se pode observar um elevado crescimento do percentual de

tarifas consolidadas tanto dos países desenvolvidos (PD) quanto daqueles em desenvolvimento

(PED) (1).

Em linhas gerais, o propósito de garantir segurança e previsibilidade às Partes Contratantes da

OMC encontrou respaldo nas decisões do Painel, no DS269 e DS375/376/377, e do Órgão de

Apelação, no DS 269.

No caso EC – Chicken Cuts (DS269), a Comissão Europeia, por meio do regulamento EC

1233/2002 e da Decisão EC 2003/97, alterou a classificação tarifária dos cortes de frango salgados

congelados, o que, na prática, significou uma elevação tarifária de 15,4% ad valorem (CN

02.10.90.20) para aproximadamente 70% ad valorem (tributo específico de 1,024 euros por

tonelada – CN 02.07.41.10). Esse fato fez com que o Brasil alegasse que a medida fosse

incompatível com os Artigos II: 1(a) e II:1 (b) do GATT 94, uma vez que conferia tratamento

menos favorável do que aquele conferido na Lista de Compromissos das Comunidades Europeias

(2).

A União Europeia argumentava que o frango salgado exportado pelo Brasil não poderia ser

classificado como “salgado” de acordo com a linha tarifária 02.010.90.20, uma vez que esse

processo não havia sido implementado com o intuito de preservar o produto no longo prazo (long

term preservation). Dessa forma, toda a análise do Painel girou em torno da relação entre o termo

“salgado” (presente na CN 02.10.90.20) e a noção de preservação no longo prazo que o processo de

salga deveria conferir ao produto. Ao entender que a lista de concessões tarifárias da CE (e

consequentemente o CN 02.10.90.20) era linguagem jurídica proveniente de um tratado, o Painel

utilizou-se dos procedimentos previstos nos Artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viena dos Direitos

Tratados (CVDT) para interpretar a linguagem da linha tarifária em questão. Apesar de análise do

termo “salgado” ter sido realizada com base nos diversos elementos referentes aos Artigos 31 e 32

da CVDT (sentido ordinário, contexto, entre outros), merece destaque a interpretação do termo em

relação ao objeto e propósito do tratado constitutivo da OMC e do GATT94. Nesse sentido, o

Painel constatou que a CE não apresentou nenhuma ideia clara do conceito de “preservação no

longo prazo” no que se refere ao termo “salgado”, e a falta de certeza na utilização desse critério na

linha tarifária 02.10.90.20 vai de encontro a um dos objetos e propósitos da OMC e do GATT 1994,

26

que é o de preservar a segurança e previsibilidade nas concessões mutuamente acordadas entre as

partes.

O Órgão de Apelação concordou com a interpretação do Painel e ainda atentou para o fato de

potenciais problemas surgirem ao se interpretar, isoladamente, disposições específicas do tratado,

sem levar em consideração os objetivos e propósitos gerais deste.

No caso EC – IT Products (DS375/376/377), o tratamento tarifário dado pela CE a determinados

produtos de Tecnologia da Informação gerou questionamentos de Taiwan, Japão e EUA, que

alegaram que o Bloco havia violado, entre outros, os Artigos II:1 (a) e II:1(b) do GATT. De acordo

com os demandantes, por conta de a CE ser signatária do Acordo de Tecnologia de Informação

(ITA), firmado em 1996 por alguns Membros da OMC, o bloco deveria garantir que não seriam

cobrados impostos sobre tais produtos (duty free treatment).

O ponto central da disputa estava novamente na análise dos termos que caracterizariam tais

produtos. A partir da interpretação de tais termos, poder-se-ia dizer se estes estariam ou não

cobertos pelo ITA e, consequentemente, se poderiam gozar de tratamento tarifário diferenciado

(duty free). Um dos termos que, por conta de ter sido alvo de interpretação do Painel, merece

destaque é “Input or output units”, contido na linha tarifária 847160, que constava no ITA, gozava

de tratamento tarifário diferenciado e, segundo os demandantes, teria sido objeto de violação por

parte da CE. A análise do Painel, que ocorreu nos termos dos Artigos 31 e 32 da CVDT (3),

procurou avaliar o sentido ordinário da linha tarifária em questão, com base em seu contexto e sob a

luz dos seus objetivos e propósitos.

Inicialmente, o Painel expôs que o objeto e propósito relevante para sua interpretação é o Acordo

constitutivo da OMC, do qual fazem parte o GATT 94 e a Lista de Concessões da CE. Em seguida,

alertou para o fato de que a concessão tarifária dos Membros da OMC devia ser interpretada de

modo a fomentar a segurança e previsibilidade das vantagens mutuamente acordadas entre eles, as

quais visam a reduzir barreiras ao comércio. Por fim, ao interpretar o texto da linha tarifária 847160

da lista de Concessões da CE, sob a luz do objeto e propósito dos preceitos supracitados, o Painel

indicou que não havia nada que impedisse o tratamento tarifário diferenciado à concessão.

A relação entre o objeto e propósito gerais do GATT 1994 e a concessão tarifária de um Membro

também foi analisada pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (DS56).

Segundo a interpretação do Órgão, qualquer redução de uma concessão, por meio da imposição de

tarifas em excesso daquilo que foi consolidado entre os Membros, promoveria um distúrbio no

equilíbrio das concessões entre estes (4).

Em suma, tendo como referência os casos em questão, pode-se perceber que as análises do Painel e

do Órgão de Apelação referentes à relação entre as concessões negociadas pelas Partes Contratantes

e o objeto e propósito do Acordo da OMC mostram uma recorrente tendência em se interpretar o(s)

termo(s) controverso(s) sob a luz de preceitos fundamentais para o Sistema Multilateral de

Comércio, como segurança jurídica e previsibilidade, a partir do cumprimento daquilo que foi

acordado entre as Partes Contratantes.

Footnote 1: Segundo a OMC, o percentual de tarifas consolidadas dos PD aumentou 21 pontos percentuais (p.p.), saindo

de 78% para 99% ao final dessa Rodada. No que se refere aos países em desenvolvimento, o percentual de tarifas

consolidadas, que antes de 1994 era de 21%, passou a ser de 73% após esse período, o que representou um crescimento de

52 p.p. Fonte: Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). Disponível em:

<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm Acesso em: 18/10/2011>.

Footnote 2: GARBELINI JÚNIOR, A. “O contencioso entre as Comunidades Europeias e o Brasil” em Solução de

Controvérsias: O Brasil e o contencioso na OMC. PÁDUA LIMA, Maria Lúcia; ROSENBERG, Bárbara (Coords.). Tomo

1 (Série GV Law). São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009. pp. 384-385.

Footnote 3: Relatório do Painel - WT/DS375/R WT/DS376/R WT/DS377/R, para 7.1246

Footnote 4: Relatório do Órgão de Apelação: Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47; Panel Report on EC - Chicken

Cuts, para. 7.319.

27

2. Artigo II.1(a)

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

O Painel decidiu que a proteção das expectativas legítimas relacionadas às concessões tarifárias

corresponde a uma das funções mais importantes do Artigo II. (Relatório do Painel no caso EC –

Computer Equipment, para. 8.23, DS62, 67 e 68). Este posicionamento pode ser corroborado, de

acordo com o Painel, pelo disposto no Artigo II.5 (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Computer

Equipment, para. 8.24, DS62, 67 e 68).

Para o Painel, embora na maioria das vezes a descrição contida na lista de concessões reflita as

expectativas legítimas, há casos em que tais expectativas podem ser formadas também por outros

fatores. (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 8.26, DS62, 67 e 68). O

Órgão de Apelação reverteu o entendimento do Painel mencionado acima, e entendeu que o Artigo

II.5 não preconiza que a expectativa somente do Membro exportador pode ser a base para a

interpretação da lista de concessões com o escopo de analisar se o Membro agiu em consonância

com as suas obrigações descritas no Artigo II.1 (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC –

Computer Equipment, para. 81, DS62, 67 e 68).

Tal decisão do Órgão de Apelação utilizou a regra de interpretação contida no Artigo 31 da

Convenção de Viena e, por isso, buscou a intenção comum das partes. O Órgão de Apelação

asseverou que a intenção comum não se depreende de uma expectativa unilateral, já que concessões

tarifárias são recíprocas e resultam de mútuas negociações. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no

caso EC – Computer Equipment, para. 84, DS62, 67 e 68).

Por fim, deve-se mencionar que no entendimento do Painel as expectativas legítimas do Membro

exportador são pautadas, no mínimo, na continuação do tratamento tarifário existente no momento

da negociação, exceto quando há evidências no sentido oposto (Relatório do Painel no caso EC –

Computer Equipment, para. 8.45, DS62, 67 e 68).

Tratamento Não Menos Favorável

Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini

Por considerar que as práticas do GATT não forneciam princípios claros para julgar alterações

feitas pelos Membros no tipo do direito cobrado na importação de mercadorias, o DSB elaborou

nova interpretação sobre em quais circunstâncias a modificação do tipo de direito cobrado viola o

Artigo II do GATT.

No julgamento do caso 56 (Argentina – Textiles and Apparel), o Painel considerou que a simples

variação do tipo do direito cobrado pela Argentina – utilização do direito específico mínimo ao

invés de ad valorem, conforme prevê a lista de concessões do país – já constitui, por si só,

“tratamento não menos favorável” e, portanto, automática violação ao Artigo II:1(a) (Relatório do

Painel no caso Argentina – Textiles and Apparel que afetam importações de têxtil e vestuário, para.

6.31 – 6.32, WT/DS56/R). O Painel havia se baseado em interpretações anteriores, especificamente

o Caso 158 (EC - Bananas).

O Órgão de Apelação, no entanto, considerou que a decisão do Painel não se baseou na leitura do

Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b), mas sim em frágeis decisões anteriores do GATT que não serviam como

referência para o Caso 56, o que motivou a busca por uma interpretação nova. Com a leitura do

Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b), o Órgão de Apelação notou que o principal objetivo da norma é fazer com que

os países preservem o valor das tarifas negociadas na lista de concessões (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação em Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, paras. 45–47 WT/DS56/R). Portanto, o principal

princípio a ser respeitado para que o Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b) não seja violado é que a mudança na

28

forma de cobrar o direito não gere valor que exceda aquele consolidado pelo Membro na lista de

concessões.

Ao definir a nova interpretação, o Órgão de Apelação apresentou como premissa que a violação da

obrigação contida no Artigo II:1(b) viola automaticamente o Artigo II:1(a). Desta forma, o Órgão

de Apelação preferiu utilizar para o julgamento o Artigo II:1(b), por ser mais “específico” e trazer

provisões mais “relevantes” do que o Artigo II:1(a). Como conclusão, o Órgão de Apelação definiu

que a aplicação de um tipo de direito diferente daquele acordado na lista de concessões (neste caso,

mudança de ad valorem para direito específico mínimo) viola a obrigação contida no Artigo II:1(b),

e portanto também 1(a), somente na medida que esta alteração implique em que a tarifa cobrada

exceda o valor consolidado (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no Caso Argentina – Textiles and

Apparel, paras. 55–56, WT/DS56/R).

3. Artigo II.1(b)

Frederico Arana Meira

A evolução interpretativa do Artigo II:1(b) do GATT 1994 e do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação

do Artigo II:1(b) foi relevante para adicionar precisão na definição de três tipos de direitos e

encargos: os direitos aduaneiros ordinários (ordinary customs duties – primeira sentença do Artigo

II:1(b)); os outros direitos e encargos (other duties and charges – segunda sentença do Artigo

II:1(b)); e os encargos e tributos internos (internal charges and taxes – Artigo III:2).

No que se refere à diferenciação entre os direitos aduaneiros ordinários previstos pelo Artigo II:1(b)

e os tributos internos do Artigo III:2, o Órgão de Apelação definiu a importância de se observar se o

fato gerador decorre do momento da importação. O aspecto temporal foi enfatizado para a

identificação do direito aduaneiro ordinário, no sentido de que a obrigação do importador recolher o

direito decorre do momento em que o produto entra no território aduaneiro de um Membro e em

função da importação. Não obstante, um direito aduaneiro ordinário pode ser recolhido após a

importação e um tributo interno pode ser recolhido no momento da importação. (Relatório do Órgão

de Apelação no caso China – Auto Parts, paras. 153 e 158, DS339/340/342).

Ademais, o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu que um direito pode apresentar, de forma simultânea,

características de um direito aduaneiro ordinário e de um tributo interno. Nesses casos, deve-se

levar em consideração os elementos centrais mais relevantes que caracterizam a aplicação do

direito. Além da determinação do momento do fato gerador, podem ser observados os responsáveis

pelo recolhimento do tributo (importador versus agente doméstico) e a comparação ao tratamento

dado a outros produtos No que se refere à diferenciação entre os semelhantes importados no mesmo

momento. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso China – Auto Parts, paras. 171, 172,

DS339/340/342).

Direitos aduaneiros ordinários e os outros direitos e encargos (respectivamente, primeira e segunda

sentença do Artigo II:1(b)), o Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo II:1(b) estabelecido na

Rodada Uruguai previu a separação destes em uma nova coluna na lista de concessões dos

Membros. Não obstante, o Órgão de Apelação definiu que os direitos aduaneiros ordinários e os

outros direitos e encargos não possuem a mesma natureza, sendo que o segundo não apresenta

relação com o momento da importação, mas está conectado com a importação. Ademais, os outros

direitos aduaneiros podem ser de qualquer tipo e, portanto, são mais abrangentes que os direitos

aduaneiros ordinários. Nesse sentido, a definição de outros direitos aduaneiros somente pode ser

realizada por exclusão. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties,

paras. 156- 157, DS360 e Relatório do Panel no caso Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of

Cigarettes, paras. 7113-7114, DS302).

29

4. Artigo II.2(a)

Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini

Encargos equivalentes a um imposto interno exigido

A deliberação do DSB referente ao Artigo II:2(a) adicionou entendimentos importantes para definir

o que se deve compreender sobre os conceitos “equivalente a um imposto interno” e “em

conformidade com o disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III”. Além disso, houve deliberação sobre a

quem recai o ônus da prova em casos envolvendo o Artigo.

O conceito de “equivalente a um imposto interno” gerou interpretações distintas entre o Painel e o

Órgão de Apelação, mas como conclusão final o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a interpretação inicial

do Painel de que o termo “equivalente” deva ser entendido exclusivamente como “ter a mesma

função ou ter função correspondente”. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, esta definição não pode ser

aceita, pois seria o mesmo que dizer que as tarifas aduaneiras e internas podem ser equivalentes

ainda que exista um diferencial de carga tributária em detrimento do produto importado. Em outras

palavras, o termo equivalente não pode ter o seu significado entendido de maneira estreita e

demanda também uma comparação quantitativa entre as tarifas de importação e os impostos

internos.

No caso de referência, caso 360 (India – Addictional Import Duties), o órgão afirmou que, “quando

uma tarifa é imposta em excesso aos correspondentes tributos internos, é parte integral da análise

determinar o quanto esta carga é justificada de acordo com o Artigo II:2(a)” (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R).

Outra deliberação importante do Órgão de Apelação é de que o conceito “equivalente” e

“consistência com o parágrafo 2 do Artigo III” não podem ser interpretados isoladamente um do

outro, pois eles se comunicam entre si e requerem uma “leitura conjunta” (Relatório do Órgão de

Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R). Além disso,

não é necessário que o demandante entre com uma representação de violação do Artigo II:2(a) em

conjunto com a do Artigo III:2 para que este último seja levado em consideração, pois ao acionar o

primeiro, automaticamente o último deve ser analisado (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso

India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 181, WT/DS360/AB/R). Em resumo, a imposição do

tributo “de forma consistente com o Artigo III:2” é parcela integrante da determinação em relação

ao Artigo II:2(a), a fim de determinar o quanto uma tarifa e os impostos internos são equivalentes.

O Órgão de Apelação deliberou também sobre qual parte contratante deve ser responsável por

providenciar prova em casos de suspeita de violação do Artigo II:2(a). A decisão do Órgão de

Apelação foi de que a atribuição do ônus da prova deve ser julgada “caso a caso, provisão por

provisão e medida por medida” (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional

Import Duties, para. 186, WT/DS360/AB/R).

De conformidade com o disposto no parágrafo 2 do Artigo III

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

O Painel decidiu que o elemento de consistência com o Artigo III.2 não é uma condição necessária

para a aplicação do Artigo II:2(a) (Relatório do Painel no caso India – Addictional Import Duties,

para. 2.212, DS360). Todavia, tal entendimento foi modificado pelo Órgão de Apelação, que exigiu

a observância do Artigo III.2 do GATT na verificação de equivalência entre encargos aduaneiros e

impostos internos. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India – Addictional Import Duties,

para. 181, DS360).

30

Ademais, o Painel entendia ser necessário um questionamento específico para o Artigo III.2 do

GATT, caso o demandante desejasse a análise da equivalência entre impostos internos e encargos

aduaneiros, prevista no Artigo II:2(a) do GATT, à luz do Artigo III.2 do GATT (Relatório do Painel

no caso India – Addictional Import Duties, para. 2.215, DS360). Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação

reverteu esse entendimento, pois considera que a análise do Artigo III.2 do GATT é inerente à

verificação do Artigo II.2(a) neste aspecto (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India –

Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, DS360).

5. Relação com outros Artigos

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura

Observa-se que o Artigo II do GATT não foi alterado durante a Rodada Uruguai. Assim, o Órgão

de Apelação, ao analisar a relação entre o GATT (Artigos II e XIII) e o Acordo sobre Agricultura

no caso EC – Bananas III, seguiu a jurisprudência do antigo GATT, especificamente contida no

caso US – Restrições na Importação de Açúcar. Tal decisão determinou que um Membro pode

estabelecer seus direitos relacionados a compromissos tarifários, desde que não diminua as

obrigações assumidas no âmbito do GATT (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas

III, para. 154, DS27). Desse modo, o Órgão de Apelação corroborou também a decisão do Painel no

caso EC – Bananas III, que havia registrado a violação das Comunidades Europeias com

fundamentação semelhante (Relatório do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III, paras. 7.113-7.114,

DS27). Cabe pontuar que tal decisão vai ao encontro do parágrafo 3 do Protocolo de Marraqueche.

Já no tocante a aspectos relacionados a produtos agrícolas, o relatório do Órgão de Apelação no

caso EC – Bananas III estatui a aplicação dos compromissos assumidos pelos Membros

relacionados a acesso a mercados, respeitando os dispositivos específicos do Acordo sobre

Agricultura. (Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas III, para. 155, DS27).

Ressalte-se que o Acordo sobre Agricultura, por ser mais específico que o GATT, deve prevalecer

sobre este nos casos de conflito aparente entre tais normas.

Artigo XXVIII do GATT

Jacqueline Spolador Lopes

No caso EC – Bananas III o Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 se manifestou sobre a

relação do Artigo II com o Artigo XXVIII do GATT, ressaltando que tal análise não era objeto do

seu termo de referência. Não obstante, concluiu que um Membro continua vinculado a sua lista de

concessões até a conclusão do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT. (Relatório do

Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso EC — Bananas III, para. 7.454, DS27).

Já o Órgão de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do caso em questão destacou que a

modificação da lista de concessões não exige uma emenda formal nos termos do Artigo X do

Acordo da OMC. Essa alteração é efetuada por meio do procedimento estabelecido no Artigo

XXVIII do GATT ou por meio de rodadas multilaterais de negociações. Assim, decidiu que

eventual modificação ou prorrogação das quotas concedidas pela lista de concessões das

Comunidades Europeias deve ser feita por meio do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do

GATT. Portanto, o Órgão de Apelação corroborou o entendimento do Painel. (Relatório do Órgão

de Apelação do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso EC — Bananas III, paras. 385 e 395,

DS27).

31

Artigo III.2

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article III

National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

3.1 The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws,

regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,

transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring

the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be

applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.

3.2 The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal

charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic

products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other

internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set

forth in paragraph 1.

3.3 With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of

paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April

10, 1947, in which the import duty on the taxed product is bound against increase, the

contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to postpone the application of the provisions

of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain release from the obligations of such

trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty to the extent necessary to

compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax.

3.4 The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other

contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like

products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their

internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of

this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges

which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on

the nationality of the product.

3.5 No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating

to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which

requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which

is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no

contracting party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary

to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.

3.6 The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal quantitative regulation in

forcein the territory of any contracting party on July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or March 24,

1948, at the option of that contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is

contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the detriment of imports

and shall be treated as a customs duty for the purpose of negotiation.

3.7 No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in

specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such

amount or proportion among external sources of supply.

3.8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements

governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for

32

governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the

production of goods for commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively

to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds

of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and

subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

3.9 The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control measures, even though

conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects prejudicial to the interests

of contracting parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, contracting parties applying

such measures shall take account of the interests of exporting contracting parties with a view

to avoiding to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects.

3.10 The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from establishing or

maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films and

meeting the requirements of

Article IV

Notes and Supplementary Provisions

Ad Article III

Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the kind

referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product

and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation,

is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or

requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of

Article III.

Paragraph 1

The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local governments and

authorities with the territory of a contracting party is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph

of Article XXIV. The term “reasonable measures” in the last-mentioned paragraph would not

require, for example, the repeal of existing national legislation authorizing local governments to

impose internal taxes which, although technically inconsistent with the letter of Article III, are not

in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such repeal would result in a serious financial hardship for the

local governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or

authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Article III, the term “reasonable

measures” would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a

transition period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and financial difficulties.

Paragraph 2

A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be

considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where

competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a

directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.

Paragraph 5

Regulations consistent with the provisions of the first sentence of paragraph 5 shall not be

considered to be contrary to the provisions of the second sentence in any case in which all of the

products subject to the regulations are produced domestically in substantial quantities. A regulation

33

cannot be justified as being consistent with the provisions of the second sentence on the ground that

the proportion or amount allocated to each of the products which are the subject of the regulation

constitutes an equitable relationship between imported and domestic products.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo III

Tratamento Nacional no tocante à Tributação e Regulamentação Internas

3.1 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os impostos e outros tributos internos, assim como

leis, regulamentos e exigências relacionadas com a venda, oferta para venda, compra,

transporte, distribuição ou utilização de produtos no mercado interno e as regulamentações

sobre medidas quantitativas internas que exijam a mistura, a transformação ou utilização de

produtos, em quantidade e proporções especificadas, não devem ser aplicados a produtos

importados ou nacionais, de modo a proteger a produção nacional.

3.2 Os produtos do território de qualquer Parte Contratante, importados por outra Parte

Contratante, não estão sujeitos, direta ou indiretamente, a impostos ou outros tributos

internos de qualquer espécie superiores aos que incidem, direta ou indiretamente, sobre

produtos nacionais. Além disso nenhuma Parte Contratante aplicará de outro modo, impostos

ou outros encargos internos a produtos nacionais ou importados, contrariamente aos

princípios estabelecidos no parágrafo 1.

3.3 Relativamente a qualquer imposto interno existente, incompatível com o que dispõe o

parágrafo 2, mas expressamente autorizado por um acordo comercial, em vigor a 10 de abril

de 1947, no qual se estabelece o congelamento do direito de importação que recai sobre um

produto à Parte Contratante que aplica o imposto será lícito protelar a aplicação dos

dispositivos do parágrafo 2 a tal imposto, até que possa obter dispensadas obrigações desse

acordo comercial, de modo a lhe ser permitido aumentar tal direito na medida necessária

compensar a supressão da proteção assegurada pelo imposto.

3.4 Os produtos de território de uma Parte Contratante que entrem no território de outra Parte

Contratante não usufruirão tratamento menos favorável que o concedido a produtos similares

de origem nacional, no que diz respeito às leis, regulamento e exigências relacionadas com a

venda, oferta para venda, compra, transporte, distribuição e utilização no mercado interno. Os

dispositivos deste parágrafo não impedirão a aplicação de tarifas de transporte internas

diferenciais, desde que se baseiem exclusivamente na operação econômica dos meios de

transporte e não na nacionalidade do produto.

3.5 Nenhuma Parte Contratante estabelecerá ou manterá qualquer regulamentação quantitativa

interna que se relacione com a mistura, transformação ou utilização de produtos em

quantidades ou proporções determinadas e que exija, direta ou indiretamente o fornecimento

pelas fontes produtoras nacionais, de quantidade ou proporção determinada de um produto

enquadrado na regulamentação. Além disso, nenhuma Parte Contratante aplicará de outro

modo, regulamentações quantitativas internas, de forma a contrariar os princípios

estabelecidos no parágrafo 1.

3.6 Os dispositivos do parágrafo 5 não se aplicarão a qualquer regulamentação quantitativa

interna em vigor, no território de qualquer Parte Contratante, a 1 de julho de 1939, a 10 de

abril de 1947, ou a 24 de março de 1948, à escolha da Parte Contratante, contanto que

qualquer regulamentação dessa natureza, contrária ao que dispõe o parágrafo 5, não seja

modificada em detrimento de importações e seja tratada como se fosse um direito aduaneiro,

para efeito de negociação.

34

3.7 Nenhuma regulamentação quantitativa interna que se relacione com a mistura, transformação

ou utilização de produtos em quantidades ou proporções determinadas será aplicada, de modo

a repartir qualquer quantidade, ou proporção dessa natureza entre fontes estrangeiras de

suprimento.

3.8 (a) As disposições desse Artigo não se aplicarão às leis, regulamentos ou exigências que

se refiram a aquisições, por órgão governamentais de produtos comprados para atender

às necessidades dos poderes públicos e não se destinam à revenda, no comércio, ou à

produção de bens para venda no comércio.

(b) As disposições deste Artigo não impedirão o pagamento de subsídios exclusivamente a

produtores nacionais compreendidos os pagamentos a produtores nacionais com

recursos provenientes da arrecadação dos impostos ou tributos internos aplicados de

conformidade com os dispositivos deste Artigo e de subsídios concedidos sob a forma

de compra de produtos nacionais pelos poderes públicos.

3.9 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as medidas internas para controle de preços máximos

embora guardem conformidade com outros dispositivos deste Artigo, podem ocasionar

prejuízos aos interesses das Partes Contratantes que fornecem os produtos importados. As

Partes Contratantes que tomarem tais medidas levarão em conta os interesses das Partes

Contratantes exportadoras, com o fim de evitar o mais possível, esses efeitos perniciosos.

3.10 Os dispositivos deste Artigo não impedirão qualquer Parte Contratante de estabelecer ou

manter regulamentações quantitativas internas relativas à exibição de filmes

cinematográficos e de atender às exigências do Artigo IV.

Notas e Disposições Adicionais

Ao Artigo III

Qualquer imposto ou outros tributos internos, bem como qualquer lei, regulamento ou

prescrição mencionados no § 1º que se apliquem não só ao produto importado como também ao

produto nacional similar e que sejam cobrados ou exigidos no caso do produto importado no

momento e no local da importação, serão não obstante considerados como taxa interna ou um outro

tributo interno ou como uma lei, regulamentação ou exigências regidas no § 1º e estão

consequentemente sujeitas às disposições do Artigo III.

Parágrafo primeiro

A aplicação do parágrafo primeiro às taxas internas cobradas pelas autoridades

governamentais ou administrativas locais do território de uma Parte Contratante é regida pelas

disposições constantes do último parágrafo do Artigo XXIV. A expressão “medidas razoáveis que

estejam a seu alcance” que figura nesse parágrafo não deve ser interpretada como obrigando, por

exemplo uma Parte Contratante a revogar uma legislação nacional que dá às autoridades

mencionadas acima, o poder de aplicar taxas internas que sejam contrárias na forma, à letra do

Artigo III, sem contratarem, de fato, o espírito deste Artigo se essa extinção trouxer graves

dificuldades financeiras para as autoridades locais interessadas. No que concerne às taxas cobradas

por essas autoridades locais e que sejam contrárias à letra e ao espírito do Artigo III, a expressão

“medidas razoáveis que estejam a seu alcance” permite a uma Parte Contratante elimina

progressivamente essas taxas no curso de um período de transição, se a sua supressão imediata

ameace provocar graves dificuldades administrativas e financeiras.

Parágrafo 2

Uma taxa que satisfaça às prescrições da primeira frase do parágrafo 2 somente deve ser

considerada como incompatível com as prescrições da Segunda frase nos casos em que haja

35

concorrência entre de um lado, o produto taxado e de outro, um produto diretamente competidor ou

que possa ser substituto direto e que não seja taxado igualmente.

Parágrafo 5

As medidas de regulamentação compatíveis com as disposições da primeira frase do

parágrafo 5 não serão consideradas como contrárias às disposições da segunda frase se o país que

aplica a regulamentação produz em quantidade substancial todos os produtos a ela submetidos. Não

se poderá invocar o fato de que na atribuição de uma determinada proporção ou quantidade de cada

um dos produtos submetidos à regulamentação guardou-se uma relação quantitativa entre os

produtos nacionais e os importados para sustentar que uma regulamentação está conforme com as

disposições da Segunda frase.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo III:2

1. Artigo III.2, primeira frase – significado de “produtos similares aos nacionais” (“like

domestic products”)

a) Definição de “produtos similares” (“like products”)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic

Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras.

112-114

Para. 112. “Because the second sentence of Article III:2 provides for a separate and distinctive

consideration of the protective aspect of a measure in examining its application to a broader

category of products that are not “like products” as contemplated by the first sentence, we agree

with the Panel that the first sentence of Article III:2 must be construed narrowly so as not to

condemn measures that its strict terms are not meant to condemn.”

Para. 113. “How narrowly is a matter that should be determined separately for each tax measure in

each case. We agree with the practice under the GATT 1947 of determining whether imported and

domestic products are “like” on a case-by-case basis.”

Para. 114. “No one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for all cases. The criteria

in Border Tax Adjustments should be examined, but there can be no one precise and absolute

definition of what is “like”. The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an

accordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as different

provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those

places must be determined by the particular provision in which the term “like” is encountered as

well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision

may apply.”

b) “Critérios”

36

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic

Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras.

113-115

Para. 113. “(…) In applying the criteria cited in Border Tax Adjustments to the facts of any

particular case, and in considering other criteria that may also be relevant in certain cases, panels

can only apply their best judgement in determining whether in fact products are “like”. This will

always involve an unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgement …”.

Para. 114. “(…) it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering the various

characteristics of products in individual cases.”

“Uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System (the “HS”) was recognized in GATT

1947 practice as providing a useful basis for confirming “likeness” in products. However, there is a major difference

between tariff classification nomenclature and tariff bindings or concessions made by Members of the WTO under Article

of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 115. “(…) tariff bindings that include a wide range of products are not a reliable criterion for

determining or confirming product “likeness” under Article III:2.”

2. Artigo III.2, primeira frase – significado de “superiores aos que incidem” (“in excess

of”)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic

Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras.

112 e 115

Para. 112. “(…) Read in their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose of the WTO

Agreement, the words of the first sentence require an examination of the conformity of an internal

tax measure with Article III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic

products are “like” and, second, whether the taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess

of” those applied to the like domestic products. If the imported and domestic products are “like

products”, and if the taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the

like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence.”

Para. 115. “(…) Even the smallest amount of “excess” is too much. “The prohibition of

discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is

it qualified by a de minimis standard.”

3. Artigo III.2, segunda frase – significado de “produto diretamente competidor ou que

possa ser substituto direto” (“like” and “directly competitive or substitutable”

products)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages

II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 117

37

Para. 117. “(…) As with “like products” under the first sentence, the determination of the

appropriate range of “directly competitive or substitutable products” under the second sentence

must be made on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only

at such matters as physical characteristics, common end-uses, and tariff classifications, but also at

the “market-place”. This seems appropriate. (…) It does not seem inappropriate to look at

competition in the relevant markets as one among a number of means of identifying the broader

category of products that might be described as “directly competitive or substitutable”. Nor does it

seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as one means of examining those relevant

markets.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic

Beverages), Demandante: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS75/AB/R, paras. 114-115,

118, 120, 124, 127, 134, 137 e 142-143

Para. 114. “The term “directly competitive or substitutable” describes a particular type of

relationship between two products, one imported and the other domestic. It is evident from the

wording of the term that the essence of that relationship is that the products are in competition. This

much is clear both from the word “competitive” which means “characterized by competition”, and

from the word “substitutable” which means “able to be substituted”. The context of the competitive

relationship is necessarily the marketplace since this is the forum where consumers choose between

different products. Competition in the market-place is a dynamic, evolving process. Accordingly,

the wording of the term “directly competitive or substitutable” implies that the competitive

relationship between products is not to be analyzed exclusively by reference to current consumer

preferences. In our view, the word “substitutable” indicates that the requisite relationship may exist

between products that are not, at a given moment, considered by consumers to be substitutes but

which are, nonetheless, capable of being substituted for one another.”

Para. 115. “Thus, according to the ordinary meaning of the term, products are competitive or

substitutable when they are interchangeable or if they offer, as the Panel noted, “alternative ways of

satisfying a particular need or taste”. Particularly in a market where there are regulatory barriers to

trade or to competition, there may well be latent demand.”

Para. 118. “(…) “Like” products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all

like products are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all

“directly competitive or substitutable” products are “like”. The notion of like products must be

construed narrowly but the category of directly competitive or substitutable products is broader.

While perfectly substitutable products fall within Article III:2, first sentence, imperfectly

substitutable products can be assessed under Article III:2, second sentence.”

Para. 120. “In view of the objectives of avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive

conditions and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships, we decline to take a static

view of the term “directly competitive or substitutable.” The object and purpose of Article III

confirms that the scope of the term “directly competitive or substitutable” cannot be limited to

situations where consumers already regard products as alternatives. If reliance could be placed only

on current instances of substitution, the object and purpose of Article III:2 could be defeated by the

protective taxation that the provision aims to prohibit.”

38

Para. 124. “(…) the term “directly competitive or substitutable” does not prevent a panel from

taking account of evidence of latent consumer demand as one of a range of factors to be considered

when assessing the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products under Article

III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 127. “(…) the object and purpose of Article III is the maintenance of equality of competitive

conditions for imported and domestic products. It is, therefore, not only legitimate, but even

necessary, to take account of this purpose in interpreting the term “directly competitive or

substitutable product”.

Para. 134. “In taking issue with the use of the term “nature of competition”, Korea, in effect,

objects to the Panel’s sceptical attitude to quantification of the competitive relationship between

imported and domestic products. For the reasons set above, we share the Panel’s reluctance to rely

unduly on quantitative analyses of the competitive relationship. In our view, an approach that

focused solely on the quantitative overlap of competition would, in essence, make cross-price

elasticity the decisive criterion in determining whether products are “directly competitive or

substitutable”.”

Para. 137. “It is, of course, true that the “directly competitive or substitutable” relationship must be

present in the market at issue. (…) It is also true that consumer responsiveness to products may vary

from country to country. This does not, however, preclude consideration of consumer behaviour in

a country other than the one at issue. It seems to us that evidence from other markets may be

pertinent to the examination of the market at issue, particularly when demand on that market has

been influenced by regulatory barriers to trade or to competition. Clearly, not every other market

will be relevant to the market at issue. But if another market displays characteristics similar to the

market at issue, then evidence of consumer demand in that other market may have some relevance

to the market at issue. This, however, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking

account of all relevant facts.”

Para. 142. “(…) Some grouping is almost always necessary in cases arising under Article III:2,

second sentence, since generic categories commonly include products with some variation in

composition, quality, function and price, and thus commonly give rise to sub-categories. From a

slightly different perspective, we note that “grouping” of products involves at least a preliminary

characterization by the treaty interpreter that certain products are sufficiently similar as to, for

instance, composition, quality, function and price, to warrant treating them as a group for

convenience in analysis. But, the use of such “analytical tools” does not relieve a panel of its duty

to make an objective assessment of whether the components of a group of imported products are

directly competitive or substitutable with the domestic products.”

Para. 143. “Whether, and to what extent, products can be grouped is a matter to be decided on a

case-by-case basis.”

4. Artigo III.2, segunda frase – significado de “não seja taxado igualmente” (“not similarly

taxed”)

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic

Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canadá e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras.

118-119

39

Para. 118. “To interpret “in excess of” and “not similarly taxed” identically would deny any

distinction between the first and second sentences of Article III:2. Thus, in any given case, there

may be some amount of taxation on imported products that may well be “in excess of” the tax on

domestic “like products” but may not be so much as to compel a conclusion that “directly

competitive or substitutable” imported and domestic products are “not similarly taxed” for the

purposes of the Ad Article to Article III:2, second sentence. In other words, there may be an amount

of excess taxation that may well be more of a burden on imported products than on domestic

“directly competitive or substitutable products” but may nevertheless not be enough to justify a

conclusion that such products are “not similarly taxed” for the purposes of Article III:2, second

sentence.”

Para.119. “(…) We agree with the Panel that this amount of differential taxation must be more than

de minimis to be deemed “not similarly taxed” in any given case. And, like the Panel, we believe

that whether any particular differential amount of taxation is de minimis or is not de minimis must,

here too, be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, to be “not similarly taxed”, the tax burden on

imported products must be heavier than on “directly competitive or substitutable” domestic

products, and that burden must be more than de minimis in any given case.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile – Alcoholic

Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/AB/R, paras. 49 e 52-53

Para. 49. “(…) We must, therefore, assess the relative tax burden imposed on directly competitive

or substitutable domestic and imported products.”

Para. 52. “(…) The examination under the second issue must, therefore, take into account the fact

that the group of directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products at issue in

this case is not limited solely to beverages of a specific alcohol content, falling within a particular

fiscal category, but covers all the distilled alcoholic beverages in each and every fiscal category

under the New Chilean System.”

Para. 53. “A comprehensive examination of this nature, which looks at all of the directly

competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products, shows that the tax burden on imported

products, most of which will be subject to a tax rate of 47 per cent, will be heavier than the tax

burden on domestic products, most of which will be subject to a tax rate of 27 per cent.”

III. Comentários

No tocante ao Artigo III.2, é possível constatar que sua interpretação pelo Órgão de Apelação

inicia-se no caso Japão – Bebidas Alcoólicas II. De acordo com essa decisão, para o Art. III não

importa a intenção, ou seja, não importa se o Membro desenhou sua regulação interna no sentido de

favorecer empresas nacionais, mas apenas se a regulação interna objetivamente concede essa

proteção.

De fato, o Artigo III estabelece alguns parâmetros para a investigação da proteção interna: ele

distingue entre os produtos nacionais que podem ser qualificados como “similares” de produtos

importados (primeira frase do segundo parágrafo) e os produtos internos que são “diretamente

competidores e substitutos” dos importados (segunda frase do segundo parágrafo).

40

Esses dois tipos de produtos estão sujeitos a conceitos jurídicos distintos: se, de um lado, o conceito

de produtos “similares” parece ambíguo, de outro o conceito que se aplica a produtos “diretamente

competidores e substitutos” e a distinção entre essas duas categorias está muito mais clara.

No caso Japão – Bebidas Alcoólicas II, o Órgão de Apelação foi claro ao afirmar que “even the

smallest amount of excess is too much… The prohibition under Article III.2, first sentence, is not

conditional on a trade effects test nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard”. Esta afirmação nos

faz indagar como são aferidos os “produtos similares”, e, em particular, como os “produtos

similares” podem ser diferenciados dos “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”.

Como esclarecido nas várias decisões do Órgão de Apelação acima mencionadas, os “produtos

similares” são espécie do gênero “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”. Produtos

similares importados ou nacionais devem supostamente possuir mais características físicas em

comum e devem, ordinariamente, estar sujeitos aos mesmos impostos.

No tocante aos produtos “competidores e substitutos”, o critério jurídico não é tão claro. Em

primeiro lugar, a diferença no tratamento de produtos estrangeiros e nacionais está sujeita a um

critério minimalista. Ou seja, para que seja proibido, será necessário demonstrar que o tratamento

de produtos nacionais e importados não é similar. Em segundo lugar, como a segunda frase do

Artigo III.2 faz referência expressa ao primeiro parágrafo do mesmo dispositivo, entende-se que,

para que seja proibido, é imprescindível demonstrar também que a diferença de tratamento de

produtos nacionais e estrangeiros é o que efetivamente confere proteção àquele.

As diferenças entre produtos “similares” e produtos “competidores diretos e substitutos” e seus

critérios restritivos parecem estar associadas à presunção de que se dois produtos são bastante

semelhantes, qualquer diferença de tratamento entre eles traduzirá em uma proteção significativa

para o produto que se beneficiará de condições mais favoráveis. Neste caso, presume-se que o efeito

de proteção existe e é significativo. De outro lado, se os produtos são mais diferenciados, o sentido

do efeito de proteção tem que ser demonstrado. Esta presunção, todavia, parece não estar correta. Se

o grau de proteção se eleva na proporção do aumento da possibilidade de substituição de um

produto pelo outro, isto não é condição suficiente para gerar uma proteção necessariamente

significativa.

Daí porque, deve-se questionar o sentido prático de distinguir entre os critérios jurídicos aplicados a

produtos “similares” e produtos “competidores diretos e substitutos”.

Em primeiro lugar, a distinção entre os dois tipos de produtos não é, na prática, nada fácil. De

acordo com as decisões do Órgão de Apelação acima mencionadas, essa distinção deve ser feita

caso a caso e não existe um critério único que possa ser usado em todos os casos. Como já dito,

existe um aparente consenso de que “produtos similares” devem compartilhar mesmas

características físicas e produtos “competidores diretos e substitutos” devem ser aferidos de acordo

com regras de mercado, levando-se em conta a similaridade no uso final do produto. No entanto,

mais do que isto, quase nenhuma outra informação sistemática pode ser extraída das decisões do

Órgão de Apelação.

Em segundo lugar, a distinção entre critérios jurídicos aplicáveis a dois tipos de produtos é

imaterial. O caso do Japão – Bebidas Alcoólicas II é emblemático: ficou decidido pelo painel que

“for it to conclude that dissimilar taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for it to find

that the dissimilarity is not de minimis”. Em outras palavras, se a diferença de tratamento é muito

grande, o efeito protetivo pode ser presumido (no caso de “produtos similares”). Daí porque, a

única diferença entre o critério aplicado a produtos “similares” e “diretamente competidores e

substitutos” estaria relacionada à importância do tratamento da desigualdade. No entanto, o Órgão

de Apelação discordou desse entendimento e afirmou que a questão de aferir se a proteção foi

concedida deve ser entendida separadamente da questão de aferir se o tratamento foi desigual.

41

Infelizmente, contudo, o Órgão de Apelação somente discorreu vagamente sobre o tema de como

aferir a proteção, referindo que, acima da importância do tratamento desigual, existem “other

factors to be considered”. Não se encontra esclarecido quais devem ser esses “other factors”.

Conclui-se, portanto, que nenhuma avaliação dos efeitos da proteção é necessária para “produtos

similares”, diferentemente do que ocorre com os “produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos”.

É certo que os Painéis da OMC evitam padrões quantitativos. Mesmo assim, para verificar se um

produto substitui outro é obviamente uma questão de gradação, já que não existe padrão para

decidir quando a substituição é pequena o suficiente para considerar que os produtos não são

competidores diretos. Pelo mesmo motivo, os painéis da OMC não têm considerado nenhum padrão

para avaliar a desigualdade entre produtos.

Esses Painéis têm tentado identificar “produtos similares” e “produtos diretamente competidores e

substitutos” separadamente de sua avaliação da importância das barreiras que são criadas para as

empresas estrangeiras (a importância da desigualdade no tratamento). Mesmo assim, pode-se

reconhecer que a proteção é, verdadeiramente, uma questão de gradação e não uma questão de

princípios.

Ademais, o quanto as empresas nacionais protegem-se por barreiras não-tarifárias será determinado

(entre outros fatores) pelo grau de substituição entre produtos nacionais e estrangeiros e a

importância da barreira imposta. Em outras palavras, se o Artigo III expressa um padrão quanto ao

grau de proteção, não se pode escapar de estabelecer também algum nível de padrão para o que é

considerado um grau de proteção admissível. Desta feita, a avaliação da proteção atual em face do

padrão deveria considerar conjuntamente a importância da barreira e o grau de substituição entre os

produtos nacionais e estrangeiros.

42

Artigo IV

43

Artigo V

44

Artigo VI

45

Artigo VII

46

Artigo VIII

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article VIII

Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation*

8.1 (a) All fees and charges of whatever character (other than import and export duties and

other than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in

connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost

of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a

taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes.

(b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of

fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a).

(c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and

complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying

import and export documentation requirements.*

8.2 A contracting party shall, upon request by another contracting party or by the

CONTRACTING PARTIES, review the operation of its laws and regulations in the light of

the provisions of this Article.

8.3 No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs

regulations or procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any omission or

mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously made without

fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than necessary to serve merely as a

warning.

8.4 The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and requirements

imposed by governmental authorities in connection with importation and exportation,

including those relating to:

(a) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates;

(b) quantitative restrictions;

(c) licensing;

(d) exchange control;

(e) statistical services;

(f) documents, documentation and certification;

(g) analysis and inspection; and

(h) quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo VIII

Formalidades Relativas à importação e à exportação

8.1 As partes Contratantes reconhecem que os direitos e taxas que não sejam os direitos

alfandegários impostos pelas autoridades governamentais à importação ou à exportação ou

relativos à importação ou exportação, deveriam limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços

prestados e não constituir uma proteção indireta aos produtos nacionais ou taxas de caráter

fiscal sobre a importação ou a exportação.

47

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, igualmente, a necessidade de limitar o número e a diversidade

desses direitos e taxas, de reduzir ao mínimo os efeitos e a complexidade das formalidades de

importação e de exportação e de reduzir e simplificar as formalidades relativas aos documentos a

fornecer em matéria de importação e de exportação.

8.2 As Partes Contratantes tomarão logo que possível medidas de acordo com os princípios e

objetivos mencionados no parágrafo 1 do presente Artigo. Além disso, examinarão, cada vez

que outra Parte Contratante o solicitar, a aplicação de qualquer lei ou de qualquer

regulamento à luz dos referidos princípios.

8.3 Nenhuma Parte Contratante imporá penalidades severas por ligeiras infrações à

regulamentação ou ao processo aduaneiro. Em particular, as penalidades pecuniárias

impostas em virtude de omissões ou erros nos documentos apresentados à Alfândega não

excederão, nos casos em que forem facilmente reparáveis e manifestamente isentos de

qualquer intenção fraudulenta, que não correspondam a negligência grave, importância que

represente uma simples advertência.

8.4 As disposições do presente Artigo se estenderão aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e

exigências impostas pelas autoridades governamentais em conexão com a importação e

exportação, inclusive no que disser respeito:

a) às formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares:

b) às restrições quantitativas;

c) às licenças;

d) ao controle de câmbios;

e) aos serviços de estatística;

f) aos documentos a exibir, à documentação e à emissão de certificados;

g) às análises e às verificações;

h) à quarentena, à inspeção sanitária e à desinfeção

(Lei nº 313, de 30 de julho de 1948)

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

De modo geral, a tradução do Artigo VIII do GATT não observa integralmente a forma e o teor da

versão em inglês do referido dispositivo normativo. Em relação à forma, destaca-se que o texto do

Artigo traduzido não foi estruturado da mesma maneira que o original em inglês. Ademais, cumpre

notar que na tradução suprimiu-se a referência expressa ao Artigo III do GATT. Quanto ao

conteúdo, verifica-se que certas palavras foram suprimidas da versão em português. Abaixo está

proposta de tradução do Artigo:

“Artigo VIII: Taxas e Formalidades Relativas à importação e à exportação

1) (a) Todas as taxas e cobranças de qualquer natureza (exceto direitos de importação e

exportação e tributos abrangidos no escopo do Artigo III) impostos pelas autoridades

governamentais à importação ou à exportação ou relativos à importação ou exportação, deveriam

limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados e não constituir uma proteção indireta aos

produtos nacionais ou tributação sobre a importação ou a exportação.

(b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and

charges referred to in subparagraph (a).

(c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of

import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation

requirements.*

48

(b) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem a necessidade de limitar o número e a diversidade desses

direitos e taxas referidos no subitem (a), acima.

(c) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, igualmente, a necessidade de reduzir ao mínimo os efeitos e

a complexidade das formalidades de importação e de exportação e de reduzir e simplificar as

formalidades relativas aos documentos a fornecer em matéria de importação e de exportação.

2. Uma Parte Contratante, mediante requerimento de outra parte contratante ou das PARTES

CONTRATANTES, deverá rever a aplicação de suas leis e regulamentação à luz do disposto neste

Artigo.

3. Nenhuma Parte Contratante imporá penalidades severas por infrações leves à regulamentação

ou aos procedimentos aduaneiros. Em particular, as penalidades impostas em decorrência de

omissões ou erros referentes à documentação alfandegária, que forem de fácil retificação, desde que

ocasionados sem propósito fraudulento ou por negligência grave, não deverão ser impostas além do

necessário para representar uma simples advertência.

4. As disposições do presente Artigo se estenderão aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e

exigências impostas pelas autoridades governamentais em conexão com a importação e exportação,

inclusive no que disser respeito:

a) às formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares:

b) às restrições quantitativas;

c) às licenças;

d) ao controle de câmbios;

e) aos serviços de estatística;

f) aos documentos a exibir, à documentação e à certificação;

g) às análises e às inspeções; e

h) à quarentena, à inspeção sanitária e à desinfeção.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo VIII

1. Definição dos termos “limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Apparel and other Items (Argentina – Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R,

para. 6.75

Ao interpretar a expressão “limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos serviços prestados”, o Painel em

Argentina – Textil and Apparel reproduziu trechos constantes de relatório do caso US - Customs

User Fee (35S/245). Reiterou-se que a expressão impõe um requisito duplo. Primeiro, as taxas e

cobranças devem envolver a prestação de determinado serviço. Segundo, o valor cobrado não deve

exceder o custo dos serviços prestados.

Para. 6.75. “The meaning of Article VIII was examined in detail in the Panel Report on. The panel

found that Article VIII’s requirement that the charge be ‘limited in amount to the approximate cost

of services rendered’ is ‘actually a dual requirement, because the charge in question must first

involve a ‘service’ rendered, and then the level of the charge must not exceed the approximate cost

of that ‘service’. According to the panel report, the term ‘services rendered’ means ‘services

rendered to the individual importer in question’.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel no caso US – Certain EC Products,

Demandante: EUA, WT/DS165/R, para. 6.69

2. Imposição de Taxas ad valorem Ilimitadas

49

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R,

para. 6.75

O DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que a imposição de taxas ad valorem ilimitadas está em

desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo VIII do GATT. Justificou-se que a imposição de taxas

sob a referida modalidade não refletiria o custos dos serviços prestados, portanto não se limitaria ao

custo aproximado dos serviços prestados.

Para. 6.75. “An ad valorem duty with no fixed maximum fee, by its very nature, is not ‘limited in

amount to the approximate cost of services rendered’. For example, high-price items necessarily

will bear a much greater tax burden than low-price goods, yet the service accorded to both is

essentially the same. An unlimited ad valorem charge on imported goods violates the provisions of

Article VIII because such a charge cannot be related to the cost of the service rendered.”

3. Taxas alfandegárias com propósitos fiscais

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R,

paras. 6.77-6.78

O DSB esclareceu que o Artigo VIII do GATT veda a imposição de taxas alfandegárias com

propósitos fiscais (arrecadatórios).

Para. 6.77. “(…) While the gathering of statistical information concerning imports may benefit

traders in general, Article VIII bars the levying of any tax or charge on importers to support the

related costs ‘for the individual entry in question’ since it will also benefit exports and exporters.”

Para. 6.78. “As to Argentina’s argument that it was collecting this tax for ‘fiscal’ purposes in the

context of its undertakings with the IMF, we note that not only does Article VIII of GATT

expressly prohibit such measures for fiscal purposes but that clearly a measure for fiscal purposes

will normally lead to a situation where the tax results in charges being levied in excess of the

approximate costs of the statistical services rendered.”

4. Relação com outros Acordos

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,

Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R,

para 6.79

Com base em circunstâncias fáticas, o Painel em Argentina – Textiles and Apparel concluiu que não

haveria nos Acordos da OMC exceções ao disposto no Artigo VIII do GATT. Chegou-se à mesma

conclusão em relação ao acordo firmado entre OMC e FMI, à Declaração sobre a relação entre a

OMC e o FMI, bem como à Declaração sobre a Contribuição da OMC para alcançar maior

coerência na Política Econômica Global.

Para. 6.79. “(…) Argentina argues that the tax should be found to comply with Article VIII, if

necessary through a less strict application of the requirements of Article VIII of GATT than was

adopted in the Customs Users Fee. We find no exception in the WTO Agreement that would excuse

Argentina's compliance with the requirements of Article VIII of GATT. Moreover, we see nothing

in the Agreement between the IMF and the WTO, the Declaration on the Relationship of the World

Trade Organization with the International Monetary Fund and the Declaration on the Contribution

of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic

Policymaking that suggests that we should interpret Article VIII as argued by Argentina.”

50

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina –

Textiles and Apparel, Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/AB/R, para. 74

5. Definição dos termos “taxas” e “cobranças”

Relatório do Painel China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials

(China - Raw Materials), Demandantes: União Europeia, México e EUA,

WT/DS394/DS395/DS398/R, para. 7.844

O DSB interpretou de forma ampla os termos “taxas” (i.e. fees) e “cobranças” (i.e. charges)

constantes do Artigo VIII do GATT. De acordo com a definição adotada pelo Painel em China –

Raw Materials, “taxas” e “cobranças” previstas no Artigo VIII do GATT devem: (a) ser impostas

de forma relacionada a importações ou exportações; e (b) ser cobradas em contrapartida a prestação

de serviços.

Para. 7.844. “The Panel concluded above that the meaning of ‘fees’ or ‘charges’ that fall within the

scope of Article VIII is broad. Notwithstanding this view, the Panel concluded further that only fees

imposed ‘on or in connection with importation or exportation’ and collected in exchange for a

‘service rendered’ may be considered as falling within the scope of Article VIII:1(a). The Panel

noted that typically such fees or charges would include payments provided for customs-related

documentary, certification and inspection, and statistical activities.”

III. Comentários

Poucos foram os precedentes em que o DSB analisou detidamente o conteúdo do Artigo VIII do

GATT. Nos relatórios em que o dispositivo em questão foi apreciado, focou-se em expressões

constantes do primeiro parágrafo do Artigo, tais como: “taxas”, “cobranças” e “serviços prestados”.

A partir da análise de precedentes, resta claro que taxas e cobranças impostas por autoridades

governamentais nos termos do Artigo VIII do GATT devem: (a) ter como contrapartida a prestação

de serviços; (b) ser impostas de forma relacionada a importações ou exportações; e (c) estar

limitadas ao custo dos serviços efetivamente prestados. Referidas taxas e cobranças não poderiam,

portanto, ser impostas de forma ilimitada, bem como com propósitos arrecadatórios.

Não obstante, pelo fato de o Artigo VIII do GATT ser dotado de linguagem ampla, é possível

identificar diversas lacunas interpretativas. O disposto no parágrafo 3 do Artigo VIII é exemplo

disso, visto que até o momento não houve posicionamentos em relação ao significado dos termos

“penalidades substanciais por infrações leves”.

51

Artigo X

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article X

Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations

10.1 Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made

effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products

for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements,

restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or

affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection,

exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as

to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting

international trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental

agency of any contracting party and the government or governmental agency of any other

contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this paragraph shall not require

any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law

enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate

commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.

10.2 No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a

rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or

imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on

the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially

published.

10.3(a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable

manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in

paragraph 1 of this Article.

(b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial,

arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the

prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters.

Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with

administrative enforcement and their decisions shall be implemented by, and shall

govern the practice of, such agencies unless an appeal is lodged with a court or

tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed for appeals to be lodged

by importers; Provided that the central administration of such agency may take steps

to obtain a review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to

believe that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the

actual facts.

(c) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the elimination

or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date

of this Agreement which in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of

administrative action even though such procedures are not fully or formally

independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement. Any

contracting party employing such procedures shall, upon request, furnish the

CONTRACTING PARTIES with full information thereon in order that they may

determine whether such procedures conform to the requirements of this

subparagraph.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

52

Artigo X

Publicação e Apuração dos Regulamentos Relativos Ao Comércio

10.1 As leis, regulamentos, decisões judiciárias e administrativas de aplicação geral, adotados por

qualquer Parte Contratante e que visem à classificação ou avaliação dos produtos para fins

aduaneiros, às tarifas de Alfândegas, taxas e outras despesas, ou às prescrições, restrições ou

interdições de importação ou de exportação, ou a transferência de pagamentos que lhes digam

respeito, ou que se refiram à sua venda, sua distribuição, seu transporte ou seu seguro, ou à

sua estadia em entreposto, sua inspeção, sua exposição, sua transformação, sua mistura ou

outras utilizações, serão prontamente publicados de maneira a permitir aos Governos ou aos

comerciantes deles tomar conhecimento. Os acordos em vigor entre o Governo ou um órgão

governamental de qualquer Parte Contratante e o Governo ou um órgão governamental de

uma outra Parte Contratante que afetem a política econômica internacional serão igualmente

publicados. O presente parágrafo não obrigará uma Parte Contratante a revelar informações

de ordem confidencial que constituam obstáculo à aplicação das leis ou que, por outro lado,

sejam contrários ao interesse público ou tragam prejuízo aos interesses comerciais legítimos

de empresas públicas ou particulares.

10.2 Nenhuma medida de ordem geral, que possa tomar uma Parte Contratante e que tenha por

consequência uma elevação do nível de um direito alfandegário ou de outra taxa imposta à

importação em virtude de usos estabelecidos e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrição,

uma restrição ou uma interdição novas ou agravadas em matéria de importação ou de

transferência de fundos relativos a uma importação deverá ser posta em vigor antes de ter

sido publicada oficialmente.

10.3 (a) Cada Parte Contratante manterá ou aplicará de maneira uniforme, imparcial e

equitativa todos os regulamentos, leis, decisões judiciárias e administrativas da

categoria visada no parágrafo 1 de presente Artigo.

(b) Cada Parte Contratante manterá ou instituirá, logo que possível, tribunais judiciários,

administrativos ou de arbitragem, ou instâncias que tenham por fim especialmente

reexaminar e retificar prontamente as medidas administrativas relacionadas com as

questões aduaneiras. Esses tribunais ou instâncias serão independentes dos

organismos encarregados de aplicação das medidas administrativas e suas decisões

serão executadas por esses organismos, cuja prática administrativa dirigirão

igualmente, a menos que seja interposta apelação junto a uma jurisdição superior nos

prazos previstos para as apelações interpostas pelos importadores, ressalvada a

possibilidade da administração central de tal organismo tomar medidas com o fim de

obter uma revisão da questão em uma outra ação, se houver base para supor que a

decisão é incompatível com os princípios fixados pela lei ou com a realidade dos

fatos.

(c) Disposição alguma da alínea (b) do presente parágrafo exigirá a eliminação ou

substituição dos processos em vigor no território de uma Parte Contratante no dia da

assinatura do presente Acordo, que prevejam uma revisão imparcial das decisões

administrativas, ainda mesmo que esses procedimentos não sejam plena ou

oficialmente independentes dos organismos encarregados da aplicação das medidas

administrativas. Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar tais processos deverá,

quando solicitada, comunicar às Partes Contratantes todas as informações pertinentes

que as habilitem a decidir se esses processos estão de acordo com a prescrição da

presente alínea.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

53

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo X do GATT 1994

1. Objeto do Artigo

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of

Certain Poultry Products (EC – Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115

Para. 115. “Article X relates to the publication and administration of ‘laws, regulations, judicial

decisions and administrative rulings of general application’, rather than to the substantive content of

such measures. Thus, to the extent that Brazil’s appeal relates to the substantive content of the EC

rules themselves, and not to their publication or administration, that appeal falls outside the scope of

Article X of the GATT 1994.”

2. Artigo X:1: primeira frase – significado do termo “de aplicação geral” (“of general

application”)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of

Certain Poultry Products (EC – Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 111 e

113

Para. 111. “Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 makes it clear that Article X does not deal with specific

transactions, but rather with rules ‘of general application’. It is clear to us that the EC rules

pertaining to import licensing set out in Regulation 1431/94 are rules ‘of general application’. (…)

Para. 113. “Although it is true, as Brazil contends, that any measure of general application will

always have to be applied in specific cases, nevertheless, the particular treatment accorded to each

individual shipment cannot be considered a measure ‘of general application’ within the meaning of

Article X. The Panel cited the following passage from the panel report in United States -

Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear:

The mere fact that the restraint at issue was an administrative order

does not prevent us from concluding that the restraint was a

measure of general application. Nor does the fact that it was a

country-specific measure exclude the possibility of it being a

measure of general application. If, for instance, the restraint was

addressed to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment,

it would not have qualified as a measure of general application.

However, to the extent that the restraint affects an unidentified

number of economic operators, including domestic and foreign

producers, we find it to be a measure of general application.”

We agree with the Panel that “conversely, licences issued to a

specific company or applied to a specific shipment cannot be

considered to be a measure ‘of general application’ within the

meaning of Article X.”

3. Artigo X:2

54

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made

Fibre Underwear (US - Underwear), Demandante: Costa Rica, WT/DS24/AB/R, páginas 20-21

Pg. 20. “Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental

importance — that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private

persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy principle is

widely known as the principle of transparency and has obviously due process dimensions. The

essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by

governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, should have a

reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to

protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures.”

Pg. 21. “[W]e are bound to observe that Article X:2 of the General Agreement, does not speak to,

and hence does not resolve, the issue of permissibility of giving retroactive effect to a safeguard

restraint measure. The presumption of prospective effect only does, of course, relate to the basic

principles of transparency and due process, being grounded on, among other things, these

principles. But prior publication is required for all measures falling within the scope of Article X:2,

not just ATC safeguard restraint measures sought to be applied retrospectively. Prior publication

may be an autonomous condition for giving effect at all to a restraint measure. Where no authority

exists to give retroactive effect to a restrictive governmental measure, that deficiency is not cured

by publishing the measure sometime before its actual application. The necessary authorization is

not supplied by Article X:2 of the General Agreement.”

4. Artigo X:3

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp

Products (US – Shrimp), Demandantes: Índia, Paquistão, Tailândia e Malásia,

WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 182-183

Para. 182. “[T]he provision of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 bear upon this matter. In our view,

Section 609 falls within the “laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of

general application” described in Article X:1. Inasmuch there are due process requirements

generally for measures that are otherwise imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is only

reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due process should be

required in the application and administration of a measure which purports to be an exception to the

treaty obligations of the member imposing the measure and which effectively results in a

suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other members.”

Para. 183. “It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain minimum

standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations which,

in our view, are not met here. The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental

procedures applied by the competent officials in the Office of Marine Conservation, the Department

of State, and the United States National Marine Fisheries Service throughout the certification

processes under Section 609, as well as the fact that countries whose applications are denied do not

55

receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons for the denial, and the fact, too, that there is

no formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application, are all contrary

to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.”

b) “Objeto do Artigo”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 200

Para. 200. “The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indicates that the requirements of ‘uniformity,

impartiality and reasonableness’ do not apply to the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings

themselves, but rather to the administration of those laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. The

context of Article X:3(a) within Article X, which is entitled ‘Publication and Administration of

Trade Regulations’, and a reading of the other paragraphs of Article X, make it clear that Article X

applies to the administration of laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. To the extent that the laws,

regulations, decisions and rulings themselves are discriminatory, they can be examined for their

consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994.”

III. Comentários

O objetivo primordial do Artigo X é estabelecer uma certa transparência na publicação e apuração

dos regulamentos relacionados ao comércio internacional. Ou seja, dar publicidade imediata e

adequada às alterações em leis e regulamentos concernentes ao comércio internacional.

No caso CE – Frangos, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a reclamação do Brasil de aplicação retroativa

de medidas de salvaguardas transitórias no Acordo sobre Têxteis e Vestuário estava proibido por

força do Artigo X.

O Artigo X:1 estabelece que cada país-membro deve prontamente publicar suas leis, regulamentos,

decisões judiciais e regras administrativas que afetem o comércio exterior. Acordos que afetem

regras do comércio internacional também devem ser publicados. A publicação deve ocorrer “de

maneira a permitir aos Governos ou aos comerciantes deles tomar conhecimento”. Para lidar com os

possíveis efeitos colaterais negativos decorrentes dessa obrigatoriedade de comunicação, o Artigo

X:1 estabelece que “não obrigará uma Parte Contratante a revelar informações de ordem

confidencial que constituam obstáculo à aplicação das leis ou que, por outro lado, sejam contrários

ao interesse público ou tragam prejuízo aos interesses comerciais legítimos de empresas públicas ou

particulares”.

No caso CE – Frangos, o Órgão de Apelação reformou a decisão do Painel de que certas licenças de

importação da Comunidade Europeia a respeito de determinados produtos de frango violavam o

Artigo X porque a informação solicitada pelo Brasil dizia respeito a um carregamento específico,

fora do objeto do Artigo X (“the information which Brazil claims the EC should have made

available concerns a specific shipment, which is outside the scope of Article X of GATT”).

O Artigo X:2 estabelece que nenhum país-membro pode fazer valer determinadas medidas antes da

respectiva publicação oficial. As medidas cobertas por essa obrigação incluem a “elevação do nível

de um direito alfandegário ou de outra taxa imposta à importação em virtude de usos estabelecidos

e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrição, uma restrição ou uma interdição novas ou

agravadas em matéria de importação ou de transferência de fundos relativos a uma importação”.

56

O Painel Estados Unidos – Restrições quantitativas referentes às roupas de baixo provenientes da

Costa Rica foi estabelecido para decidir se um país-membro está autorizado, quando utilizar

medidas de salvaguardas provisória do Artigo 6 do ATC, a retroagir a aplicação de tais medidas

para a data de publicação do pedido de consulta. O Painel decidiu que o Artigo 6.10 era omisso

sobre a questão, que, por sua vez, deveria ser resolvida segundo o Artigo X do GATT. O Painel

concluiu que “if the importing country publishes the proposed restraint period and restraint level

after the request for consultations, it can later set the initial date of the restraint period as the date of

the publication of the proposed restraint”. No entanto, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da conclusão

do Painel quanto à omissão e entendeu que o Artigo 6.10 proíbe a retroação. Com relação à decisão

do Painel a respeito do Artigo X do GATT, o Órgão de Apelação decidiu que a publicação prévia

da medida, nos termos do referido dispositivo, não pode, por si, justificar o efeito retroativo de

medida governamental restritiva.

O Artigo X:3 determina aos países-membros que apliquem todas as leis, regulamentos decisões

judiciárias e administrativas listadas no parágrafo 1 “de maneira uniforme, imparcial e equitativa”,

devendo manter ou instituir, “logo que possível” tribunais judiciários, administrativos ou de

arbitragem, ou instâncias que tenham por fim especialmente reexaminar e retificar prontamente as

medidas administrativas relacionadas com as questões aduaneiras, gozando esses tribunais de certas

garantias de independência em relação aos órgãos de que fazem parte.

Excetuam-se os procedimentos que prevejam uma revisão imparcial das decisões administrativas,

ainda mesmo que esses procedimentos não sejam plena ou oficialmente independentes dos

organismos encarregados da aplicação das medidas administrativas, se já estiverem em vigor “no

dia da assinatura do presente Acordo”. No entanto, se qualquer Parte Contratante quiser aplicar tais

processos deverá comunicar as demais Partes Contratantes quando solicitada.

Por fim, vale ressaltar que a facilitação comercial (“Trade Facilitation”) é um dos principais temas

da Rodada de Doha de negociações multilaterais da OMC, onde está sendo negociado um “Acordo

de Facilitação Comercial” que tem por objeto a simplificação, harmonização, padronização e

modernização dos procedimentos do comércio internacional.

No tocante à transparência normativa, o primeiro aspecto do Acordo de Facilitação Comercial

refere-se à obrigatoriedade da publicação e disponibilização de informações relacionadas ao

comércio exterior seja por meio da internet, seja por meio do estabelecimento de serviços de

informação, ou seja, por meio de notificação ao público interessado.

A obrigatoriedade é de que cada Membro publique prontamente de forma não discriminatória e

adequada diversos tipos de informações. A obrigatoriedade é positiva, pois objetiva dar acesso e,

logo, previsibilidade no planejamento das operações de comércio exterior.

Outro ponto de destaque é a obrigatoriedade de pré-publicação e discussão prévia de normas que

implicam alteração de procedimentos. Trata-se de medida para aumentar a participação dos

operadores na elaboração das normas. O Acordo obrigaria o estabelecimento de prazos razoáveis

entre a publicação e a entrada em vigor da nova legislação.

Ainda no contexto da transparência devem-se mencionar as tratativas para a instituição de um

mecanismo de consulta prévia (decisões antecipadas) relativa à interpretação da legislação. Caso

aprovado o Brasil deverá ampliar o alcance da consulta tradicional, instituída por meio da Lei nº

9.430/96. O objetivo é precisamente o mesmo, ou seja, garantir a certeza na interpretação da

legislação. Também sobre o assunto está a obrigatoriedade de cada país estabelecer uma central de

serviços de informação.

Outro destaque será a obrigatoriedade do direito de recurso aos operadores com a criação e

manutenção de tribunais administrativos ou judiciais imparciais voltados para o julgamento de

causas no comércio exterior. O Brasil já trabalha com tal mecanismo por meio do Conselho

57

Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (CARF). Ainda, outra demanda atendida no Acordo é a

obrigatoriedade de utilização da análise de riscos para promover a liberação de mercadorias de

baixo risco, assim como a utilização de auditoria a posteriori por parte das Aduanas, para agilizar a

liberação das mercadorias na zona primária.

58

Artigo XI

Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XI

General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions

11.1 No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made

effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or

maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any

other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the

territory of any other contracting party.

11.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:

(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical

shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;

(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards

or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in

international trade;

(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form,

necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:

(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or

produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product,

of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly

substituted; or

(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no

substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for

which the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus

available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices

below the current market level; or

(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the

production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported

commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively

negligible.

Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to

subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the

product permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such

quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will

reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the

proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of

restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the

proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which may

have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XI

Eliminação Geral das Restrições Quantitativas

59

11.1 Nenhuma Parte Contratante instituirá ou manterá, para a importação de um produto

originário do território de outra Parte Contratante, ou para a exportação ou venda para

exportação de um produto destinado ao território de outra Parte Contratante, proibições ou

restrições a não ser direitos alfandegários, impostos ou outras taxas, quer a sua aplicação seja

feita por meio de contingentes, de licenças de importação ou exportação, quer por outro

qualquer processo.

11.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo não se estenderão aos casos

seguintes:

(a) proibições ou restrições aplicadas temporariamente à exportação para prevenir ou

remediar uma situação crítica, devido a uma penúria de produtos alimentares ou de

outros produtos essenciais para a Parte Contratante exportadora;

(b) proibições ou restrições à importação e à exportação necessárias à aplicação de normas

ou regulamentações referentes à classificação, controle da qualidade ou venda de

produtos destinados ao comércio internacional;

(c) restrições à importação de qualquer produto agrícola ou de pescaria, seja qual for a

forma de importação desses produtos, quando forem necessárias à aplicação de

medidas governamentais que tenham por efeito:

(i) restringir a quantidade do produto nacional similar a ser posta à venda ou

produzida, ou na falta de produção nacional importante do produto similar, a

quantidade de um produto nacional que o produto importado possa substituir

diretamente;

(ii) reabsorver um excedente temporário do produto nacional similar ou, na falta de

produção nacional importante do produto similar, de um produto nacional que o

produto importado possa substituir diretamente colocando esse excedente à

disposição de certos grupos de consumidores do país gratuitamente ou a preços

inferiores aos correntes no mercado; ou

(iii) restringir a quantidade a ser produzida de qualquer produto de origem animal

cuja produção depende diretamente, na totalidade ou na maior parte, do produto

importado, se a produção nacional deste último for relativamente desprezível.

Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar restrições à importação de um produto de acordo com as

disposições da presente alínea (c) do presente parágrafo, tornará público o total do volume ou do

valor do produto cuja importação for autorizada para um período ulterior determinado assim como

qualquer modificação sobrevinda nesse volume ou nesse valor. Além disso, as restrições aplicadas

conforme o item (i) supra não deverão ser tais que reduzam o total das importações em relação ao

da produção nacional, em comparação com a proporção que se poderia razoavelmente antecipar

entre ambas na ausência das ditas restrições. Para determinar essa proporção, a Parte Contratante

levará devidamente em conta a que existia no correr de um período de referência anterior e todos os

fatores especiais.

IC. Comentários à Tradução

Nenhum comentário.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XI

1. Medida Interna lidando com o Tratamento dos Produtos Importados – (Internal measure

dealing with the treatment of imported products)

60

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras.

8.98-8.100

O Painel entende que há violação ao Artigo III:4, o qual é aplicável ao caso em que uma medida

interna disponha sobre o tratamento de produtos importados. O Artigo XI:1 é aplicável às

transações comerciais de exportação, mas não se aplica ao caso no contexto das atividades dessas

exportações. A posição do Canadá de excluir o Artigo XI:1 do caso foi negada. O Canadá pediu

pela aplicação cumulativa dos Artigos XI:1 e III:4 na parte relativa ao decreto de proibição de

importação, mas o Painel não considera que essa é a forma que o DSB tem por referência.

Para. 8.98. “As regards Canada's reference to paragraph 4.26 of the aforementioned report, we

consider that it does not substantiate Canada's position in this case either. In this paragraph, the

Panel refrains from ruling on a violation of Article III:4. It appears to do so, however, for reasons of

legal economy because it simultaneously recognizes that Article III:4 could apply to state-trading

transactions. Contrary to Canada's assertion, this paragraph does not confirm the non-applicability

of Article III:4 to the part of an internal measure dealing with the treatment of imported products.

At the most, it could confirm the application of both provisions. Nevertheless, as explained in the

preceding paragraph, the Panel found that Article XI:1 applied, referring to the Note Ad Articles

XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. This Note only applies to state-trading transactions. In the present

case, however, there is no question of a measure applied in the context of state-trading activities.”

Para. 8.99. “For the foregoing reasons, we consider that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 applies to

the ban on importing asbestos and asbestos-containing products imposed by the Decree. On the

basis of the grounds for this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine further

Canada's arguments on the exclusive application of Article XI:1.”

Para. 8.100. “Looking at Canada's arguments, it is difficult to see whether Canada is claiming that,

even if the import ban falls under Article III:4, it is also covered by Article XI:1. If Canada does in

fact make such a claim for the cumulative application of Article III:4 and Article XI:1 to the part of

the Decree banning imports, we do not consider that this forms part of the terms of reference given

to the Panel by the DSB and, even if that were the case, Canada's arguments do not make a prima

facie case in the sense given to this concept by the Appellate Body. Consequently, we do not

consider it necessary to examine this point any further.”

2. A Noção de Restrição à Importação (the notion of “restriction… on importation”)

Relatório do Painel no caso India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India – Autos),

WT/DS146/R e WT/DS175/R, para. 7.265

Em considerando à proibição expressa no Artigo XI:1, a conclusão do Painel é a de que qualquer

forma de limitação em relação à importação constitui uma restrição.

Para. 7.265. “This Panel endorses the ordinary meaning of the term “restriction” as identified by

the India - Quantitative Restrictions panel and its view as to the generally broad scope of the

prohibition expressed in Article XI:1. As a result, it can be concluded that any form of limitation

imposed on, or in relation to importation constitutes a restriction on importation within the meaning

of Article XI:1.”

3. Análise das Condições de Equilíbrio de Comércio (Analysis of the trade balancing

condition)

Relatório do Painel no caso India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India – Autos),

WT/DS146/R e WT/DS175/R, para. 7.278

61

O Painel afirma que a nota nº 60 do Memorandum de Entendimento que limita a quantidade de

importação a um compromisso de exportação é uma restrição prevista no Artigo XI:1.

Para. 7.278. “The Panel therefore finds that the trade balancing condition contained in Public

Notice nº 60 and in the Memorandum of Understanding MOUs signed thereunder, by limiting the

amount of imports through linking them to an export commitment, acts as a restriction on

importation, contrary to the terms of Article XI:1. With respect to the European Communities'

argument that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signatories that have yet to achieve the

70% indigenization requirement would continue to incur export obligations after 1 April 2001, the

Panel notes that no evidence was presented to show that any such new export obligations have in

fact accrued.”

4. Alimento de Grama ou de Grão, Condicionantes Limitadores e Restrições à Importação

(Grass-fed/grain-fed condition constitutes a limit and an import restriction)

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen

Beef (Korea – Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS161/R e WT/DS169/R, Demandante: EUA,

paras. 777-778

O Painel entende que o uso de limitações condicionadas ao alimento do gado corresponde às

restrições à importação previstas no Artigo XI.

Para. 777. “In the light of the evidence before it, the Panel considers that the LPMO (NR:

G/STR/N/4/KOR, 10 December 1998 - LPMO is a notified state-trading agency for beef and imports

its share of the annual quota through a tendering system) practices to call for tenders on the basis of

the distinction between grass-fed and grain-fed beef, constitute an import restriction in violation of

Article XI of GATT, through the Ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII.”

Para. 778. “The Panel considers that pursuant to Article II, any other “terms, conditions or

qualifications” that add to import concessions must be set forth in Korea's Schedule. The Panel

recalls that Korea has made no condition concerning grass-fed/grain-fed beef in its Schedule. In

administering its import beef quota on the basis of grain-fed and grass-fed beef distinctions, Korea is

imposing a condition in the form of individual limits applied to grass and grain-fed beef, within

Korea's total import quota. The Panel recalls its conclusion above, that such grass-fed/grain-fed

condition constitutes a limit, an import restriction, inconsistent with Article XI of GATT.”

5. Discriminação dos Preços Transnacionais (Transnational Price Discrimination)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916 Act),

WT/DS162/R, para. 6.277

Com respeito à necessidade de deliberar sobre o Artigo XI, o Painel entende que o Artigo VI se

aplica mais diretamente ao 1916 Act do que o XI:1, no que se refere à discriminação dos preços

internacionais. O Artigo VI se aplica sempre que uma medida objetivar uma situação de

discriminação de preços transnacionais, conforme definido no no Artigo VI:1.

Para. 6.277. “With respect to the necessity to make findings under Article XI of GATT 1994, we are

of the view that the same reasoning as with Article III:4 applies. In our opinion, Article VI addresses

the basic feature of the 1916 Act (i.e. transnational price discrimination) more directly than Article

XI:1. In our findings, we concluded that Article VI applies to a measure whenever that measure

objectively targets a situation of transnational price discrimination, as defined in Article VI:1. Thus,

we found that the 1916 Act was fully subject to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and

the Anti-Dumping Agreement and could not escape the disciplines of Article VI by the mere fact

that it had anti-trust objectives, did not address injurious dumping as such, included additional

62

requirements of an anti-trust nature or led to the imposition of measures other than anti-dumping

duties.”

6. A Inconsistência do 1916 Act com as Obrigações dos Estados Unidos - Artigos III:4 e XI

do GATT 1994 (1916 Act’s inconsistency with United States' obligations under Articles

III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916

Act), WT/DS136/AB/R e WT/DS162/AB/R, paras. 153-154

O Japão e a União Europeia pediram que o Painel deliberasse que o 1916 Act é inconsistente com os

Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994 e Artigo XVI:4 do Acordo da OMC, em atendimento aos Artigos

III:4 e XI do GATT 1994. Para tanto, dever-se-ia rever a decisão do Painel em relação ao 1916 Act,

com base no Artigo VI do GATT e do Acordo Anti-Dumping. As condições para esse pleito não

foram satisfeitas e não foram contempladas as apelações da União Europeia e do Japão.

Para. 153. “In their joint other appellant's submission, the European Communities and Japan ask us

to rule that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with United States' obligations under Articles III:4 and XI of

the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. With respect to Articles III:4 and XI of

the GATT 1994, their requests are conditioned on our reversal of the Panel's findings that the 1916

Act falls within the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement. With

respect to Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, their requests are conditioned on our reversal of

the Panel's findings with respect to jurisdiction and the distinction between mandatory and

discretionary legislation. Since, however, the conditions on which these requests are predicated have

not been fulfilled, there is no need for us to examine the conditional appeals of the European

Communities and Japan.”

Para. 154. “For these reasons, we decline to rule on the conditional appeals of the European

Communities and Japan relating to Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the

WTO Agreement.”

7. A Decisão de um Painelista (Findings: One Panelist’s view)

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Import Measures Certain Products from the

European Communities (US – Certain EC Products), WT/DS165/R, para. 6.60

Um painelista tem a opinião de que os requisitos podem legitimamente ser alocados para reforçar os

direitos e obrigações da OMC.

Para. 6.60. “One Panelist is of the view that bonding requirements can legitimately be in place to

enforce WTO compatible rights and obligations. Such bonding requirements could benefit from the

application of Article XX(d), as “measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations

which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement”, assuming they support WTO

compatible rights/obligations and they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the chapeau of

Article XX). If bonding requirements are used to secure the respect of WTO compatible

rights/obligations, they would not appear to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. However, if

not, they could be viewed as effectively imposing a form of 'restriction' contrary to Article XI of

GATT.”

8. Avaliação (Evaluation)

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and

Marketing of Biotech Products (EU - Biotech Products), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS291/R,

WT/DS292/R e WT/DS293/R, paras. 7.3428-7.3429

63

As medidas de salvaguardas são inconsistentes com o Artigo XI:1, bem como com os Artigos 5.1 e

2.2 do Acordo de Medidas Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias.

Para. 7.3428. “The Panel notes that the United States' claim under Article XI:1 concerns one of the

nine safeguard measures challenged by it, namely, Greece – Topas oilseed rape. Canada's claim

under Article XI:1 is in respect of the same Greek safeguard measure.”

Para. 7.3429. “We recall that we have already reached the conclusion that the aforementioned

safeguard measures being challenged by the United States and Canada, respectively, are inconsistent

with Article 5.1 and, by implication, the second and third requirements in Article 2.2 of the SPS

Agreement. In these circumstances, we see no need to examine, and offer additional findings on,

whether the relevant safeguard measures are also inconsistent with Article XI:1. Accordingly, as did

previous panels in similar situations, we exercise judicial economy with regard to the United States'

and Canada's claims under Article XI:1.”

9. Restrição à Importação de Cigarros (Restriction “on the Importation” of Cigarettes)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.257-7.258

O Painel não está convencido de que os requisitos são uma restrição à importação de cigarros.

Para. 7.257. “The Panel notes that, in the case of imported cigarettes, the bond is not enforced either

at the time or at the point of importation. Indeed, under Article 14 of the Decree 79-03, the bond is

posted both by importers and local manufacturers with the Directorate General of Internal Taxes,

and not with customs authorities. The Dominican Republic has informed that, after the bond is

posted with the Directorate General of Internal Taxes, it is then sent to the National Treasury

(Tesorería Nacional) for safekeeping. The Dominican Republic has added that it is not the customs

authorities, but the internal tax authorities, who would verify that the bond has been posted.”

Para. 7.258. “Most importantly, the Panel is not persuaded that the bond requirement is a restriction

“on the importation” of cigarettes. Article XI:1 of the GATT does not cover any restriction, but only

those restrictions that are instituted or maintained by any Member “on the importation” (or

exportation) of products. In the expression “on the importation” – read in the context of an Article

that is entitled “General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions” –, the ordinary meaning of the

word “on” suggests that it is a preposition denoting a relation. In that sense, the expression “on the

importation” would be akin to “with respect to the importation”. Indeed, the panel on India – Autos,

considering the ordinary meaning of the phrase “restriction on importation”, reached a similar

conclusion. “An ordinary meaning of the term 'on', relevant to a description of the relationship which

should exist between the measure and the importation of the product, includes 'with respect to', 'in

connection, association or activity with or with regard to'. In the context of Article XI:1, the

expression 'restriction… on importation' may thus be appropriately read as meaning a restriction

'with regard to' or 'in connection with' the importation of the product.” Even if, arguendo, the bond

requirement could be considered to be a limiting condition, the Panel still does not find evidence that

it is a condition specifically related to the importation of cigarettes, nor that it is instituted or

maintained “with regard to” or “in connection with” the importation of cigarettes.”

10. Portaria SECEX 14/2004

Relatório do Painel no caso Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil -

Retreaded Tyres), Demandante: European Communities, (WT/DS332/R), para. 7.34

64

O Painel entende que a licença de importação da Portaria SECEX 14/2004, Portaria DECEX 8 e

Resolução CONAMA 23/1996 são inconsistentes com o Artigo XI:1 do GATT 1994 em relação à

importação de pneus recauchutados.

Para. 7.34. “For the reasons provided above, the Panel finds that the prohibition on granting of

import licences under Portaria SECEX 14/2004 is an import prohibition inconsistent with the

requirements under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. We also find that Portaria DECEX 8/1991, to

the extent that it prohibits the importation of retreaded tyres, is also an import prohibition

inconsistent with Article XI:1. We do not find, however, that Resolution CONAMA 23/1996 is

inconsistent with Article XI:1 in respect of the importation of retreaded tyres. As for the other four

measures listed in the European Communities' panel request, the Panel considers that the European

Communities has not established a prima facie case regarding these claims.”

11. Condição de Compra Doméstica (Domestic Purchase Requirement)

Relatório do Painel no caso Turkey - Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice),

WT/DS334/R, paras. 7.194-7.196

Os EUA consideram que, em relação aos requisitos de compras domésticas, os Artigos XI:1 do

GATT e 4.2 do Acordo sobre Agricultura devem ser considerados equivalentes.

Para. 7.194. “Only after the Panel considers the consistency of the domestic purchase requirement

with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, will it turn to the issue of whether the same measure should

also, or alternatively, be viewed as a border measure and thus properly analysed under Article XI:1

of the GATT 1994 or Article 4.2 of the Agreement on A product, while Article 4.2 of the Agreement

on Agriculture is limited to measures imposed on products that fall within the scope of the

Agreement of Agriculture.”

Para. 7.195. “In this particular case, and with regard to the domestic purchase requirement, the

United States' claims under both Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement

on Agriculture may be considered to be equivalent. Following the same approach used before, if the

Panel decides that it should also, or alternatively, consider the domestic purchase requirement as a

border measure, it will start by examining the claims presented by the United States under Article

4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement may be considered more specific in

respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products.”

Para. 7.196. “In conclusion, the Panel will begin its analysis of the claims advanced by the United

States regarding the domestic purchase requirement, by considering first the claim brought under

Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. After the domestic purchase requirement has been considered under

Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel will then consider whether the same measure should also,

or alternatively, be viewed as a border measure and thus analysed under Article XI:1 of the GATT

1994 or Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, or both. In this part of its analysis, should it be

necessary, the Panel would start by examining the claims presented by the United States under

Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement may be considered more specific

in respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products. If the Panel were to make findings

under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, it would then consider whether it should also

make findings under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Finally, if the Panel were to determine that the

domestic purchase requirement was inconsistent with any or all of the above-cited GATT provisions,

it would then consider whether it is also necessary to issue findings under the TRIMs Agreement.”

III. Comentários

A evolução das interpretações do DSB em relação ao Artigo XI e XI:1 do GATT foi bastante

significativa e as conclusões do DSB variam em nível de complexidade. Esse nível se intensifica

65

desde a definição do termo “restrição”, no caso India - Autos, até análises mais complexas. Nota-se

uma evolução da complexidade das decisões relativas ao Artigo XI e XI:1 em alguns dos casos,

como por exemplo: India – Autos, que analisou as condições da balança comercial das partes; Korea

– Beef, no qual o Painel determinou que havia restrição à importação, uma vez que o governo

coreano diferenciava o tratamento comercial em função da dieta do gado, cuja carne era importada

de países que os alimentavam ou com grãos ou com grama.

Nesse caso, o Painel concluiu que tal diferença de tratamento por tipos de alimento dado ao gado

significava uma restrição ao comércio. A partir dos casos visualizados, chega-se à conclusão de que

as demandas dos Membros com o pleito de eliminação de restrições quantitativas têm propiciado a

evolução das interpretações. As decisões do DSB relativas ao Artigo XI e XI.1 dependem, cada vez

mais, de esforços de definição de parâmetros que impeçam que outras medidas protetivas ao livre

comércio sejam estabelecidas; possibilitando, assim, que as regras determinadas nos acordos da

OMC sejam obedecidas por todos os Membros.

66

Artigo XI

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XI of GATT

General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions

11.1 No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made

effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or

maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any

other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the

territory of any other contracting party.

11.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:

(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical

shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party;

(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of

standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities

in international trade;

(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form,

necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:

(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be

marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like

product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly

substituted; or

(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no

substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which

the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to

certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current

market level; or

(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the

production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported

commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.

Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to

subparagraph

(d) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product

permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such

quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such

as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as

compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the

two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party

shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous representative

period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the

trade in the product concerned.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XI

Eliminação Geral das Restrições Quantitativas

67

11.1 Nenhuma Parte Contratante instituirá ou manterá, para a importação de um produto

originário do território de outra Parte Contratante, ou para a exportação ou venda para

exportação de um produto destinado ao território de outra Parte Contratante, proibições ou

restrições a não ser direitos alfandegários, impostos ou outras taxas, quer a sua aplicação seja

feita por meio de contingentes, de licenças de importação ou exportação, quer por outro

qualquer processo.

11.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo não se estenderão aos casos

seguintes:

(a) proibições ou restrições aplicadas temporariamente à exportação para prevenir ou

remediar uma situação crítica, devido a uma penúria de produtos alimentares ou de

outros produtos essenciais para a Parte Contratante exportadora;

(b) proibições ou restrições à importação e à exportação necessárias à aplicação de normas

ou regulamentações referentes à classificação, controle da qualidade ou venda de

produtos destinados ao comércio internacional;

(c) restrições à importação de qualquer produto agrícola ou de pescaria, seja qual for a

forma de importação desses produtos, quando forem necessárias à aplicação de

medidas governamentais que tenham por efeito:

(i) restringir a quantidade do produto nacional similar a ser posta à venda ou

produzida, ou na falta de produção nacional importante do produto similar, a

quantidade de um produto nacional que o produto importado possa substituir

diretamente;

(ii) reabsorver um excedente temporário do produto nacional similar ou, na falta de

produção nacional importante do produto similar, de um produto nacional que o

produto importado possa substituir diretamente colocando esse excedente à

disposição de certos grupos de consumidores do país gratuitamente ou a preços

inferiores aos correntes no mercado; ou

(iii) restringir a quantidade a ser produzida de qualquer produto de origem animal

cuja produção depende diretamente, na totalidade ou na maior parte, do produto

importado, se a produção nacional deste último for relativamente desprezível.

Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar restrições à importação de um produto de acordo com as

disposições da presente alínea (c) do presente parágrafo, tornará público o total do volume ou do

valor do produto cuja importação for autorizada para um período ulterior determinado assim como

qualquer modificação sobrevinda nesse volume ou nesse valor. Além disso, as restrições aplicadas

conforme o item (i) supra não deverão ser tais que reduzam o total das importações em relação ao

da produção nacional, em comparação com a proporção que se poderia razoavelmente antecipar

entre ambas na ausência das ditas restrições. Para determinar essa proporção, a Parte Contratante

levará devidamente em conta a que existia no correr de um período de referência anterior e todos os

fatores especiais

IC. Comentários à Tradução

Na versão em português do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio constante no Decreto

promulgador foram encontrados erros de português de importância menor e algumas passagens que

dão azo a interpretações, senão contraditórias, diversas daquelas originalmente almejadas pelos

negociadores do ato internacional. Em específico, apontamos:

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a) no Artigo 2, “imported in any form” refere-se a “agricultural or fisheries product”. Na versão em

português, tornou-se “seja qual for a forma de importação desses produtos”. Há margem para

interpretação que substancialmente altera o campo de incidência do Artigo. Enquanto que a redação

original referia-se às múltiplas formas dos produtos agrícolas e da pesca per se, a em português

parece aludir aos variados meios e modos de importação desse produtos.

b) no Artigo 2.c.1, “permitted to be marketed or produced” tornou-se “a ser posta à venda ou

produzida”. Novamente, uma alteração semântica. No ultimo caso,

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XI do GATT 1994

Relatório do Painel no caso Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia -

Salmon), WT/DS18/R, para. 8.185

Para. 8.185. “Al haber constatado ya que la medida objeto de la diferencia es incompatible con las

prescripciones del Acuerdo MSF, no consideramos necesario seguir examinando si es además

incompatible con el artículo XI del GATT de 1994.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação (WT/DS18/AB/R)

Nenhuma consideração sobre o Artigo XI.

Relatório do Painel no caso Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia –

Salmon), WT/DS18/R/USA

Nada consta nos “findings” do Panel a respeito do Artigo XI do GATT 1947.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat

and Meat Products (Hormones), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS26/AB/R-WT/DS48/AB/R

Nada consta nos “findings” do Órgão de Apelação a respeito do Artigo XI do GATT 1947.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas, paras. 5.4, 5.7, 7,

Para. 5.4. “(…) The negotiations foreseen in Article XVII:3 are thus not to result in arrangements

inconsistent with the General Agreement, in particular not quantitative restrictions made effective

through state-trading that are not justified by an exception to Article XI:1. The Panel saw no reason

why a different principle should apply to quantitative restrictions made effective by other means.

Para. 5.7. “For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel found that Article II:1(b)

does not permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General

Agreement and that the provisions in the United States GATT Schedule of Concessions can

consequently not justify the maintenance of quantitative restrictions on the importation of certain

sugars inconsistent with the application of Article XI:1.”

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Para. 7. “In some cases, the results of the agricultural negotiations were not consistent with the

rules found in other WTO agreements. For example, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture

prohibits the use of certain measures that might otherwise be authorized by Article XI:2 of GATT;

Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture permits the use of certain measures that might otherwise

be questioned under Articles II and XIX of GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards. In order to

establish priority for rules of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 21.1 of that Agreement

specifies:

The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade

Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply

subject to the provisions of this Agreement [i.e., the Agreement on

Agriculture].

In our view, Article 4.1 is not a substantive provision, but is a statement of where market access

commitments can be found. The definition of “market access concessions” (Article 1(g) of the

Agreement on Agriculture) makes it clear that the Schedules annexed to Article II of GATT also

contain the import quota commitments undertaken pursuant to Annex 5 of the Agreement on

Agriculture (as well as an identification of the tariff lines which are eligible for the special

safeguard provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture). If the Agreement on

Agriculture would have allowed for country-specific allocations of tariff quotas there would have

been a specific provision to this effect in deviation from Article XIII:2(d) as with the special

treatment provisions of Annex 5. In contrast, Article 4.2 is a substantive provision in that it

prohibits the use of certain non-tariff barriers, subject to certain qualifications. As a substantive

provision, it prevails over such GATT provisions as Article XI:2(c).

Moreover, the use of the term “restriction” in Article 3.2 is not a reason to give a narrow reading to

the scope of the Licensing Agreement. Past GATT panel reports support giving the term

“restriction” an expansive interpretation. The introductory words of Article XI of GATT provide as

follows:

No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other

charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export

licences or other measures ... .

Thus, tariffs and tariff quotas are restrictions as that term is used in

Article XI, although “duties, taxes or other charges” are excepted

from Article XI's requirements. A similar reading is appropriate in

the case of the Licensing Agreement. Article 3.2 of the Licensing

Agreement refers to “restrictions” and Article 3.3 of the Licensing

Agreement applies to “licensing requirements for purposes other

than the implementation of quantitative restrictions”. Accordingly,

we find that licensing procedures used for the implementation of

measures other than quantitative restrictions, including tariff

quotas, are subject to the disciplines of the Licensing Agreement.

We also note that our argument that tariff quotas are “restrictions”

does not imply that they are not, in principle, legitimate trade

measures under the agreements covered by the WTO in the same

sense that tariffs are.

In considering these arguments, we first examine the relationship

of the TRIMs Agreement to the provisions of GATT. We note that

with the exception of its transition provisions the TRIMs

Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of

Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment

measures are concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add

to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies

that Article III:4 may cover investment-related matters.”

Para. 188. “With regard to the specific relationship between, in the case before us, Article XXIV

and Articles XI and XIII (and Article 2.4 of the ATC), we consider that the wording of Article

70

XXIV does not authorize a departure from the obligations contained in Articles XI and XIII of

GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. We base our findings on the nature of the conditional right

established in Article XXIV as opposed to the clear and unambiguous obligation in Article XI

prohibiting the use of quantitative restrictions, notwithstanding the specific contrary practice which

has in the past existed in the sector of textiles and clothing but which the ATC represents a

collective commitment to terminate. As further discussed above, we consider that it is possible, and

even necessary in order to avoid a conclusion that would lead to politically and economically

absurd results, to interpret the provisions of Article XXIV in such a way as to avoid conflicts with

the prescriptions of Articles XI and XIII of GATT, and Article 2.4 of the ATC.”

Para. 189. “As we have noted, paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV provide parameters for the

establishment and assessment of a customs union, but in doing so allow flexibility in the choice of

measures to be put in place on the formation of a customs union. In this context we recall the use of

the terms “substantially all the trade” and “substantially the same duties and other regulations of

commerce”. While the meaning of these terms is not precisely clear in relation to what and how

much constitute “substantially”, they do confirm clearly that in both cases the standard is not all.

These provisions do not, however, address any specific measures that may or may not be adopted

on the formation of a customs union and importantly they do not authorize violations of Articles XI

and XIII, and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Moreover, we note that paragraph 6 of Article XXIV provides

for a specific procedure for the renegotiation of tariffs which are increased above their bindings

upon formation of a customs union; no such provision exists for quantitative restrictions. To the

Panel, if the introduction of WTO inconsistent quantitative restrictions were intended to be

negotiable on the formation of a customs union, it would seem odd to us that an explicit procedure

would exist for changes in GATT's preferred form of trade barrier (i.e. tariffs), while no procedure

would be provided for negotiation of compensation connected with imposition of otherwise GATT

inconsistent measures. We draw the conclusion that even on the occasion of the formation of a

customs union, Members cannot impose otherwise incompatible quantitative restrictions.”

Para. 191. “Finally, we recall that the prohibitions against quantitative restrictions in the sector of

textiles and clothing constitute a fundamental feature of the WTO Agreement which argues strongly

against the introduction of any new such restrictions in that sector. Moreover, considering the

flexibility offered by the possibility of “interim agreements” under Article XXIV 375 and the

inherently transitional nature of quantitative import restrictions in the sector of textiles and clothing,

we find that Turkey was in a position to avoid the violations of Articles XI and XIII 376 of GATT,

and Article 2.4 of the ATC.”

Para. 192. “Consequently, we reject Turkey's defense that Article XXIV allows it to introduce,

upon the formation of its customs union with the European Communities, quantitative restrictions

on 19 categories of textile and clothing products, in violation of Articles XI and XIII of GATT and

Article 2.4 of the ATC.”

Para. 208. “We then proceeded to examine Turkey's defense based on Article XXIV of GATT. In

this context, we decided that we had jurisdiction to examine any specific measure adopted by a

WTO Member in the context of a customs union but that, in this case, we did not need, and indeed

we were asked by the parties not to assess the overall WTO compatibility of the Turkey-EC

customs union. We have found that, as a general principle, Turkey was bound, at all times, by all

WTO obligations, unless there was a conflict between any provisions. Since the wording of Articles

XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC is clear in prohibiting the introduction of

quantitative restrictions such as those at issue, we examined the terms of Article XXIV to decide

whether Turkey could be exempted from the application of these prohibitions. We found that the

provisions of paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV did not authorize any violation of the WTO

obligations, other than the MFN obligation. Indeed, these paragraphs do not provide any indication

as to the type of measure to be used in the formation of a customs union but rather provide

guidelines for the overall assessment of regional trade agreements. We have therefore concluded

that Article XXIV did not authorize the violation of Articles XI and XIII of GATT or Article 2.4 of

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the ATC. While reaching this conclusion on the basis of the wording of the provisions at issue, we

have endeavoured to ensure that our interpretation did not render Turkey's right to form a customs

union with the European Communities a nullity, since pursuant to Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), constituent

members to a customs union are required to adopt substantially the same regulations of commerce.

We found that this standard leaves flexibility to the constituent members. In any event, in the

present case, taking into account, inter alia, the share of trade affected by the type of measures at

issue (quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing), we found that there were WTO compatible

alternatives available to Turkey if it wanted to conclude a customs union with the European

Communities. Finally we found that even if the presumption of nullification of Article 3.8 of the

DSU were rebuttable, Turkey had not submitted evidence that the benefits accruing to India under

the ATC and GATT had not been reduced or nullified by the introduction of WTO incompatible

quantitative restrictions.”

III. Comentários

Em junho de 1992, o primeiro Painel aberto sob a égide do GATT 1994 contra os regimes nacionais

europeus de importação de bananas alegou sua desconformidade aos Artigos I e XI.1 do GATT.

Para confirmar a existência de restrições quantitativas proibidas à importação de bananas, o Painel

seguiu os precedentes dos Casos “Canadá - restrições à importação de sorvete e iogurte” (BISD

36S/68), “CEE - Restrições às importações de maçãs - Denúncia pelo Chile” (BISD 36S/93), “CEE

- Restrições à importação de maçãs - Denúncia pelos Estados Unidos” (BISD 36S/135) e “Japão -

Restrições às importações de determinados produtos agrícolas” (BISD 35S/163), e submeteu o

regime europeu e as políticas nacionais dos principais importadores ao crivo do Artigo XI.2, (c),

que apresenta exceção à regra geral desde que contempladas, cumulativamente, as seguintes

hipóteses:

(i) a medida deve constituir uma restrição à importação;

(ii) a restrição à importação deve recair sobre um produto agrícola ou da pesca;

(iii) deve haver uma medida governamental para limitar as quantidades de um produto permitido a

ser comercializado ou produzido;

(iv) a restrição à importação deve ser necessária à execução da de uma restrição na oferta interna;

(v) a restrição à importação, não deve reduzir o total de importações em relação ao total de

produção interna, quando comparada com a proporção que se poderia razoavelmente esperar entre

os dois, na ausência de restrições;

(vi) a restrição à importação e a restrição do abastecimento doméstico devem, em princípio, ser

aplicáveis a produtos similares

(vii) deve ser tornados públicos a quantidade total permitida ou o valor da cota para cada produto.

De ver-se que a cumulatividade refere-se, tão-somente, aos critérios inscritos na letra (c), não

havendo, em sede dessa jurisprudência, interpretação no sentido da inseparabilidade daqueles

ínsitos nos Artigo XI.2, (a), (b) e (c):

O Painel considerou que, uma vez que a sua análise anterior havia mostrado que duas ou mais

condições de Artigo XI: 2 (c) não haviam sido cumpridas em relação às medidas tomadas pela

França, Portugal e Espanha, não era necessário examinar essas medidas à luz das demais condições

previstas neste Artigo. O Painel conclui, assim, em seu relatório de junho de 1993, pela condenação

dos regimes nacionais anteriores ao regime comum europeu, por ilegais e discriminatórios. Novo

Painel foi aberto para questionar o próprio regime comum de bananas: o DS38/R, ou caso Bananas

II.

O relatório, finalizado em janeiro de 1994, também condenava o novo regime. As argumentações

contidas no relatório em Bananas II forneceram a base para as conclusões do DS 27, o caso

Bananas III, já sob a égide da OMC.

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Alegavam os demandantes do caso DS38/R que o regime europeu comum, com seu sistema de

quotas tarifárias, tarifas extra-cotas e licenças não automáticas às importações de bananas – em tese,

permitidas - impunha restrições quantitativas de facto, ao que a CEE contra-argumentava que o

regime europeu para importação de bananas era apresentado no âmbito do Artigo II do GATT

(Agenda de Concessões, ou Compromissos) e que, portanto, os parâmetros do Artigo XI não se

aplicavam ao caso.

O Painel concluiu que a aplicação de quotas tarifárias per se, sob o Artigo II, não era uma violação

ao Artigo XI, secundando-se no fato de que nenhum Membro Contratante havia alegado

incompatibilidade nesse tocante. Assim também seriam as tarifas extra-quotas (aquelas

especificamente aplicadas quando a quantidade importada extrapolar a quota inicialmente

pactuada), ainda que seus efeitos sobre o mercado tornassem as exportações desvantajosas.

Para o Painel, o Artigo XI: 1 faz distinção apenas entre “proibições e restrições”, por um lado, e

“taxas, impostos ou outros encargos”, em nada se referindo aos efeitos comerciais da utilização

destes instrumentos. O relatório do Painel menciona, sem individualizar, casos anteriores nos quais

teria assinalado que, para determinar se uma medida constitui ou não restrição quantitativa, seria

irrelevante averiguar o real impacto da medida sobre os fluxos de comércio. Finalmente, no que

tange às licenças não automáticas, o Painel concluiu que qualquer que fosse o regime de

licenciamento, ele não alterou a natureza do contingente pautal e, como tal, era consistente com o

Artigo XI: 1.

Embora não com base no Artigo XI.1 – mas, sim, nos Artigos I, II e III – o Painel concluiu que o

regime comum de bananas era discriminatório por três motivos: (a) impunha tratamento

preferencial em tarifas, (b) impunha tratamento preferencial em quotas, (c) atribuía sistemas

discriminatórios de concessão de licenças. Para aquele colegiado, a única forma legal, em relação

ao sistema multilateral de comércio, que a União Europeia teria de oferecer tais privilégios às

exportações de bananas dos membros da ACP seria pela conceção de um waiver. Esse relatório

tampouco foi adotado em razão da vigência da cláusula de consenso existente no sistema

multilateral de comércio pré-OMC.

Em 1995, dois anos após a entrada em vigor do regulamento europeu que criou o mercado comum

de bananas e um ano após o fim do Painel quanto ao caso Bananas II, sob a égide da recém criada

OMC, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA abriram pedido de consultas junto ao DSB para

perquirir as Comunidades Europeias acerca da adequação dos supramencionados acordos às regras

do sistema multilateral de comércio. O DS 16, porém, parou na fase de consultas porque, com a

entrada do Equador, o maior exportador de bananas do mundo, na Organização, os postulantes do

DS 16 decidiram reingressar, juntamente com aquele país, com pedido de abertura de Painel junto

ao DSB da OMC. Deu-se origem ao DS 27, ou em Bananas III.

Os demandantes do DS 27 solicitaram que um Painel fosse aberto para examinar a política europeia

à luz do GATT, do Acordo sobre Procedimentos para o Licenciamento de Importações, do Acordo

Sobre Agricultura, do GATS e do TRIMS. Para os fins deste trabalho, interessa-nos as teses

defendidas em torno do Artigo X do GATT, argumentações e contra-argumentações, assim como as

conclusões do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação.

A tese dos demandantes no que atine à inadequação da restrição quantitativa contida no

Regulamento às normas multilaterais de comércio assentavam sobre três pilares: os “direitos do

avô” não se aplicam a práticas discriminatórias; ainda que se aplicassem, as vantagens e o acesso

oferecidos pelo mercado comum de bananas excedia àqueles mantidos pelos regimes europeus que

lhe antecederam: finalmente, alguns dispositivos do regime de distribuição de quotas gerava efeitos

distorcivos no mercado europeu.

O Órgão de Apelação conclui, em 1997, que o regime de importação de bananas da União Europeia

era inconsistente com as regras da OMC porque (1) a alocação das cotas tarifárias, sobretudo para

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os países da ACP, era contrária à regra de não-discriminação (Artigo 13 do GATT); (2) os

procedimentos para a emissão de licenças, os quais envolviam a compra de bananas dos países da

ACP para se ter direito de importar bananas de alguns países latino-americanos (ou outros países),

eram contrários ao princípio na nação mais favorecida e ao princípio do tratamento nacional

(Artigos 1 e 3 do GATT, respectivamente); e (3) os procedimentos de licenciamento eram também

contrários ao princípio na nação mais favorecida e ao princípio do tratamento nacional (Artigos 2 e

17 do GATS). Não houve, portanto, reconhecimento de que o regime comum de bananas feria o

Artigo XI.

Após o caso Bananas III, outros quatro casos foram postulados na OMC sobre o mesmo objeto,

todos eles considerados prejudicados pelo andamento do DS 27: DS 105 (considerado prejudicado

pela DS 27), DS 158 (aberto após o periodo de 15 meses estabelecidos pelo DSB para o início da

entrada em vigor das medidas necessárias para atender às conclusões do relatório do Órgão de

Apelação), DS 361 e DS 364 (sobre o novo regime comum de bananas, em vigor desde 2006).

O Painel considerou que a alusão ao Artigo XI, entre outros, como base legal para questionar a

moratória europeia era desnecessária em razão do fato de que o Artigo. 2.3 do Acordo de Medidas

Sanitárias e Fitossanitárias, igualmente evocado, era suficiente para enquadrar o tema. O

mencionado Artigo estabelece que tais medidas não devem gerar discriminação arbitrária ou

injustificada entre os Membros e que elas não devem ser usadas de modo a que se constituam

restrição disfarçada ao comércio. Em outras palavras, o Painel eximiu-se, portanto, de examinar o

DS 291, o DS 292 e o DS 293, em relação aos quais expediu o mesmo relatório, à luz do Artigo XI.

As Comunidades Europeias solicitaram consulta à República Popular da China sobre a imposição

de medidas que afetavam negativamente as exportações de peças de automóveis das Comunidades

para aquele país. Entre outras irregularidades, a China teria agido de forma inconsistente com o

Artigo 2.1 e do Artigo 2.2 do TRIMs em conjunto com o parágrafo 1 (a) da lista exemplificativa

anexa ao TRIMs pela aplicação de medidas de investimento relacionadas ao comércio de bens de

forma incompatível com as disposições do Artigo III e do Artigo XI do GATT.

As medidas comerciais chinesas em questão impunham tarifa de 25% sobre importações de peças

automotivas que representavam mais de 60% do valor do veículo. A tarifa aplicada a peças que não

se encaixavam nessa categoria era de 10%. Essas políticas resultavam em discriminação de peças

estrangeiras e gerava subsídio à produção doméstica. A imposição da tarifa também coloca por terra

o compromisso da China de não tratar peças como carros inteiros, assumido por ocasião da acessão

à OMC. A China alegava que a medida necessária a fim de prevenir a ocorrência de evasão fiscal

por parte de empresas que importam carros inteiros desmontados, com o objetivo de evitar as tarifas

mais elevadas aplicadas a automóveis montados.

O relatório do Painel evocou o caso US – Sugar para explicar que o Artigo II confere às partes

contratantes a possibilidade de incorporar e de qualificar, no quadro legal dos compromissos

decorrentes do GATT, compromissos adicionais, mas não a oportunide de reduzir seus

compromissos em outras disposições desse Acordo. O Artigo II:1 (b) não permitiria, portanto, a

manutenção de restrições quantitativas, incompatíveis que são com o Artigo XI:1.

Tanto o relatório do Painel quanto o do Órgão de Apelação tenderam a considerar que o objetivo

preponderante das normativas chinesas quanto à importação de autopeças era a imposição de

parâmetros de conteúdo nacional. As restrições quantitativas e a remissão ao Artigo XI ficaram,

assim, em segundo plano. O relatório do Órgão de Apelação sequer as mencionou.

A Índia, entre outros dispositivos, alegou, na fase de consultas, que a medida norte-americana

enfrenta o Artigo XI do GATT, uma vez que a exigência de depósitos maiores do que os regulares

pode ser caracterizada como uma medida outra que não encargos e obrigações. Com essa

argumentação, a Índia abriu o escopo semântico do Artigo XI do GATT para sustentar que esses

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depósitos serviriam como uma forma de restrição quantitativa, pois não se tratavam de direitos,

tributos ou outros encargos, ao passo que efetivamente impunham uma restrição ao comércio.

O Painel isentou-se de se pronunciar sobre a denúncia da Índia no que atine ao Artigo XI, julgando

suficientes as ponderações feitas acerca dos outros Artigos levantados, justificando-se nos

precedentes do Órgão, fundamentando-se na necessidade de economia processual (parágrafo 7.167

do Relatório).

Nada obstante, no Anexo A do Relatório do Painel, sobre os sumários executivos das primeiras

petições escritas, encontra-se a afirmação de que a diretiva não limitava a quantidade de camarão

que poderia ser importada para os EUA e, portanto, não constituía uma restrição quantitativa, na

acepção do Artigo XIII do GATT. A Índia não teria oferecido suporte para a sua afirmação de que

os EUA teria violado o Artigo XIII, além do argumento de que a diretiva “restringe severamente as

importações”. Essa afirmação seria insuficiente para concluir que a diretiva era uma restrição

quantitativa. Em sede de apelação, não foi evocado o Artigo XI, motivo por que o relatório do

Órgão de Apelação tampouco o menciona.

A controvérsia sobre restrições quantitativas, no entanto, versou apenas à limitação dos portos de

entrada. O Panamá pretender forjar a tese de que o termo “restrição” contido no Artigo XI do

GATT referia-se a toda e qualquer “condição limitante” sobre a importação de produtos não

classificáveis como obrigações, tributos e outros encargos. Evocou, em apoio à sua tese, a

jurisprudência dos casos Índia - Restrições quantitativas e Índia – Autos. De sua feita, a Colômbia

entendeu que o entendimento nesse viés seria demasiado amplo, porquanto, no limite, a proibição

alcançaria toda e qualquer medida condicionante à importação - por definição, limitante.

O Painel acompanhou a Colômbia e não reconheceu o mérito da alegação de que a medida

infringiria o Artigo XI:1. Não foi utilizada a via recursal.

Em julho de 1997, os EUA abriram consulta junto à Índia por considerar que as restrições

quantitativas mantidas por ela – incluindo, mas não limitados – aos mais de 2.700 linhas de

produtos agrícolas e industriais notificados à OMC no Anexo I, Parte B do WT/BOP/N/21

(Notificação prevista no parágrafo 9 do Entendimento das Disposições sobre Balança de

Pagamentos do GATT), datado 22 de maio de 1997, parecem ser incompatíveis com as obrigações

da Índia sob diversos Artigos, dentre os quais o XI:1.

As restrições quantitativas englobariam todas as proibições de importação, proibições, restrições,

licenças de importação, licenças especiais de importação e a proibição de não-comerciais (amostra)

quantidades, bem como os procedimentos para implementar e administrar essas medidas.

O Artigo XVIII do GATT, sob o título “Ajuda Governamental ao Desenvolvimento Econômico”,

Seção B, permite aos países nos primeiros estágios de desenvolvimento, com dificuldades de

manter condições mínimas de vida para seus súditos e em processo de rápida expansão de seu

mercado interno, a restringirem quantitativamente as importações ao enfrentarem dificuldades na

Balança de Pagamentos, garantindo-lhes níveis de reservas adequadas ao seu programa de

desenvolvimento econômico. As medidas, contudo, somente podem ser instituídas, mantidas ou

intensificadas perante sério risco de declínio das reservas monetárias e até que atinja níveis

razoáveis dessa reserva. No processo, poderá priorizar a importação de produtos essenciais à luz de

sua política econômica de desenvolvimento, desde que, inter alia, sejam aplicadas de modo a evitar

danos desnecessários aos interesses econômicos e a não obstacularizar os canais regulares de

comércio.

A Índia afirmou que ao Painel não caberia vergar-se sobre o Artigo XI:1, uma vez que o Artigo

apenas enuncia a proibição geral de restrições quantitativas, mas não a forma como as restrições

autorizados sob s exceções ao seriam administradas.

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Os EUA apontaram que o GATT em muitas ocasiões reconheceu, em interpretação expansiva, que

o licenciamento discricionário e não automático de importação constitui uma restrição quantitativa

sobre o comércio nos termos do Artigo XI: 1. Evocou, em auxílio à tese, o relatório do Painel CE -

Regime para a importação, venda e distribuição de bananas, o caso CE - Programa de Preços

Mínimos de Importação, Licenças e Depósitos de Seguro para Certas Frutas Processadas e Vegetais

e o Painel Japão - Comércio de Semi-condutores.

As importações dos bens constantes no título “Itens restritos”, Anexo II da Notificação sob a

referência WT/BOP/N/24, necessitam de licença emitida pelo Diretor-Geral do Comércio Exterior

(DGFT) da Índia. De acordo com os EUA, o licenciamento seria discricionário e não transparente.

A Índia contra-argumentou afirmando que o sistema era transparente e baseado em regras, e

registrou, em particular, que o Ato sobre Comércio Exterior, de 1992, apresenta os critérios para a

concessão de licenças e o dever de que a recusa de concessão de uma licença seja motivada por

escrito e as decisões sobre a concessão de licenças, incluindo recusas, passíveis de recurso.

O Painel secundou as alegações norte-americanas (parágrafo 5.128 do relatório) e confirmou que o

Artigo X:1 tem escopo largo e se aplica a quaisquer medidas restritivas que não possam ser

enquadradas em direitos, tributos e outros encargos, tal qual decidido o âmbito do Painel Japão -

Comércio de Semi-condutores. Em particular, a jurisprudência do GATT, no Painel sobre

Restrições Quantitativas à Importação de Certos Produtos de Hong Kong, por interpretação

extensiva, fez equivaler certas medidas de licença a restrições quantitativas.

Para o Painel seria pacífico o entendimento de que sistemas de licenciamento discricionários ou

não-automáticos, pela sua própria natureza, funcionam como limitações na ação, já que certas

importações não podem ser permitidas. Com isso, houve certa modificação jurisprudencial quanto

ao escopo do Artigo X.1 tal qual proclamado em Bananas III. Conforme visto, a despeito das

alegações norte-americanas, licenças não-automáticas não eram per se consideradas restrições

quantitativas. Aliadas, contudo, a critérios sinuosos de qualificação para a concessão de licenças de

importação, elas se constituiriam, à luz do caso em apreço, não apenas restrições não tarifárias –

gerais e ilegítimas – ao comércio, mas restrições quantitativas em si. O Órgão de Apelação

sustentou os argumentos do Painel quanto ao Artigo XI:1.

Em India - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, o Painel

considerou que a Índia agiu de forma inconsistente com suas obrigações nos termos do Artigo XI

do GATT de 1994, impondo aos fabricantes de automóveis, nos termos do Edital nº 60 e

respectivos memorandos de entendimento assinados, a obrigação de equilibrar a importação de kits

e componentes com determinadas exportações de valor equivalente. A Índia chegou a levar o caso

ao Órgão de Apelação, mas retirou o pedido recursal.

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Artigo XII

77

Artigo XIII

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIII

Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions

13.1 No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of

any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any

product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the

like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is

similarly prohibited or restricted.

13.2 In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution

of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various

contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this

end shall observe the following provisions:

(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports

(whether allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given

of their amount in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article;

(b) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means

of import licences or permits without a quota;

(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in

accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or

permits be utilized for the importation of the product concerned from a particular

country or source;

(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting

party applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of

shares in the quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in

supplying the product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably

practicable, the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a

substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions,

supplied by such contracting parties during a previous representative period, of the

total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any

special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product.

No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any contracting

party from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has been

allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to

which the quota may relate.

13.3 (a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions,

the contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any

contracting party having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant

information concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import licences

granted over a recent period and the distribution of such licences among supplying

countries; Provided that there shall be no obligation to supply information as to the

names of importing or supplying enterprises.

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(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the

product or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future

period and of any change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in

question which were en route at the time at which public notice was given shall not

be excluded from entry; Provided that they may be counted so far as practicable,

against the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in question, and also,

where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following

period or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting party customarily

exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or withdrawn from

warehouse for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of such public

notice, such practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph.

(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an

interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently

allocated, by quantity or value, to the various supplying countries and shall give

public notice thereof.

13.4 With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or

under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product

and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made

initially by the contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting

party shall, upon the request of any other contracting party having a substantial interest in

supplying that product or upon the request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult

promptly with the other contracting party or the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the

need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for

the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions,

formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an

adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.

13.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any

contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend

to export restrictions.

(…)

ANNEX I

NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

(…)

Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII

Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms “import restrictions” or “export

restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations.

(…)

Ad Article XIII

Paragraph 2 (d)

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No mention was made of “commercial considerations” as a rule for the allocation of quotas because

it was considered that its application by governmental authorities might not always be practicable.

Moreover, in cases where it is practicable, a contracting party could apply these considerations in

the process of seeking agreement, consistently with the general rule laid down in the opening

sentence of paragraph 2.

Paragraph 4

See note relating to “special factors” in connection with the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 of

Article XI.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XIII

Aplicação Não Discriminatória das Restrições Quantitativas

13.1 Nenhuma proibição ou restrição será aplicada por uma Parte Contratante à importação de um

produto originário do território de outra Parte Contratante ou à exportação de um produto

destinado ao território de outra Parte Contratante a menos que proibições ou restrições

semelhantes sejam aplicadas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os outros

países ou à exportação do produto similar destinado a todos os outros países.

13.2 Na aplicação das restrições à importação de um produto qualquer, as Partes Contratantes

esforçar-se-ão por chegar a uma repartição do comércio desse produto que se aproxime tanto

quanto possível da que, na ausência dessas medidas, as diferentes Partes Contratantes teriam

o direito de esperar, observando para esse fim as disposições seguintes:

(a) Sempre que for possível, contingentes que representem a soma global das

importações autorizadas (sejam eles ou não repartidos entre os países fornecedores)

serão fixados e sua importância será publicada de acordo com a alínea 3 (b) do

presente Artigo;

(b) Quando não for possível fixar contingentes globais, as restrições poderão ser

aplicadas por meio de licenças ou permissões de importação sem contingente global;

(c) A menos que se trate de tornar efetivas as cotas concedidas segundo a alínea (d) do

presente parágrafo, as Partes Contratantes não prescreverão que as licenças ou

permissões de exportação sejam utilizadas para a importação do produto visado de

proveniência de uma fonte abastecedora ou de um país determinado;

(d) Nos casos de ser um contingente repartido entre os países fornecedores, a Parte

Contratante que aplica as restrições poderá entender-se com todas as Partes

Contratantes que têm um interesse substancial no fornecimento do produto visado

para a repartição do contingente. Nos casos em que não for razoavelmente possível

aplicar este método, a Parte Contratante em questão atribuirá às Partes Contratantes

que têm um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes

proporcionais à contribuição trazida pelas Partes Contratantes ao volume total ou

valor total das importações do produto em questão no decorrer de um período

anterior de referência, devidamente levados em conta todos os elementos especiais

que tenham podido ou que possam afetar o comércio desse produto. Não será imposta

nenhuma condição ou formalidade de natureza a impedir uma Parte Contratante de

utilizar ao máximo a parcela do volume total ou do valor total que lhe for atribuída,

com a condição de ser a importação feita dentro dos limites do período fixado para a

utilização desse contingente.

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13.3 (a) Nos casos de serem as licenças de importação atribuídas dentro do quadro de

restrições à importação, a Parte Contratante que aplicar a restrição fornecerá, a pedido

de qualquer Parte Contratante interessada no comércio do produto visado, todas as

informações pertinentes relativas à aplicação dessa restrição, as licenças de importação

concedidas no decorrer de um período recente e à repartição dessas licenças entre os

países fornecedores, ficando entendido que não será obrigada a fornecer informações a

respeito do nome dos estabelecimentos importadores e fornecedores.

(b) Nos casos de restrições à importação que comportem a fixação de contingentes, a Parte

Contratante que as aplicar tornará público o volume total ou o valor total do ou dos

produtos cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer de um período ulterior

determinado bem como toda modificação sobrevinda neste volume ou nesse valor. Se

qualquer desses produtos em questão estiver em viagem no momento em que o aviso

for publicado, a entrada não será proibida. Todavia, será facultado computar esse

produto, na medida do possível, na quantidade cuja importação estiver autorizada no

decorrer do período em questão, e igualmente, se for o caso, na quantidade cuja

importação for autorizada no decorrer do período ou dos períodos seguintes. Além

disso, se de modo habitual, uma Parte Contratante dispensar dessas restrições os

produtos que forem, dentro de trinta dias a contar da data dessa publicação, declarados

com destino ao consumo ou que forem retirados de entrepostos com fins de consumo,

essa prática será considerada plenamente satisfatória às prescrições da presente alínea.

(c) Nos casos de contingentes repartidos entre os países fornecedores, a Parte Contratante

que aplicar as restrições informará sem demora todas as outras Partes Contratantes

interessadas no fornecimento do produto em questão da parcela do contingente

expressa em volume ou em valor, comumente atribuída aos diversos países

fornecedores e publicará todas as informações úteis a esse respeito.

13.4 No que se refere às restrições aplicadas de acordo com a alínea 2 (d) do presente Artigo ou a

alínea 2 (c) do Artigo XI a escolha, para qualquer produto, de um período de referência e a

apreciação dos elementos especiais que afetam seu comércio serão feitos, a princípio, pela

Parte Contratante que instituir a restrição. A dita Parte Contratante, a pedido de qualquer

outra Parte Contratante que tenha um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, ou

a pedido das Partes Contratantes, consultará sem demora a outra Parte Contratante ou às

Partes Contratantes a respeito da necessidade de ajustar a repartição ou o período de

referência ou de apreciar de novo os elementos especiais em jogo ou de suprimir as

condições, formalidades ou outras disposições prescritas de modo unilateral a respeito da

atribuição de um contingente apropriado ou de sua utilização sem restrição.

13.5 As disposições do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão a qualquer contingente alfandegário

instituído ou mantido por uma Parte Contratante; além disso, tanto quanto possível, os

princípios do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão igualmente às restrições à exportação.

ANEXO I

NOTAS E DISPOSIÇÕES ADICIONAIS

(...)

Aos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII

Nos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII as expressões “restrições à importação” ou

“restrições à exportação” visam igualmente às restrições aplicadas por meio de transações efetuadas

em decorrência do comércio do Estado.

Ao Artigo XIII

81

Parágrafo 2(d)

Nenhuma menção foi feita às “considerações de ordem comercial”, como critério para a

distribuição de cotas, porque foi considerado que sua aplicação pelas autoridades governamentais

nem sempre pode ser praticável. Além disso, nos casos em que essa aplicação seja possível, uma

parte contratante poderia aplicar esse critério como instrumento para chegar a um acordo, conforme

a regra geral consignada na primeira sentença do § 2.

Parágrafo 4

Vide a nota relativa “aos fatores especiais” em conexão com a última alínea do § 2 do Artigo XI.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

• Houve erro de tradução no tocante ao parágrafo 2(c). A expressão “import licences or

permits” foi traduzida como “as licenças ou permissões de exportação”, quando o correto seria “as

licenças ou permissões de importações”.

• Quando da internalização do GATT 1947, a tradução nacional baseou-se na versão francesa.

Todavia, quando se incorporou o GATT 1994 ao ordenamento pátrio, a tradução lastreou-se no

texto oficial em inglês (1). Isto é importante para se compreender a observação a seguir.

• Verifica-se que a passagem “a Parte Contratante em questão atribuirá às Partes Contratantes

que têm um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais”, inserida no

parágrafo 2(d), na forma como traduzida, apresenta-se truncada, pois seria melhor que a vírgula

constante do texto fosse suprimida ou que fosse acrescida outra vírgula imediatamente em seguida

ao verbo “atribuirá”. Nesta quadra, observa-se que a versão oficial em inglês não apresenta

qualquer vírgula no trecho em apreço (“the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting

parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions”). Já

a versão francesa dispõe o seguinte: “la partie contractante en question attribuera, aux parties

contractantes ayant un intérêt substantiel à la fourniture de ce produit, des parts proportionnelles”.

Tendo a versão nacional sido efetuada com arrimo na sua congênere francesa, deveria ter seguido a

metodologia desta e empregado uma vírgula logo após o verbo “atribuirá”, o que tornaria o texto

mais suave.

• Por fim, nota-se, na parte final do parágrafo 3(a), o uso da expressão “do nome”. A versão

inglesa refere-se a “the names” (plural), enquanto que a francesa utilizava “le nom” (singular).

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XIII

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale

and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e

WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 343

A idéia de não-discriminação prevista no Artigo I:1 é diferente daquela contida no Artigo XIII.

Para. 343: “If a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from

different supplier countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member

fails to give access to or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier

countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article

XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas in a manner

that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares”

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Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Measures Affecting

Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Proultry Products), Demandante: Brasil,

WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 108

Contigentes alfandegários devem ser calculados com base na totalidade das importações, incluindo

Membros e não-Membros da OMC.

Para. 108: “Therefore, we uphold the finding of the Panel in paragraph 233 of the Panel Report that

the European Communities has not acted inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 by

calculating Brazil´s tariff-rate quota based on the total quantity of imports, including those from

non-Members”.

Relatório de Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, para.

6.46

No caso vertente, apontou-se como uma distorção, entre outras, o fato de que o período anterior de

referência, constante do Artigo XIII:2(d), não pode estar acobertado por distorções de mercado.

Para. 6.46: “(...) the world market excluding the European Communities is of limited value for

purposes of calculating country shares based on a previous representative period because different

banana-exporting countries have quite different market shares in different regions of the world. For

example, Ecuador´s world market share has increased from 26 to 36 per cent during the last decade

and thus is significantly higher than its country allocation under the EC revised regime (...) Because

different banana-exporting countries have quite different market shares in different regions of the

world, it would also be difficult, if not impossible, to use a regional or specific country market as a

basis for allocating tariff quota shares”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-– Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para.

190

A utilização de dois regimes jurídicos distintos, por parte um Membro da OMC, não tem relevância

na aplicação do princípio da Não-Discriminação previsto no Artigo XIII.

Para. 190: “If, by choosing a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying

different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to

the imports of like products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-

discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the

non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements, if these

provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by that Member”.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante:

República da Coreia, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.49

O Painel em US – Line Pipe consignou que, caso os negociadores da Rodada Uruguai tivessem

pretendido expressamente omitir o Artigo XIII do contexto das medidas de salvaguarda, eles

poderiam ter dito isso no Acordo de Salvaguardas, mas não o fizeram. Aprofundando a explanação,

o Painel asseverou que:

Para. 7.49: “(...) we would suggest that it is the paucity of disciplines governing the application of

tariff quota safeguard measure in Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement that supports our

interpretation of Article XIII. If Article XIII did not apply to tariff quota safeguard measures, such

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safeguard measures would escape the majority of the disciplines set forth in Article 5. This is an

important consideration, given the quantitative aspect of a tariff quota. For example, if Article XIII

did not apply, quantitative criteria regarding the availability of lower tariff rates could be introduced

in a discriminatory manner, without any consideration to prior quantitative performance. In our

view, the potential for such discrimination is contrary to the object and purpose of both the

Safeguards Agreement, and the WTO Agreement”.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante:

República da Coreia, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.54

O Painel em US - Line Pipe entendeu que, na aplicação do Artigo XIII, caput, devem ser levados

em consideração os padrões tradicionais de comércio entre as partes.

Para. 7.54. “(...) imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (...)

Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for

projecting what might have ocurred in the absence of that measure”.

III. Comentários

A eliminação geral das restrições quantitativas é uma das ideias basilares do sistema GATT/OMC,

estando prevista no Artigo XI do GATT 1994. Entretanto, este mesmo Artigo prevê algumas

exceções a essa regra. Acontece que, para que essas exceções sejam utilizadas, elas devem obedecer

às disposições do Artigo XIII, que versa sobre a administração não-discriminatória das restrições

quantitativas.

O Artigo XIII tem um histórico de jurisprudência relativamente escasso. Poucos foram os litígios

solucionados pelo sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC, o que contribui para que boa parte

das disposições do mencionado Artigo XIII ainda permaneça sem uma interpretação segura.

Fator que corrobora para a rara incidência do Artigo ora em foco é a utilização do princípio da

economia processual pelo órgão julgador (seja Painel ou o Órgão Permanente de Apelação). O uso

desse princípio tem um viés político. É difícil saber até que ponto os julgadores querem evitar a

criação de jurisprudência. O Artigo XIII tem uma redação extensa, que, em algumas passagens,

reflete a dificuldade – típica de tratados multilaterais com muitos participantes - de se chegar a

termos precisos. Em Artigo divulgado em 2010, Busch e Pelc assinalam que

(...) in 41 percent of all cases, panels exercise judicial economy, a practice by which they rule not to

rule on certain of the litigants´ legal arguments, deeming these unnecessary to solving the dispute at

hand. This practice is important not only for the litigants, who frequently appeal its use, but for the

membership as a whole, since judicial economy limits the scope of the case law that results. We

argue in this article that panels invoke judicial economy to narrow the precedent they create, and do

so largely at the insistence of the wider membership. (1)

Entre as expressões do Artigo XIII, que ainda necessitam ter seus significados delineados,

destacam-se: “todos os elementos especiais” e “período anterior de referência”, ambas constantes

do parágrafo 2(d) e que têm grande importância para a aplicação do Artigo em apreço. Embora já

tenha um Painel do caso EC - Bananas, estabelecido com base em recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do DSU,

consignando que o “período anterior de referência” não deve estar abarcado por distorções de

mercado, ainda se está longe de ser definido um marco temporal preciso.

Por fim, útil frisar que, às vezes, a parte demandada usa a estratégia de invocar uma outra

disposição ou instituto da legislação da OMC para tentar afastar a incidência do Artigo XIII, como,

por exemplo, o Artigo XIX, que cuida das medidas de salvaguarda, ou o waiver, que é uma

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derrogação temporária das obrigações assumidas. O Órgão de Apelação tem rejeitado essa tese de

defesa. Percebe-se que o argumento empregado é o de que o Princípio da Não-Discriminação

(inserido no Artigo XIII) não pode ser afastado por normas de exceção que permitem um

afrouxamento dos compromissos assumidos no sistema GATT/OMC.

Footnote 1: BUSCH, Marc L.; PELC, Krzysztof J. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization.

International Organization 64, Spring 2010, pp. 257-58. Disponível em:

http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/Busch%20&%20Pelc%20Judicial%20Economy%20IO.pdf. Acesso em: 13

de dezembro de 2011.

85

Artigo XIII

Fabio Weinberg Crocco

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XIII*

Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions

13.1 No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of

any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any

product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the

like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is

similarly prohibited or restricted.

13.2 In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution

of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various

contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this

end shall observe the following provisions:

(a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports

(whether allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given

of their amount in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article;

(b) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means

of import licences or permits without a quota;

(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in

accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or

permits be utilized for the importation of the product concerned from a particular

country or source;

(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting party

applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in

the quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying

the product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the

contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial

interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such

contracting parties during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or

value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which

may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product. No conditions or

formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any contracting party from utilizing

fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to it, subject

to importation being made within any prescribed period to which the quota may

relate.*

13.3(a) In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions, the

contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any

contracting party having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant

information concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import licences

granted over a recent period and the distribution of such licences among supplying

countries; Provided that there shall be no obligation to supply information as to the

names of importing or supplying enterprises.

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(b) In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the

product or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future

period and of any change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in

question which were en route at the time at which public notice was given shall not be

excluded from entry; Provided that they may be counted so far as practicable, against

the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in question, and also, where

necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following period

or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting party customarily exempts from

such restrictions products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for

consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of such public notice, such

practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph.

(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party

applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an

interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently

allocated, by quantity or value, to the various supplying countries and shall give public

notice thereof.

13.4 With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under

paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the

appraisal of any special factors* affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by

the contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting party shall, upon

the request of any other contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that

product or upon the request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the

other contracting party or the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the need for an

adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal

of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other

provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its

unrestricted utilization.

13.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any

contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend

to export restrictions.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XIII

Aplicação não discriminatória das restrições quantitativas

13.1 Nenhuma proibição ou restrição será aplicada por uma parte contratante à importação de um

produto originário do território de outra parte contratante ou à exportação de um produto

destinado ao território de outra parte contratante a menos que proibições ou restrições

semelhantes sejam aplicadas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os outros

países ou à exportação do produto similar destinado a todos os outros países.

13.2 Na aplicação das restrições à importação de um produto qualquer, as partes contratantes

esforçar-se-ão por chegar a uma repartição do comércio desse produto que se aproxime tanto

quanto possível da que, na ausência dessas medidas, as diferentes partes contratantes teriam o

direito de esperar, observando para esse fim as disposições seguintes:

(a) Sempre que for possível, contingentes que representem a soma global das importações

autorizadas (sejam eles ou não repartidos entre os países fornecedores) serão fixados e

sua importância será publicada de acordo com a alínea 3 (b) do presente Artigo;

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(b) quando não for possível fixar contingentes globais, as restrições poderão ser aplicadas

por meio de licenças ou permissões de importação sem contingente global;

(c) a menos que se trate de tornar efetivas as quotas concedidas segundo a alínea (d) do

presente parágrafo, as partes contratantes não prescreverão que as licenças ou

permissões de exportação sejam utilizadas para a importação do produto visado de

proveniência de uma fonte abastecedora ou de um país determinado;

(d) nos casos de ser um contingente repartido entre os países fornecedores, a parte

contratante que aplica as restrições poderá entender-se com todas as partes contratantes

que têm um interesse substancial no fornecimento do produto visado para a repartição

do contingente. Nos casos em que não for razoavelmente possível aplicar este método,

a parte contratante em questão atribuirá às partes contratantes que têm um interesse

substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais à contribuição trazida

pelas partes contratantes ao volume total ou valor total das importações do produto em

questão no decorrer de um período anterior de referência, devidamente levados em

conta todos os elementos especiais que tenham podido ou que possam afetar o

comércio desse produto. Não será imposta nenhuma condição ou formalidade de

natureza a impedir uma parte contratante de utilizar ao máximo a parcela do volume

total ou do valor total que lhe for atribuída, com a condição de ser a importação feita

dentro dos limites do período fixado para a utilização desse contingente.

13.3(a) Nos casos de serem as licenças de importação atribuídas dentro do quadro de restrições

à importação, a parte contratante que aplicar a restrição fornecerá, a pedido de

qualquer parte contratante interessada no comércio do produto visado, todas as

informações pertinentes relativas à aplicação dessa restrição, as licenças de importação

concedidas no decorrer de um período recente e à repartição dessas licenças entre os

países fornecedores, ficando entendido que não será obrigada a fornecer informações a

respeito do nome dos estabelecimentos importadores e fornecedores.

(b) Nos casos de restrições à importação que comportem a fixação de contingentes, a parte

contratante que as aplicar tornará público o volume total ou o valor total do ou dos

produtos cuja importação for autorizada no decorrer de um período ulterior

determinado bem como toda modificação sobrevinda neste volume ou nesse valor. Se

qualquer desses produtos em questão estiver em viagem no momento em que o aviso

for publicado, a entrada não será proibida. Todavia, será facultado computar esse

produto, na medida do possível, na quantidade cuja importação estiver autorizada no

decorrer do período em questão, e igualmente, se for o caso, na quantidade cuja

importação for autorizada no decorrer do período ou dos períodos, seguintes. Além

disso, se de modo habitual, uma parte contratante dispensar dessas restrições os

produtos que forem, dentro de trinta dias a contar da data dessa publicação, declarados

com destino ao consumo ou que forem retirados de entrepostos com fins de consumo,

essa prática será considerada plenamente satisfatória às prescrições da presente alínea.

(c) Nos casos de contingentes repartidos entre os países fornecedores. a parte contratante

que aplicar as restrições informará sem demora todas as outras partes contratantes

interessadas no fornecimento do produto em questão da parcela do contingente

expressa em volume ou em valor comumente atribuída aos diversos países

fornecedores e publicará todas as informações úteis a esse respeito.

13.4 No que se refere às restrições aplicadas de acordo com a alínea 2 (d) do presente Artigo ou a

alínea 2 (c) do Artigo XI a escolha, para qualquer produto, de um período de referência e a

apreciação dos elementos especiais que afetam seu comércio serão feitos, a princípio, pela

parte contratante que instituir a restrição. A dita parte contratante, a pedido de qualquer outra

parte contratante que tenha um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, ou a

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pedido das partes contratantes, consultará sem demora a outra parte contratante ou às partes

contratantes a respeito da necessidade de ajustar a repartição ou o período de referência ou de

apreciar de novo os elementos especiais em jogo ou de suprimir as condições, formalidades

ou outras disposições prescritas de modo unilateral a respeito da atribuição de um

contingente apropriado ou de sua utilização sem restrição.

13.5 As disposições do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão a qualquer contingente alfandegário

instituído ou mantido por uma parte contratante; além disso, tanto quanto possível, os

princípios do presente Artigo aplicar-se-ão igualmente às restrições à exportação e a qualquer

regulamentação e exigência de ordem interna prevista nos §§ 3 e do Artigo III.

(Lei n.º 313, de 30 de Julho de 1948)

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XIII

1. Artigo XIII, caput

(a) “Regimes administrativos de alocação de quotas tarifárias diferenciados”

Em CE – Bananas III o DSB concluiu que as regras de não-discriminação dispostas no Artigo XIII

do GATT aplicam-se a um determinado produto, independentemente da forma pela qual os

Membros implementam seus regimes de alocação de quotas tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.79

Para. 7.79. “We note that Article XIII:1 provides that no restriction shall be applied by any

Member on the importation of any product of another Member ‘unless the importation of the like

product of all third countries ... is similarly ... restricted’. Article XIII:2 requires Members when

allocating tariff quota shares to ‘aim at a distribution of trade (...) approaching as closely as possible

the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such

restrictions’. By their terms, these two provisions of Article XIII do not provide a basis for

analysing quota allocation regimes separately because they have different legal bases or because

different tariff rates are applicable. Article XIII applies to allocations of shares in an import market

for a particular product which is restricted by a quota or tariff quota. In our view, its non-

discrimination requirements apply to that market for that product, irrespective of whether or how a

Member subdivides it for administrative or other reasons. Indeed, to accept that a Member could

establish quota regimes by different legal instruments and argue that they are not as a consequence

subject to Article XIII would be, as argued by the Complainants, to eviscerate the non-

discrimination provisions of Article XIII.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC – Bananas III,

(WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 190

2. Artigo XIII:1

(a) Interpretação do termo “restrição”

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O Painel em EC – Bananas III interpretou a palavra “restrição” de modo amplo, como qualquer

benefício concedido a um determinado Membro que seja capaz de afetar competitividade de outros

Membros.

Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador,

Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, para. 7.332

Para. 7.332. “Given that broad interpretation of the term ‘restriction’, the Panel sees the European

Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota as a restriction for Ecuador within the meaning of

Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. As the European Communities recognizes, its banana import

regime confers a benefit, although a quantitatively limited one, to ACP countries, and Ecuador, like

other MFN banana suppliers, cannot have access to that quantitatively limited benefit. Any benefit

accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members presumably affects the competitive opportunities

of like bananas imported from other Members, including from Ecuador, to the European

Communities market. By its very nature, such a benefit reserved for some Members generally

represents a disadvantage for other Members.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso

European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC –

Bananas III), WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 7.679

Mudança de posicionamento:

Entretanto, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel, restringindo a

interpretação do termo “restrição”. De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação o referido termo deveria

ser lido como uma referência a “quotas tarifárias”, e não como “benefício”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities –

Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes:

Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA,

paras. 337 e 346

Para. 337. “[…] “Applying Article XIII:1 to a tariff quota requires that the word ‘restriction’ be

read as a reference to a tariff quota. Article XIII:1 is then rendered thus: no tariff quota shall be

applied by a Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member, unless

the importation of the like product of all third countries is similarly made subject to the tariff quota.

The application of the tariff quota is thus on a product-wide basis. The principle of non-

discriminatory application captured by Article XIII:1 requires that, if a tariff quota is applied to one

Member, it must be applied to all; and, consequently, the term ‘similarly restricted’ means, in the

case of tariff quotas, that imports of like products of all third countries must have access to, and be

given an opportunity of, participation. If a Member is excluded from access to, and participation in,

the tariff quota, then imports of like products from all third countries are not ‘similarly restricted’.”

Para. 346. “Having said that, we note our disagreement with the Panel's overly broad interpretation

of the term ‘restriction’ in Article XIII:1 as ‘[a]ny benefit accorded to fresh bananas of only some

Members presumably affect[ing] the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other

Members’ considering that ‘[b]y its very nature, ... a benefit reserved for some Members generally

represents a disadvantage for other Members.’ Such a broad reading of the term ‘restriction’ in

Article XIII would mean that even a simple tariff preference without a limitation would lead to

dissimilar restrictions within the meaning of Article XIII, thus confounding the function and

coverage of Article I and Article XIII. Such an interpretation would also ignore the fact that Article

XIII is concerned with the non-discriminatory administration of tariff quotas, and does not prohibit

them as such.”

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3. Artigo XIII:2

(a) “Objetivo e propósito”

De acordo com a intepretação adotada pelo DSB, o Artigo XIII:2 objetivaria minimizar os impactos

causados aos fluxos internacionais de comércio em decorrência da imposição de quotas tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, paras. 7.68 e 7.80

Para. 7.68. “[…] “In light of the terms of Article XIII, it can be said that the object and purpose of

Article XIII:2 is to minimize the impact of a quota or tariff quota regime on trade flows by

attempting to approximate under such measures the trade shares that would have occurred in the

absence of the regime. In interpreting the terms of Article XIII, it is important to keep their context

in mind. Article XIII is basically a provision relating to the administration of restrictions authorized

as exceptions to one of the most basic GATT provisions-the general ban on quotas and other non-

tariff restrictions contained in Article XI.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso EC –

Bananas III, para. 7.706

4. Artigo XIII:2(a)

(a) “Aplicação da tarifa mínima”

O Painel no caso US – Pipe Line concluiu que o Artigo XIII:2(a) do GATT impõe o dever de,

sempre que possível, fixar o montante total de importações permitidas com base na tarifa mais

baixa existente.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Pipe Line), Demandante: Coreia

do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.58

Para. 7.58. “Irrespective of whether or not tariff quotas constitute ‘quotas’ within the meaning of

Article XIII:2(a), tariff quotas are necessarily subject to the disciplines contained in Article

XIII:2(a) as a result of the express language of Article XIII:5. Thus, Article XIII:2(a) must have

meaning in the context of tariff quotas. We believe that, in respect of tariff quotas, Article XIII:2(a)

requires Members to fix, wherever practicable, the total amount of imports permitted at the lower

tariff rate.” (1)

Footnote 1: The obligation cannot extend to fixing the total amount of permitted imports at the higher tariff rate, because

that would effectively undermine the distinction between tariff quotas and quantitative restrictions.

5. Artigo XIII:2(d)

(a) “Aplicação do princípio de não discriminação à alocação de quotas tarifárias”

O Órgão de Apelação concluiu em EC – Bananas III que Membros estão impedidos de fazer

discriminações ao alocar quotas tarifárias entre Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no

fornecimento de determinado produto.

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Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale

and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 161

Para. 161. “(...) [A]llocation to Members not having a substantial interest must be subject to the

basic principle of nondiscrimination. When this principle of non-discrimination is applied to the

allocation of tariff quota shares to Members not having a substantial interest, it is clear that a

Member cannot, whether by agreement or by assignment, allocate tariff quota shares to some

Members not having a substantial interest while not allocating shares to other Members who

likewise do not have a substantial interest. To do so is clearly inconsistent with the requirement in

Article XIII:1 that a Member cannot restrict the importation of any product from another Member

unless the importation of the like product from all third countries is ‘similarly’ restricted.”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes relatórios: (i) Relatório do Painel no caso EC –

Bananas III, (WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA), para. 7.73 e (ii) Relatório do Painel, fase de

implementação, no caso EC – Bananas III, (WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 7.715

(b) “Presunção relativa em relação aos critérios previstos no Artigo XIII:2, caput”

De acordo com o relatório do Órgão de Apelação na fase de implementação do caso EC – Bananas

III, o Artigo XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presunção relativa em relação à observância dos critérios

estabelecidos no Artigo XIII:2, caput.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities -

Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes:

Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA,

para. 338

Para. 338. “(…) Article XIII:2(d) allows for the case where a quota is allocated among supplying

countries, either by way of agreement or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by allotment to

Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and in accordance with

the proportions supplied by those Members during a previous representative period, taking due

account of ‘special factors’. In other words, Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive ‘safe harbour’;

compliance with the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) is presumed to lead to a distribution of trade

as foreseen in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, as far as substantial suppliers are concerned.”

(c) “Relação subsidiária entre primeira e segundas frases do Artigo XIII:2”

De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, a relação entre as duas frases constantes do Artigo

XIII:2(d) do GATT é de natureza subsidiária. Ademais, não seria permissível firmar acordos com

apenas determinados Membros que tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de um

determinado produto.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.72

Para. 7.72. “The terms of Article XIII:2(d) make clear that the combined use of agreements and

unilateral allocations to Members with substantial interests is not permitted. The text of Article

XIII:2(d) provides that where the first ‘method’, i.e., agreement, is not reasonably practicable, then

an allocation must be made. Thus, in the absence of agreements with all Members having a

substantial interest in supplying the product, the Member applying the restriction must allocate

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shares in accordance with the rules of Article XIII:2(d), second sentence. In the absence of this rule,

the Member allocating shares could reach agreements with some Members having a substantial

interest in supplying the product that discriminated against other Members having a substantial

interest supplying the product, even if those other Members objected to the shares they were to be

allocated.”

(d) “Discriminação entre estados que não tenham interesse no fornecimento de

determinado produto”

Em CE – Bananas III o Painel concluiu que se, por ventura, um Membro optar por alocar quotas

tarifárias a Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado

produto, tais quotas devem ser estendidas a todos os Membros enquadrados nessa categoria.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.73

Para. 7.73. “The question then is whether country-specific shares can also be allocated to Members

that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the product and, if so, what the method of

allocation would have to be. As to the first point, we note that the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d)

refers to allocation of a quota ‘among supplying countries’. This could be read to imply that an

allocation may also be made to Members that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the

product. If this interpretation is accepted, any such allocation must, however, meet the requirements

of Article XIII:1 and the general rule in the chapeau to Article XIII:2(d). Therefore, if a Member

wishes to allocate shares of a tariff quota to some suppliers without a substantial interest, then such

shares must be allocated to all such suppliers. Otherwise, imports from Members would not be

similarly restricted as required by Article XIII:1. As to the second point, in such a case it would be

required to use the same method as was used to allocate the country-specific shares to the Members

having a substantial interest in supplying the product, because otherwise the requirements of Article

XIII:1 would also not be met.”

(e) “Estados Não-Membros”

O Painel do caso CE – Frangos posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT permite

alocações de quotas tarifárias a Membros que não sejam Membros da OMC e não seriam vedadas

pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of

Certain Poultry Products (EC – Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/R, paras. 230-232

Para. 230. “We note that Article XIII carefully distinguishes between Members (‘contracting

parties’ in the original text of GATT 1947) and ‘supplying countries’ or ‘source’. There is nothing

in Article XIII that obligates Members to calculate tariff quota shares on the basis of imports from

Members only. If the purpose of using past trade performance is to approximate the shares in the

absence of the restrictions as required under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, exclusion of a non-

Member, particularly if it is an efficient supplier, would not serve that purpose.”

Para. 231. “This interpretation is also confirmed by the use in Article XIII:2(d) of the term ‘of the

total quantity or value of imports of the product’ without limiting the total quantity to imports from

Members.”

Para. 232. “The conclusion above is not affected by the fact that the TRQ in question was opened

as compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII because Article XIII is a general provision

93

regarding the non-discriminatory administration of import restrictions applicable to any TRQs

regardless of their origin.”

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC –

Poultry, (WT/DS69/AB/R), paras. 106 e 108

(f) “Relação entre o disposto em XIII:1 e XIII:2(d) do GATT”

Nos termos do relatório do Painel no caso EC – Poultry o disposto no Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT

deve ser tido como lex especialis em relação ao Artigo XIII:1, e não como uma exceção.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.75

Para. 7.75. “The consequence of the foregoing analysis is that Members may be effectively

required to use a general ‘others’ category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial

interest in supplying the product. The fact that in this situation tariff quota shares are allocated to

some Members, notably those having a substantial interest in supplying the product, but not to

others that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the product, would not necessarily be in

conflict with Article XIII:1. While the requirement of Article XIII:2(d) is not expressed as an

exception to the requirements of Article XIII:1, it may be regarded, to the extent that its practical

application is inconsistent with it, as lex specialis in respect of Members with a substantial interest

in supplying the product concerned.”

6. Artigo XIII:5

(a) “Aplicação do Artigo XIII a regimes com uma única quota tarifária”

O Painel, na fase de implementação do caso CE – Bananas, concluiu, por meio de interpretação

literal do Artigo XIII:5 do GATT, que o Artigo XIII do GATT é aplicável tanto aos regimes de

impostação de quotas tarifárias múltiplas, quanto àqueles regimes que preveem apenas uma quota

tarifária.

Relatório do Painel, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities - Regime for

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador,

Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.290

Para. 7.290. “First, the Panel looks at the language of Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994. The words

‘any’ (both before the terms ‘tariff quota’ and ‘contracting party’) and ‘shall’ in Article XIII:5

underscore the absolute and categorical nature of the application of ‘the provisions of (...) Article

[XIII]’ to tariff quotas. The Panel notes also that Article XIII:5 uses the term ‘any tariff quota

instituted or maintained by any [Member]’ in the singular. The Panel reads this to mean that Article

XIII of the GATT 1994 is also applicable to one single tariff quota, and that this is so irrespective of

whether that single tariff quota is prt of an import regime with more tariff quotas or is part of an

import regime that comprises only one tariff quota.”

Ademais, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII do GATT é aplicável a quotas

tarifárias.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

94

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.68

Para. 7.68. “However, Article XIII:5 makes it clear, and the parties agree, that Article XIII applies

to the administration of tariff quotas.”

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso EC –

Bananas III, (WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 160

7. Relação com outros Artigos do GATT

(a) “Artigo I do GATT”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (CE – Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.107

De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, o Artigo I do GATT prevê regra geral de não

discriminação. O Artigo XIII:1, por sua vez, também prevê a mesma regra, mas especificamente em

relação à administração de quotas tarifarias. Trata-se, portanto, de norma mais específica.

Para. 7.107. “Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I

and XIII:1, both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in

respect of ‘rules and formalities in connection with importation, a phrase that has been interpreted

broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff

quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they

are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be imposed. To describe the relationship

somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring non-discriminatory

treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation. Article

XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of

quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with

that of Article I.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de implementação, no caso European Communities –

Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE – Bananas III), Demandantes:

Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA,

para. 343

Não obstante, de acordo com o entendimento do Órgão de Apelação constante do relatório de EC –

Bananas III, a despeito de os Artigos I e XIII do GATT imporem deveres de não-discriminação, a

dispensa do cumprimento do disposto no primeiro dispositivo não implica dispensa do

cumprimento no segundo.

Para. 343. “We consider that the notion of ‘non-discrimination’ in the application of tariffs under

Article I:1 and the notion of non-discriminatory application of a ‘prohibition or restriction’ under

Article XIII are distinct, and that Article XIII ensures that a Member applying a restriction or

prohibition does not discriminate among all other Members. Article I:1, which applies to tariffs, and

Article XIII:1, which applies to quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas, may apply to different

elements of a measure or import regime. Article XIII adapts the MFN-treatment principle to

specific types of measures, that is, quantitative restrictions, and, by virtue of Article XIII:5, tariff

quotas. Tariff quotas must comply with the requirements of both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the

GATT 1994. This, in our view, does not make Article XIII redundant in respect of tariff quotas: if a

Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier

95

countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to

or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the

requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I

would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas in a manner that avoids

discrimination in the allocation of shares.”

8. Relação com outros acordos

(a) “Acordo de Agricultura”

O DSB concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura não prevê expressamente a alocação de quotas

tarifárias específicas para cada país em relação a produtos agrícolas. De acordo com o

posicionamento do DSB, se essa fosse a intenção dos negociadores, haveria previsão específica a

esse respeito no Acordo de Agricultura.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.124

Para. 7.124. “(…) If the Agreement on Agriculture would have allowed for country-specific

allocations of tariff quotas there would have been a specific provision to this effect in deviation

from Article XIII:2(d) as with the special treatment provisions of Annex 5. In contrast, Article 4.2 is

a substantive provision in that it prohibits the use of certain non-tariff barriers, subject to certain

qualifications. As a substantive provision, it prevails over such GATT provisions as Article

XI:2(c).”

O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes relatórios: (i) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação

no caso EC – Bananas III, (WT/DS27/AB/R), para. 157 e (ii) Relatório do Painel, fase de

implementação, no caso EC – Bananas III, (WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 7.642

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.126

O DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos

compromissos de acesso a mercado, relacionados a produtos agrícolas, exceto se previsto

expressamente em sentido contrário no Acordo sobre Agricultura.

Para. 7.126. “Finally, we note that, pursuant to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, GATT

rules apply ‘subject to’ the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, a wording that clearly

suggests priority for the latter. But giving priority to Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture,

which simply ‘relates’ market access concessions to Members' goods schedules as attached to

GATT by the Marrakesh Protocol, does not necessitate, or even suggest, a limitation on the

application of Article XIII. The provisions are complementary, and do not clash. Thus, Article 21 of

the Agreement on Agriculture is not relevant in this case.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 155

96

Para. 155. “(…) Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to

market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the

Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.”

(b) “Acordo de Salvaguardas”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US – Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia

do Sul, WT/DS202/R, paras. 7.40-7.44 e 7.49

O DSB concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT deve ser observado para fins de imposição de medidas

de salvaguarda. Alegou-se, portanto, que não há disposição expressa no Acordo de Salvaguardas

que autorize os Membros a agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII.

Para. 7.40. “In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's finding in EC- Bananas III (AB) that ‘[i]f

the negotiators had intended to permit Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT

1994 [by virtue of the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture], they would have said so

explicitly.’ We see nothing in the Safeguards Agreement that expressly authorises a Member to act

inconsistently with Article XIII. The fact that the Safeguards Agreement does not contain any

express reference to Article XIII certainly does not amount to an express authorisation to depart

from the provisions of that Article.”

Para. 7.44. “(…) “Just because some provisions of Article XIII are replicated in the Safeguards

Agreement, that alone does not mean that the remaining provisions cease to be binding on

Members. We therefore decline to draw any conclusions from the fact that certain Article XIII

provisions are not replicated in the Safeguards Agreement. Like the Appellate Body, we consider

that if the Uruguay Round negotiators had intended to expressly omit Article XIII from the

safeguards context, “they would and could have said so in the Agreement on Safeguards. They did

not”.”

Para. 7.49. “(…) We are of the view that non-application of Article XIII in the context of

safeguards would result in tariff quota safeguard measures partially escaping the control of

multilateral disciplines. This result would be contrary to the objectives set out in the preamble of the

Safeguards Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of

Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US – Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia

do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.54

Também em US – Line Pipe, o Painel concluiu que a imposição de medidas de salvaguarda em

dissonância com padrões históricos de fluxos internacionais de comércio estaria em

desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:2, caput, do GATT.

Para. 7.54. “In our view, Korea is correct to argue that a Member would violate the general rule set

forth in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 if it imposes safeguard measures without respecting

traditional trade patterns (at least in the absence of any evidence indicating that the shares a

Member might be expected to obtain in the future differ, as a result of changed circumstances, from

its historical share). Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective,

factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure.”

9. Lomé Waiver

Em EC – Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que o Lomé Waiver se estenderia não

apenas ao disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas também ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT.

97

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and

Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras,

México e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,

WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, paras. 7.106 e 7.107

Para. 7.106. “(…) If the Lomé waiver is interpreted to waive only compliance with the obligations

of Article I:1, the waiver would effectively limit preferential treatment to tariff preferences. (…) In

other words, in order to give real effect to the Lomé waiver, it needs to cover Article XIII to the

extent necessary to allow the EC to allocate country-specific tariff quota shares to the ACP

countries in the amount of their pre-1991 best- ever banana exports to the EC. Otherwise, the EC

could not practically fulfil its basic obligation under the Lomé Convention in respect of bananas, as

we have found that it was not unreasonable for the EC to conclude that the Lomé Convention may

be interpreted to require country-specific tariff quota shares at levels not compatible with Article

XIII. Since it was the objective of the Lomé waiver to permit the EC to fulfil that basic obligation,

logically we have no choice therefore but to interpret the waiver so that it accomplishes that

objective (…).”

Para. 7.107. “Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I

and XIII:1, both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in

respect of ‘rules and formalities in connection with importation’, a phrase that has been interpreted

broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff

quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they

are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be imposed. To describe the relationship

somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring non-discriminatory

treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation. Article

XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of

quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with

that of Article I.”

Mudança de posicionamento

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Regime for Importation,

Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala,

Honduras, México e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 183

O Órgão de Apelação, no entanto, o divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel. De acordo com o

seu entendimento, o Lomé Waiver não implica dispensa do cumprimento de obrigações previstas no

Artigo XIII do GATT.

Para. 183. “We disagree with the Panel's conclusion. The wording of the Lomé Waiver is clear and

unambiguous. By its precise terms, it waives only ‘the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the

General Agreement ... to the extent necessary’ to do what is ‘required’ by the relevant provisions of

the Lomé Convention. The Lomé Waiver does not refer to, or mention in any way, any other

provision of the GATT 1994 or of any other covered agreement. Neither the circumstances

surrounding the negotiation of the Lomé Waiver, nor the need to interpret it so as to permit it to

achieve its objectives, allow us to disregard the clear and plain wording of the Lomé Waiver by

extending its scope to include a waiver from the obligations under Article XIII. Moreover, although

Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 are both non-discrimination provisions, their relationship is

not such that a waiver from the obligations under Article I implies a waiver from the obligations

under Article XIII.”

O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatório do Órgão de Apelação, fase de

implementação, no caso EC – Bananas III (Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, México

e EUA), (WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA), para. 350

98

III. Comentários

A análise de precedentes envolvendo a interpretação do Artigo XIII do GATT demonstra que

questões relacionadas à administração de regimes de quotas tarifárias foram objeto de diversas

disputas no âmbito da OMC. Trata-se, portanto, de tema significativamente controvertido.

Certamente, a natureza aberta e até mesmo indefinida de diversos conceitos constantes do Artigo

XIII do GATT contribuiu para tanto. Ademais, pôde-se verificar que diversas disputas tiveram

como cerne a relação dos parágrafos do referido Artigo, bem como a relação do Artigo com outros

dispositivos constantes de outros acordos da OMC.

Em EC – Bananas III, por exemplo, analisou-se se a criação de regimes diferenciados de alocação

de quotas tarifárias para importações de um mesmo produto estaria em conformidade com os

acordos da OMC. Com fundamento no Artigo XIII do GATT, concluiu-se que a subdivisão de

regimes administrativos de importação não pode ser utilizada como mecanismo destinado a

circunvir obrigações de não-discriminação. Firmou-se, portanto, o entendimento de que as regras de

não-discriminação dispostas no Artigo XIII do GATT aplicam-se a um determinado produto,

independentemente da forma pela qual os Membros implementam seus regimes de alocação de

quotas tarifárias. Assim, a criação de regimes administrativos diferenciados de alocação de quotas

tarifárias não é vedada per se, sendo permissível desde que observadas as obrigações de não-

discriminação entre os Membros.

Conforme mencionado, o DSB também foi questionado sobre o significado de termos constantes do

Artigo XIII. Por exemplo, na fase de implementação de EC – Bananas III, o Painel interpretou de

modo amplo o termo “restrição”, constante do Artigo XIII:1 do GATT. De acordo com a

abordagem adotada pelo Painel, a palavra “restrição” deveria ser interpretada como qualquer

benefício concedido a um determinado Membro que fosse capaz de afetar a competitividade de

outros Membros. Contudo, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel,

restringindo a interpretação do termo “restrição”. De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, o referido

termo deveria ser lido como uma referência ao termo “quotas tarifárias”, e não como “benefício”.

Segundo a definição mais precisa adotada pelo Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo XIII:1 do GATT

impõe aos Membros o dever de não imporem quotas tarifárias a outros Membros, a menos que

quotas tarifárias semelhantes sejam impostas à importação do produto similar originário de todos os

outros Membros exportadores.

Também foi objeto de apreciação do DSB a interpretação de princípios gerais constantes do Artigo

XIII do GATT. Em EC – Bananas III, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a alocação de quotas

tarifárias deve ser feita em observância ao princípio de não-discriminação previsto no Artigo XIII:1

do GATT. Com efeito, entendeu-se que Membros estão impedidos de fazer discriminações na

alocação de quotas tarifárias entre Membros que não tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento

de determinado produto.

Também pôde-se identificar intepretações finalísticas do Artigo em comento. Exemplo disso é a

análise sobre o objeto e propósito do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT feita pelo Painel no caso EC –

Bananas III. De acordo com a intepretação dada pelo Painel, o referido dispositivo objetivaria

reduzir o impacto que a imposição de quotas tarifárias causa nos fluxos internacionais de comércio.

Conforme mencionado, o DSB também analisou a relação entre os diversos parágrafos e alíneas do

Artigo XIII. Por exemplo, de acordo com o relatório do Órgão de Apelação na fase de

implementação do caso EC – Bananas III, o Artigo XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presunção relativa em

relação à observância dos critérios estabelecidos no Artigo XIII:2, caput.

O relatório do Painel no caso EC – Bananas III contém outro exemplo de análise da relação entre os

parágrafos do Artigo XIII. Nos termos do relatório em questão, o Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT deve

ser tido como lex especialis em relação ao Artigo XIII:1. Ou seja, o Painel rejeitou o argumento de

que o Artigo XIII:2(d) representaria uma exceção ao disposto no Artigo XIII:1. Concluiu-se, nesse

sentido, que por serem autorizadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT, práticas de alocação de quotas

99

tarifárias apenas a Membros com interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto não

estão, necessariamente, em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:1.

Ademais, analisou-se a relação de frases constantes de um mesmo dispositivo. De acordo com o

entendimento firmado no relatório do Painel em EC – Bananas III, sobre a relação entre as duas

frases constantes do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT é de natureza subsidiária. Segundo esse

posicionamento, primeiro o Membro importador deve tentar buscar firmar acordos com todos os

Membros que tiverem interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto. Caso

conclua-se que chegar a um acordo não é praticável, o Membro importador deverá alocar quotas

tarifárias em observância ao disposto na segunda frase do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT. Ademais,

concluiu-se que não é permissível firmar acordos com apenas determinados Membros que tenham

interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto.

A relação do Artigo XIII com outros Artigos do GATT também foi objeto de análise. Por exemplo,

o DSB firmou o entendimento de que o Artigo I do GATT prevê regra geral de não-discriminação.

O Artigo XIII:1, por sua vez, também reflete o mesmo princípio, porém com abrangência restrita à

administração de quotas tarifárias. Ou seja, trata-se de norma de natureza mais específica.

Outra questão controversa analisada foi o tratamento concedido a Membros que não têm interesse

no fornecimento de determinados produtos. Em EC – Bananas III, o Painel concluiu que se, por

ventura, um Membro optar por alocar quotas tarifárias a Membros que não tenham interesse

substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto, tais quotas devem ser estendidas a todos os

Membros enquadrados nessa categoria.

Também discutiu-se se a alocação de quotas tarifárias a Estados que não sejam Membros da OMC

seria vedada, por força do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT. A esse respeito, o Painel em EC – Poultry

posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT não obriga Membros a calcularem quotas

tarifárias exclusivamente com base em importações oriundas de outros Membros. Portanto,

concluiu-se que alocações de quotas tarifárias a Membros que não sejam Membros da OMC não

seriam vedadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT.

Também foi objeto de análise a relação do Artigo XIII com dispositivos constantes de outros

acordos da OMC. Por exemplo, em US – Pipe Line, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT

deve ser observado para fins da imposição de medidas de salvaguarda. Para tanto, constatou-se que

não há disposição expressa no Acordo de Salvaguardas que autorize expressamente Membros a

agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII. No mesmo precedente, o Painel

considerou as consequências políticas e jurídicas da eventual inaplicabilidade do Artigo XIII do

GATT ao contexto da imposição das medidas de salvaguarda. Também em US – Pipe Line, o Painel

concluiu que a imposição de medidas de salvaguarda em dissonância com padrões históricos de

fluxos internacionais de comércio estaria em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:2,

caput, do GATT. Por consequência, concluiu-se que o referido dispositivo deve ser observado por

Membros que impõem medidas de salvaguarda.

O DSB também analisou a relação entre o Artigo XIII do GATT e as normas constantes do Acordo

sobre Agricultura. A esse respeito, destacam-se dois entendimentos firmados em EC – Bananas III.

Primeiro, o DSB concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura não prevê expressamente a alocação de

quotas tarifárias específicas para cada país em relação a produtos agrícolas. De acordo com o

posicionamento do DSB, se essa fosse a intenção dos negociadores, haveria previsão específica a

esse respeito no Acordo sobre Agricultura. Em segundo lugar, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de

que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercado

relacionado a produtos agrícolas, exceto se previsto expressamente em sentido contrário no Acordo

sobre Agricultura.

Por fim, cumpre destacar a mudança de entendimento em relação à extensão do Lomé Waiver ao

disposto no Artigo XIII. Inicialmente, em EC – Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de

100

que o Lomé Waiver se estenderia não apenas ao disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas também ao

disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT. Todavia, o Órgão de Apelação divergiu da abordagem adotada

pelo Painel. De acordo com o entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, o Lomé Waiver não implica

dispensa do cumprimento de obrigações previstas no Artigo XIII do GATT. Ao reverter o

entendimento adotado pelo Painel, o Órgão de Apelação consignou que o referido waiver não

contém nenhuma referência ao GATT 1994. O entendimento do Órgão de Apelação também

pautou-se nas circunstâncias envolvidas na negociação do Lomé Waiver. Levando-se em

consideração os objetivos dos negociadores do referido waiver, concluiu-se que não haveria

fundamentos sólidos que permitissem estender o escopo do Lomé Waiver ao disposto no Artigo

XIII do GATT.

101

Artigo XV

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XV

Exchange Arrangements

15.1 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with the International Monetary

Fund to the end that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated

policy with regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of

quantitative restrictions and other trade measures within the jurisdiction of the

CONTRACTING PARTIES.

15.2 In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or deal with

problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange

arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such

consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other

facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of

payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a

contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the

International Monetary Fund, or with the terms of a special exchange agreement between that

contracting party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES in

reaching their final decision in cases involving the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of

Article XII or in paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination of the Fund as

to what constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party’s monetary reserves, a very low

level of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary reserves, and as

to the financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such cases.

15.3 The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek agreement with the Fund regarding procedures

for consultation under paragraph 2 of this Article.

15.4 Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate* the intent of the provisions of

this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement

of the International Monetary Fund.

15.5 If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider, at any time, that exchange restrictions on

payments and transfers in connection with imports are being applied by a contracting party in

a manner inconsistent with the exceptions provided for in this Agreement for quantitative

restrictions, they shall report thereon to the Fund.

15.6 Any contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall, within a time to be

determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES after consultation with the Fund, become a

member of the Fund, or, failing that, enter into a special exchange agreement with the

CONTRACTING PARTIES. A contracting party which ceases to be a member of the Fund

shall forthwith enter into a special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES.

Any special exchange agreement entered into by a contracting party under this paragraph

shall thereupon become part of its obligations under this Agreement.

15.7 (a) A special exchange agreement between a contracting party and the CONTRACTINg

PARTIES under paragraph 6 of this Article shall provide to the satisfaction of the

CONTRACTING PARTIES that the objectives of this Agreement will not be

frustrated as a result of action in exchange matters by the contracting party in question.

102

(b) The terms of any such agreement shall not impose obligations on the contracting party

in exchange matters generally more restrictive than those imposed by the Articles of

Agreement of the International Monetary Fund on members of the Fund.

15.8 A contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall furnish such information within

the general scope of section 5 of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the

International Monetary Fund as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may require in order to

carry out their functions under this Agreement.

15.9 Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude:

(a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in

accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or with

that contracting party’s special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING

PARTIES, or

(b) the use by a contracting party of restrictions or controls in imports or exports, the sole

effect of which, additional to the effects permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII and

XIV, is to make effective such exchange controls or exchange restrictions.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XV

Acordos em Matéria de Câmbio

15.1 As Partes Contratantes se esforçarão por colaborar com o Fundo Monetário Internacional, a

fim de promover uma política coordenada no que se refere às questões de câmbio, dentro da

competência do Fundo e as questões de restrições quantitativas ou outras medidas

comerciais, dentro da competência das Partes Contratantes,

15.2 Em todos os casos em que as Partes Contratantes forem chamadas a examinar ou a resolver

problemas relativos às reservas monetárias, à balança de pagamentos ou aos sistemas e

acordos de câmbio, entrarão em ligação estreita com o Fundo Monetário Internacional. No

decorrer dessas consultas, as Partes Contratantes aceitarão todas as constatações de fato, de

ordem estatística ou de outra que lhes forem comunicadas pelo Fundo Monetário

Internacional em matéria de câmbio, de reservas monetárias e de balança de pagamento; e

todas as conclusões do Fundo sobre a conformidade das medidas tomadas por uma Parte

Contratante em matéria de câmbio, com os Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional ou

com as disposições de um acordo especial de câmbio concluído entre essa Parte Contratante e

as Partes Contratantes. Quando tiver que tomar sua decisão final nos casos em que entrem em

linha de conta os critérios estabelecidos no § 2 (a) do Artigo XII ou no parágrafo 9 do Artigo

XVIII, as Partes Contratantes aceitarão as conclusões do Fundo Monetário Internacional

sobre a questão de saber se as reservas monetárias da Parte Contratante sofreram uma baixa

importante, se se acham em nível muito baixo ou se se elevaram segundo um quociente de

crescimento razoável, assim como sobre os aspectos financeiros dos outros problemas aos

quais se estendam as consultas em semelhante caso.

15.3 As Partes Contratantes procurarão um acordo com o Fundo Monetário Internacional a

respeito do processo de consulta prevista no § 2 da presente Artigo.

15.4 As Partes Contratantes abster-se-ão de qualquer medida cambial que possa frustrar os

objetivos considerados no presente Acordo e de qualquer medida comercial que possa

frustrar os objetivos visados pelos Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional.

103

15.5 Se a qualquer momento as Partes Contratantes considerarem que uma das partes aplica

restrições cambiais que incidem sobre os pagamentos e as transferências relativas às

importações de modo incompatível com as exceções previstas no presente Acordo no que se

refere às restrições quantitativas, encaminharão ao Fundo Monetário Internacional um

relatório a esse respeito.

15.6 Toda Parte Contratante que não for membro do Fundo Monetário Internacional deverá,

dentro de um prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes Contratantes. após consulta ao Fundo Monetário

Internacional, tornar-se membro do Fundo, ou senão, concluir com as Partes Contratantes um

acordo especial sobre câmbio. A Parte Contratante que deixar de ser membro do Fundo

Monetário Internacional concluirá imediatamente com as Partes Contratantes um Acordo

especial de câmbio. Qualquer acordo especial sobre câmbio concluído por uma Parte

Contratante em virtude do presente parágrafo, fará, logo após sua conclusão, parte dos

compromissos assumidos por essa Parte Contratante nos termos do presente acordo.

15.7 (a) Qualquer acordo especial de câmbio, concluído entre uma Parte Contratante e as Partes

Contratantes em virtude do § 6 do presente Artigo, conterá as disposições que as Partes

Contratantes acharem necessárias para que as medidas tomadas em matéria de câmbio

pela Parte Contratante em questão não contrariem o presente acordo.

(b) Os termos de tal acordo não imporão à Parte Contratante, em matéria de câmbio,

obrigações mais restritivas no seu conjunto que as impostas pelos Estatutos do Fundo

Monetário Internacional a seus próprios membros.

15.8 A Parte Contratante que não for membro do Fundo Monetário Internacional fornecerá às

Partes Contratantes as informações que elas possam pedir dentro do quadro geral da Seção 5

do Artigo VIII dos Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional, com o fim de desempenhar

as funções que lhes atribui o presente acordo.

15.9 Nada neste Acordo impedirá:

(a) O recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, aos controles ou a restrições cambiais, de acordo

com os Estatutos do Fundo Monetário Internacional ou com o acordo especial sobre

câmbio concluído entre aquela Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes;

(b) nem o recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, a restrições ou a medidas de controle

incidindo sobre importações ou exportações cujo único efeito sem prejuízo dos fins

autorizados pelos Artigos XI, XII, XIII e XIV, seja dar eficácia às medidas de controle

ou restrições cambiais dessa natureza.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

• Parágrafo 1 – “Deverão se esforçar” seria melhor do que “se esforçarão” para “shall seek”.

• Parágrafo 2 – Ao invés de “entrarão em ligação estreita”¸seria melhor “sempre deverão

consultar”, no caso de “shall fully consult”. “Deverão aceitar”, ao invés de “aceitarão”. Melhor

sugestão de pontuação para o trecho grifado, a seguir: “de reservas monetárias, de balança de

pagamentos e todas as conclusões do Fundo”. A expressão “em que entrem em linha de conta” não

é usual, recomenda-se “que envolvam” somente. Novamente, sugere-se “deverão aceitar”. Ao invés

de “baixa importante”, sugere-se “queda significativa”. Por fim, o trecho final do parágrafo está

com uma redação estranha, sugerindo a seguinte redação: “se encontram num nível muito baixo ou

se possuem uma taxa razoável de crescimento, bem como sobre os aspectos financeiros de outras

questões relacionadas às consultas em casos similares”.

104

• Parágrafo 3 – “Deverão procurar” seria melhor do que “procurarão”, no caso de “shall seek”.

“Prevista” está errado, deveria ser “previsto”, já que se refere ao processo.

• Parágrafo 4 – Sugere-se nova redação a esse importante dispositivo do GATT: “As partes

contratantes não deverão, por meio de ações relacionadas ao câmbio [exchange action], frustrar o

propósito dos dispositivos do GATT nem, por ação de comércio, o propósito dos dispositivos dos

Artigos do Acordo do FMI”.

• Parágrafo 5 – Ao invés de “encaminharão”, sugere-se “deverão encaminhar”, para a

expressão “shall report”.

• Parágrafo 6 – Ao invés de “concluirá”, sugere-se “deverá concluir”.

• Parágrafo 7 – (a) “§6” ao invés de “§6”. “Deverá conter” ao invés de “conterá”. Sugere-se

“ações relacionadas ao câmbio” ao invés de “medidas tomadas em matéria de câmbio”; (b) “não

deverão impor” ao invés de “não imporão”. Também sugere-se “ações relacionadas ao câmbio” ao

invés de “em matéria de câmbio”. Por fim, sugere-se “em seu conjunto do que” ao invés de “no seu

conjunto que”.

• Parágrafo 8 – Ao invés de “fornecerão”, recomenda-se “deverão fornecer”, para “shall

furnish”.

• Parágrafo 9 – Sugere-se para o trecho grifado: “efeito, além dos fins autorizados pelos (...)”.

II. Evolução da Interpretação do Painel/Órgão de Apelação

1. Taxa de Câmbio como Extrapolação dos Compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um

Membro

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.106

Para. 7.106. “Honduras claims that the foreign exchange fee as an “other duty or charge” is

inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic contends that the fee

is an exchange restriction justified under Article XV:9(a). It states that should the Panel find to the

contrary, it is nevertheless consistent with Article II:1(b) since it was recorded in the Schedule.

Given its terms of reference and in light of the parties' claims and arguments during the

proceedings, the Panel considers it necessary to examine the matter by analysing the following legal

issues: (i) whether the foreign exchange fee is an ODC as recorded in the Schedule; (ii) whether the

foreign exchange fee is inconsistent with Article II:1(b); (iii) whether the foreign exchange fee is an

“exchange restriction” under Article XV:9(a); (iv) whether the fee is imposed “in accordance with”

Articles of Agreement of the IMF; and (v) whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of

the GATT.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.116-122

105

Para. 7.116. “On the issue of whether the foreign exchange fee as an ODC has been recorded in the

Schedules of Concessions of the Dominican Republic, the Panel notes that the parties made

essentially the same arguments as they did on the issue of whether the surcharge measure has been

recorded in the Schedule. The Panel therefore considers that the same analysis the Panel made with

respect to the recording of the surcharge measure in paragraphs 7.37 to 7.40 also applies to the

recording of the foreign exchange although the Panel notes that the foreign exchange fee did exist at

the level of 1.5 per cent as of 15 April 1994.”

Para. 7.117. “Therefore, the Panel's overall factual assessment with respect to the recording of the

foreign exchange fee measure is that the foreign exchange fee was applied at 1.5 per cent in 1994,

but it was not recorded in the Schedule. What the Dominican Republic notified in document G/SP/3

was basically the products list and the ad valorem Selective Consumption Tax rates as applied to

these imported products under Law 11-92 in force in 1994. It is clear that in fact these products

were only subject to the Selective Consumption Tax, not to an equal amount of additional “other

duties and charges” back in 1994.”

Para. 7.118. “The Panel has found in paragraph 7.40 that the Dominican Republic has actually

recorded in its Schedule the Selective Consumption Tax as it applied to imported products as of 15

April 1994. The fact that the Selective Consumption Tax applied both to imported and domestic

products makes it clear that it is in the nature of an internal tax. Article II:2(a) and Article II:1(b)

make a distinction between an internal tax that is subject to Article III and an ODC that is subject to

a bound requirement with the consequence that the two are mutually exclusive. If a measure is in

the nature of an internal tax, it is not an ODC. If a measure is in the nature of an ODC, it is not an

internal tax. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Dominican Republic has not established that

the nature of the measure recorded in the Schedule of the Dominican Republic is an ODC measure

within the meaning of Article II:1(b) that could be invoked to justify the current ODC measure, the

foreign exchange fee.”

Para. 7.119. “The Panel also considers that Honduras’s challenge to the nature of the recorded

measure is not prohibited by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Understanding or by the fact of absence of

invocation of the Understanding in its Panel request based on the same analysis as developed by the

Panel in paragraphs 7.67, 7.71 and 7.78.”

Para. 7.120. “The Panel recalls that the foreign exchange fee is applied to all imported products,

well beyond the selective products list in the G/SP/3 notification. As the Panel found in paragraph

7.103, the foreign exchange fee as applied to products outside the scope of the products listed in the

G/SP/3 notification, is within the Panel's terms of reference.”

Para. 7.121. “The Panel concludes for the reasons set out above, that there was no legally valid

recording of any ODC measure as required by the Understanding in the Schedule of the Dominican

Republic. For all legal and practical purposes, what was notified by the Dominican Republic in

document G/SP/3 is equivalent to “zero” in the Schedule. The Panel finds that the foreign exchange

fee is therefore applied in excess of the level of “zero” pursuant to the Schedule of the Dominican

Republic and therefore is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.122. “The Panel also considers that the application of foreign exchange fee to products

other than those products listed in the G/SP/3 notification is in excess of the level of “zero” or

“none” pursuant to the Schedule of the Dominican Republic, since nothing was recorded for these

products, either as an ODC or otherwise.”

106

2. Relação do Artigo XV:2 com as Regras do FMI

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear,

Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS56/AB/R e WT/DS56/AB/R/Corr.1, paras. 84-85

Para. 84. “The only provision of the WTO Agreement that requires consultations with the IMF is

Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994. This provision requires the WTO to consult with the IMF when

dealing with “problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange

arrangements”.”

Para. 85. “As in the WTO Agreement, there are no provisions in the Agreement Between the IMF

and the WTO that require a panel to consult with the IMF in a case such as this. Under paragraph 8

of this latter Agreement, in a case involving “exchange measures within the Fund’s jurisdiction”,

the IMF “shall inform in writing the relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) (…)

whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.” This case does

not, however, involve “exchange measures within the Fund’s jurisdiction”. Paragraph 8 also

provides that the IMF “may communicate its views in writing on matters of mutual interest to the

[WTO] or any of its organs or bodies (excluding the WTO’s dispute settlement panels) (…)”

(emphasis added). Evidently, the IMF has not been authorized to provide its views to a WTO

dispute settlement panel on matters not relating to exchange measures within its jurisdiction, unless

it is requested to do so by a panel under Article 13 of the DSU.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 149, 151-152

Para. 149. “On the basis of these provisions, the Panel submitted to the IMF a number of questions

regarding India’s balance-of-payments situation. The Panel gave considerable weight to the views

expressed by the IMF in its reply to these questions. However, nothing in the Panel Report supports

India’s argument that the Panel delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective

assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the Panel Report makes clear that the Panel did not

simply accept the views of the IMF. The Panel critically assessed these views and also considered

other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions.”

Para. 151. “We conclude that the Panel made an objective assessment of the matter before it.

Therefore, we do not agree with India that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the

DSU.”

Para. 152. “The question whether Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 requires panels to consult with

the IMF and to consider as dispositive specific determinations of the IMF was debated at length by

the parties before the Panel. However, the Panel did not consider it necessary, for the purposes of

this dispute, to decide this issue. As this finding of the Panel is not appealed, we abstain from taking

any position on it.”

107

3. Relação do Artigo XV:9 (a) com as Regras do FMI

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 1.8

Para. 1.8. “Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement between the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization, the Panel, on 17 May 2004, requested the

IMF to provide information on how the “Comisión Cambiaria a las Importaciones” (previously

called “Comisión de Cambio” and originally introduced by the Monetary Board of the Dominican

Republic's Central Bank on 24 January 1991) is being implemented by the Dominican Republic.

The Panel also requested the IMF to provide its views on whether the “Comisión Cambiaria a las

Importaciones”, as applied by the Dominican Republic, is considered to be an “exchange control”

or “exchange restriction” under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. On

25 June 2004 the IMF sent its response to the Panel. (1) The letter from the IMF was circulated to

Parties and the Panel invited Parties to make comments. Honduras made some comments and the

Dominican Republic did not submit any comments.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.123

Para. 7.123. “The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is an exchange

measure justified by Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic considers that

Article XV:9(a) is an exception to other provisions of the GATT, including Article II. In its view,

Members are entitled to use exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes),

Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.138-7.146

Paras. 7.138. “The Panel takes note of the argument made by the Dominican Republic that the

foreign exchange fee is approved by the IMF as a part of the stand-by arrangement between the

IMF and therefore it is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. (2) The Panel

notes that paragraph 2 of Article XV provides that:

In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called

upon to consider or deal with problems concerning monetary

reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements,

they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In

such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all

findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating

108

to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments,

and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action

by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with

the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or

with the terms of a special exchange arrangement between that

contracting party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.... (emphasis

added)

Paras. 7.139. “The Panel considered during the proceedings that it needed to seek more information

on the precise legal nature and status of the foreign exchange fee measure in the stand-by

arrangement between the IMF and the Dominican Republic. Secondly, since the Dominican

Republic argues that the fee is an exchange restriction and it is imposed in accordance with the

Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel considered that it needed to consult with the IMF

based on paragraph 2 of Article XV to verify such an argument for a determination by the Panel on

whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT. The core issue in this regard is

whether the foreign exchange measure constitutes an “exchange restriction” in the package of the

stand-by arrangement. If the answer is positive, the next issue then is whether the foreign exchange

fee is “in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and hence justified under Article

XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994.”

Paras. 7.140. “The Panel is also aware of the provision in paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement

between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization that “The Fund shall

inform in writing the relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) considering

exchange measures within the Fund's jurisdiction whether such measures are consistent with the

Articles of Agreement of the Fund”.”

Paras. 7.141. “The Panel also recalls a similar situation in Argentina – Textiles, where an ad

valorem statistical tax was imposed allegedly for fiscal performance purposes so as to obtain IMF

financing to deal with a financial crisis. That panel in that instance did not consult with the IMF.

The Appellate Body considered that that panel had good reason for not consulting the IMF because

the statistical tax was not one of the “problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments

or foreign exchange arrangements”. However, it nevertheless stated that “it might perhaps have

been useful for the Panel to have consulted with the IMF on the legal character of the relationship

or arrangement between Argentina and the IMF in this case”. (3)

Paras. 7.142. “Bearing these considerations in mind, the Panel requested information on 17 May

2004 from the IMF on the following two issues: (i) how the foreign exchange fee is being

implemented by the Dominican Republic; (ii) whether the foreign exchange fee as currently applied

by the Dominican Republic is an “exchange control” or “exchange restriction” under the Articles of

Agreement of the IMF.”

Paras. 7.143. “On the first issue, the IMF General Counsel replied that:

(a) The 'exchange commission' is levied under the legal authority

of the Banco Central de la República Dominicana (BCRD). Since

its introduction in January 1991, the commission has undergone a

number of changes in the way that it is levied. Initially, the

commission was payable on sales of foreign exchange and was

calculated as a percentage of the selling rate.

(b) Since August 2002, however, pursuant to the Agreement

between the BCRD and the Directorate General for Customs

(DGC) of August 22, 2002, the commission has been collected in

its entirety by the DGC. Moreover, although the commission is still

referred to as an “exchange commission” (because it is levied on

the basis of the legal authority vested in the BCRD to charge a

commission on sales of foreign exchange), the commission is no

longer payable on sales of foreign exchange. Rather, it is payable

as a condition for the importation of goods, and the amount of the

commission is now calculated exclusively on the CIF valuation of

109

the imported goods as determined by the DGC (Article 1 of the

Agreement between the BCRD and the DGC). By Notice of

Resolution nº 1 of the Monetary Board of October 22, 2003, the

rate of the commission was increased to ten per cent in

October 2003.” (4)

Paras. 7.144. “On the second issue that the Panel requested information on, the reply states:

As applied since August 2002, the exchange commission is no

longer a measure subject to Fund approval. As noted above, the

commission is no longer payable on sales of foreign exchange. It is

payable as a condition for the importation of goods and the amount

to be paid is based on the CIF value of the imported goods (rather

than the amount of foreign exchange sold to an importer for the

payment of goods). As such, it does not constitute a multiple

currency practice or an exchange restriction notwithstanding its

label or the fact that the commission is charged on the basis of the

legal authority vested in the BCRD to charge an exchange

commission on sales of foreign exchange. For the same reasons, it

is not an exchange control measure.”(emphasis added)

Paras. 7.145. “The Panel fully agrees with the opinion of the IMF. For the reasons set out above by

the Panel and considering the opinion expressed by the IMF, the Panel finds that the foreign

exchange fee measure as it is currently applied by the Dominican Republic does not constitute an

“exchange restriction” within the meaning of Article XV: 9(a) of the GATT 1994.”

Paras. 7.146. “Whether the fee is imposed “in accordance with” Articles of Agreement of the IMF:

(a) Arguments of the parties

The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is

applied in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund

as provided in Article XV:9(a). On 29 August 2003, The

Dominican Republic concluded a stand-by arrangement with the

Fund by which the Dominican Republic enforced, inter alia, a non-

unified exchange rate system. The stand-by arrangement

incorporated performance criteria calling for full unification of the

dual exchange system by the end of 2003. The Fund approved the

non-unified exchange rate system. However, due to its economic

performance, the Dominican Republic was unable to fulfil its

commitments made in the stand-by arrangement with the Fund and

requested a waiver from the Fund in January 2004 for non-

observance of the performance criteria, inter alia, on the

unification of the foreign exchange market and for the continuous

performance criteria regarding exchange rate restrictions and

multiple currency practices. The Dominican Republic submits that

the Executive Board of the Fund completed its first review and the

Dominican Republic understands that the Fund approved the

“exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practices”. The

foreign exchange fee as an exchange rate restriction, or multiple

currency practice, is applied by the Dominican Republic “in

accordance with” the Fund Articles of Agreement. Therefore, in

the opinion of the Dominican Republic, it is permitted under

Article XV:9(a) of the GATT.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante:

Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.150-7.155

110

Para. 7.150. “In fact, the reply of the IMF General Counsel concludes that since the foreign

exchange commission does not constitute an exchange restriction, “the issue of its consistency or

inconsistency with the Funds Articles for purpose of paragraph 8 of the Co-operation Agreement

does not arise”. The Panel fully agrees with this statement.”

Para. 7.151. “The Panel considers that even if the foreign exchange fee does constitute an

“exchange restriction”, Article XV:9(a) requires that it has to be applied “in accordance with”

Articles of Agreement of the IMF. In light of the parties' arguments in this regard, the Panel will

analyse whether the Dominican Republic has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the

foreign exchange fee is “in accordance with” the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.”

Para. 7.152. “The Dominican Republic refers only to an IMF news release. The Panel has not been

presented with a copy of the formal Decision made by IMF. The Dominican Republic referred to

this decision as a “waiver”. It is not clear which provision of the IMF Articles of Agreement is the

legal basis of the waiver and what is the legal basis to establish that the waiver was made in

accordance with the Articles of Agreement. The Dominican Republic confirmed in its replies to

questions that the waiver will be valid for three months. (5) As a result, the legal status of the

waiver after the three-month period is not clear to the Panel.”

Para. 7.153. “On the substance of the IMF news release, the meaning of the language that the IMF

“approved the Dominican Republic's request to waive the non-observance of (...) continuous

performance criteria concerning (...) exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practice” is

not self-evident. Does it mean that the IMF waived the obligation for the Dominican Republic to

completely unify the dual exchange markets and to form one unified exchange rate? Is the foreign

exchange fee one component of the “exchange rate restrictions”? The Panel considers that the

foreign exchange fee measure is independent of the dual exchange rates system. Even before the

dual exchange rates are unified, the foreign exchange fee can be eliminated without changing the

dual exchange rate system. It is also true that, even after the dual exchange rates are unified, the

foreign exchange fee can still be imposed without changing the unified exchange rate market.”

Para. 7.154. “For these reasons, the Panel finds that the IMF waiver decision does not constitute a

legal basis for the application of the foreign exchange fee measure and the Dominican Republic has

not demonstrated that the foreign exchange fee is applied “in accordance with” the Articles of

Agreement of the IMF.”

Whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994

Para. 7.155. “The Panel considers that Article XV:9(a) as an exception provision has to be invoked

and proved by the Dominican Republic to justify the inconsistency of the foreign exchange fee

measure with the second sentence of Article II:1(b). As the Panel has already found that the

measure does not constitute an “exchange restriction” within the meaning of Article XV:9(a) of the

GATT 1994 and that the Dominican Republic has not demonstrated that it is “in accordance with”

the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel concludes that the foreign exchange fee is

inconsistent with Article II:1(b) and can not be justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994.”

4. Conceito de “Exchange restriction” de acordo com o Artigo XV:9 (a)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.124- 7.125

111

Paras. 7.124. “The Dominican Republic also argues that the foreign exchange fee is an “exchange

restriction” because of the following features: it is prescribed by monetary authorities, not by trade

or customs authorities; it applies to exchange actions, not to import transactions as such; and it is a

charge on foreign exchange transactions imposed through the banking system, not a charge on

import transactions levied by customs authorities. (6)”

Paras. 7.125. “The Dominican Republic considers that the meaning of exchange restrictions is to be

interpreted by the IMF. In this regard, it reminds the Panel of a Decision made by the Executive

Directors of the Fund on 1 June 1960 stating that “[t]he guiding principle in ascertaining whether a

measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII,

Section 2, is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of

exchange as such”. (7) The Dominican Republic considers that the criterion for identifying an

“exchange restriction” does not involve the motive behind a measure or the effect it produces. (8)

The Dominican Republic considers that the foreign exchange fee is an “exchange restriction”

because paragraph 12 of the Resolution of 24 January 1991 provides that the Central Bank will levy

a percentage on foreign exchange transactions. (9)

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.132

Paras. 7.132. “The Panel is also aware of the argument of the Dominican Republic that the criterion

for determining whether a measure is an “exchange restriction” is “whether it involves a direct

governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such”, as set out by a Decision of

the Executive Directors of the Fund in 1960 and the fact that Honduras does not disagree with this

criterion. The Panel considers that, since Article XV:9 of the GATT exempts exchange restrictions

measures that are applied in accordance with the Fund Articles, from obligations under other

Articles of the GATT, the guiding principle that the IMF prescribed as the criterion for the

determination of what constitutes an “exchange restriction” should be respected by this Panel.

Therefore, the Panel should apply this criterion in its evaluation of the measure before it.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.134- 7.137

Paras. 7.134. “The Panel considers it necessary to examine the specific aspects of the current

foreign exchange measure to determine whether it is in fact imposed solely on import-related

exchange transactions. In this regard, the Panel notes that the 1991 Resolution provides differently

from that of the later Resolution.”

Paras. 7.135. “A reading of the 1991 Resolution reveals the nature of foreign exchange fee as it

was applied in 1991. Paragraph 12 provides: “the Central Bank shall charge users of official foreign

exchange transactions and commercial banks, for the delegation of foreign exchange operations, the

equivalent in Dominican Pesos (RD$) of two and a half per cent (2-1/2%) of the selling exchange

rate applied to each transaction”. This means that the fee was originally imposed on foreign

112

exchange transactions conducted in both official and private foreign exchange markets through

either the Central Bank or commercial banks. This Resolution actually required that the foreign

exchange fee be paid for all kinds of foreign currency transactions, including both selling and

purchasing transactions. This measure actually increased the cost for the use of foreign currency,

for all kinds of transactions regardless of whether the transaction was related to importation. The

Panel considers that the foreign exchange fee as it was applied in 1991 could be characterized as an

exchange measure, as it is possible that the IMF would deem the increase of cost for the

availability of foreign exchange as a means of “restriction” on the availability of the foreign

currency. However, it is not necessary for the Panel to decide on the measure as it was applied in

1991. The measure to be examined by the Panel for the resolution of the dispute is the currently

applied foreign exchange fee measure.”

Paras. 7.136. “With regard to the currently applied foreign exchange fee measure, the Panel notes

that the relevant provisions in the 1991 Resolution of the Monetary Board have been amended by

later resolutions. On the issue of whether the fee is imposed on all types of transactions or solely on

import-related transactions, the applicable rules are those under the Resolution of 20 August 2002.

Paragraph 2 of this Resolution provides “exchange commissions shall henceforth no longer be

applied to external debt service payments, capital repatriation, remittances of profits, technology

transfers, sales for travel expenses and medical services, credit cards and other services”. (10) The

Dominican Republic confirms in its replies to a Panel question that “[t]he foreign exchange fee

applies only to importation of goods. It does not apply to foreign exchange payments of non-import

related services, nor to foreign currency payments made by Dominican Republic residents, nor to

remittance of dividends from companies located in the Dominican Republic”. (11)

Paras. 7.137. “The Panel considers that the ordinary meaning of the “direct limitation on

availability or use of exchange (...) as such” means a limitation directly on the use of exchange

itself, which means the use of exchange for all purposes. It cannot be interpreted in a way so as to

permit the restriction on the use of exchanges that only affects importation. To conclude otherwise

would logically lead to the situation whereby any WTO Member could easily circumvent

obligations under Article II:1(b) by imposing a foreign currency fee or charge on imports at the

customs and then conveniently characterize it as an “exchange restriction”. Such types of measures

would seriously discriminate against imports while not necessarily being effective in achieving the

legitimate goals under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Therefore, the Panel finds that

because the fee as currently applied is imposed only on foreign exchange transactions that relate to

the importation of goods, and not on other types of transactions, it is not “a direct limitation on the

availability or use of exchange as such”.

5. Ônus de invocar o Artigo XV como Exceção ou Defesa Afirmativa

Relatório do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and

Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R,

paras. 7.107 e 7.131

Para. 7.107. “As to the order of analysis of the claim made by Honduras and the defence made by

the Dominican Republic, the Panel considers it necessary to first examine the claim of

inconsistency of the fee with Article II:1(b). Both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT is an

exception or an affirmative defence. The Panel agrees with this characterization of Article XV. That

means that it serves as a justification for inconsistency with other provisions of the GATT. If there

is no inconsistency with other GATT provisions in the first place, there is no need to have recourse

113

to any affirmative defence for justification. Therefore, the Panel should begin its analysis with the

claim under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 7.131. “The Panel takes note that both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT 1994 is an

exception or an affirmative defence. Although the two concepts are not identical, an exception can

often be invoked as an affirmative defence. It is well established that under an exception provision,

the burden is on the defending party to justify the consistency of its measure under the exception

provision it invoked (12) Therefore, in this case, the Dominican Republic bears the burden to

establish: (i) that the foreign exchange fee measure is an “exchange control or exchange restriction”

within the meaning of Article XV:9(a); and (ii) that the measure is “in accordance with” the

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund”, as required by Article XV:9(a).”

Footnote 1: Letter dated 25 June 2004 addressed to Chairman of the Panel, from the General Counsel of the International

Monetary Fund, in response to Panel request for information (See Annex D).

Footnote 2: First written submission of the Dominican Republic, 13 April 2004, paras. 199-201.

Footnote 3: Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles, para. 65.

Footnote 4: Letter from the General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund, Annex D, supra note 6.

Footnote 5: Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 63.

Footnote 6: Ibid., para. 93.

Footnote7: First written submission of the Dominican Republic, 13 April 2004, para. 94.

Footnote 8: Ibid.

Footnote 9: Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 58.

Footnote 10: The text of the First Resolution of the Monetary Board, dated 20 August 2002, was provided by Honduras as

Exhibit HOND-3(c).

Footnote 11: See, Replies of the Dominican Republic to questions addressed by the Panel, reply to question nº 9.

Footnote 12: For the reasoning of the Appellate Body, see Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirt and Blouses, pp. 15-

16; Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 104-105; Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 22-23;

and Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 45.

III. Comentários

O Artigo XV do GATT, apesar de abordar o tema sensível do câmbio e de extrema relevância, não

foi interpretado peloDSB em muitas disputas no âmbito da OMC. De acordo com a base de dados

da OMC, o referido dispositivo foi invocado como violado em apenas duas disputas, havendo

interpretações do OSC relevantes com relação à sua aplicação em não mais que três disputas. Não

obstante, as interpretações realizadas detêm sua relevância e foram aqui divididas por temas, quais

sejam: (i) Taxa de câmbio como extrapolação dos compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um

Membro; (ii) Relação do Artigo XV:2 com as regras do FMI; (iii) Relação do Artigo XV:9 com as

regras do FMI, (iv) Conceito de “Exchange restriction” de acordo com o Artigo XV:9 (a) e;

finalmente, (v) Ônus de invocar o Artigo XV como exceção ou defesa afirmativa. Quanto ao

primeiro tema, o Painel na DS302 contribui para atentar para a importância de se observar os

compromissos assumidos na agenda do Membro, ao se analisar se a taxa de câmbio é uma violação

ao GATT ou uma exceção dentro do Artigo XV:9 (a).

Conforme metodologia adotada pelo Painel para analisar a referida violação (vide parágrafo 7.106

do relatório), o primeiro passo é verificar se a medida em questão, no caso a taxa de câmbio é uma

extrapolação dos compromissos firmados na Agenda. Na disputa, o Painel entendeu que a taxa de

câmbio implementada pela República Dominicana foi aplicada em excesso, sendo inconsistente

com o Artigo II:1(b) do GATT. A relação do dispositivo com as regras do FMI é objeto do segundo

e terceiro tema sugerido de análise, mais especificamente com relação ao parágrafo XV:2 e XV:9

(a), respectivamente.

No que diz respeito ao primeiro parágrafo, denota-se que o Órgão de Apelação já entendeu que tal

era o único dispositivo da OMC que ilustra uma situação na qual uma consulta com o FMI se faz

necessária, qual seja, quando se considera questões como reservas monetárias, balança de

pagamentos ou acordos cambiais. O entendimento do Órgão de Apelação também demonstra que

cabe aos Painéis decidir se na disputa se faz necessário recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para

questões específicas, como ocorrido em diversas disputas (como DS90, DS302). No caso DS90, por

114

exemplo, o Painel ponderou seriamente o entendimento do FMI, mas não o considerou como

determinante para realizar suas conclusões.

Já a relação do Artigo XV: 9 (a) com as regras do FMI foi mais discutida no âmbito do DSB. Como

explanado anteriormente, o dispositivo delimita a possibilidade dos Membros recorrerem a medidas

cambiais de acordo com as regras do FMI. Em suma, o entendimento dos Painéis nos referidos

casos demonstra: (a) o recurso ao entendimento do FMI por parte do DSB para embasar suas

decisões relacionadas a assuntos cambiais; e, (b) a necessidade de verificação de compatibilidade

com as regras do FMI para que uma medida seja entendida como uma restrição cambial e, em caso

afirmativo, considerada como uma exceção legítima nos termos do Artigo XV:9 (a). Por esses

motivos, verifica-se a importância de se compreender a medida cambial aplicada pelo Membro,

inclusive sob a égide das regras do FMI, para que o DSB possa deliberar sobre a sua

compatibilidade com o GATT. Interessante notar que os casos demonstram que, de fato, se a

medida for tida como compatível com as regras do FMI, também são compatíveis com a OMC, e

vice-versa, conforme prevê o Artigo XV:9 (a).

A título de curiosidade, cabe apontar que o Artigo XV(4) (“as partes contratantes não deverão, por

meio de ações relacionadas ao câmbio [exchange action], frustrar o propósito dos dispositivos do

GATT nem, por ação de comércio, o propósito dos dispositivos dos Artigos do Acordo do FMI”)

também indica uma atuação da OMC de forma a atentar para as regras do FMI.

O quarto tema foca no conceito de “restrição cambial” nas interpretações promovidas pelo DSB. O

Painel no caso DS302 reforça a necessidade de compreensão da medida aplicada para se concluir se

tal pode ser considerada uma efetiva “restrição cambial” à luz da definição trazida pelo FMI. Por

ela, entende-se uma medida como tal quando envolve uma “limitação governamental direta na

disponibilidade e utilização do câmbio como tal”. Mais uma vez, é reforçada a necessidade de

recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para que DSB analise tais temas.

O quinto e último tema demonstra ser relevante o entendimento do Painel, também na DS302,

quanto ao caráter excepcional ou de defesa afirmativo do Artigo XV, uma vez que serve como

justificativa para que uma medida seja inconsistente com outro dispositivo do GATT. Caso não haja

inconsistência com outro dispositivo do GATT, não há, portanto, necessidade de se recorrer à

exceção do Artigo XV. Logicamente, por seu caráter excepcional, cabe à parte demandada justificar

a consistência da medida, de acordo com o dispositivo de exceção invocado, bem como de provar a

sua compatibilidade com as regras do FMI, tal como exige o já mencionado Artigo XV:9 (a).

Por fim, diante do atual cenário de intensa discussão sobre a interferência do câmbio no comércio

internacional, ousa-se dizer que os dispositivos da OMC que tratam da questão cambial tal como o

Artigo XV do GATT ganham um papel ainda mais relevante na conjuntura da regulação do

comércio exterior.

115

Artigo XVII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XVII

Empreendimentos Comerciais do Estado

17.1 (a) Cada Parte Contratante que funde ou mantenha uma empresa de Estado, seja onde for,

ou que conceda de direito ou de fato, a qualquer empresa privilégios exclusivos ou

especiais compromete-se a que essa empresa, em suas compras ou vendas que tenham

por origem ou por conseqüência importações ou exportações, se conforme ao princípio

geral de não discriminação adotado pelo presente Acordo para as medidas de natureza

legislativa ou administrativa relativas às importações ou exportações efetuadas pelos

comerciantes particulares.

(b)As disposições da alínea (a) do presente parágrafo deverão ser interpretadas como

impondo a essas empresas a obrigação, levadas devidamente em conta as outras

disposições do presente Acordo, de proceder às compras e vendas dessa natureza

inspirando-se unicamente em considerações de ordem comercial, inclusive no que diz

respeito ao preço, à qualidade, às quantidades disponíveis, às possibilidades de venda,

aos transportes e outras indicações de compra ou venda, e como impondo a obrigação

de oferecer às empresas de outras Partes Contratantes todas as facilidades de livre

concorrência nas vendas ou compras dessa natureza, de acordo com as práticas

comerciais usuais,

(c) Nenhuma Parte Contratante impedirá qualquer empresa quer se trate ou não de uma

empresa mencionada na alínea (a) do presente parágrafo sujeita à sua jurisdição, de

agir de acordo com os princípios enunciados nas alíneas (a) e (b) do presente

parágrafo.

17.2 As disposições do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo não se aplicarão às importações de

produtos destinados a serem imediata ou finalmente consumidos pelos poderes públicos ou

por sua conta e não a serem revendidos ou a servirem à produção de mercadorias destinadas à

venda. No que diz respeito a tais importações, cada Parte Contratante concederá ao comércio

das outras Partes Contratantes um tratamento leal e equitativo.

17.3 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os empreendimentos do gênero daqueles que são

definidos na alínea (a) do parágrafo primeiro do presente Artigo poderão ser utilizados de

maneira que deles resultem sérios entraves ao comércio; nestas condições, é importante, para

assegurar o desenvolvimento do comércio internacional, entabular negociações sobre uma

base de reciprocidade e de vantagens mútuas, a fim de limitar ou de reduzir esses entraves.

116

a) 17.4(a) As Partes Contratantes notificarão às Partes Contratantes os produtos que são

importados em seus territórios ou que deles são exportados por empreendimentos do

gênero daqueles que são definidos na alínea (a) do parágrafo primeiro do presente

Artigo.

b) Qualquer Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantém ou autoriza um monopólio de

importação de um produto sobre o qual não foi outorgada concessão nos termos do

Artigo 2, deverá, a pedido de uma outra Parte Contratante que tenha um comércio

substancial deste produto, levar ao conhecimento das Partes Contratantes a majoração

do preço de importação do dito produto durante um período de referência recente ou,

quando isto não for possível o preço cobrado, na revenda deste produto.

c) As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma Parte Contratante que tenha razões

para crer que seus interesses no quadro do presente acordo estão sendo atingidos pelas

operações de um empreendimento do gênero daqueles que são definidos na alínea (a)

do parágrafo primeiro, convidar a Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantém ou

autoriza um tal empreendimento a fornecer sobre as operações do mencionado

empreendimento as informações referentes à execução do presente acordo.

d) As disposições do presente parágrafo não obrigarão uma Parte Contratante a revelar

informações confidenciais cuja divulgação oponha obstáculo à aplicação das leis seja

contrária ao interesse público ou prejudique os interesses comerciais legítimos de um

empreendimento.

II. Evolução da Interpretação do Painel/Órgão de Apelação

1. Princípios de Tratamento Não Discriminatório

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 85

Para. 85. “Subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 contains a number of different elements, including

both an acknowledgement and an obligation. It recognizes that Members may establish or maintain

State enterprises or grant exclusive or special privileges to private enterprises, but requires that, if

they do so, such enterprises must, when they are involved in certain types of transactions

(“purchases or sales involving either imports or exports”), comply with a specific requirement. That

requirement is to act consistently with certain principles contained in the GATT 1994 (“general

principles of non-discriminatory treatment … for governmental measures affecting imports or

exports by private traders”). Subparagraph (a) seeks to ensure that a Member cannot, through the

creation or maintenance of a State enterprise or the grant of exclusive or special privileges to any

enterprise, engage in or facilitate conduct that would be condemned as discriminatory under the

GATT 1994 if such conduct were undertaken directly by the Member itself. In other words,

subparagraph (a) is an “anti-circumvention” provision.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 87

117

Para. 87. “This requirement, which lies at the core of subparagraph (a), is a requirement that STEs

not engage in certain types of discriminatory conduct. When viewed in the abstract, the concept of

discrimination may encompass both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well

as treating dissimilar situations in a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has previously

dealt with the concept of discrimination and the meaning of the term “non-discriminatory”, and

acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of distinctions between similar situations is

concerned, the ordinary meaning of discrimination can accommodate both drawing distinctions per

se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a

provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of differential treatment

is prohibited. In all cases, a claimant alleging discrimination will need to establish that differential

treatment has occurred in order to succeed in its claim.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 98 e nota de rodapé 104

Para. 98 e Nota de Rodapé 104. “As we have seen, through its reference to the “general principles

of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting

imports or exports by private traders”, Article XVII:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to use

STEs in order to discriminate in ways that would be prohibited if undertaken directly by Members.

Yet even if Article XVII:1 itself did not exist, this would not imply that STEs would be subject to

no disciplines under the GATT 1994. For example, the express provisions of Article II:4 of the

GATT 1994 and the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII constrain the behaviour of

STEs. Other provisions of the GATT 1994, notably Article VI, also apply to the activities of STEs.

Nota 104: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft104>). We need not identify, for purposes of

this appeal, all of the provisions of the GATT 1994 that may apply to STEs, nor consider how these disciplines interact

with and reinforce each other. We do, however, believe that these other provisions reveal that, even in 1947, the

negotiators of the GATT created a number of complementary requirements to address the different ways in which STEs

could be used by a contracting party to seek to circumvent its obligations under the GATT. The existence of these other

provisions of the GATT 1994 also supports the view that Article XVII was never intended to be the sole source of the

disciplines imposed on STEs under that Agreement. This is also consistent with the view that Article XVII:1 was intended

to impose disciplines on one particular type of STE behaviour, namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than to constitute

a comprehensive code of conduct for STEs. Moreover, as the Panel observed, since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round,

a number of additional obligations, under different covered agreements, operate to further constrain the behaviour of

STEs.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 145

Para. 145. “(…) The disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain types of

discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting that provision as imposing

comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs, as the United States would have us do.”

118

2. Preços Diferenciados por Razões Comerciais (Note Ad, XVII do GATT 1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 94

Para. 94. “(…) This ad Note is attached to Article XVII:1 as a whole, rather than to either

subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) alone. This sentence of the ad Note confirms that at least one

type of differential treatment — price differentiation — is consistent with Article XVII:1 provided

that the reasons for such differential prices are commercial in nature, and gives an example of such

commercial reasons (“to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets”). Thus, this

Note also contemplates that determining the consistency or inconsistency of an STE’s conduct with

Article XVII:1 will involve an examination of both differential treatment and of commercial

considerations.”

3. Relação entre os Subparágrafos (a) e (b)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 89

Para. 89. “(…) the question we are asked to consider is how subparagraph (a) relates to

subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1. In our view, the answer to that inquiry is not found in the text

of subparagraph (a). Rather, the words that bear most directly on the relationship between the first

two paragraphs of Article XVII:1 are found in the opening phrase of subparagraph (b), which states

that the “provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such

enterprises shall (…)”. (emphasis added) This phrase makes it abundantly clear that the remainder

of subparagraph (b) is dependent upon the content of subparagraph (a), and operates to clarify the

scope of the requirement not to discriminate in subparagraph (a). (…) Thus, the opening phrase in

subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 supports Canada’s view that the principal source of the relevant

obligation(s) in Article XVII:1(a) and (b) is, indeed, found in “[t]he provisions of subparagraph

(a)”.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 91

Para. 91. “Having examined the text of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1, it is our view

that subparagraph (b), by defining and clarifying the requirement in subparagraph (a), is dependent

upon, rather than separate and independent from, subparagraph (a). (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 99-100

119

Para. 99. “(…) subparagraphs (a) and (b) are necessarily related to each other. Subparagraph (a) is

the general and principal provision, and subparagraph (b) explains it by identifying types of

differential treatment in commercial transactions. It appears to us that these types of differential

treatment would be the most likely to occur in practice and, therefore, that most if not all cases

under Article XVII:1 will involve an analysis of both subparagraphs (a) and (b).”

Para. 100. “For all these reasons, we are of the view that subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 of the

GATT 1994 sets out an obligation of non-discrimination, and that subparagraph (b) clarifies the

scope of that obligation. We therefore disagree with the United States that subparagraph (b)

establishes separate requirements that are independent of subparagraph (a).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 106 e nota de rodapé 115

Para. 106 e Nota de Rodapé 115. “Our conclusions regarding the relationship between

subparagraphs (a) and (b) imply that a panel confronted with a claim that an STE has acted

inconsistently with Article XVII:1 will need to begin its analysis of that claim under subparagraph

(a), because it is that provision which contains the principal obligation of Article XVII:1, namely

the requirement not to act in a manner contrary to the “general principles of non-discriminatory

treatment prescribed in [the GATT 1994] for governmental measures affecting imports or exports

by private traders.” At the same time, because both subparagraphs (a) and (b) define the scope of

that non-discrimination obligation, we would expect that panels, in most if not all cases, would not

be in a position to make any finding of violation of Article XVII:1 until they have properly

interpreted and applied both provisions.

Nota 115: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft115>.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 109

Para. 109. “Thus, in each case it is the nature of the relationship between two provisions that will

determine whether there exists a mandatory sequence of analysis which, if not followed, would

amount to an error of law. In some cases, this relationship is such that a failure to structure the

analysis in the proper logical sequence will have repercussions for the substance of the analysis

itself.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 110-111

120

Para. 110. “(…) a panel faced with a claim of inconsistency with Article XVII:1(a) and (b) will, in

most if not all cases, need to analyze and apply both provisions in order to assess the consistency of

the measure at issue. Subparagraph (b) sets forth two specific conditions with which an STE must

comply if allegedly discriminatory conduct falling, prima facie, within the scope of subparagraph

(a) is to be found consistent with Article XVII:1. Yet, in order to know whether the conditions in

(b) are satisfied, a panel must know what constitutes the conduct alleged to be inconsistent with the

principles of non-discriminatory treatment in the GATT 1994. A panel will need to identify at least

the differential treatment at issue. The outcome of an assessment under subparagraph (b) of whether

the differential treatment is consistent with commercial considerations may depend, in part, upon

whether the alleged discrimination relates to pricing, quality, or conditions of sale, and whether it is

discrimination between export markets or some other form of discrimination.”

Para. 111. “It follows that, logically, a panel cannot assess whether particular practices of an

allegedly discriminatory nature accord with commercial considerations without first identifying the

key elements of the alleged discrimination. We emphasize that we are not suggesting that panels are

always obliged to make specific factual and legal findings with respect to each element of a claim

of discrimination under subparagraph (a) before undertaking any analysis under subparagraph (b).

Rather, because a panel’s analysis and application of subparagraph (b) to the facts of the case is,

like subparagraph (b) itself, dependent on the obligation set forth in subparagraph (a), panels must

identify the differential treatment alleged to be discriminatory under subparagraph (a) in order to

ensure that they are undertaking a proper inquiry under subparagraph (b).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 124-125

Para. 124. “(…) although the Panel refrained from explicitly defining the relationship between the

first two subparagraphs of Article XVII:1, its approach was consistent with our interpretation of that

relationship.”

Para. 125. “In sum, we find that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Panel did not err

in not considering the “proper” relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 of

the GATT 1994, or in proceeding to examine the consistency of the CWB Export Regime with

Article XVII:1(b) without first having found a breach of Article XVII:1(a) (…).”

4. “Considerações Comerciais” (Artigo XVII:1(b) GATT 1994)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 140-141

Para. 140. “(…) The Panel began its analysis by considering the meaning of the term “commercial

considerations” in subparagraph (b) and found that this term should be understood as meaning

121

“considerations pertaining to commerce and trade, or considerations which involve regarding

purchases or sales ‘as mere matters of business’.” The Panel also determined that the requirement

that STEs act solely in accordance with such considerations “must imply that they should seek to

purchase or sell on terms which are economically advantageous for themselves and/or their owners,

members, beneficiaries, etc.” Thus, the Panel interpreted the term “commercial considerations” as

encompassing a range of different considerations that are defined in any given case by the type of

“business” involved (purchases or sales), and by the economic considerations that motivate actors

engaged in business in the relevant market(s).”

Para. 141. “The Panel then turned to address several arguments advanced by the United States with

respect to the interpretation of the first clause of subparagraph (b). It was in responding to the

United States’ assertion that the requirement that STEs act “solely in accordance with commercial

considerations” is equivalent to a requirement that STEs act like “commercial actors” that the Panel

made the statement that “the requirement in question is simply intended to prevent STEs from

behaving like ‘political’ actors”. Yet in so doing the Panel expressly stated that it was not, as the

United States now suggests that it did, equating “non-commercial” actors with political actors.

(…).”

Relatório do Orgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 144-145

Para. 144. “(…) it is important to observe that the Panel’s interpretation of the term “commercial

considerations” necessarily implies that the determination of whether or not a particular STE’s

conduct is consistent with the requirements of the first clause of subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1

must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, and must involve a careful analysis of the relevant

market(s). We see no error in the Panel’s approach; only such an analysis will reveal the type and

range of considerations properly considered “commercial” as regards purchases and sales made in

those markets, as well as how those considerations influence the actions of participants in the

market(s).”

Para. 145. “At the same time, our interpretation of the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and

(b) of Article XVII:1 necessarily implies that (…) a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted

solely in accordance with commercial considerations must undertake this inquiry with respect to the

market(s) in which the STE is alleged to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b)

does not give panels a mandate to engage in a broader inquiry into whether, in the abstract, STEs

are acting “commercially”. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 146

Para. 146. “(…) For the United States, because commercial actors naturally conduct their business

on the basis of commercial considerations, the first clause of Article XVII:1(b) necessarily must

prevent an STE from using its privileges in a way that creates serious obstacles to trade and

disadvantages such commercial actors. (…).”

122

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

(WT/DS276/AB/R), para. 149

Para. 149. “(…) the Panel’s approach emphasizes that whether an STE is in compliance with the

disciplines in Article XVII:1 must be assessed by means of a market-based analysis, rather than

simply by determining whether an STE has used the privileges that it has been granted. In arguing

that Article XVII:1(b) must be interpreted as prohibiting STEs from using their exclusive or special

privileges to the disadvantage of “commercial actors”, the United States appears to construe Article

XVII:1(b) as requiring STEs to act not only as commercial actors in the marketplace, but as

virtuouscommercial actors, by tying their own hands. We do not see how such an interpretation can

be reconciled with an analysis of “commercial considerations” based on market forces. In other

words, we cannot accept that the first clause of subparagraph (b) would, as a general rule, require

STEs to refrain from using the privileges and advantages that they enjoy because such use might

“disadvantage” private enterprises. STEs, like private enterprises, are entitled to exploit the

advantages they may enjoy to their economic benefit. Article XVII:1(b) merely prohibits STEs

from making purchases or sales on the basis of non-commercial considerations.”

5. Oferecer às Empresas de outras Partes Contratantes todas as Facilidades de Livre

Concorrência nas Vendas ou Compras dessa Natureza

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 153

Para. 153. “(…) The United States asserts that the Panel’s incorrect interpretative approach led it to

the erroneous conclusion that this term [afford the enterprises of the other Member adequate

opportunity … to compete for participation in such purchases or sales] referred to enterprises that

wish to buyfrom an STE, but not to enterprises that wish to sell in competition with an STE. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 156-157

Para. 156. “In the abstract, competition to participate in purchases and sales could include

competition to participate as a buyer, as a seller, or both. However, the clause under examination

does not refer, in the abstract, to any purchases and sales. Rather, it refers to “such purchases or

sales”, repeating the phrase found in the first clause of subparagraph (b). As discussed in our

analysis above, this phrase in subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 refers back to the activities

identified in subparagraph (a), namely the purchases and sales of an STE involving imports or

exports.”

123

Para. 157. “In other words, the second clause of subparagraph (b) refers to purchases and sales

transactions where: (i) one of the parties involved in the transaction is an STE; and (ii) the

transaction involves imports to or exports from the Member maintaining the STE. Thus, the

requirement to afford an adequate opportunity to compete for participation (i.e., taking part with

others) in “such” purchases and sales (import or export transactions involving an STE) must refer to

the opportunity to become the STE’s counterpart in the transaction, not to an opportunity to replace

the STE as a participant in the transaction. If it were otherwise, the transaction would no longer be

the type of transaction described by the phrase “such purchases or sales” in the second clause of

Article XVII:1(b), because it would not involve an STE as a party. Thus, in transactions involving

two parties, one of whom is an STE seller, the word “enterprises” in the second clause of Article

XVII:1(b) can refer only to buyers.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 160

Para. 160. “(…) The Panel did not determine the full ambit of the requirement to “afford adequate

opportunity (…) to compete for participation” in relevant purchases and sales. Nor do we. The

Panel expressly recognized the possibility that, in other circumstances, particular enterprises could

act both as a buyer and as a seller. The Panel also explicitly stated that it was not asked to, and was

not, ruling on the scope of the obligation in this clause with respect to STEs that act as purchasers,

rather than as sellers.”

6. Artigo XVII:3

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 97

Para. 97. “To us, [Article XVII:3] explicitly recognizes that, notwithstanding the existence of

certain disciplines on STEs in Article XVII:1, these alone may not suffice to prevent the various

ways in which STEs might create obstacles to trade, and that additional measures to limit or reduce

such obstacles should therefore be pursued through negotiation. Thus, this provision constitutes

acknowledgement by the GATT contracting parties of the limitations inherent in Article XVII:1,

and recognizes that Article XVII:1 cannot serve as the sole legal basis for eliminating all potential

obstacles to trade relating to STEs. (…).”

III. Conclusão

124

Artigo XVIII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XVIII

Ajuda do Estado em Favor de Desenvolvimento Econômico

18.1 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que a realização dos objetivos do presente Acordo será

facilitada pelo desenvolvimento progressivo de suas economias, em particular nos casos das

Partes Contratantes cuja economia não asseguram à população senão um baixo nível de vida

e que está nos primeiros estágios de seu desenvolvimento.

18.2 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem além disso que pode ser necessário para as Partes

Contratantes previstas no parágrafo primeiro, com o objetivo de executar seus programas e

suas políticas de desenvolvimento econômico orientados para a elevação do nível geral de

vida de suas populações, tomar medidas de proteção ou outras medidas que afetem as

importações e que tais medidas são justificadas na medida em que elas facilitem a obtenção

dos objetivos deste Acordo. Elas estimam, em consequência, que estas Partes Contratantes

deveriam usufruir facilidades adicionais que as possibilitem: (a) conservar na estrutura de

suas tarifas aduaneiras suficiente flexibilidade para que elas possam fornecer a proteção

tarifária necessária à criação de um ramo de produção determinado, e (b) instituir restrições

quantitativas destinadas a proteger o equilíbrio de suas balanças de pagamento de uma

maneira que leve plenamente em conta o nível elevado e permanente da procura de

importação suscetível de ser criada pela realização de seus programas de desenvolvimento

econômico.

18.3 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem finalmente que, com as facilidades adicionais previstas

nas seções A e B do presente Artigo, as disposições do presente Acordo deveriam

normalmente permitir às Partes Contratantes enfrentar às necessidades de seu

desenvolvimento econômico. Elas reconhecem, todavia, que pode haver casos em que não

seja possível, na prática, instituir a medida compatível com aquelas disposições, que

permitem a uma Parte Contratante em via de desenvolvimento econômico, conceder o auxílio

necessário do Estado para favorecer a criação de ramos de produção determinada com o fim

de elevar o nível de vida geral de sua população. Normas especiais previstas para tais casos

nas seções C e D do presente Artigo.

18.4 (a) Em consequência, qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia não pode assegurar à

população senão um baixo nível de vida e que se encontra nos primeiros estágios de seu

desenvolvimento, terá a faculdade de dispensar-se, temporariamente, das disposições dos

outros Artigos do presente Acordo, na forma prevista nas seções A, B e C do presente Artigo.

(b)Qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia está em via de desenvolvimento, mas que não

se enquadra no plano da alínea (a) acima, pode encaminhar pedidos às Partes Contratantes, na

forma prevista na seção D do presente Artigo.

125

18.5 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as receitas de exportação das Partes Contratantes

cuja economia é do tipo descrito nas alíneas (a) e (b) do parágrafo 4 acima, e que dependem

da exportação de um pequeno número de produtos de base, podem sofrer uma séria baixa em

face do enfraquecimento da venda desses produtos. Em conseqüência quando as exportações

dos produtos de base de uma Parte Contratante que se encontra nesta situação são afetadas

seriamente por medidas adotadas por uma outra Parte Contratante, a referida Parte

Contratante poderá recorrer às disposições do Artigo XXII do presente Acordo, relativas às

consultas.

18.6 As Partes Contratantes procederão cada ano a um exame de todas as medidas aplicadas em

virtude das disposições das seções C e D do presente Artigo.

SEÇÃO A

18.7 (a) Se uma Parte Contratante que se enquadra na alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente

Artigo, considera conveniente, para a criação de determinado ramo da produção que tenha

em vista a elevação geral do nível de vida de sua população, a modificação ou a retirada de

uma concessão tarifária incluída na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, ela

notificará às Partes Contratantes, para esse fim, e entrará em negociações com a Parte

Contratante com a qual aquela concessão tenha sido negociada primitivamente e com

qualquer outra Parte Contratante cujo interesse substancial nesta concessão tenha sido

reconhecido pelas Partes Contratantes. Se houver um acordo entre as Partes Contratantes em

apreço, a elas será permitido modificar ou retirar as concessões incluídas nas listas

correspondentes, anexas ao presente Acordo, a fim de dar cumprimento ao aludido Acordo,

inclusive as compensações que ele comportar.

(b) Se, decorrido o prazo de sessenta dias, contado a partir da data da notificação

mencionada na alínea (a) acima, não se verificar um acordo, a Parte Contratante que se

propõe a modificar ou a retirar a concessão poderá submeter a questão à apreciação das

Partes Contratantes que deverão examiná-la prontamente. Se lhes parecer que a Parte

Contratante que se propõe a modificar ou a retirar a concessão fez tudo que lhe era possível

fazer para chegar um acordo, e que a compensação oferecida é suficiente, a referida Parte

Contratante terá a faculdade de modificar ou de retirar a concessão sob a condição de aplicar

ao mesmo tempo a compensação. Se parecer às Partes Contratantes que a compensação

oferecida por uma Parte Contratante que se propõe a modificar ou a retirar a concessão não é

suficiente mas que esta Parte Contratante fez tudo que lhe seria razoavelmente possível fazer

para oferecer uma compensação suficiente, a Parte Contratante terá a faculdade de por em

aplicação a modificação ou a retirada. Se tal medida for adotada, qualquer outra Parte

Contratante mencionada na alínea (a) acima terá a faculdade de modificar ou de retirar

concessões substancialmente equivalentes, negociadas primitivamente com a Parte

Contratante que adotou a medida em questão.

SEÇÃO B

18.8 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as Partes Contratantes enquadradas no plano da

alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo podem, quando se encontram em rápido processo

de desenvolvimento experimentar, para equilibrar sua balança de pagamentos, dificuldades

provenientes, sobretudo, dos esforços que desenvolvem, no sentido de dar expansão aos seus

mercados internos, bem como instabilidade nos termos de seu intercâmbio.

18.9 Tendo em vista salvaguardar a sua situação financeira exterior e assegurar o nível de reservas

suficiente para a execução de seu programa de desenvolvimento econômico, uma Parte

Contratante que se enquadra no plano da alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente Artigo pode,

sob reserva das disposições dos parágrafos 10 a 12, regulamentar o nível geral de suas

importações, limitando o volume ou o valor das mercadorias cuja importação ela autoriza,

126

com a condição de que as restrições à importação instituídas ou mantidas intensificadas não

devam ultrapassar do que é necessário: (a) para se opor à ameaça de uma baixa importante de

suas reservas monetárias ou para por fim a esta baixa; (b) ou para aumentar suas reservas

monetárias, segundo uma taxa de crescimento razoável, caso elas sejam insuficientes. Nesses

dois casos, serão devidamente considerados todos os fatores especiais que possam afetar as

reservas monetárias da Parte Contratante, ou as suas necessidades de reservas monetárias, e,

notadamente, assim que, disponham de créditos externos especiais ou de outros recursos, a

necessidade de prever o emprego adequado dos seus créditos ou dos seus recursos.

18.10 Na aplicação destas restrições a Parte Contratante em apreço pode determinar sua incidência

sobre as importações dos diferentes produtos ou das várias categorias de produtos, de

maneira a dar prioridade à importação dos produtos mais necessários, levando em conta sua

política de desenvolvimento econômico; todavia, as restrições deverão ser aplicadas de modo

a evitar um prejuízo inútil dos interesses comerciais ou econômicos de qualquer outra Parte

Contratante e não causar indevidamente obstáculos à importação de mercadorias em

quantidades comerciais mínimas de qualquer natureza que sejam cuja exclusão embaraçaria

as correntes normais de intercâmbio; além disso, as referidas restrições não deverão ser

aplicadas de modo a criar dificuldades à importação de amostras comerciais ou à observação

dos processos relativos à patentes, marcas de fábrica, direitos autorais e de reprodução ou de

outros processos análogos.

18.11 Na execução de sua política nacional a Parte Contratante em causa levará devidamente em

conta a necessidade de restabelecer o equilíbrio de sua balança de pagamentos numa base

sadia e durável, e a oportunidade de assegurar a utilização de seus recursos produtivos sobre

uma base econômica. Ela atenuará progressivamente, na medida que a situação melhorar,

qualquer restrição adotada por força da presente seção, e não a manterá senão na medida

necessária, considerando as disposições do parágrafo 9 do presente Artigo; tão logo a

situação não mais justificar sua manutenção ela a eliminará, contudo, nenhuma Parte

Contratante será obrigada a suprimir ou modificar as restrições, salvo se ocorrer uma

mudança em sua política de desenvolvimento, caso em que as restrições que aplica por força

da presente seção deixarão de ser necessárias.

18.12 (a) Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique novas restrições ou que estabeleça o nível

geral das restrições existentes, reforçando de maneira substancial as medidas

aplicadas em virtude da presente seção, deverá, imediatamente após haver instituído

ou reforçado essas restrições (ou, no caso em que consultas prévias sejam possíveis

na prática, antes de as haver feito), consultar as Partes Contratantes sobre a natureza

das dificuldades referentes à sua balança de pagamentos, os diversos corretivos entre

os quais ela tem preferência, bem como as repercussões possíveis daquelas restrições

sobre a economia de outras Partes Contratantes.

(b) Numa data a ser fixada, as Partes Contratantes passarão em revista todas as restrições

que naquela data forem ainda aplicadas por força da presente seção. No fim do

período de dois anos, a contar da data acima mencionada, as Partes Contratantes que

aplicarem restrições em virtude da presente seção, iniciarão, com as Partes

Contratantes, em intervalos que serão aproximadamente de dois anos, sem serem

inferiores a esta duração consultas do tipo previsto na alínea (a) acima, segundo um

programa que será estabelecido anualmente pelas Partes Contratantes; contudo,

nenhuma consulta, em virtude da presente alínea, se efetuará menos, de dois anos

após o término de uma consulta de caráter geral que seria iniciada em virtude de uma

outra disposição do presente parágrafo.

(c) (i) Se, no decorrer dos entendimentos havidos com uma Parte Contratante, conforme

a alínea (a) ou alínea (b) do presente parágrafo, parecer às Partes Contratantes que as

restrições não são compatíveis com as disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do

127

Artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposições do Artigo XIV), elas indicarão os pontos de

divergência e poderão aconselhar no sentido de que modificações apropriadas sejam

introduzidas nas restrições. (ii) Contudo, se no decorrer daquelas consultas as Partes

Contratantes determinem que as restrições sejam aplicadas de maneira que comporte

uma séria incompatibilidade com as disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do

Artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposições do Artigo XIV) e que resulte num prejuízo

ou numa ameaça de prejuízo para o comércio de uma Parte Contratante, elas avisarão

a Parte Contratante que aplica as restrições e farão recomendações apropriadas, tendo

em vista assegurar a observação num prazo determinado das disposições em apreço.

Se a Parte Contratante não se conforma com aquelas recomendações no prazo fixado,

as Partes Contratantes poderão dispensar qualquer Parte Contratante cujo comércio

for prejudicado pelas restrições, de quaisquer obrigações resultantes do presente

Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado dispensar levando em conta as circunstâncias

com relação à Parte Contratante que aplica as restrições.

(d) As Partes Contratantes convidarão qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique restrições

por força da presente seção, a entrar em consulta com elas, a pedido de qualquer

Parte Contratante, e que possa estabelecer prima facie que as restrições são

incompatíveis com as disposições da presente seção ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob

reserva de disposições do Artigo XIV), e que seu comércio foi atingido. Todavia, este

convite só será encaminhado se as Partes Contratantes constatarem que as

conversações mantidas diretamente entre as Partes Contratantes interessadas não

chegaram a bom termo. Se nenhum acordo for realizado em decorrência das

consultas com as Partes Contratantes, e se as Partes Contratantes determinam que as

restrições são aplicadas de modo incompatível com as disposições

supramencionadas, resultando num prejuízo ou numa ameaça de prejuízo para o

comércio da Parte Contratante que iniciou o procedimento elas recomendarão a

supressão ou a modificação das restrições. Se as restrições não são suprimidas ou

modificadas no prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes Contratantes, estas poderão dispensar

a Parte Contratante que iniciou o procedimento de qualquer compromisso resultante

do presente Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado dispensar levando em conta as

circunstâncias, com a relação à Parte Contratante que aplica as restrições.

(e) Se uma Parte Contratante, contra a qual uma medida foi tomada, de conformidade

com a última frase da alínea (c) (ii) ou da alínea (d) do presente parágrafo, verificar

que a dispensa concedida pelas Partes Contratantes prejudica a execução de seu

programa e de sua política de desenvolvimento econômico, lhe será permitido, num

prazo de 30 dias, a contar da aplicação desta medida, notificar por escrito ao

Secretário Executivo3 das Partes Contratantes, sua intenção de denunciar o presente

Acordo. Esta denúncia entrará em vigor ao expirar um prazo de sessenta dias contado

a partir em que o Secretário executivo das Partes Contratantes tiver recebido a

referida notificação.

(f) Em qualquer procedimento iniciado, de conformidade com o presente parágrafo, as

Partes Contratantes levarão devidamente em conta os fatores mencionados no

parágrafo 2 do presente Artigo. As determinações previstas no presente parágrafo

deverão ser apresentadas prontamente e, se possível, num prazo de 60 dias, a contar

da data em que as consultas tiverem sido iniciadas.

SEÇÃO C

18.13 Se uma Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alínea (a) do parágrafo 4 do presente

Artigo verifica que um auxílio do Estado é necessário para facilitar a criação de um

determinado ramo de produção com o fim de elevar o nível de vida geral da população, sem

que seja possível na prática adotar medidas compatíveis com as outras disposições do

128

presente Acordo para realizar este objetivo, lhe será permitido recorrer às disposições e aos

processos da presente seção.

18.14 A Parte Contratante em apreço notificará as Partes Contratantes sobre as dificuldades

especiais que ela encontra na realização do objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente

Artigo; ela indicará a medida precisa que afeta as importações que se propõe a promover para

remediar tais dificuldades. Ela não adotará esta medida antes do término do prazo fixado no

parágrafo 15 ou no parágrafo 17, conforme o caso, ou se a medida afeta as importações de

um produto que se tornou objeto de uma concessão contida na lista correspondente anexa ao

presente Acordo, a não ser que tenha obtido a aprovação das Partes Contratantes, de

conformidade com as disposições do parágrafo 18; todavia, se o ramo de produção que

recebe uma ajuda do Estado já entrou em atividade, a Parte Contratante poderá, após ter

informado as Partes Contratantes, tomar as medidas necessárias para evitar que, durante

aquele período, as importações do produto ou dos produtos em questão não ultrapassem

substancialmente um nível normal.

18.15 Se, num prazo de trinta dias contado a partir da notificação da referida medida as Partes

Contratantes não convidarem a Parte de Contratante em apreço a entrar em consultas com

elas, a 3 Corresponde hoje ao cargo de “Diretor Geral” Parte Contratante terá a faculdade de

dispensar-se das disposições dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, aplicáveis em espécie,

na medida necessária à aplicação da medida projetada.

18.16 Se ela é convidada pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte Contratante em causa entrará em

consulta com elas sobre o objeto da medida projetada, as diversas medidas entre as quais ela

tem a escolha no plano do presente Acordo, bem como as repercussões que a medida

projetada poderia ter sobre os interesses comerciais ou econômicos de outras Partes

Contratantes. Se, no decorrer dessas consultas as Partes Contratantes reconhecem que não é

possível na prática adotar a medida compatível com as outras disposições do presente Acordo

para realizar o objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo, e, se elas dão sua

aprovação à medida projetada, a Parte Contratante em causa será desobrigada dos

compromissos que lhe cabem nos termos das disposições dos outros Artigos do presente

Acordo aplicáveis em espécie, desde que aquela seja necessária à aplicação da medida.

18.17 Se, num prazo de 90 dias a contar daquele da notificação da medida projetada, conforme o

parágrafo 14 do presente Artigo, as Partes Contratantes não aprovarem a medida em questão,

a Parte Contratante em causa poderá adotar a referida medida após ter informado as Partes

Contratantes.

18.18 Se a medida projetada afeta um produto que foi o objeto de uma concessão contida na lista

correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo a Parte Contratante em apreço consultará qualquer

outra Parte Contratante com a qual a concessão tiver sido negociada primitivamente bem

como com toda outra Parte Contratante cujo interesse substancial na concessão tiver sido

reconhecido pelas Partes Contratantes. Estas darão sua aprovação à medida projetada se

reconhecerem a impossibilidade, na prática, de adotar a medida compatível com as outras

disposições do presente Acordo para realizar o objetivo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente

Artigo e se elas tiverem a segurança. (a) que um Acordo foi realizado com as outras Partes

Contratantes em questão, em decorrência das consultas, acima indicadas. (b) ou que, se

nenhum Acordo foi realizado no prazo de 60 dias a partir da data em que a notificação

prevista no parágrafo 14, tenha sido recebida pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte Contratante

que recorreu às disposições da presente seção fez tudo que lhe era razoavelmente possível

fazer para chegar a um tal acordo, e que os interesses das outras Partes Contratantes seriam

suficientemente salvaguardados. A Parte Contratante que recorreu às disposições da presente

seção será isentada das obrigações que lhe tocam nos termos das disposições dos demais

Artigos do presente Acordo aplicáveis na espécie, desde que isto seja necessário para lhe

permitir a aplicação da medida.

129

18.19 Se uma medida projetada do tipo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo se refere a um

ramo da produção, cuja criação foi facilitada, no decorrer do período inicial, pela proteção

acessória resultante das restrições que impõem a Parte Contratante a fim de proteger o

equilíbrio de sua balança de pagamentos a títulos das disposições do presente Acordo,

aplicáveis na espécie, a Parte Contratante poderá recorrer às disposições e aos processos da

presente seção, com a condição de que ela não aplique a medida projetada sem a aprovação

das Partes Contratantes.

18.20 Nenhuma disposição dos parágrafos procedentes da presente seção autorizará a derrogação

das disposições dos Artigos primeiro, II e XIII do presente Acordo. As reservas do parágrafo

10 do presente Artigo serão aplicáveis a qualquer restrição dependente da presente seção.

18.21 A qualquer momento durante a aplicação de uma medida, em virtude das disposições do

parágrafo 1º, do presente Artigo, qualquer das Partes Contratantes afetada de modo

substancial por aquela medida poderá suspender a aplicação no comércio da Parte

Contratante que recorreu às disposições da presente seção de concessões ou de outras

obrigações substancialmente equivalentes que resultem do presente Acordo, e cujas Partes

Contratantes não desaprovarem a suspensão, com a condição de que um aviso prévio de 60

dias seja dado às Partes Contratantes, ou no máximo, seis meses depois que a medida tenha

sido adotada ou modificada de modo substancial em detrimento da Parte Contratante afetada.

Esta Parte Contratante deverá se prestar às consultas, de conformidade com as disposições do

Artigo XXII do presente Acordo.

SEÇÃO D

18.22 Será permitido a qualquer Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alínea (b) do parágrafo 4

do presente Artigo e que para favorecer o desenvolvimento de sua economia, deseja instituir

uma medida do tipo definido no parágrafo 13 do presente Artigo, no que se refere à criação

de um determinado ramo de produção determinando encaminhar às Partes Contratantes um

pedido de aprovação de uma tal medida. As Partes Contratantes entrarão prontamente em

consultas com aquela Parte Contratante, e, formulando sua decisão se inspirarão nas

considerações expostas no parágrafo 16. Se as Partes Contratantes aprovarem a medida

projetada, elas isentarão a Parte Contratante em causa das obrigações que lhe cabem nos

termos das disposições dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, aplicáveis em espécie, desde

que isto seja necessário para lhe permitir a aplicação da medida; Se a medida projetada afeta

um produto que foi objeto da concessão contida na lista correspondente anexa ao presente

Acordo as disposições do parágrafo 18 serão aplicáveis.

18.23 Qualquer uma das medidas aplicadas em virtude da presente seção, deverá ser compatível

com as disposições ao parágrafo 20 do presente Artigo.

II. Evolução da Interpretação do Painel/Órgão de Apelação

1. Artigo XVIII:11

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 126 e 128

130

Para. 126. “(…) we are of the opinion that the use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not

related to any particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Members regardless of the

type of development policy they pursue. (…).”

Para. 128. “We believe structural measures are different from macroeconomic instruments with

respect to their relationship to development policy. If India were asked to implement agricultural

reform or to scale back reservations on certain products for small-scale units as indispensable policy

changes in order to overcome its balance-of-payments difficulties, such a requirement would

probably have involved a change in India’s development policy.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 102-103

Para. 102. “(…) Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into question either the

availability or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP Understanding. On

the contrary, if panels refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments

restrictions, they would diminish the explicit procedural rights of Members under Article XXIII and

footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their substantive rights under Article XVIII:11.”

Para. 103. “We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council

with respect to balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the

BOP Understanding. However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of

panels. Moreover, we are convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments

restrictions, panels should take into account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP

Committee, as did the panel in Korea — Beef.”

2. Artigo XVIII, Note Ad

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and

Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA,

WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 98 e nota de rodapé 104

Para. 98. “As we have seen, through its reference to the “general principles of non-discriminatory

treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by

private traders”, Article XVII:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to use STEs in order to

discriminate in ways that would be prohibited if undertaken directly by Members. Yet even if

Article XVII:1 itself did not exist, this would not imply that STEs would be subject to no

disciplines under the GATT 1994. For example, the express provisions of Article II:4 of the GATT

1994 and the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII constrain the behaviour of STEs.

Other provisions of the GATT 1994, notably Article VI, also apply to the activities of STEs.104 We

need not identify, for purposes of this appeal, all of the provisions of the GATT 1994 that may

apply to STEs, nor consider how these disciplines interact with and reinforce each other. We do,

however, believe that these other provisions reveal that, even in 1947, the negotiators of the GATT

created a number of complementary requirements to address the different ways in which STEs

could be used by a contracting party to seek to circumvent its obligations under the GATT. The

131

existence of these other provisions of the GATT 1994 also supports the view that Article XVII was

never intended to be the sole source of the disciplines imposed on STEs under that Agreement. This

is also consistent with the view that Article XVII:1 was intended to impose disciplines on one

particular type of STE behaviour, namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than to constitute a

comprehensive code of conduct for STEs. Moreover, as the Panel observed, since the conclusion of

the Uruguay Round, a number of additional obligations, under different covered agreements,

operate to further constrain the behaviour of STEs.”

3. Artigo XVIII:11, Note Ad

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 114

Para. 114. “We agree with the Panel that the Ad Note, and, in particular, the words “would

thereupon produce”, require a causal link of a certain directness between the removal of the

balance-of-payments restrictions and the recurrence of one of the three conditions referred to in

Article XVIII:9. (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 115

Para. 115. “We also agree with the Panel that the Ad Note and, in particular, the word “thereupon”,

expresses a notion of temporal sequence between the removal of the balance-of-payments

restrictions and the recurrence of one of the conditions of Article XVIII:9. (…).”

4. Prima facie

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 136

Para. 136. “(…) Assuming that the complaining party has successfully established a prima facie

case of inconsistency with Article XVIII:11 and the Ad Note, the responding party may, in its

defence, either rebut the evidence adduced in support of the inconsistency or invoke the proviso. In

the latter case, it would have to demonstrate that the complaining party violated its obligation not to

require the responding party to change its development policy. This is an assertion with respect to

which the responding party must bear the burden of proof. (…).”

5. Artigo XVIII:12

132

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 102-103

Para. 102. “(…) Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into question either the

availability or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP Understanding. On

the contrary, if panels refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments

restrictions, they would diminish the explicit procedural rights of Members under Article XXIII and

footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their substantive rights under Article XVIII:11.”

Para. 103. “We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council

with respect to balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the

BOP Understanding. However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of

panels. Moreover, we are convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments

restrictions, panels should take into account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP

Committee, as did the panel in Korea — Beef.”

6. Artigo XVIII, B

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 84-86

Para. 84. “This dispute was brought pursuant to, inter alia, Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.

According to Article XXIII, any Member which considers that a benefit accruing to it directly or

indirectly under the GATT 1994 is being nullified or impaired as a result of the failure of another

Member to carry out its obligations, may resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Article

XXIII. The United States considers that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT 1994 was nullified

or impaired as a result of India’s alleged failure to carry out its obligations regarding balance-of-

payments restrictions under Article XVIII: B of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the United States was

entitled to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII with regard to this

dispute.”

Para. 85. “Article XXIII is elaborated and applied by the DSU. The first sentence of Article 1.1 of

the DSU provides:

The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute

settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as

the “covered agreements”).

We note that Appendix 1 to the DSU lists “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods”, to which the GATT 1994

belongs, among the agreements covered by the DSU. A dispute concerning Article XVIII:B is, therefore, covered by the

DSU.”

Para. 86. “Article 1.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part:

The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject

to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute

133

settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in

Appendix 2 to this Understanding.

Appendix 2 does not identify any special or additional dispute

settlement rules or procedures relating to balance-of-payments

restrictions. It does not mention Article XVIII:B of the GATT

1994, or any of its paragraphs. The DSU is, therefore, fully

applicable to the current dispute.

III. Conclusão

134

Artigo XXII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXII

Consultation

22.1 Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford

adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by

another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this

Agreement.

22.2 The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with

any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible

to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXII

Consultas

22.1 Cada Parte Contratante examinará com compreensão as representações que lhe sejam

encaminhadas por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e deverá se prestar a consultas a

respeito daquelas representações, desde que elas digam respeito a questões relativas à

aplicação do presente Acordo.

22.2 As Partes Contratantes poderão, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em

entendimentos com uma ou várias Partes Contratantes sobre questões para as quais a

solução satisfatória não poderia ser alcançada através das consultas previstas no parágrafo

primeiro.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretação e aplicação do Artigo 1

Este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC.

III. Comentários

Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

135

Article XXIII

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXIII

Nullification or Impairment

18.1 If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly

under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of

the Agreement is being impeded as the result of

(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this

Agreement, or

(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it

conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or

(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the

satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the

other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting

party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or

proposals made to it.

18.2 If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a

reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article,

the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING

PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make

appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned,

or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult

with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and

with any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such

consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances

are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to

suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other

obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If

the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact

suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action

is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of its

intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the

sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXIII

Proteção de Concessões e Vantagens

23.1 No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela,

direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos

objetivos do Acordo está sendo dificultado, em consequência:

a) do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela

mesma assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo;

b) da aplicação por outra das Partes Contratantes de uma medida, contrária ou não às

disposições do presente Acordo; ou

136

c) da existência de qualquer outra situação, dita Parte Contratante, a fim de obter

solução satisfatória para a questão, poderá dirigir representações ou propostas por

escrito à outra ou outras Partes Contratantes que lhe parecerem interessadas.

Qualquer Parte Contratante, por essa forma interpelada, examinará, com boa vontade,

as representações ou propostas que lhe tenham sido dirigidas.

23.2 Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo satisfatório dentro

de um prazo razoável, ou se a dificuldade for uma das previstas no § 1 (c) deste

Artigo, a questão poderá ser submetida às Partes Contratantes. As Partes Contratantes

iniciarão, sem demora, uma investigação sobre qualquer assunto que lhes seja

submetido e, se julgarem conveniente, dirigirão recomendações especiais e

apropriadas às partes Contratantes que julguem interessadas, ou baixarão normas

sobre a questão. As Partes Contratantes, quando acharem necessário, poderão efetuar

consultas com as outras Partes Contratantes, com o Conselho Econômico e Social das

Nações Unidas e com qualquer outra organização intergovernamental competente. Se

as Partes Contratantes acharem que as circunstâncias são suficientemente graves para

justificar tal medida, poderão autorizar a uma ou a várias Partes Contratantes a

suspensão, relativamente a tal ou a tais Partes Contratantes, da aplicação de qualquer

obrigação ou concessão resultante do presente Acordo. Se, a observância de uma

obrigação ou o benefício de uma concessão em favor de uma Parte Contratante for

suspenso efetivamente, essa Parte Contratante poderá dentro de um prazo de sessenta

dias a contar da data da aplicação da medida, notificar o Secretário Geral das Nações

Unidas por escrito, de sua intenção de denunciar este Acordo e tal denúncia terá

efeito, expirado o prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data em que o Secretário Geral

das Nações Unidas receba notificação escrita da denúncia.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

O título originalmente conferido (versão oficial em inglês) ao Artigo XXIII pelo GATT 1947 e,

subsequentemente, pelo GATT 1994, refere-se à “anulação ou prejuízo” enquanto conceitos

imprescindíveis para a apresentação de uma demanda perante o OSC com base no Artigo XXIII

GATT. O conceito de “anulação ou prejuízo” a benefícios decorrentes do Acordo é requisito

essencial aplicável a qualquer um dos tipos de demanda previstas nos incisos do Artigo XXIII,

quais sejam, (a) “violação”; (b) “não-violação” e; (c) “situação”. O próprio sistema de solução de

controvérsias acabou por confirmar, em inúmeras oportunidades (1), que qualquer violação a um

dos Acordos da OMC configuraria uma “anulação ou prejuízo prima facie” (2) a benefícios

decorrentes dos Acordos.

A tradução para a língua portuguesa adotada pelo Decreto nº 1355, de 30 de Dezembro de 1994, em

contrapartida, não reflete este mesmo espírito, mas restringe o título conferido ao mesmo Artigo

XXIII à finalidade de um dos seus mecanismos (demandas fundadas em casos de “não-violação”),

qual seja, a proteção de concessões tarifárias recíprocas da utilização de medidas que acabem por

anular ou reduzir benefícios previstos nos Acordos da OMC.

Ainda que o título do Artigo XXIII, da forma como incorporado ao sistema legal brasileiro, acabe

por restringir o verdadeiro alcance do mencionado Artigo, suas provisões legais parecem ter sido

traduzidas em observância à versão original publicada em inglês, francês e espanhol, de forma a

evitar qualquer efeito distorsivo na aplicação global do mencionado dispositivo legal.

Footnote 1: EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 8.2; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15; EEC - Bananas II, para. 8.4 etc.

Footnote 2: Artigo 3.8 DSU: “In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered

agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is

normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered

agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the

charge”.

137

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXIII GATT

1. Artigo XXIII:1

a) “uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente

Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Demandante: Uruguai,

L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 14

Para. 14: “(...) The Panel thought it essential to have a clear idea as to what would constitute a

nullification or impairment. In its view impairment and nullification in the sense of Article XXIII

does not arise merely because of the existence of any measures; the nullification or impairment

must relate to benefits accruing to the contracting party ‘under the General Agreement’.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United Kingdon - Customs Classification of Certain

Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS67/AB/R, para.

80

Para. 80: “We disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the meaning of a tariff concession in a

Member's Schedule may be determined in the light of the “legitimate expectations” of an exporting

Member. First, we fail to see the relevance of the EEC - Oilseeds panel report with respect to the

interpretation of a Member's Schedule in the context of a violation complaint made under Article

XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. The EEC - Oilseeds panel report dealt with a non-violation

complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, and is not legally relevant to the case before

us. Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for three legally-distinct causes of action on which

a Member may base a complaint; it distinguishes between so-called violation complaints, non-

violation complaints and situation complaints under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). The concept of

“reasonable expectations”, which the Panel refers to as “legitimate expectations”, is a concept that

was developed in the context of non-violation complaints. (3) As we stated in India - Patents, for

the Panel to use this concept in the context of a violation complaint “melds the legally-distinct bases

for ‘violation’ and ‘non-violation’ complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one

uniform cause of action” (4), and is not in accordance with established GATT practice.”

Footnote 3: Appellate Body Report, India - Patents, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 36 and 41.

Footnote 4: Adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 42.

2. Artigo XXIII:1(a)

a) “do não cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma

assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo”

Relatório do Painel no caso Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962

Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15

138

Para. 15. “(...) In cases where there is a clear infringement of the provisions of the General

Agreement, or in other words, where measures are applied in conflict with the provisions of GATT

and are not permitted under the terms of the relevant protocol under which the GATT is applied by

the contracting party, the action would, prima facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment

and would ipso facto require consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to

justify the authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations”.

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported

Substances, adotado em 17 de Junho de 1987, Demandante: Canadá, L/6175, BISD 34S/136,

paras. 5.1.4-5.1.6

Para. 5.1.4. “(...) the practice of the Contracting Parties is to make recommendations or rulings on

measures found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement independent of the impact of such

measures (...).”

Para. 5.1.5. “[Citing paragraph 5 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding:] “Thus, the 1979

Understand¬ing does not refer to the adverse impact of a measure, and the possibility of a rebuttal,

in connection with the power of the Contracting Parties to make recommendations or give rulings

on measures inconsistent with the General Agreement; it does so only in connection with the

authorization of compensatory action. This, in the view of the Panel, supports the conclusion that

the impact of a measure inconsistent with the General Agreement is not relevant for a determination

of nullification or impairment by the Contracting Parties.”

Para. 5.1.6. “The Panel examined how the Contracting Parties have reacted in previous cases to

claims that a measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore

did not nullify or impair benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party

that had brought the complaint. The Panel noted such claims had been made in a number of cases

but that there was no case in the history of the GATT in which a contracting party had successfully

rebutted the presumption that a measure infringing obligations causes nullification and impairment

(...).”

3. Artigo XXIII:1(b)

a) Visão Geral da reclamação de “não-violação”

Relatório GATT Working Party no caso The Australian Subsidy on ammonium Sulphate,

adotado em 03 de Abril de 1950, Partes: Austrália e Chile, GATT/CP.4/39, BISD II/188, para.

12

Para. 12: “The working party next considered whether the injury that the Government of Chile said

it had suffered represented a nullification or impairment. (...) It was agreed that such impairment

would exist if the action of the Australian Government which resulted in upsetting the competitive

relationship between sodium nitrate and ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been

anticipated by the Chilean Government, taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances and

139

the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time it negotiated for the duty-free binding on

sodium nitrate. The working party concluded that the Government of Chile had reason to assume,

during these negotiations, that the war-time fertilizer subsidy would not be removed from sodium

nitrate before it was removed from ammonium sulphate. In reaching this conclusion, the working

party was influenced in particular by the combination of the circumstances that:

(a) The two types of fertilizer were closely related;

(b) Both had been subsidized and distributed through the same

agency and sold at the same price;

(c) Neither had been subsidized before the war, and the war-time

system of subsidization and distribution had been introduced in

respect of both at the same time and under the same war powers of

the Australian Government;

(d) This system was still maintained in respect of both fertilizers at

the time of the 1947 tariff negotiations.

For these reasons, the working party also concluded that the Australian action should be considered

as relating to a benefit accruing to Chile under the Agreement, and that it was therefore subject to

the provisions of Article XXIII. (...) The inequality created and the treatment Chile could have

expected at the time of the negotiation, after taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances,

including the circumstances mentioned above, and the provisions of the General Agreement, were

important elements in the working party’s conclusions.

The situation in this case is different from that which would have arisen from the granting of a new

subsidy on one of the two competing products. In such a case, given the freedom under the General

Agreement of the Australian Government to impose subsidies and to select the products on which a

subsidy would be granted, it would be more difficult to say that the Chilean Government had

reasonably relied on the continuation of the same treatment for the two products. In the present

case, however, the Australian Government, in granting a subsidy on account of the war-time

fertilizer shortage and continuing it in the post-war period, had grouped the two fertilizers together

and treated them uniformly. In such circumstances it would seem that the Chilean Government

could reasonably assume that the subsidy would remain applicable to both fertilizers so long as

there remained a local nitrogenous fertilizer shortage.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, adotado em 31 de

Outubro de 1952, Partes: Alemanha e Noruega, GATT/G/26, BISD 1S/53, para. 16

Para. 16: “The Panel ... agreed that ... impairment [of a benefit under Article XXIII] would exist if

the action of the German Government, which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship

between preparations of clupea pilchardus and preparations of the other varieties of the clupeoid

family could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Norwegian Government at the time it

negotiated for tariff reductions on preparations of clupea sprattus and clupea harengus. The Panel

concluded that the Government of Norway had reason to assume, during these negotiations that

preparations of the type of clupeae in which they were interested would not be less favourably

treated than other preparations of the same family and that this situation would not be modified by

unilateral action of the German Government.”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of

Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de

1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 147-148

140

Para. 147. “(...) The Panel examined whether it was reasonable for the United States to expect that

the Community would not introduce subsidy schemes systematically counteracting the price effect

of the tariff concessions. (...) The essential argument of the Community in this respect was that it is

not legitimate to expect the absence of production subsidies even after the grant of a tariff

concession because Articles III:8(b) and XVI:1 explicitly recognize the right of contracting parties

to grant production subsidies. This right would be effectively eliminated if its exercise were

assumed to impair tariff concessions.”

Para. 148. “The Panel (...) found the following: (…) At issue in the case before it are product-

specific subsidies that protect producers completely from the movement of prices for imports and

thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between

domestic and imported oilseeds. The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is

that it provides an assurance of better market access through improved price competition.

Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily to obtain that advantage. They must

therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on the expectation that the price effect of the

tariff concessions will not be systematically offset. If no right of redress were given to them in such

a case they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General Agreement would no

longer be useful as a legal framework for incorporating the results of trade negotiations. The Panel

does not share the view of the Community that the recognition of the legitimacy of such

expectations would amount to a re writing of the rules of the General Agreement. The contracting

parties have decided that a finding of impairment does not authorize them to request the impairing

contracting party to remove a measure not inconsistent with the General Agreement; such a finding

merely allows the contracting party frustrated in its expectation to request, in accordance with

Article XXIII:2, an authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations

under the General Agreement. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation thus essentially

means the recognition of the legitimacy of such a request. The recognition of the legitimacy of an

expectation relating to the use of production subsidies therefore in no way prevents a contracting

party from using production subsidies consistently with the General Agreement; it merely

delineates the scope of the protection of a negotiated balance of concessions. For these reasons the

Panel found that the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated the introduction of

subsidies which protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices

for imports and thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive

relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, and which have as one consequence that all

domestically produced oilseeds are disposed of in the internal market notwithstanding the

availability of imports.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities -Measures Affecting Asbestos

and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R,

para. 186

Para. 186: “Like the Panel in Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper

(“Japan - Film”), we consider that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) “should be approached with

caution and should remain an exceptional remedy”. That Panel stated:

Although the non-violation remedy is an important and accepted

tool of WTO/GATT dispute settlement and has been ‘on the

books’ for almost 50 years, we note that there have only been eight

cases in which panels or working parties have substantively

141

considered Article XXIII:1(b) claims. (5) This suggests that both

the GATT contracting parties and WTO Members have

approached this remedy with caution and, indeed, have treated it as

an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement. We note in this

regard that both the European Communities and the United States

in the EEC — Oilseeds case, and the two parties in this case, have

confirmed that the non-violation nullification or impairment

remedy should be approached with caution and treated as an

exceptional concept. (6) The reason for this caution is

straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that they agree to

follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for

actions not in contravention of those rules.” (7)

b) “Finalidade”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle,

Swine and Grani from (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante:

EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 144

Para. 144. “(...) The Panel noted that these provisions, as conceived by the drafters and applied by

the contracting parties, serve mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions. The idea

underlying them is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected

from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General

Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting

parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal

concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application of any measure,

whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar -

containing Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Heanote in Schedule of Tariff

Concessions BISD 37S/228, adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade

Econômica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21

Para. 5.21. “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party

bringing a complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ ...

The Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the

Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions ... The party bringing

a complaint under that provision would therefore normally be expected to explain in detail that

benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired. (...)”.

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and

Paper (Japan – Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.50

142

Para. 10.50. “[The purpose of Article XXIII:1(b)] is to protect the balance of concessions under

GATT by providing a means to redress government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT rules

that nonetheless nullify or impair a Member’s legitimate expectations of benefits from tariff

negotiations. (8).”

c) “Alcance”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of

Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante:

EUA, WTO/DS90/AB/R, paras. 87-88

Para. 87: “Any doubts that may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement

procedures under Article XXIII were available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments

restrictions have been removed by the second sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding,

which reads:

The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as

elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding

may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the

application of restrictive import measures taken for balance-of-

payments purposes. (emphasis added)

Para. 88: “In our opinion, this provision makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures under

Article XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, are available for disputes relating to any

matters concerning balance-of-payments restrictions.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos

and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R,

paras. 187-189

Para. 187: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a

‘benefit’ is being ‘nullified or impaired’ through the ‘application … of any measure, whether or not

it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement ‘. (emphasis added) The wording of the provision,

therefore, clearly states that a claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure

‘conflicts’ with some substantive provisions of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at

one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and,

nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure

‘conflicts’ with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the scope of

application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that this reading of Article

XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan - Film and EEC - Oilseeds, which both

support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the

scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. (8) Accordingly, we decline the

European Communities’ first ground of appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 188: “[W]e look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that ‘the application by

another Member of any measure’ may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of

the word ‘any’ suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text

143

does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of

Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities’ argument that certain types of measure,

namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article

XXIII:1(b).”

Para. 189: “In any event, an attempt to draw the distinction suggested by the European

Communities between so-called health and commercial measures would be very difficult in

practice. By definition, measures which affect trade in goods, and which are subject to the

disciplines of the GATT 1994, have a commercial impact. At the same time, the health objectives of

many measures may be attainable only by means of commercial regulation. Thus, in practice, clear

distinctions between health and commercial measures may be very difficult to establish. Nor do we

see merit in the argument that, previously, only ‘commercial’ measures have been the subject of

Article XXIII:1(b) claims, as that does not establish that a claim cannot be made under Article

XXIII:1(b) regarding a ‘noncommercial’ measure.”

d) “Teste nos termos do Artigo XXIII:1(b)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and

Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.41

Para. 10.41: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a complaining party

must demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application

of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3)

nullification or impairment of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure.”

e) “Ônus da prova”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de

Novembro de 1962, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15

Para. 15: “While it is not precluded that a prima facie case of nullification or impairment could

arise even if there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be in such cases incumbent on

the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation.

Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential

for a judgement to be made under this Article.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar

– containing Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of of

Tariff Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante:

Comunidade Econômica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, paras. 5.20-5.21 e 5.23

144

Para. 5.20: “(...) The Panel ... concluded that the fact that the restrictions found to be inconsistent

with Article XI:1 conform to the terms of the Waiver does not prevent the EEC from bringing a

complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement but it is up to the EEC to

demonstrate that a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to it under the General

Agreement has resulted from these restrictions.”

Para. 5.21: “According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party

bringing a complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is ‘called upon to provide a detailed justification’ (...)

The Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the

Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions (...) The party

bringing a complaint under that provision would therefore normally be expected to explain in detail

that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired. (...) the Panel

noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General

Agreement and that, therefore, the question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1

remains inconsistent with the General Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself,

determine whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the

meaning of that provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a

justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with

the General Agreement (...).”

Para. 5.23: “For the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel did not examine the

case before it in the light of Article XXIII:1(b). The Panel would however like to stress that nothing

in this report is meant to preclude the EEC from bringing a complaint under that provision with the

required detailed justification.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper

(Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.32

Para. 10.32: “Consistent with the explicit terms of the DSU and established WTO/GATT

jurisprudence, and recalling the Appellate Body ruling that ‘precisely how much and precisely what

kind of evidence will be required to establish (…) a presumption [that what is claimed is true] will

necessarily vary from (…) provision to provision’, we thus consider that the United States, with

respect to its claim of non-violation nullification or impairment under Article XXIII:1(b), bears the

burden of providing a detailed justification for its claim in order to establish a presumption that

what is claimed is true. It will be for Japan to rebut any such presumption.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras.

8.280-8.282 e 8.292

Para. 8.280: “We do not consider that Canada has correctly interpreted the Panel report in Japan -

Film. First of all, the presumption to which the Panel refers is that, if it is shown that a measure has

been introduced after the conclusion of the tariff negotiations in question, then the complainant

should not be considered as having anticipated that measure, which is only one of the tests applied

by the Panel. Moreover, if the interpretation of the burden of proof suggested by Canada were

followed, the obligation to present a detailed justification for which Article 26.1(a) provides might

145

in certain cases be evaded. Accordingly, we do not follow the interpretation proposed by Canada

but the rule laid down in Japan — Film.”

Para. 8.281: “Furthermore, in the light of our reasoning in paragraph 8.272 above, we consider that

the special situation of measures justified under Article XX, insofar as they concern non-

commercial interests whose importance has been recognized a priori by Members, requires special

treatment. By creating the right to invoke exceptions in certain circumstances, Members have

recognized a priori the possibility that the benefits they derive from certain concessions may

eventually be nullified or impaired at some future time for reasons recognized as being of

overriding importance. This situation is different from that in which a Member takes a measure of a

commercial or economic nature such as, for example, a subsidy or a decision organizing a sector of

its economy, from which it expects a purely economic benefit. In this latter case, the measure

remains within the field of international trade. Moreover, the nature and importance of certain

measures falling under Article XX can also justify their being taken at any time, which militates in

favour of a stricter treatment of actions brought against them on the basis of Article XXIII:1(b).”

Para. 8.282: “Consequently, the Panel concludes that because of the importance conferred on them

a priori by the GATT 1994, as compared with the rules governing international trade, situations that

fall under Article XX justify a stricter burden of proof being applied in this context to the party

invoking Article XXIII:1(b), particularly with regard to the existence of legitimate expectations and

whether or not the initial Decree could be reasonably anticipated.”

Para. 8.292: “[W]e consider that in view of the time that elapsed between those concessions and

the adoption of the Decree (between 50 and 35 years), Canada could not assume that, over such a

long period, there would not be advances in medical knowledge with the risk that one day a product

would be banned on health grounds. For this reason, too, we also consider that the presumption

applied in Japan - Film cannot be applied to the concessions granted in 1947 and 1962. Any other

interpretation would extend the scope of the concept of non-violation nullification well beyond that

envisaged by the Panel in Japan - Film. On the contrary, it is for Canada to present detailed

evidence showing why it could legitimately expect the 1947 and 1962 concessions not to be

affected and could not reasonably anticipate that France might adopt measures restricting the use of

all asbestos products 50 and 35 years, respectively, after the negotiation of the concessions

concerned. In the present case, the burden of proof must be all the heavier inasmuch as the

intervening period has been so long. Indeed, it is very difficult to anticipate what a Member will do

in 50 years time. It would therefore be easy for a Member to establish that he could not reasonably

anticipate the adoption of a measure if the burden of proof were not made heavier.”

f) “Medida”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Canned Fruit (US - Canned Fruit), adotado em 20

de Fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 51

Para. 51: “The Panel considered the definition given to 'nullification or impairment' of tariff

concessions in past GATT Panel reports which had examined “non-violation complaints” in respect

of tariff concessions (BISD II/193; 1S/58). It agreed with the findings in these reports that

nullification or impairment of tariff concessions would exist if the measure in question: (1) could

not have reasonably been anticipated by the party bringing the complaint at the time of negotiation

of the tariff concessions and (2) the measure resulted in the upsetting of the competitive position of

the imported products concerned. In the present case, this meant that nullification or impairment of

the tariff concessions would exist if the introduction or increase of the EEC production aids could

146

not have been reasonably anticipated by the United States at the time of the negotiations for the

tariff concessions on those products (below under b) and the aid systems had upset the competitive

position of imported canned peaches, canned pears, canned fruit cocktail and dried grapes on the

EC market (below under c).”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States – Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar

– containing Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of

Tariff Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante:

Comunidade Econômica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21

Para. 5.21: “(...) The EEC has not claimed that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession

made by the United States in accordance with Article II have been nullified or impaired as a result

of measures taken under the Waiver. The main justification for its claim of nullification or

impairment that the EEC presented to the Panel was that the restrictions, in spite of the Waiver,

have remained inconsistent with the General Agreement. The Panel recognized that Article

XXIII:1(b) does not exclude claims of nullification or impairment based on provisions of the

General Agreement other than Article II. However, the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies

whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the

question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General

Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs

benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the meaning of that provision. A complaint

under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere

characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper

(Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.49, 10.52 e 10.57-10.59

Para. 10.49: “[A] government policy or action need not necessarily have a substantially binding or

compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so as to

nullify or impair legitimately expected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII:1(b). Indeed, it

is clear that non-binding actions, which include sufficient incentives or disincentives for private

parties to act in a particular manner, can potentially have adverse effects on competitive conditions

of market access. For example, a number of non-violation cases have involved subsidies, receipt of

which requires only voluntary compliance with eligibility criteria.”

Para. 10.52: “As the WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in respect of which only

national governments and separate customs territories are directly subject to obligations, it follows

by implication that the term measure in Article XXIII:1(b) and Article 26.1 of the DSU, as

elsewhere in the WTO Agreement, refers only to policies or actions of governments, not those of

private parties.”

Para. 10.57: “The text of Article XXIII:1(b) is written in the present tense, viz. ‘If any Member

should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being

nullified or impaired (…) as the result of (…) (b) the application by another Member of any

measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement’. It thus stands to reason

that, given that the text contemplates nullification or impairment in the present tense, caused by

147

application of a measure, ‘whether or not it conflicts’ (also in the present tense), the ordinary

meaning of this provision limits the non-violation remedy to measures that are currently being

applied.”

Para. 10.58: “Moreover, GATT/WTO precedent in other areas, including in respect of virtually all

panel cases under Article XXIII:1(a), confirms that it is not the practice of GATT/WTO panels to

rule on measures which have expired or which have been repealed or withdrawn. (9) In only a very

small number of cases, involving very particular situations, have panels proceeded to adjudicate

claims involving measures which no longer exist or which are no longer being applied. In those

cases, the measures typically had been applied in the very recent past. (10)”

Para. 10.59: “[W]e do not rule out the possibility that old ‘measures’ that were never officially

revoked may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. Similarly, even if

measures were officially revoked, the underlying policies may continue to be applied through

continuing administrative guidance. However, the burden is on the United States to demonstrate

clearly that such guidance does in fact exist and that it is currently nullifying or impairing benefits.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos

and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,

WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-188

Para. 187: “Against this background, we turn now to the European Communities' argument that

Article XXIII:1(b) does not apply to measures that fall within the scope of application of other

provisions of the GATT 1994. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that

provision arises when a “benefit” is being “nullified or impaired” through the “application (…) of

any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement “. (emphasis added)

The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states that a claim may succeed, under Article

XXIII:1(b), even if the measure “conflicts” with some substantive provisions of the GATT 1994. It

follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach of, a

provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article

XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure “conflicts” with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure

must actually fall within the scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree

with the Panel that this reading of Article XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan –

Film and EEC – Oilseeds, which both support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures

which simultaneously fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994.

189 Accordingly, we decline the European Communities' first ground of appeal under Article

XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 188: “The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding that Article

XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which

can, therefore, be justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Once again, we look to the text

of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that “the application by another Member of any measure”

may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word “any” suggests that

measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish between,

or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts

the European Communities' argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health

objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).”

g) “Vantagem”

148

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of

Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de

1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 150-152

Para. 150: “In the past Article XXIII:1(b) cases, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have adopted the

same approach: their findings of nullification or impairment were based on a finding that the

products for which a tariff concession had been granted were subjected to an adverse change in

competitive conditions. In none of these cases did they consider the trade impact of the change in

competitive conditions to be determining. In one case they specifically rejected the relevance of

statistics on trade flows for a finding on nullification and impairment. It is of course true that, in the

tariff negotiations in the framework of GATT, contracting parties seek tariff concessions in the

hope of expanding their exports, but the commitments they exchange in such negotiations are

commitments on conditions of competition for trade, not on volumes of trade.”

Para. 151: “The approach of the CONTRACTING PARTIES reflects the fact that governments can

often not predict with precision what the impact of their interventions on import volumes will be. If

a finding of nullification or impairment depended not only on whether an adverse change in

competitive conditions took place but also on whether that change resulted in a decline in imports,

the exposure of the contracting parties to claims under Article XXIII:1(b) would depend on factors

they do not control; the rules on nullification and impairment could consequently no longer guide

government policies. Moreover, the contracting parties facing an adverse change in policies could

make a claim of nullification or impairment only after that change has produced effects. Such

claims could consequently not be made to prevent adverse effects; they could only be made to

obtain redress ex post. If Article II were considered to be protecting expectations on trade flows it

would be necessary for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine what export volumes a

contracting party can reasonably expect after having obtained a tariff concession. The Panel is not

aware of any criteria or principles that could be applied to make such a determination. The Panel

further noted that changes in trade volumes result not only from government policies but also other

factors, and that, in most circumstances, it is not possible to determine whether a decline in imports

following a change in policies is attributable to that change or to other factors. The provisions of

Article XXIII:1(b) could therefore in practice hardly be applied if a contracting party claiming

nullification or impairment had to demonstrate not only that an adverse change in competition has

taken place but also that the change has resulted in a decline in imports.”

Para. 152: “For these reasons the Panel found that benefits accruing to the United States under

Article II of the General Agreement in respect of the zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the

Community Schedule of Concessions were impaired as a result of subsidy schemes which operate

to protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices of imports

and thereby prevent the oilseeds tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive

relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and

Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.64-10.66

Para. 10.64: “GATT 1994 incorporates both ‘protocols and certifications relating to tariff

concessions’ under paragraph 1(b)(i) and ‘the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994’ under paragraph

149

1(d). The ordinary meaning of the text of paragraphs 1(b)(i) and 1(d) of GATT 1994, read together,

clearly suggests that all protocols relating to tariff concessions, both those predating the Uruguay

Round and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994, are incorporated into GATT 1994 and continue

to have legal existence under the WTO Agreement.”

Para. 10.65: “Where tariff concessions have been progressively improved, the benefits —

expectations of improved market access — accruing directly or indirectly under different tariff

concession protocols incorporated in GATT 1994 can be read in harmony. This approach is in

accordance with general principles of legal interpretation which, as the Appellate Body reiterated in

US - Gasoline, teach that one should endeavour to give legal effect to all elements of a treaty and

not reduce them to redundancy or inutility.”

Para. 10.66: “The conclusion that benefits accruing from concessions granted during successive

rounds of tariff negotiations may separately give rise to reasonable expectations of improved market

access is consistent with past panel reports. (11) The panel in EEC — Canned Fruit found that the

United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC’s 1974 tariff concessions pursuant

to Article XXIV:6 negotiations and 1979 Tokyo Round tariff concessions (even though the panel

separately found that the United States could have anticipated certain subsidies in respect of the

Tokyo Round tariff concessions). (12) And the EEC — Oilseeds panel found that the United States

had a reasonable expectation arising from the EEC’s 1962 Dillon Round tariff concessions. (13) As

the United States points out, these findings would not have been possible if subsequent multilateral

tariff agreements or enlargement agreements were deemed to extinguish wholesale the tariff

concessions in prior tariff schedules.”

h) “Expectativas legítimas”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985,

Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 76

Para. 76. “The Panel was of the view that the three Panel reports which had examined “non-

violation complaints” under Article XXIII of the General Agreement (i.e. the Report of the

Working Party on the Australian subsidy on ammonium sulphate, BISD II/188F the Report of the

Panel on the treatment by Germany of imports of sardines, BISD 1S/53; and the Panel Report on

Uruguay's recourse to Article XXIII, BISD 11S/95) had not precluded the possibility that an

unforeseeable subsequent introduction or increase of a domestic subsidy on a product, for which a

tariff concession had been previously granted, could constitute an assumption of prima facie

nullification or impairment of the tariff concession concerned. The Panel also noted that the

Working Party Report of 1955 on other barriers to trade (BISD 3S/222, 224) and the Panel Report

on subsidies of 1961 (BISD 10S/201, 209) had established a principle that “(...) a contracting party

which has negotiated a concession under Article II may be assumed, for the purposes of Article

XXIII, to have a reasonable expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the value of the

concession will not be nullified or impaired by the contracting party which granted the concession

by the subsequent introduction or increase of a domestic subsidy on the product concerned”

(3S/224). Since the Panel agreed that it had established the existence of nullification or impairment

of tariff concessions and that this finding did not depend on any assumptions of prima facie

nullification or impairment of tariff concessions, the Panel found that an examination of whether the

production aid systems constitute prima facie nullification or impairment would have no bearing on

the Panel conclusions. The Panel decided, therefore, not to include its deliberations on this legal

question in the Panel report.”

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Relatório do Painel no caso Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and

Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.76-10.77, 10.79-10.80

Para. 10.76: “As suggested by the 1961 report (14), in order for expectations of a benefit to be

legitimate, the challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff

concession was negotiated. If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a

legitimate expectation of improved market access to the extent of the impairment caused by these

measures.”

Para. 10.77: “Thus, under Article XXIII:1(b), the United States may only claim impairment of

benefits related to improved market access conditions flowing from relevant tariff concessions by

Japan to the extent that the United States could not have reasonably anticipated that such benefits

would be offset by the subsequent application of a measure by the Government of Japan.”

Para. 10.79: “We consider that the issue of reasonable anticipation should be approached in respect

of specific ‘measures’ in light of the following guidelines. First, in the case of measures shown by

the United States to have been introduced subsequent to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at

issue, it is our view that the United States has raised a presumption that it should not be held to have

anticipated these measures and it is then for Japan to rebut that presumption. Such a rebuttal might

be made, for example, by establishing that the measure at issue is so clearly contemplated in an

earlier measure that the United States should be held to have anticipated it. However, there must be

a clear connection shown. In our view, it is not sufficient to claim that a specific measure should

have been anticipated because it is consistent with or a continuation of a past general government

policy. As in the EEC — Oilseeds case (15), we do not believe that it would be appropriate to

charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures, such as

‘measures’ to improve what Japan describes as the inefficient Japanese distribution sector. Indeed,

if a Member were held to anticipate all GATT-consistent measures, a non-violation claim would not

be possible. Nor do we consider that as a general rule the United States should have reasonably

anticipated Japanese measures that are similar to measures in other Members’ markets. In each such

instance, the issue of reasonable anticipation needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”

Para. 10.80: “[I]n the case of measures shown by Japan to have been introduced prior to the

conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that Japan has raised a presumption that

the United States should be held to have anticipated those measures and it is for the United States to

rebut that presumption. In this connection, it is our view that the United States is charged with

knowledge of Japanese government measures as of the date of their publication. We realize that

knowledge of a measure’s existence is not equivalent to understanding the impact of the measure on

a specific product market. For example, a vague measure could be given substance through

enforcement policies that are initially unexpected or later changed significantly. However, where

the United States claims that it did not know of a measure’s relevance to market access conditions

in respect of film or paper, we would expect the United States to clearly demonstrate why initially it

could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or paper market

and when it did realize the effect. Such a showing will need to be tied to the relevant points in time

(i.e., the conclusions of the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) in order to assess the extent of

the United States’ legitimate expectations of benefits from these three Rounds. A simple statement

that a Member’s measures were so opaque and informal that their impact could not be assessed is

not sufficient. While it is true that in most past non-violation cases, one could easily discern a clear

link between a product-specific action and the effect on the tariff concession that it allegedly

impaired, one can also discern a link between general measures affecting the internal sale and

151

distribution of products, such as rules on advertising and premiums, and tariff concessions on

products in general.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and

Agricultural Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras.

42 e 45

Para. 42: “The meaning of this provision is clear: the only cause of action permitted under the

TRIPS Agreement during the first five years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement is a

“violation” complaint under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. This case involves allegations of

violation of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. However, the Panel's invocation of the

“legitimate expectations” of Members relating to conditions of competition melds the legally-

distinct bases for “violation” and “non-violation” complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT

1994 into one uniform cause of action. This is not consistent with either Article XXIII of the GATT

1994 or Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement (…).”

Para. 45: “The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Panel misunderstands

the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of

public international law. The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the

language of the treaty itself. The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to

determine the intentions of the parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles of

treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. But these principles of

interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or

the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R, paras.

8.291, 8.295-8.298

Para. 8.291: “[P]revious panels found that a number of elements were not relevant. We consider it

necessary to assess their applicability in relation to the circumstances of the present case.

(a) First of all, we note that the reports in Japan — Film and

EEC — Oilseeds concluded that a specific measure could not be

considered foreseeable solely because it was consistent with or a

continuation of a past general government policy. However, we

note that, in contrast to the two cases mentioned above, France had

already developed a specific policy in response to the health

problems created by asbestos before the adoption of the Decree.

This factor must certainly be taken into account in our analysis.

(b) The Panel in Japan — Film, also concluded that it would not

be appropriate to charge the United States with having reasonably

anticipated all GATT-consistent measures. Consequently, we do

not consider that Canada reasonably anticipated all GATT-

consistent measures, or even possible measures justifiable under

Article XX.

(c) Finally, insofar as the Decree postdates the most recent tariff

negotiations, we could apply the presumption applied by the Panel

in Japan — Film, according to which normally Canada should not

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be considered to have anticipated a measure introduced after the

tariff concession had been negotiated. However, we do not

consider such a presumption to be consistent with the standard of

proof that we found to be applicable in paragraph 8.272 above in

the case of an allegation of non-violation nullification concerning

measures falling under Article XX of the GATT 1994.”

Para. 8.295: “As we have found (…) the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan - Film cannot

be applied to the present case. (16) Unlike Canada, which claims that no recent scientific

development could have made the measure foreseeable, we consider that there is evidence to show

that regulations restricting the use of asbestos could have been anticipated. First of all, the

hazardous nature of chrysotile has long been known (…).”

Para. 8.296: “Moreover, in the light of the information submitted by the parties and the experts, we

consider that the study of the diseases associated with the inhalation of asbestos is a field of science

in which any possible conclusion would appear to be based on the observation of pathological cases

day by day (…).”

Para. 8.297: “On the other hand, the accumulation of international and Community decisions

concerning the use of asbestos, even if it did not necessarily make it certain that the use of asbestos

would be banned by France, could not do other than create a climate which should have led Canada

to anticipate a change in the attitude of the importing countries, especially in view of the long-

established trend towards ever tighter restrictions on the use of asbestos. We also note that the use

of chrysotile asbestos was banned by Members of the WTO well before it was banned by France.

Admittedly, in Japan — Film the Panel considered that the adoption in other Members’ markets of

measures similar to the measures in question could not make the latter foreseeable. However, here

again it was a question of commercial measures. We consider that in the present case the situation is

different since it concerns public health and the competent international organizations have already

taken a position on the question. The adoption, in an already restrictive context, of public health

measures by other States, faced with a social and economic situation similar to that in France,

creates an environment in which the adoption of similar measures by France, is no longer

unforeseeable.”

Para. 8.298: “Moreover, as noted above, at the end of the Uruguay Round France already had in

place a number of measures regulating the use of asbestos. These included, in particular, measures

relating to the exposure of workers taken after asbestos was recognized as a carcinogen by the

IARC (Decree 77-949 of 17 August 1977) and the adoption of ILO Convention 162, as well as for

the purpose of implementing Community directives applicable. The Panel also notes that Decree

88-466 of 28 April 1988 on products containing asbestos had prohibited the use of chrysotile

asbestos in the manufacture of certain products.” (17)

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural

Chemical Products (Korea - Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, para. 7.75

Para. 7.75: “At the outset of our analysis of this issue, we must address some relevant issues

relating to use of negotiating history which arose in the European Communities — Computer

Equipment dispute. In that dispute, the Appellate Body specifically found that the standard of

reasonable expectation or legitimate expectation existing with respect to non-violation cases had no

role in reviewing negotiating history in order to aid in resolving the issues pertaining to a violation

case. One of the reasons is that in a non-violation case the relevant question is what was the

reasonable expectation of the complaining party. However, if it is necessary to go beyond the text in

a violation case, the relevant question is to assess the objective evidence of the mutual

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understanding of the negotiating parties. (18) This involves not just the complaining and responding

parties, but also involves possibly other parties to the negotiations. It is also important to note that

there is a difference in perspectives of the reasonable expectations of one party as opposed to the

mutual understanding of all the parties. The information available at the time of the negotiations

may be available to some parties but not all. In other words, the evidence before the panel may be

different in the two analyses and the weighting and probative value may also differ.”

i) “anulada ou reduzida”

Relatório do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and

Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.82, 10.84-10.88

Para. 10.82: “[I]t must be demonstrated that the competitive position of the imported products

subject to and benefitting from a relevant market access (tariff) concession is being upset by

(‘nullified or impaired (…) as the result of’) the application of a measure not reasonably

anticipated. The equation of ‘nullification or impairment’ with ‘upsetting the competitive

relationship’ established between domestic and imported products as a result of tariff concessions

has been consistently used by GATT panels examining non-violation complaints. For example, the

EEC — Oilseeds panel, in describing its findings, stated that it had ‘found (…) that the subsidies

concerned had impaired the tariff concession because they upset the competitive relationship

between domestic and imported oilseeds, not because of any effect on trade flows’. (19) The same

language was used in the Australian Subsidy and Germany — Sardines cases. Thus, in this case, it

is up to the United States to prove that the governmental measures that it cites have upset the

competitive relationship between domestic and imported photographic film and paper in Japan to

the detriment of imports. In other words, the United States must show a clear correlation between

the measures and the adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships.”

Para. 10.84: “As to the first issue (…) Japan should be responsible for what is caused by measures

attributable to the Japanese Government as opposed, for example, to what is caused by restrictive

business conduct attributable to private economic actors. At this stage of the proceeding, the issue is

whether such a measure has caused nullification or impairment, i.e., whether it has made more than

a de minimis contribution to nullification or impairment.”

Para. 10.85: “In respect of the second issue (…) even in the absence of de jure discrimination

(measures which on their face discriminate as to origin), it may be possible for the United States to

show de facto discrimination (measures which have a disparate impact on imports). However, in

such circumstances, the complaining party is called upon to make a detailed showing of any

claimed disproportionate impact on imports resulting from the origin-neutral measure. And, the

burden of demonstrating such impact may be significantly more difficult where the relationship

between the measure and the product is questionable.”

Para. 10.86: “We note that WTO/GATT case law on the issue of de facto discrimination is

reasonably well-developed, both in regard to the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment under

GATT Article I (20) and in regard to that of national treatment under GATT Article II (21) (…) We

consider that despite the fact that these past cases dealt with GATT provisions other than Article

XXIII:1(b), the reasoning contained therein appears to be equally applicable in addressing the

question of de facto discrimination with respect to claims of non-violation nullification or

impairment, subject, of course, to the caveat, that in an Article XXIII:1(b) case the issue is not

whether equality of competitive conditions exists but whether the relative conditions of competition

154

which existed between domestic and foreign products as a consequence of the relevant tariff

concessions have been upset.”

Para. 10.87: “The third issue is the relevance of intent to causality (…). We note (…) that Article

XXIII:1(b) does not require a proof of intent of nullification or impairment of benefits by a

government adopting a measure. What matters for purposes of establishing causality is the impact

of a measure, i.e. whether it upsets competitive relationships. Nonetheless, intent may not be

irrelevant. In our view, if a measure that appears on its face to be origin-neutral in its effect on

domestic and imported products is nevertheless shown to have been intended to restrict imports, we

may be more inclined to find a causal relationship in specific cases, bearing in mind that intent is

not determinative where it in fact exists.”

Para. 10.88: “Finally, as for the US position that the Panel should examine the impact of the

measures in combination as well as individually (a position contested by Japan), we do not reject

the possibility of such an impact. It is not without logic that a measure, when analyzed in isolation,

may have only very limited impact on competitive conditions in a market, but may have a more

significant impact on such conditions when seen in the context of - in combination with - a larger

set of measures. Notwithstanding the logic of this theoretical argument, however, we are sensitive

to the fact that the technique of engaging in a combined assessment of measures so as to determine

causation is subject to potential abuse and therefore must be approached with caution and

circumscribed as necessary.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of

Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/R,

para. 8.289

Para. 8.289: “[T]he Panel finds it appropriate to consider that in view of the type of measure in

question the ‘upsetting of the competitive relationship’ can be assumed. By its very nature, an

import ban constitutes a denial of any opportunity for competition, whatever the import volume that

existed before the introduction of the ban. We will therefore concentrate on the question of whether

the measure could reasonably have been anticipated by the Canadian Government at the time that it

was negotiating the various tariff concessions covering the products concerned.”

j) “Reclamação de não-violação com relação ao Acordo de Compras Governamentais”

Relatório do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement (Korea -

Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, paras. 7.93 e 7.101

Para. 7.93: “[T]he non-violation remedy as it has developed in GATT/ WTO jurisprudence should

not be viewed in isolation from general principles of customary international law. As noted above,

the basic premise is that Members should not take actions, even those consistent with the letter of

the treaty, which might serve to undermine the reasonable expectations of negotiating partners. This

has traditionally arisen in the context of actions which might undermine the value of negotiated

tariff concessions. In our view, this is a further development of the principle of pacta sunt servanda

in the context of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947 and disputes that arose thereunder, and

155

subsequently in the WTO Agreements, particularly in Article 26 of the DSU. The principle of pacta

sunt servanda is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention (22) in the following manner:

‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be

performed by them in good faith.’”

Para. 7.101: “[W]e will review the claim of nullification or impairment raised by the United States

within the framework of principles of international law which are generally applicable not only to

performance of treaties but also to treaty negotiation. (23) To do otherwise potentially would leave

a gap in the applicability of the law generally to WTO disputes and we see no evidence in the

language of the WTO Agreements that such a gap was intended. If the non-violation remedy were

deemed not to provide a relief for such problems as have arisen in the present case regarding good

faith and error in the negotiation of GPA commitments (and one might add, in tariff and services

commitments under other WTO Agreements), then nothing could be done about them within the

framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if general rules of customary international

law on good faith and error in treaty negotiations were ruled not to be applicable. As was argued

above, that would not be in conformity with the normal relationship between international law and

treaty law or with the WTO Agreements.”

Footnote 5: Original footnote: Report of the Working Party on Australia — Ammonium Sulphate; Panel Report on

Germany — Sardines; [Panel Report on] Uruguay — Recourse to Article XXIII; Panel Report on EC — Citrus; Panel

Report on EEC — Canned Fruit; [Panel Report on] Japan — Semi-Conductors; EEC — Oilseeds I; [Panel Report on] US

— Sugar Waiver.

Footnote 6: Original footnote: In EEC — Oilseeds I, the United States stated that it “concurred in the proposition that

non-violation nullification or impairment should remain an exceptional concept. Although this concept had been in the

text of Article XXIII of the General Agreement from the outset, a cautious approach should continue to be taken in

applying the concept”. EEC — Oilseeds I, para. 114. The EEC in that case stated that “recourse to the ‘non-violation’

concept under Article XXIII:1(b) should remain exceptional, since otherwise the trading world would be plunged into a

state of precariousness and uncertainty”. Ibid, para. 113.

Footnote 7: Original footnote: Panel Report on Japan — Film, para. 10.36.

Footnote 8: Original footnote: GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144.

Footnote 9: Original footnote: See Panel Report on US — Gasoline, para. 6.19, where the panel observed that “it had not

been the usual practice of a panel established under the General Agreement to rule on measures that, at the time the

panel’s terms of reference were fixed, were not and would not become effective”. See also Panel Report on Argentina —

Footwear, Textiles and Apparel, pp. 84-86

Footnote 10: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, where the panel ruled on a

measure that was revoked after the interim review but before issuance of the final report to the parties; Panel Report on

EEC — Measure on Animal Feed Proteins, where the panel ruled on a discontinued measure, but one that had terminated

after the terms of reference of the panel had already been agreed; Panel Report on United States — Prohibitions on

Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, para. 4.3., where the panel ruled on the GATT consistency of a

withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties’ agreement to this procedure; Panel Report on EEC — Restrictions

on Imports of Apples from Chile, where the panel ruled on a measure which had terminated before agreement on the

panel’s terms of reference but where the terms of reference specifically included the terminated measure and, given its

seasonal nature, there remained the prospect of its reintroduction.

Footnote 11: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on EEC - Canned Fruit; and EEC - Oilseeds I.

Footnote 12: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit, para. 54.

Footnote 13: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 144-146.

Footnote 14: Original footnote: The “1961 report” referenced to is the GATT Panel Report on Operation of the Provisions

of Article XVI, adopted on 21 November 1961, BISD 10S/201.

Footnote 15: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds I, paras. 147 and 148.

Footnote 16: Original footnote: Even if it were applicable, we consider that the EC rebutted this presumption by their

references to the systems established at international and Community level concerning the use of asbestos.

Footnote 17: Original footnote: See Annex II, reply of the European Communities to the Panel’s question No. 4 at the

Second Meeting with the Parties, paras. 254 to 261.

Footnote 18: Original footnote: Appellate Body Report on EC — Computer Equipment at paragraphs 81-84, 93.

Footnote 19: Original footnote: Follow-up on the GATT Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds, BISD 39S/91, para. 77

(emphasis added).

Footnote 20: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on European Economic Community — Imports of Beef from

Canada, paras. 4.2, 4.3.

Footnote 21: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on US — Section 337, para. 5.11; Canada — Import, Distribution and

Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 5.12-5.14 and 5.30-5.31; US — Malt

Beverages, para. 5.30; and Panel Reports on US — Gasoline, para. 6.10; Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.33; and

EC — Bananas III, paras. 7.179-7.180.

156

Footnote 22: Original footnote: A reference to the rule of pacta sunt servanda also appears in the preamble to the Vienna

Convention.

Footnote 23: Original footnote: “We note that DSU Article 7.1 requires that the relevant covered agreement be cited in the

request for a panel and reflected in the terms of reference of a panel. That is not a bar to a broader analysis of the type we

are following here, for the GPA would be the referenced covered agreement and, in our view, we are merely fully

examining the issue of non-violation raised by the United States. We are merely doing it within the broader context of

customary international law rather than limiting it to the traditional analysis that accords with the extended concept of

pacta sunt servanda. The purpose of the terms of reference is to properly identify the claims of the party and therefore the

scope of a panel’s review. We do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of reference are meant to exclude reference

to the broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the Panel.”

4. Relação entre Artigo XXIII:1 (a) e Artigo XXIII:1 (b)

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of

Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de

1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 142

Para. 142: “(...) The Panel (...) examined whether its finding that the payments to the processors are

inconsistent with the General Agreement might make an examination of the question of the

nullification or impairment of the tariff concessions unnecessary. The Panel noted that this would

be the case if compliance by the Community with the finding on Article III:4 would necessarily

remove the basis of the United States claim of nullification or impairment. The Panel noted that the

subsidies the Community presently grants to producers of oilseeds result from the maintenance of

producer prices at levels generally exceeding the price of competing imports through payments to

processors conditional upon the purchase or transformation of domestic oilseeds. The finding of the

Panel under Article III:4 does not relate to the benefits accruing to the Community producers under

the Community subsidy schemes but only to the benefits accruing to processors. The Panel further

noted that the Community could comply with the Panel’s finding on Article III and still make

available in the Community market oilseeds produced with the benefit of producer prices

maintained at levels exceeding the price of competing imports. Compliance with the finding on

Article III thus could, but would not necessarily, eliminate the basis of the United States complaint

that the benefits accruing to the Community producers of oilseeds impair the Community’s tariff

concessions for oilseeds. The Panel therefore decided that it had to examine that complaint as well”.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Measures Afecting Asbestos

and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS135/AB/R,

para. 185

Para. 185: “Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to

carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a),

therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT

1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the

application of a measure, a Member has ‘nullified or impaired’ ‘benefits’ accruing to another

Member, ‘whether or not that measure conflicts with the provisions’ of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is

not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with,

or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason,

sometimes described as ‘non-violation’ cases; we note, though, that the word ‘non-violation’ does

not appear in this provision. The purpose of this rather unusual remedy was described by the panel

157

in European Economic Community — Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of

Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins (…) in the following terms:

The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that

the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be

expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by

measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by

measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage

contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore

be given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is

impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application

of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General

Agreement.’ (24) (emphasis added)

Footnote 24: Panel Report on EEC — Oilseeds I, para. 144.

5. Artigo XXIII:2

a) “Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas não chegarem a um Acordo satisfatório”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de

Novembro de 1962, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 10

Para. 10: “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides that the Contracting Parties shall promptly

investigate any matter referred to them under that paragraph. From the context it is obvious,

however, that before a ‘matter’ can be so referred to the Contracting Parties it must have been the

subject of representations or proposals made pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article which have not

resulted in a ‘satisfactory adjustment’ (unless the difficulty is of the type referred to in paragraph

1(c) of the Article)”. (25)

b) “as Partes Contratantes ... dirigirão recomendações especiais e apropriadas ... ou

baixarão normas sobre a questão”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de

Novembro de 1962, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 11-12 e 20

Para. 11: “Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides, apart from promptly investigating any matter so

referred to them, for two kinds of action by the Contracting Parties, namely:

(i) they shall make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling

on the matter;

(ii) they may authorize the suspension of concessions or

obligations.

The action stated under (i) is obligatory and must be taken in all

cases where there can be an ‘appropriate’ recommendation or

ruling. The action under (ii) is to be taken at the discretion of the

Contracting Parties in defined circumstances.”

Para. 12: “The paragraph states that the Contracting Parties ‘shall make appropriate

recommenda¬tions to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned or give a ruling

158

on the matter, as appropriate’. Whilst a ‘ruling’ is called for only when there is a point of contention

on fact or law, ‘recommendations’ should always be appropriate whenever, in the view of the

Contracting Parties, they would lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the matter.”

Para. 20: “Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the

provisions of the General Agreement (and is not covered by the ‘existing legislation’ clause of a

Protocol), the Panel has in all cases recommended that the measure in question be removed.”

c) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de violação segundo Artigo XXIII:1(a)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Norway Trondheim Toll Ring, adotado em 13 de Maio de 1992,

Demandante: EUA, GPR.DS2/R, BISD 40S/319, para. 4.21

Para. 4.21: “Moreover, the Panel observed that, under the GATT, it was customary for panels to

make findings regarding conformity with the General Agreement and to recommend that any

measures found inconsistent with the General Agreement be terminated or brought into conformity

from the time that the recommendation was adopted. The provision of compensation had been

resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure was impracticable and as a temporary

measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which were inconsistent with the General

Agreement (BISD, 26S/216). Questions relating to compensation or withdrawal of benefits had

been dealt with in a stage of the dispute settlement procedure subsequent to the adoption of panel

reports.”

d) “Recomendações com relação a reclamações de não-violação segundo Artigo

XXIII:1(b)”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985,

Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 82

Para. 82: “Having established the existence of nullification and impairment of tariff concessions

with respect to canned peaches, canned pears, and canned fruit mixtures, the Panel considered what

suggestions it could make so as to assist CONTRACTING PARTIES in their task of formulating

recommendations to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the matter. The Panel noted that in past

“non-violation” complaints of nullification or impairment of tariff concessions (BISD II/195; 1S/30,

31, 59) the CONTRACTING PARTIES had recommended that the party against which the finding

had been made consider ways and means to remove the competitive inequality brought about by the

measure at issue. The Panel was aware of the finding of the Working Party Report on the Australian

subsidy on ammonium sulphate that “there is nothing in Article XXIII which would empower the

CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to withdraw or reduce a consumption

subsidy” (...) and that the “ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII

is that of authorizing an affected contracting party to suspend the application of appropriate

obligations or concessions under the General Agreement” (BISD II/195, para. 16). In making the

following draft recommendation, the Panel also wishes to emphasize that the recommendation

cannot constitute a legal obligation for the EEC to remove or reduce its domestic production

subsidies and does not preclude other modes of settling the dispute such as granting of

compensation or, in the last resort, a request for authorization of suspension of concessions. The

159

Panel also wishes to emphasize that this recommendation cannot detract from the rights of

contracting parties under Article XXIV:6 of the General Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by

Chile (II), (EEC - Dessert Apples), adotado em 22 de Junho de 1989, Demandante: Chile,

L/6491, BISD 36S/93, paras. 12.35-12.36

Para. 12.35: “The Panel observed that it was customary for a panel examining complaints under

paragraph 2 of Article XXIII to make a finding regarding nullification or impairment of benefits

and to recommend the termination of measures found to be inconsistent with the General

Agreement. It noted that there was no provision in the General Agreement obliging contracting

parties to provide compensation, and that the Annex to the 1979 Understanding Regarding

Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance indicated that:

‘... The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the

immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a

temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which

are inconsistent with the General Agreement.’

The Panel further recalled that a 1965 Secretariat note discussed this issue in relation to residual

quantitative restrictions affecting developing countries. This note indicated:

‘... Where a proposal for compensation has been made, it would

appear that it is open to the Contracting Parties to make an

assessment of the loss sustained (...) and to make a

recommendation that pending elimination of these restrictions the

country applying such restrictions should consider the

establishment of other appropriate concessions which would serve

to compensate this loss. There are, however, two points which

need to be noted in this connection. Firstly, any such

recommendation under the provisions of the present Article XXIII

can be implemented only to the extent that it proves acceptable to

the contracting party to whom it is addressed. If such contracting

party is not in a position to accept the recommendation, the final

sanction must remain the authority for withdrawing equivalent

obligations as provided in paragraph 2 of Article XXIII.

‘Secondly, the nature of the compensatory concessions and the

items on which these are offered would have to be determined by

the contracting party to whom the recommendation is directed and

would have to be a matter of agreement between the parties

concerned. It would not be possible for a panel or other body set up

by the Contracting Parties to adjudicate on the specific

compensations that should be offered (...)’

Para. 12.36: “The Panel endorsed the views contained in this note. It recognized that it would be

possible for the EEC and Chile to negotiate compensation consistent with the provisions of the

General Agreement; however the Panel did not consider that it would be appropriate for it to make a

recommendation on this matter.”

e) “As circunstâncias suficientemente graves para justificar suspensão da aplicação de

qualquer obrigação ou concessão”

Relatório do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de

Novembro de 1962, Demandante: EUA, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 13 e 20-21

160

Para. 13: “The latter part of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII states that “if the CONTRACTING

PARTIES consider the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize

a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of

such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in

the circumstances”. In the view of the Panel the requirement that the situation must be serious

enough limits the applicability of the provision to cases where there is nullification or impairment;

it would at any rate be difficult to conceive a situation in which the suspension of concessions or

obligations could be appropriate where nullification or impairment was not involved.”

Para. 20: “Where the Panel finds that there is prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits

accruing to Uruguay under the Agreement, it has proposed recommendations based on that finding.

Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of the

General Agreement (and is not covered by the “existing legislation” clause of a Protocol), the Panel

has in all cases recommended that the measure in question be removed. Reference is made in these

recommendations based on nullification or impairment to the possibility of further action, in the

event of non-fulfillment, by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. In

respect of these particular cases the Panel proposes the following procedure for adoption by the

CONTRACTING PARTIES: The contracting parties concerned be asked to report on their action

taken to comply with the CONTRACTING PARTIES' Recommendations or any other satisfactory

adjustment (such as the provision of suitable concessions acceptable to Uruguay) by 1 March 1963.

If by that date the Recommendations are not carried out and no satisfactory adjustment is made, the

circumstances shall be deemed to be “serious enough” to justify action under the penultimate

sentence of Article XXIII:2 and Uruguay shall be entitled immediately to ask for the authorization

of suspension of concessions or obligations. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should make

arrangements for prompt determination as to what concessions or obligations the suspension of

which should be authorized.”

Para. 21: “In recommending this two-stage procedure, the Panel had principally in mind, once

again, the requirement stated in Article XXIII:2 that the situation must be “serious enough” before

suspension should be authorized. It noted, as a report of the ninth session (BISD, Third Supplement,

pages 250-251) had made it clear, the action of authorization of suspension of concessions or

obligations should never be taken except as a last resort; it also noted that the aim of Uruguay at this

stage was to seek the prompt removal of the measures in question.”

Footnote 25: Original footnote: “However, at least in respect of quantitative import restrictions applied inconsistently

with the General Agreement, it has been agreed by the Contracting Parties that the holding of a consultation under

paragraph 1 of Article XXII would fulfil the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII (see BISD, Ninth Supplement,

pages 19-20).”

III. Comentários

Ainda sob a égide do antigo GATT e, portanto, previamente à criação da OMC, o Artigo XXIII do

GATT definiu as linhas gerais do sistema de solução de controvérsias, bem como os seus

respectivos instrumentos (“violation”, “non-violation” e “situation complaints”). Diferentemente da

maioria dos acordos internacionais, as disposições relativas à solução de disputas no GATT não

fazem qualquer menção a “direitos e obrigações das Partes Contratantes”, à “violação de obrigações

decorrentes do tratado” e, tampouco, a “controvérsias legais sobre interpretação do tratado ou

qualquer questão de direito internacional” (26). Ao contrário, adotou-se no Artigo XXIII do GATT

o “conceito chave” de “anulação ou redução de uma vantagem decorrente direta ou indiretamente

do Acordo” (27) (“nullification or impairment of any benefit ... accruing under this Agreement”)

161

cuja aplicação foi referendada tanto pela jurisprudência desenvolvida no antigo sistema do GATT,

bem como pelos relatórios do atual sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Até mesmo casos

nos quais foi alegada violação a obrigações do Acordo (conforme disposto no Artigo XXIII:1(a) do

GATT), reconheceu-se a “anulação ou redução de vantagem prima facie” (28). Muitos dos

conceitos incorporados pelo Artigo XXIII do GATT, no entanto, carecem de precisão jurídica:

conceitos como “anulação ou redução”; “qualquer vantagem”; “qualquer objetivo” e “qualquer

situação” jamais foram objeto de análise e definição, seja pelo próprio GATT, seja pelos sistemas

de solução de controvérsias do GATT 47 e da OMC.

Tendo como origem tratados bilaterais de comércio negociados nos anos 20 e 30, o conceito de

“anulação ou redução” foi concebido para evitar que concessões tarifárias fossem enfraquecidas por

barreiras não-tarifárias ou medidas governamentais sem caráter comercial. Buscava-se, portanto,

impedir que medidas em conformidade com os termos dos tratados pudessem ter, em contrapartida,

o efeito de anular ou reduzir os objetivos e obrigações assumidas sob os mesmos. A evolução

jurisprudencial confirma, no entanto, que a falta de segurança jurídica dos conceitos adotados pelo

Artigo XXIII, principalmente em relação aos casos de “não-violação”, acabou por inibir a utilização

do mencionado instrumento pelos Membros da OMC: dos 15 casos em que o Artigo XXIII:1(b) foi

utilizado como argumento jurídico principal, apenas 6 tiveram seus respectivos pedidos acolhidos

(29) (todos, ressalte-se, durante a existência do GATT). Em contrapartida, dos 4 casos em que

demandas de “não-violação” foram analisadas pelo OSC OMC (30), todos tiveram seus pedidos

rejeitados.

Relatórios de Painéis da época do GATT, adotados pelas Partes Contratantes, ressaltaram que o

termo “anulação ou redução de vantagens” não se refere a danos ao comércio, mas sim a mudanças

imprevisíveis nas condições de competitividade dos produtos importados em relação aos produtos

domésticos. Não seria necessária, portanto, a prova do dano para que se reconhecesse a “anulação

ou redução” de um benefício. Questiona-se, no entanto, se a “proteção do equilíbrio dos interesses

das Partes Contratantes”, finalidade almejada quando da elaboração do Artigo XXIII, ainda estaria

apta a fornecer parâmetros para a revisão de medidas questionáveis perante os Acordos da OMC. A

própria teoria das “expectativas legítimas” foi muito pouco explorada com relação a demandas de

“não-violação” para se permitir o uso efetivo do Artigo em questão. Ademais, não há qualquer

parâmetro desenvolvido jurisprudencialmente que permita a utilização do Artigo XXIII:1(c)

(“situation complaints”) como cláusula de escape para impedir que mudanças nas circunstâncias

acabem por prejudicar o gozo de benefícios acordados sob a égide da OMC a um determinado

Membro.

Embora muito tenha sido desenvolvido através do mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, existem

ainda muitas lacunas a serem preenchidas na interpretação dos instrumentos previstos pelo Artigo

XXIII. Em alguns dos poucos casos de “não-violação” (31) analisados ainda na época do GATT

1947, os termos “vantagens resultantes ... deste Acordo” foram aplicados também a outros

benefícios – sem caráter tarifário - decorrentes do GATT. Não ficou clara, no entanto, a extensão da

aplicabilidade do Artigo XXIII para se determinar, por exemplo, quais outros benefícios – além dos

não-tarifários – seriam acionáveis sob os Artigos XXIII:1(b) e (c). Tampouco foi possível definir,

através da jurisprudência, a precisa relação entre as “demandas de violação” e a proteção

suplementar oferecida pelo uso de alegações de “não-violação”.

Footnote 26: O Artigo 36 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça, por seu turno, menciona em seu parágrafo

segundo que: “2. Os Estados, partes do presente Estatuto, poderão, em qualquer momento, declarar que reconhecem como

obrigatória, ipso facto e sem acordos especial, em relação a qualquer outro Estado que aceite a mesma obrigação, a

jurisdição da Corte em todas as controvérsias de ordem jurídica que tenham por objeto: a) a interpretação de um tratado;

b) qualquer ponto de direito internacional; c) a existência de qualquer fato que, se verificado, constituiria violação de um

compromisso internacional; d) a natureza ou extensão da reparação devida pela ruptura de um compromisso

internacional.” (<http://www.mp.ma.gov.br/site/centrosapoio/DirHumanos/EstatCorteInternacional.htm>).

Footnote 27: Artigo XXIII:1: “No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para

ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, está sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do Acordo está

sendo dificultado (...)”.

162

Footnote 28: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, para. ; EEC Bananas II, paras. 456-477; EC - Biotech Products, para.

8.15.

Footnote 29: EC - Citrus; EEC - Oilseeds I; EEC - Oilseeds II; EC - Canned Fruit; Australia Subsidies e Germany

Sardines.

Footnote 30: Japan - Film; EC Asbestos; EC Poultry e Korea Procurement.

Footnote 31: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII; EEC - Citrus; Japan – Nullification or Impairment of the Benefits

Accruing to the EEC under the General Agreement and Impediment to the Attainment of GATT Objectives; US -

Nicaragua Trade; e Japan - Semi-Conductors.

163

Artigo XXIV

João Henrique Ribeiro Roriz

Lucas da Silva Tasquetto

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article XXIV

Territorial Application - Frontier Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas

24.1 The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the

contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this Agreement

has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant

to the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for

the purposes of the territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a

contracting party; Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to

create any rights or obligations as between two or more customs territories in respect of

which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under

Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single contracting

party.

24.2 For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to mean any

territory with respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are

maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory with other territories.

24.3 The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent:

(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to

facilitate frontier traffic;

(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by countries

contiguous to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in conflict with the

Treaties of Peace arising out of the Second World War.

24.4 The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the

development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of

the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs

union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories

and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.

24.5 Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of

contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of

an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area;

Provided that:

(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a

customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution

of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not

parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive

than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the

constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such

interim agreement, as the case may be;

(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a

free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the

164

constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free trade area or the

adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in

such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than

the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same

constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement

as the case may be; and

(c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and

schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within

a reasonable length of time.

24.6 If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a contracting party proposes to

increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set

forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due account

shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reduction brought about in the

corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union.

24.7 (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an

interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly

notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such

information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such

reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.

(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred

to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due

account of the information made available in accordance with the provisions of

subparagraph (a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not

likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the

period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a

reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the

parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case

may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these

recommendations.

(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5 (c) shall be

communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting

parties concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or

delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.

24.8 For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs

territory for two or more customs territories, so that

(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where

necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX)

are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the

constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all

the trade in products originating in such territories; and,

(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and

other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the

union to the trade of territories not included in the union;

(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs

territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,

165

where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are

eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products

originating in such territories.

24.9 The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the formation

of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of

negotiations with contracting parties affected.* This procedure of negotiations with affected

contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the elimination of preferences required to

conform with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b).

24.10 The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do

not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such

proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this

Article.

24.11 Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the establishment of India

and Pakistan as independent States and recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an

economic unit, the contracting parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement shall not

prevent the two countries from entering into special arrangements with respect to the trade

between them, pending the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive

basis.*

24.12 Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure

observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and

authorities within its territories.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo XXIV

Aplicação Territorial – Tráfico Fronteiriço – Uniões Aduaneiras e Zonas de Livre Troca

24.1 As disposições do presente Acordo aplicar-se-ão ao território aduaneiro metropolitano das

Partes Contratantes, assim como a qualquer outro território aduaneiro, a respeito do qual o

presente Acordo tenha sido aceito nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em virtude do

Artigo XXXIII ou de Acordo com o Protocolo de Aplicação Provisória. Cada um desses

territórios aduaneiros será considerado como se fosse uma parte no Acordo, exclusivamente

para fins de aplicação territorial desse Acordo, com a condição de que as estipulações do

presente parágrafo não serão interpretadas como estabelecendo os direitos e obrigações entre

dois ou vários territórios aduaneiros, a respeito dos quais o presente Acordo tenha sido aceito

nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em virtude do Artigo XXXIII ou na

conformidade do Protocolo de Aplicação Provisória, por uma só Parte Contratante.

24.2 Para os fins de aplicação do presente Acordo, entende-se por território aduaneiro todo o

território para o qual tarifas aduaneiras distintas ou outras regulamentações aplicáveis às

trocas comerciais sejam mantidas a respeito de outros territórios para uma parte substancial

do comércio do território em questão.

24.3 As disposições do presente Acordo não deverão ser interpretadas como obstáculo:

(a) às vantagens concedidas por uma Parte Contratante a países limítrofes, para facilitar o

tráfico fronteiriço;

(b) ou às vantagens concedidas ao comércio com o Território livre de Trieste pelos países

limítrofes desse Território, com a condição de que tais vantagens não sejam

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incompatíveis com as disposições dos tratados de paz resultantes da segunda guerra

mundial.

24.4 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que é recomendável aumentar a liberdade do comércio

desenvolvendo, através de acordos livremente concluídos, uma integração mais estreita das

economias dos países participantes de tais acordos. Reconhecem igualmente que o

estabelecimento de uma união aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre comércio deve ter por

finalidade facilitar o comércio entre os territórios constitutivos e não opor obstáculos ao

comércio de outras Partes Contratantes com esses territórios.

24.5 Em consequência, as disposições do presente Acordo não se oporão à formação de uma união

aduaneira entre os territórios das Partes Contratantes ou ao estabelecimento de uma zona de

livre troca ou à adoção de Acordo provisório necessário para a formação de uma união

aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre troca, com a condição de que:

(a) no caso de uma união aduaneira ou de um Acordo provisório concluído visando à

formação de uma união aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros, estabelecidos no momento

da formação dessa união ou da conclusão desse Acordo provisório, não serão, no seu

conjunto, no que respeita ao comércio com as Partes Contratantes estranhas a tais

uniões ou acordos, de uma incidência geral mais elevada, nem os regulamentos de

trocas comerciais mais rigorosos, que os direitos e as regulamentações aplicáveis às

trocas comerciais nos territórios constitutivos dessa união, antes da formação de tal

união ou da conclusão do acordo, segundo o caso;

(b) no caso de uma zona de livre troca ou de um Acordo provisório concluído visando a

formação de uma zona de livre troca, os direitos aduaneiros mantidos em cada

território constitutivo, no que respeita ao comércio das Partes Contratantes que não

fazem parte de um tal território ou que não participam de tal acordo, no momento da

formação da zona ou da conclusão do Acordo provisório, não serão mais elevados,

nem as outras regulamentações de trocas comerciais mais rigorosas que os direitos e

regulamentações correspondentes existentes nos mesmos territórios antes da formação

dessa zona ou da conclusão do Acordo provisório, segundo o caso;

(c) e com a condição de que todo Acordo provisório, tendo em vista as alíneas (a) e (b),

compreenda um plano e um programa para a formação de uma união aduaneira ou o

estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca num prazo razoável.

24.6 Se, em lugar das condições enumeradas na alínea (a) do § 5º, uma Parte Contratante se

proponha majorar um direito de maneira incompatível com as disposições do Artigo II,

o procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII será aplicável. Na determinação das

compensações, levar-se-á devidamente em conta a compensação que já tenha provindo

das reduções do direito correspondente aplicado pelos outros territórios constitutivos

da união.

24.7 (a) Toda Parte Contratante que resolva participar de uma união aduaneira ou de uma zona

de livre troca ou de um Acordo provisório, concluído para o estabelecimento de tal

união ou de tal zona, comunicará sem demora às Partes Contratantes e lhes fornecerá, a

respeito dessa união ou dessa zona, todas as informações que lhes permitam endereçar

às Partes Contratantes os relatórios e recomendações que julgarem apropriados;

(b) Se, depois de ter estudado o plano e o programa compreendidos no Acordo provisório

de que trata o parágrafo 5, de Acordo com as partes deste acordo, e ter devidamente

em conta as informações fornecidas nos termos da alínea (a), as Partes Contratantes

verificarem que o acordo não é suscetível de resultar em uma união aduaneira ou no

estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca, nos prazos previstos pelas partes de

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acordo, ou que tais prazos não sejam razoáveis, farão recomendações às partes do

acordo. As partes não manterão nem porão em vigor, conforme o caso, tal acordo, se

não estiverem dispostas a modificá-lo, tendo em vista essas recomendações.

(c) Qualquer modificação substancial do plano ou do programa previsto na alínea (c) do

parágrafo 5 deverá ser comunicada às Partes Contratantes, que poderão pedir às Partes

Contratantes interessadas que a consultem, se a modificação parecer suscetível de

comprometer ou retardar, indevidamente, a formação da união aduaneira ou o

estabelecimento da zona de livre troca.

24.8 Para fins de aplicação do presente Acordo:

(a) entende-se por união aduaneira, a substituição, por um só território aduaneiro, de dois

ou mais territórios aduaneiros, de modo que:

(i) os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentações restritivas das trocas comerciais

(com exceção, na medida necessária, das restrições autorizadas nos termos dos

Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV e XX) sejam eliminados para a maioria das

trocas comerciais entre os territórios constitutivos da união, ou ao menos para a

maioria das trocas comerciais relativas aos produtos originários desses

territórios;

(ii) e, à exceção das disposições do parágrafo 9 os direitos aduaneiros e outras

regulamentações idênticas em substância sejam aplicadas, por qualquer membro

da união, no comércio com os territórios não compreendidos naqueles;

(b) entende-se por zona de livre troca um grupo de dois ou mais territórios aduaneiros

entre os quais os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentações restritivas das trocas

comerciais (com exceção, na medida necessária, das restrições autorizadas nos termos

dos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV e XX) são eliminados para a maioria das trocas

comerciais relativas aos produtos originários dos territórios constitutivos da zona de

livre troca.

24.9 As preferências previstas no parágrafo 2 do Artigo I não serão afetadas pela formação de uma

união aduaneira ou pelo estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca; poderão, entretanto, ser

eliminadas ou ajustadas por via de negociação com as Partes Contratantes interessadas. Este

procedimento de negociação com as Partes Contratantes interessadas se aplicará notadamente

na eliminação das preferências necessárias para que os dispositivos das alíneas (a), (i) e (b)

do parágrafo 8 sejam observadas.

24.10 As Partes Contratantes poderão, por decisão tomada por maioria de dois terços, aprovar as

propostas que não estejam inteiramente de Acordo com as disposições dos parágrafos 5 a 9,

inclusive, com a condição de que elas visem à formação de uma união aduaneira ou ao

estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca, no sentido do presente Artigo.

24.11 Levando em conta as circunstâncias excepcionais que resultam da constituição da Índia e do

Paquistão em estados independentes, e reconhecendo que esses dois estados formaram,

durante muito tempo, uma unidade econômica, as Partes Contratantes ajustam que as

disposições do presente Acordo não impedirão aqueles países de concluir acordos

particulares referentes ao comércio mútuo, atendendo a que as suas relações comerciais

recíprocas sejam estabelecidas definitivamente.

24.12 Cada Parte Contratante tomará todas as medidas razoáveis de sua alçada, para que as

autoridades governamentais ou administrativas, regionais ou locais, em seu território,

observem as disposições do presente acordo.

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Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo 24 em Inglês

Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General agreement on Tariffs and

Trade 1994

Members,

Having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994;

Recognizing that customs unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in number and

importance since the establishment of GATT 1947 and today cover a significant proportion of

world trade;

Recognizing the contribution to the expansion of world trade that may be made by closer

integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements;

Recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the elimination between the

constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade,

and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded;

Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the

constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such territories;

and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should to the greatest possible extent

avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other Members;

Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of the Council for Trade

in Goods in reviewing agreements notified under Article XXIV, by clarifying the criteria and

procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all

Article XXIV agreements;

Recognizing the need for a common understanding of the obligations of Members under

paragraph 12 of Article XXIV;

Hereby agree as follows:

1 Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation of a

customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must satisfy, inter alia,

the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.

Article XXIV:5

2 The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the duties

and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs

union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment of weighted

average tariff rates and of customs duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import

statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-

line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. The

Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in

accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay

Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For this purpose, the duties and charges to be

taken into consideration shall be the applied rates of duty. It is recognized that for the

purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce for

which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures,

regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required.

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3 The “reasonable length of time” referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed

10 years only in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to an interim agreement

believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide a full explanation to the

Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer period.

4 Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when a Member

forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty. In this regard Members

reaffirm that the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII, as elaborated in the guidelines

adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the Understanding on the

Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be commenced before tariff

concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation of a customs union or an interim

agreement leading to the formation of a customs union.

5 These negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to achieving mutually

satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, as required by paragraph 6 of

Article XXIV, due account shall be taken of reductions of duties on the same tariff line made

by other constituents of the customs union upon its formation. Should such reductions not be

sufficient to provide the necessary compensatory adjustment, the customs union would offer

compensation, which may take the form of reductions of duties on other tariff lines. Such an

offer shall be taken into consideration by the Members having negotiating rights in the

binding being modified or withdrawn. Should the compensatory adjustment remain

unacceptable, negotiations should be continued. Where, despite such efforts, agreement in

negotiations on compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII as elaborated by the

Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be reached

within a reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall,

nevertheless, be free to modify or withdraw the concessions; affected Members shall then be

free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII.

6 GATT 1994 imposes no obligation on Members benefiting from a reduction of duties

consequent upon the formation of a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the

formation of a customs union, to provide compensatory adjustment to its constituents.

Review of Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas

7 All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be examined by a working

party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of this

Understanding. The working party shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on

its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in Goods may make such recommendations

to Members as it deems appropriate.

8 In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make appropriate

recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures required to complete the

formation of the customs union or free-trade area. It may if necessary provide for further

review of the agreement.

9 Members parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial changes in the plan and

schedule included in that agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods and, if so requested,

the Council shall examine the changes.

10 Should an interim agreement notified under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV not include a

plan and schedule, contrary to paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV, the working party shall in its

report recommend such a plan and schedule. The parties shall not maintain or put into force,

as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with

these recommendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review of the

implementation of the recommendations.

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11 Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report periodically to the Council

for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their

instruction to the GATT 1947 Council concerning reports on regional agreements (BISD

18S/38), on the operation of the relevant agreement. Any significant changes and/or

developments in the agreements should be reported as they occur.

Dispute Settlement

12 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the

Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from

the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade

areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area.

13 Each Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all provisions of

GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such

observance by regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.

14 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the

Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked in respect of measures affecting its

observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a

Member. When the Dispute Settlement Body has ruled that a provision of GATT 1994 has

not been observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be

available to it to ensure its observance. The provisions relating to compensation and

suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible

to secure such observance.

15 Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate

opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member

concerning measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994 taken within the territory of the

former.

Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo 24 em Português

Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo XXIV do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio

1994

Os Membros,

Tendo em vista as disposições do Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994;

Reconhecendo que o número e importância das uniões aduaneiras e áreas de livre comércio

cresceram muito desde o estabelecimento do GATT 1947 e hoje cobrem uma proporção

significativa do comércio mundial;

Reconhecendo a contribuição que pode ser feita à expansão do comércio mundial pela maior

integração entre economias das partes em tais Acordos;

Reconhecendo também que tal contribuição será maior quando a eliminação das taxas e

outros regulamentos restritivos ao comércio entre territórios constitutivos for estendida a todo o

comércio e menor quando qualquer setor importante for excluído;

Reafirmando que o propósito de tais acordos deveria ser facilitar o Comércio entre os

territórios constitutivos e não elevar barreiras ao comércio de outros Membros com aqueles

territórios, e que ao estabelecerem ou ampliarem tais acordos as partes nos mesmos deveriam na

maior medida possível evitar o surgimento de efeitos adversos ao comércio de outros Membros;

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Convencidos também da necessidade de reforçar a eficácia do papel do Conselho para o

Comércio de Bens no exame dos acordos notificados sob o Artigo XXIV, mediante o

esclarecimento dos critérios e procedimentos para a avaliação de acordos novos ou ampliados e o

aperfeiçoamento da transparência de todos os acordos sob o Artigo XXIV;

Reconhecendo a necessidade para um entendimento comum sobre as obrigações dos

Membros sob o parágrafo 12 do Artigo XXIV;

Acordam o seguinte:

1 As uniões aduaneiras, áreas de livre comércio e acordos interinos que levem à formação de

uniões aduaneiras ou áreas de livre Comércio, para serem compatíveis com o Artigo XXIV,

devem satisfazer entre outras, as disposições dos parágrafos 5, 6, 7 e 8 daquele Artigo.

2 A avaliação, ao amparo do parágrafo 5(a) do Artigo XXIV, da incidência geral das taxas e

outros regulamentos sobre o comércio aplicáveis antes da formação de uma união aduaneira

deverá, no que se refere a taxas e tributos, basear-se no exame global da média ponderada das

tarifas e taxas alfandegárias cobradas. Este exame se baseará nas estatísticas de importação

durante um período precedente representativo, a ser fornecido pela união aduaneira com

valores e quantidades por linha tarifaria, desagregada segundo a origem por país membro da

OMC. O Secretariado computará a média ponderada das tarifas e taxas alfandegárias de

acordo com a metodologia utilizada na avaliação das ofertas tarifarias na Rodada Uruguai de

Negociações Comerciais Multilaterais. Para este fim, as tarifas e taxas a serem consideradas

serão aquelas aplicadas. Fica reconhecido que para uma avaliação global da incidência de

outros regulamentos comerciais para os quais a quantificação e agregação são difíceis, o

exame individual de medidas, regulamentos, produtos cobertos e fluxos afetados poderá ser

necessário.

3 O “prazo razoável de tempo” referido no parágrafo 5(c) do Artigo XXIV só deve exceder dez

anos em casos excepcionais. Nos casos em que acreditarem que os dez anos são insuficientes,

os Membros partes de um acordo interino fornecerão explicação completa ao Conselho para

o Comércio de Bens sobre a necessidade de um período mais longo.

Artigo XXIV:6.

4 O parágrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV estabelece os procedimentos a serem seguidos quando um

Membro parte em uma união aduaneira se propõe à elevação de uma tarifa consolidada. A

esse respeito, os Membros reafirmam que o procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII, tal

como desenvolvido nas linhas de orientação (guidelines) adotadas em 10 de novembro de

1980 devem ser iniciados antes que as concessões tarifárias sejam modificadas ou retiradas

com a formação de uma união aduaneira ou de um acordo interino que leve à formação de

uma união aduaneira.

5 Essas negociações serão realizadas de boa fé com vistas a lograr um ajustamento

compensatório mutuamente satisfatório. Em tais negociações, conforme disposto no

parágrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV serão plenamente levadas em conta as reduções de direitos em

uma mesma linha tarifaria realizadas por outros países partes quando da formação da união

aduaneira. Se tais reduções não forem suficientes para prover o ajustamento compensatório

necessário, a união aduaneira ofereceria compensação, a qual poderia tomar a forma de

reduções em outras linhas tarifarias. Esta oferta será considerada pelos membros que tenham

direitos de negociação na consolidação a ser modificada ou retirada. Se o ajustamento

compensatório permanecer inaceitável, as negociações continuarão. Nos casos em que, a

despeito dos esforços realizados, após um prazo razoável de tempo não seja possível chegar a

um acordo nas negociações sobre ajustamentos compensatórios ao amparo do Artigo

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XXVIII, tal como desenvolvido no Entendimento sobre a Interpretação do Artigo XXVIII do

GATT 1994, a união aduaneira estará livre para modificar ou retirar a concessão, os

Membros afetados estarão então livres para retirar concessões substancialmente equivalentes

em conformidade com o Artigo XXVIII.

6 O GATT 1994 não impõe obrigações sobre os Membros que venham a se beneficiar da

redução de tarifas resultantes da formação de uma união aduaneira ou de acordo interino que

leve à formação de uma união aduaneira no sentido de prover ajustamento compensatório aos

países partes nos mesmos.

Exame das Uniões Aduaneiras e Áreas de Livre Comércio

7 Todas as notificações feitas ao amparo do parágrafo 7(a) do Artigo XXIV serão examinadas

por um grupo de trabalho à luz das disposições relevantes do GATT 1994 e do parágrafo 1 do

presente Entendimento. O grupo de trabalho submeterá um relatório ao Conselho para o

Comércio de Bens com suas conclusões a esse respeito. O Conselho para o Comércio de

Bens poderá fazer aos Membros as recomendações que julgar apropriadas.

8 Com relação aos acordos interinos, o grupo de trabalho, em seu relatório, poderá fazer

recomendações sobre o prazo proposto e sobre as medidas necessárias a completar a

formação da união aduaneira ou área de livre comércio. Poderá, se necessário, prover novo

exame do acordo.

9 Os Membros partes em um acordo interino notificarão modificações substanciais no plano e

no calendário incluídos naquele acordo ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens que, se for

solicitado, poderá examinar ditas modificações.

10 Caso o acordo interino não apresente um plano e um calendário, contrariamente ao que

dispõe o parágrafo 5(c) do Artigo XXIV, o grupo de trabalho deverá, em seu relatório,

recomendar um plano e um calendário. As partes não manterão em vigor o referido acordo

ou, conforme o caso, não o colocarão em vigor se não estiverem preparadas para modificá-lo

de acordo com essas recomendações. Serão previstos exames subseqüentes da

implementação das recomendações.

11 As uniões aduaneiras e os países partes em áreas de livre comércio reportarão periodicamente

ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens, como previsto nas instruções das PARTES

CONTRATANTES do GATT 1947 ao Conselho do GATT 1947, sobre relatórios de acordos

regionais (BISD 188/38) relativos à operação do acordo de que se trate. Quaisquer

modificações ou evolução nesses acordos serão reportadas à medida que ocorrerem.

Solução de Controvérsias

12 As disposições dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994, tal como regulamentadas e

aplicadas pelo Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias, podem ser invocadas com

respeito a qualquer assunto resultante da aplicação das disposições do Artigo XXIV relativas

a uniões aduaneiras, áreas de livre comércio e acordos interinos que levem à formação de

uniões aduaneiras ou áreas de livre comércio.

13 Cada Membro é plenamente responsável sob o GATT 1994 pela observância de todas as

disposições do GATT 1994 e tomarão as medidas razoáveis que estejam a sua disposição

para assegurar tal observância por governos e autoridades regionais e locais dentro de seu

território.

14 As disposições dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994 tal como regulamentadas e

aplicadas pelo Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias podem ser invocadas com

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respeito a medidas que afetem essa observância adotadas por governos e autoridades

regionais e locais dentro do território de um Membro. Quando o órgão de Solução de

Controvérsias houver determinado que uma disposição do GATT 1994 não foi observada, o

Membro responsável tomará as medidas razoáveis que estejam a sua disposição para

assegurar tal observância. As disposições relativas a compensação e suspensão de concessões

e outras obrigações se aplicarão nos casos em que não houver sido possível garantir dita

observância.

15 Cada Membro se compromete a considerar com compreensão e oferecer oportunidade

adequada para consultas relativas a quaisquer gestões realizadas por outro Membro

concernentes a medidas que afetem a operação do GATT 1994, adotadas dentro de seu

território.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Há vários detalhes nas traduções brasileiras do Artigo XXIV e do Entendimento sobre a

interpretação deste dispositivo que podem causar insegurança e dúvida ao intérprete ou aplicador.

Uma leitura comparativa atenta dos textos demonstrará várias passagens problemáticas nas versões

traduzidas, que dão espaço a interpretações diversas. Sem almejar exaurir todos os pontos

duvidosos na tradução, selecionamos alguns que demonstram as diferentes inadequações do texto

em português:

a) Passagens onde o tradutor acrescentou palavras que não constavam na versão original. Por

exemplo:

No parágrafo segundo do Artigo XXIV, a versão brasileira acrescenta a palavra “aplicação” em

“Para os fins de aplicação do presente Acordo (...)”, enquanto que na versão original não há: “For

the purposes of this Agreement (...)”. Ainda neste parágrafo, na versão brasileira foi acrescentada a

palavra “aplicáveis” em “(...) outras regulamentações aplicáveis às (...)”, enquanto versão original

dispõe: “(...) other regulations of commerce (...)”. Na alínea “a” do parágrafo quinto do Artigo

XXIV a versão brasileira inclui termos não dispostos na versão original: a palavra “concluído” em

“(...) Acordo provisório concluído visando à (...)” (“(...) interim agreement leading to (...)” e a

palavra “momento” em “(...) estabelecidos no momento da (...)” (“(...) imposed at the (...)”).

b) Traduções que podem alterar o sentido do texto original. Por exemplo:

No parágrafo quarto do Artigo XXIV, a versão brasileira traduziu o termo “desirability” em “(...)

recognize the desirability (...)” como “recomendável”, “(...) reconhecem que é recomendável (...)”,

o que pode alterar o sentido da frase. Na alínea “a” do parágrafo quinto do Art. XXIV, a versão

traduzida alterou o sentido original da seguinte passagem: “(...) be higher or more restrictive than

the general incidence (...)”; já que foi traduzida da seguinte forma: “(...) uma incidência geral mais

elevada, nem os regulamentos de trocas comerciais mais rigorosos (...)”. Ainda nesse mesmo

dispositivo, o termo “duties”, aparece duas vezes traduzido como “direitos” em “(...) união

aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros (...)” e em “(...) que os direitos e as regulamentações aplicáveis

(...)”; sendo que na primeira vez as palavras “and other regulations”, que aparecem na versão

original, não são traduzidas na versão brasileira. No Entendimento sobre a interpretação do Artigo

XXIV, parágrafo segundo, a versão brasileira não incluiu a palavra “after” de “(...) commerce

applicable before and after the formation (...)” e a tradução ficou assim: “(...) comércio aplicáveis

antes da formação (...)”. Ainda no Entendimento, no parágrafo quarto, a versão original é assim

disposta: “(...) the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the

Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be commenced (...)” e

toda a parte em itálico não consta na versão traduzida: “(...) nas linhas de orientação (guidelines)

adotadas em 10 de novembro de 1980 devem ser iniciados (...)”.

c) Passagens com erros de pontuação. Por exemplo:

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No parágrafo primeiro do Artigo XXIV, não se pontua corretamente a abreviação do “Artigo

XXXIII”, pois é utilizada uma vírgula na versão brasileira (“Artigo XXXIII”), e troca-se um ponto-

e-vírgula por uma vírgula em “(...) a contracting party; Provided that (...)” (versão brasileira: “(...)

desse Acordo, com a condição de que (...)”). No parágrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV, a expressão

“(...) as between the territories of contracting parties, (...)” está inserida entre vírgulas logo após o

início da frase:

“Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of

contracting parties, (...)”, e portanto dá sentido a todo o restante da frase que vem a seguir, e faz

referência tanto a união aduaneira e quanto a área de livre comércio. Diferentemente, a versão

brasileira insere a tradução dessa expressão da seguinte forma: “(...) à formação de uma união

aduaneira entre os territórios das Partes Contratantes (...)”, restringindo o sentido da expressão

inicial somente à união aduaneira.

É importante ressaltar que há passagens em que o texto foi traduzido de forma interpretada, não

alterando, necessariamente, o conteúdo original. Por exemplo: no parágrafo primeiro, a versão

brasileira traduziu o termo “more”, em “(...) as between two or more customs territories (...)”, como

“vários”, “(...) entre dois ou vários territórios aduaneiros (...)”, quando o mais exato seria “mais”.

Como exemplo de um possível problema que a tradução pode causar, destacamos uma passagem

interpretada pelo Órgão de Apelações da OMC, o subparágrafo 8(a)(i) (comentada com mais

detalhes no item “III. Comentários”). Na versão brasileira a expressão “(...) substantially all trade

(...)” foi traduzida como “(...) a maioria das trocas comerciais (...)”. Visto a dificuldade do Órgão de

Apelações em explicar melhor o significado de “substancialmente”, a tradução brasileira é

inadequada ao quantificar este fluxo comercial como “maioria”.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo XXIV

a) “Interpretação da expressão “shall not prevent” do Artigo XXIV, caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), AB-1999-5, Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para.

45

Para. 45. “First, in examining the text of the chapeau to establish its ordinary meaning, we note that

the chapeau states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 “shall not prevent” the formation of a

customs union. We read this to mean that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not make

impossible the formation of a customs union. Thus, the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV

may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain

other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a possible “defence” to a finding of inconsistency.”

b) “Interpretação da expressão “the formation of a customs union” do Artigo XXIV,

caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 46

175

Para. 46. “Second, in examining the text of the chapeau, we observe also that it states that the

provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not prevent “the formation of a customs union”. This wording

indicates that Article XXIV can justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain

other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union,

and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the

introduction of the measure were not allowed.”

c) “Interpretação da expressão “substantially all the trade” do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(i)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 48

Para. 48. “Sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV establishes the standard for the internal trade

between constituent members in order to satisfy the definition of a “customs union”. It requires the

constituent members of a customs union to eliminate “duties and other restrictive regulations of

commerce” with respect to “substantially all the trade” between them. Neither the GATT

CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on the

interpretation of the term “substantially” in this provision. It is clear, though, that “substantially all

the trade” is not the same as all the trade, and also that “substantially all the trade” is something

considerably more than merely some of the trade. We note also that the terms of sub-paragraph

8(a)(i) provide that members of a customs union may maintain, where necessary, in their internal

trade, certain restrictive regulations of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles XI

through XV and under Article XX of the GATT 1994. Thus, we agree with the Panel that the terms

of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer “some flexibility” to the constituent members of a customs union

when liberalizing their internal trade in accordance with this sub-paragraph. Yet we caution that the

degree of “flexibility” that sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) allows is limited by the requirement that “duties

and other restrictive regulations of commerce” be “eliminated with respect to substantially all”

internal trade.”

d) “Interpretação da expressão “substantially the same” do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(ii)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 49-50

Para. 49. “[…] The constituent members of a customs union are thus required to apply a common

external trade regime, relating to both duties and other regulations of commerce. However, sub-

paragraph 8(a)(ii) does not require each constituent member of a customs union to apply the same

duties and other regulations of commerce as other constituent members with respect to trade with

third countries; instead, it requires that substantially the same duties and other regulations of

commerce shall be applied.”

Para. 50. “We also believe that the Panel was correct in its statement that the terms of subparagraph

8(a)(ii), and, in particular, the phrase “substantially the same” offer a certain degree of “flexibility”

to the constituent members of a customs union in “the creation of a common commercial policy”.

Here too we would caution that this “flexibility” is limited. It must not be forgotten that the word

“substantially” qualifies the words “the same”. Therefore, in our view, something closely

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approximating “sameness” is required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii). Sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires the

constituent members of a customs union to adopt “substantially the same” trade regulations. In our

view, “comparable trade regulations having similar effects” do not meet this standard. A higher

degree of “sameness” is required by the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii).”

e) “Invocação do Artigo XXIV como Defesa (dupla condição)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 52 e 58

Para. 52. “Given this proviso, Article XXIV can, in our view, only be invoked as a defence to a

finding that a measure is inconsistent with certain GATT provisions to the extent that the measure is

introduced upon the formation of a customs union which meets the requirement in sub-paragraph

5(a) of Article XXIV relating to the “duties and other regulations of commerce” applied by the

constituent members of the customs union to trade with third countries.”

Para. 58. “Accordingly, on the basis of this analysis of the text and the context of the chapeau of

paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, we are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is

inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a

customs union, this “defence” is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party

claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon

the formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a)

of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union

would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both these

conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV.”

f)“Teste econômico” colocado pelo Art. XXIV, 5(a)”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey – Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 55

Para. 55. “We agree with the Panel that the terms of Article XXIV:5(a), as elaborated and clarified

by paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV, provide: “(…) that the effects of the

resulting trade measures and policies of the new regional agreement shall not be more trade

restrictive, overall, than were the constituent countries' previous trade policies”. And we also agree

that this is: “an “economic” test for assessing whether a specific customs union is compatible with

Article XXIV”.”

g) “Artigo XXIV, 4, como contexto para a interpretação do Artigo XXIV, 5, caput”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey – Textile), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 56

177

Para. 56. “The text of the chapeau of paragraph 5 must also be interpreted in its context. In our

view, paragraph 4 of Article XXIV constitutes an important element of the context of the chapeau

of paragraph 5. The chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV begins with the word “accordingly”,

which can only be read to refer to paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which immediately precedes the

chapeau.”

h) “Definição da natureza da linguagem do Artigo XXIV, 4”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and

Clothing Products (Turkey – Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 57

Para. 57. “[…] Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It does not set forth a

separate obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article

XXIV which is manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that are found

elsewhere in Article XXIV. Thus, the purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant

paragraphs of Article XXIV, including the chapeau of paragraph 5. For this reason, the chapeau of

paragraph 5, and the conditions set forth therein for establishing the availability of a defence under

Article XXIV, must be interpreted in the light of the purpose of customs unions set forth in

paragraph 4. The chapeau cannot be interpreted correctly without constant reference to this

purpose.”

III. Comentários

O Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994 segue praticamente a mesma redação do Artigo correspondente no

GATT 1947, complementado pelo Entendimento sobre o Artigo XXIV, que resulta das negociações

da Rodada Uruguai. Em que pese a redação frágil e confusa, e a multiplicação da assinatura de

acordos de livre comércio pelas principais economias do mundo, somente um contencioso do

sistema GATT/OMC, no caso Turkey – Textile, enfrentou de maneira efetiva a compatibilidade

entre o regionalismo e o multilateralismo comercial. Como boa parte dos países possui acordos

potencialmente passíveis de serem questionados no sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC, a

tendência é que os Membros evitem questionar as iniciativas de acordos regionais dos outros países.

No caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu o caput do parágrafo 5 do Artigo XXIV como a disposição

chave para resolver a controvérsia. Para determinar o significado e importância do mesmo deve-se

olhar para o texto do caput e seu contexto, entendido como sendo o parágrafo 4 do Artigo XXIV,

que daria os instrumentos de interpretação para o esclarecimento dos parágrafos seguintes.

O caput do parágrafo 5 afirma que as disposições do GATT 1994 ‘não devem obstar’ (‘shall not

prevent’) a formação de uma união aduaneira. Ao examinar o texto, o Órgão de Apelação entende

que tais disposições ‘não devem tornar impossível’ (‘shall not make impossible’) a formação de

uma união aduaneira.

Por sua vez, o subparágrafo 8(a)(i) estabelece o critério para o comércio interno entre os membros

constituintes a fim de satisfazer a definição de união aduaneira. Ao fazer isso, requer que os

membros constituintes eliminem ‘taxas e outras regulações restritivas ao comércio’ em relação à

‘substancialmente todo o comércio’. Tal obrigação limita o grau de flexibilidade dado pelo

dispositivo.

Todavia, o significado de ‘substancialmente’, que não foi esclarecido nem entre as partes

contratantes do GATT nem entre os membros da OMC, não encontra maior clareza na decisão do

178

Órgão de Apelação. Ainda que afirme que ‘substancialmente todo o comércio não é o mesmo que

todo o comércio, e substancialmente todo o comércio é algo consideravelmente mais do que

somente algum comércio’, não são dadas as bases mediante as quais será feita essa análise pelos

próximos Painéis em torno do tema.

Assim, a leitura do Órgão de Apelação permite que o Artigo XXIV possa justificar uma medida

inconsistente com outras disposições específicas do GATT, além da cláusula da nação mais

favorecida. Em suma, para tanto, primeiro, a parte que reclama o benefício dessa defesa deve

demonstrar que a medida em questão é introduzida sob o processo de formação de uma união

aduaneira que preencha plenamente os requisitos dos subparágrafos 8(a) e 5(a) do Artigo XXIV. E,

segundo, a parte deve demonstrar que a constituição da união aduaneira seria obstada caso não

autorizada a introdução de medidas dessa natureza.