Anexo Reporte CIGI.pdf

8/10/2019 Anexo Reporte CIGI.pdf

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CIGI PAPERS

NO. 31 MAY 2014

DEVELOPMENTADVANCEMENT THROUGHINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

DAVID M. MALONE AND ROHINTON P. MEDHORA


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DEVELOPMENT:

ADVANCEMENT THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

David M. Malone and Rohinton P. Medhora


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Copyright 2014 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovationor its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors or the UnitedNations University.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyrightnotice.

Cover photo: UN Photo/Lundquist

AUTHORS NOTE

A shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook ofInternational Organizations, edited by Jacob Cogan, Ian Hurd and Ian Johnstone,Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014.

57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2Canadatel +1 519 885 2444 fax +1 519 885 5450www.cigionline.org


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 About the Authors

4 Acronyms

5 Executive Summary

5 Introduction

6 Genesis

7 The United Nations and Bretton Woods

7 The United Nations

8 The International Financial Institutions

13 Non-traditional Actors

15 Transitions

17 Conclusion

18 Acknowledgements

18 Works Cited

20 About CIGI

20 CIGI Masthead


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CIGI PAPERS NO. 31 MAY 2014

4 CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION

ACRONYMS

AMC Advance Market Commitment

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and SouthAfrica

DAC Development Assistance Committee

(OECD)GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GPU General Postal Union

ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin Americaand the Caribbean

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

IBRD International Bank for Reconstructionand Development

IDA International Development Association

IDRC International Development ResearchCentre

IEO Independent Evaluation Office

IFC International Finance Corporation

IFI international financial institution

IMF International Monetary Fund

ITO International Trade Organization

ITU International Telegraph UnionMDGs Millennium Development Goals

NGO non-governmental organization

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development

RDB regional development bank

RCT randomized control trial

UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and

DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development

Programme

UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund

WTO World Trade Organization

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

David M. Malone joined the United NationsUniversity (UNU) on March 1, 2013 as its sixthrector. In that role, he holds the rank of Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations. A

Canadian national, Rector Malone holds a B.A.A.from lcole des Hautes tudes Commerciales(Montreal); an Arabic Language Diploma fromthe American University (Cairo); an M.P.A. fromthe Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity; and a D.Phil. in international relationsfrom Oxford University. Prior to joining the UNUDavid served from 2008 to 2013 as president ofCanadas International Development ResearchCentre (IDRC), a funding agency that supportspolicy-relevant research in the developing world.He has published extensively on peace andsecurity issues.

Rohinton P. Medhora is president of the Centrefor International Governance Innovation (CIGI),joining in 2012. He served on CIGIs InternationalBoard of Directors since 2009. Previously, hewas vice president of programs at the IDRC. Hereceived his Ph.D. in economics in 1988 from theUniversity of Toronto, where he subsequentlytaught. His fields of expertise are monetary andtrade policy, international economic relations,aid effectiveness and development economics.His publications include co-edited books ondevelopment thought and practice, Canadas

relations with Africa, and Canadas role in theinternational financial system.


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DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCEMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIO


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The familiar world of international organizationsprincipally devoted to development has been upendedby two phenomena. First is the emergence of sustainedeconomic success in the developing world (mostly in Asia,but increasingly also in Africa and, in a less spectacularway, Latin America) amid compelling, continuing need

among the worlds poor. Second, the slow-moving,serious financial and economic crisis of the industrializedworld since 2008 has reordered priorities in many of theircapitals toward domestic spending and away from costlyinternational projects.

Both phenomena point to deeper issues. The success inreducing poverty in developing countries has not been theresult of a single-minded application of the nostrums of theinternational development organizations. And many of thechallenges the world, and especially developing countries,face today (climate change, access to new technologies,managing the Internet) are not directly addressed by the

work of the existing family of development institutions.

A new set of institutions (the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India,China and South Africa] Development Bank, if and whenit comes into being, the Chiang Mai Initiative, which poolsinternational reserves among some Asian countries, andnew philanthropic foundations centred in developingcountries) will complement, but not soon supplant, theactivities of traditional multilateral actors. Failure to reformgovernance in traditional international organizationsis bound to lead to the rise and strengthening of thealternatives. What this new constellation of institutions willlook like is uncertain, much less the place of the traditional

actors within it. But its main thrusts are becoming clear a recognition that development is not a clearly definedgoal with only one or two paths to reach it, and that goodideas are generated anywhere in the world. The emergingsystem will succeed if it nurtures this multiplicity ininnovative ideas, and abets their application, suitablymodified to suit other circumstances, across countries andregions.

INTRODUCTION

Notions of development have varied over time, andtherefore an account of the international organizationsconcerned with the advancement of development must beaccordingly elastic.

The roots of these international organizations lie in twoaspects of global interconnectedness. The first is thepropagation and management of a nascent technologyfor the global good, which resulted in the InternationalTelegraph Union (ITU), now the InternationalTelecommunication Union, in 1865, and the General PostalUnion (GPU), now the Universal Postal Union, in 1874.

The second driver of international cooperation to achieprosperity, articulated during the early 1940s, was tfailure of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Natioto protect the peace. The ruinous economic reparations ttreaty imposed on Germany led to the severe economand social distress, laying the foundation for the rise power of Hitlers National Socialism and its revanchagenda in Germany, which precipitated World War II.

Until the end of World War II, the principintergovernmental organizations were not concernwith the poorest countries in the world, but with tconsequences of poverty and marginalization among twarring nations of Europe. The Bretton Woods Conferentoward the end of World War II foresaw the creation three organizations, the third of which, the InternationTrade Organization (ITO), was stillborn, with the GenerAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1947take on some of its functions. Here, the imperative wto create and protect global economic gains that wouunderpin a lasting peace. The idea of alleviating mater

poverty in the poorest countries (which were mostly stcolonized in 1945) did not come until later.

The desired content of development in the Global Sou(those continents lagging the industrialized countries economic prosperity as of the 1950s and 1960s) has begreatly contested, as have been the methods advocated andeployed to achieve it, not least in the preferred balanbetween poverty alleviation and social empowerme(although for many, these, at times, have seemsynonymous). This may account for the proliferation international organizations purporting to promote somaspect of development, each with a strong constituency,

least for a time.

Recently, the success of the first wave of Asian tigers athe phenomena of the emerging economies and the BRIChave resulted in fluidity in the client base of the princippostwar development organizations. Meanwhile, tfunding base of these institutions and resistance to chanin their internal governance continues to evolve. Noofficial actors (mainly the US philanthropic foundatioand the international non-governmental organizatio[NGOs]) and newer formations (the vertical funrelated to health and nutrition, the Consultative Grouon International Agricultural Research [now known

its acronym, CGIAR]) the international agriculturesearch system) and even new mechanisms (such as socior development-impact investment vehicles) have renforced the notion that poverty alleviation programmiin poor countries has to be situated in the larger conteof global cooperation and well-being, and lend itself tovariety of approaches.

In the wake of the international financial and economcrisis that has gripped much of the industrialized worsince 2008, with sometimes-delayed knock-on effe


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for some developing and emerging countries, thedevelopment landscape looks starkly different. Many ofthe traditional development donors of the industrializedworld experienced declining interest in development andpauperized treasuries battling domestic banking and othersystemic financial failures. Many developing countriesand, indeed, the continent of Africa (hitherto described,at times, as a basket case) have performed better. This

has called into question not so much the imperative ofdevelopment, but the mechanics and the institutionalinfrastructure through which it has been pursued in thedeveloping world. Thus, the golden age of internationaldevelopment organizations may be coming to a close,in part, perhaps, as victims of their own success. Even ifthey do not disappear, a recasting away from traditionalpoverty alleviation in poor countries to the provision ofglobal public goods (financial stability, climate changemitigation and, more controversially, security) is likely toaccelerate.

This hypothesis is developed only partly in chronological

fashion. The next section of this paper examines thegenesis of international organizations focusing ondevelopment the period between 1865, when theITU was created, and the end of World War II. The thirdsection covers the results of the immediate postwarperiod, in particular the Bretton Woods organizations,the UN system and the regional development banks.Their governance and (not coincidentally) the ideas andpolicies they favour merit special attention. The fourthsection covers the parallel emergence of the foundations the large NGOs with a global reach and the more recentancillaries to the established official organizations, suchas the vertical funds and trust funds. In the fifth section,a constellation of international developmental actors isexamined, highlighting the transition that each subgroup isundergoing. The final section concludes that the prognosisfor organizations caught in this transitional stage in globaleconomic governance can only be uncertain. The challengewill be for the global community to craft what the 2013

Human Development Reportcalls coherent pluralism.1

GENESIS

When hydraulic and pneumatic power was replaced byelectricity, this was once again genesis (Landes 1969, 284),

for electric power was made to be transmitted over longdistances. By the late 1830s, electricity had passed the stageof scientific curiosity to become a commercially viable formof energy with application, initially, in communication.Between 1837 and 1895, a spate of developments the electromagnetic telegraph, the undersea cable, thetelephone and wireless revolutionized communicationand ushered in a new era in cross-country cooperation,

1 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013), inparticular chapter 5.

which was driven by the need for arrangements ofvarious kinds to locate and use the nodes and connectionsbetween them effectively.2 Fifteen separate agreementscovered telegraph links within Prussia alone. On May 17,1865, the ITU was established by 20 European countriesafter only two and a half months of negotiations. Thisoccurred 20 years after Samuel Morse transmitted his firstpublic message through his ingenious new medium, the

telegraph.

About the same time, a series of measures were introducedin England that resulted in core concepts that were rapidlytaken up by other countries the postage stamp thatsignalled prepaid mail, and uniform rates for domesticletters of a certain weight regardless of distance. In thiscase, the route to an international agreement took longer.A series of conferences starting in 1863 resulted in thecreation of the GPU by 22 countries in Bern, Switzerland,on September 15, 1874, thus multilateralizing what hadworked so well at the national level.

Although not purely developmentally oriented, theITU and the GPU were part and parcel of the seriesof technological and institutional advances thattransformed commerce, international relations and socialinterconnectedness (echoed in many ways in recentdecades by the creation of the virtual world made possibleby a radically new generation of advanced informationtechnologies). The member states, and even thoseperipheral to these agreements, were made richer andmore developed as a result. These two agreements are theprecursors to international cooperation around what aretoday known as global public goods, of which commonstandards of the sort embodied in the ITU and GPU

remain the purest examples of something non-excludableand non-rivalrous. The joint nature of development andthe provision of a public good is an undercurrent of theorganizations covered in this paper. Even an internationalorganization concerned with nothing but fighting povertyat the national level is creating a global public good via theaccumulation of lessons learned and knowledge withinit, its transfer to and application in other countries, andthe creation of near-universally accessible datasets. Atanother level, the more prosperous countries they promotereinforce the wealth of their neighbours and tradingpartners.

The creation of the GPU was followed by a period thatwas not only lean, but also marked by significant failure in

2 For an account of technological advances in this period and theirimpact on society and the economy, see Landes (1969).


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international cooperation.3The Treaty of Versailles and theLeague of Nations signally failed to win the peace, withdisastrous consequences. The predatory policies in trade,investment and exchange rate management in the yearsafter the crash of 1929 were punctuated by ineffectiveinternational coordination, mostly ad hoc, resting on apoor understanding of the analytic underpinnings of theeconomic fundamentals and, in any case, not under the

auspices of an international organization.

The value proposition that countries saw in cooperatingaround the various elements of communications ageneration earlier was simply not evident in matters ofmacroeconomic performance. The lesson, a hard onelearned by the entire world, was that a new UnitedNations approach would require considerableeconomic cooperation enshrined in strong internationalorganizations. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt andUK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in particular,appreciated the point; more importantly, they were also ina position to do something about it.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND

BRETTON WOODS

The period between 1950 and 1975 has been termed thegolden age of economic growth; during that period,the world economy grew continuously and almosteverywhere at an unprecedented rate, which seemedto prove that development was not only possible,but indeed achievable, especially as the welfare state inEuropean countries indicated that state intervention couldlead to vast social improvements. This was the period

when the development cooperation experiment took offand average annual economic growth across developingcountries as a whole averaged over five percent, which washigher than the comparable rate in the industrial world.Many international organizations were either created orexpanded and came into their own during this period.

The focus of the Charter of the United Nations is onpeace, human rights and freedom. These words areused generously, starting in the preamble, and continuethroughout the document. Chapter IX (on internationaleconomic and social cooperation) and Chapter X (on theEconomic and Social Council) enshrine the view held

strongly by Roosevelt and Churchill that the peace had tobe supported by economic cooperation arrangements that

3 One exception, beyond the remit of this paper, was the emergencelate in the nineteenth century of internationally available mechanismsfor arbitration of commercial and other disputes, including ones betweenstates notably the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in1899 as a means of promoting commerce and avoiding conflict arisingfrom unaddressed grievances. Such judicial and administrative disputeresolution mechanisms have since proliferated, generally in helpfulways. Much of the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO) today isarbitral in nature with its dispute resolution system (which, on balance,has generally operated well).

had teeth. But the work to create the related institutionarchitecture and ordain the means to bring thearrangements to life formally, began a year earlier at tUnited Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.4

THE UNITED NATIONS

Article 57 of the UN Charter, agreed at San Francisco 1945, urged that pre-existing specialized agencies withrole in the economic, cultural and several other spheres brought into relationship with the UN. One such agenwas the International Labour Organization, founded 1919 in association with the League of Nations, which haon request, provided advice to a variety of governmenwith technical assistance (an early form of UN suppofor development) being a close cousin. The first majdevelopment program outside of the industrializworld to follow the creation of the United Nations, tColombo Plan (established in 1950 and initially assistiseveral South Asian countries, eventually including som

others), impelled at the outset by the Commonwealhad nothing to do with the United Nations. But decolonization proceeded, bringing independence towelter of essentially very poor states during the 1950s anearly 1960s, the United Nations was deluged with cafor support and assistance. Beyond the (initially modehelp, largely advisory, provided by several UN specializagencies, the UN General Assembly set aside US$300,0in 1948 (even then hardly a princely sum) for technicassistance for economic development, soon followed 1949 by the creation of an institutional umbrella, bringitogether specialized agencies and the United Natioitself known as the Expanded Program of TechnicAssistance. By the end of the 1950s, this program wspending close to US$35 million annually.

But much more was required, and in 1966, the UNDP caminto being through the merger of two other UN entitieventually becoming the United Nations largest broabrush development actor, which also nominally servescoordinating role and most often underpins UN countrepresentation throughout the developing world. Its 20funding levels, currently under some pressure from donoreached nearly US$5 billion. But the specialized agencialso provide developing countries with considerabprogram assistance beyond advisory services.

With an ever-growing array of UN institutional actogenerating oft-derided UN sprawl, competition amothese entities for now-shrinking overall levels of traditiondonor dollars tends to generate counterproductiprogrammatic stampedes in whatever direction the donoseem to favour (however briefly), often forsaking thcore mandates. The donors, in theory, committed to hig

4 There was extensive prior preparation, and even precedent in Latin American relations, as Helleiner (2014) describes.


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minded principles enshrined in such worthy but nearlyinstantly discarded statements as the Paris (2005), Accra(2008) and Busan (2011) declarations, have rarely remainedcommitted to strategies and priorities for long enough toestablish basic proof of concept. Not surprisingly, duringthe current economic crisis, development assistancehas become increasingly contested in parliaments ofseveral formerly steadfast donors. Further, the 1990s and

2000s witnessed a growing trend among donors to fundtelegenic emergency situations in which many lives whereat immediate risk, rather than longer-term developmentthat could benefit many more over time.5 UN agenciesare more vulnerable to disruption in funding than arethe Washington-based international financial institutions,which generally enjoy support from donor treasuries andaid ministries. In sum, donors and UN agencies make forunhappy bedfellows, with the United Nations often spreadtoo thin to achieve serious impact, with the exceptionof some narrowly focused, often innovative and well-managed agencies such as the United Nations ChildrensFund (UNICEF).

The greatest contribution of the United Nations and itsmany agencies and programs almost certainly does not liein the outcome of its operational activities. As arguedby the superb UN Intellectual History project, in its mostvivid volume, UN Voices, it is in the field of ideas thatthe United Nations has most greatly distinguished itself,doubtless, in part, because of its plurality and becauseof the dogged attachment to them of a number of pastand present staff members and national representatives(Weiss et al. 2005). At the UN, ideas are constantly underchallenge. This is healthy. Not coincidentally, it was at theUnited Nations that the concept of human developmentwas embraced, and that related work on the Arab world,led by Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, foreshadowed the ArabSpring and documented the deficits and frustrations thatled to this massive regional upheaval.

THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS

Preoccupation with material poverty in poor countries wasunderplayed at the Bretton Woods Conference held duringthree weeks in July 1944. The ITO, had it been created,was primarily intended to focus on the rules governing

trade in wealthy countries. Of the 23 initial signatories tothe GATT, only 10 were developing countries. Only threemore developing countries joined in the next 10 years. Themain reason was that Article XVIII, the only part of the

5 This syndrome came to be known as the CNN effect, due to thattelevision networks introduction of non-stop news cycles often focusingon famine and war as pestilence of various sorts, impelling publics toexert pressure on their governments and the governments, in turn, onthe UN to do something in response. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti isan example of this syndrome at play, with very little lasting impact ofinternational intervention to relieve the suffering and rebuild.

accord concerning developing countries, which grantedthem exemption from certain obligations, was deemedto be too onerous to actually implement. Instead, thedeveloping countries joined their richer counterpartsin using the balance of payments exception when theywished to apply trade restrictions. A series of other aspectsimportant to developing countries, related to commodityprice stabilization and incentives to locate value-added

activities in developing countries, were unacceptableto the United States and, therefore, were missing fromthe GATT. In trade as in finance, the aim of the BrettonWoods negotiators was to reconstruct war-torn Europeand ensure a liberal economic order within it and with theUnited States.

With the ITO failing to come into being, and the GATTbeing agreed independent of the United Nations (andremaining that way), the WTO, unlike the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), also foregoes formallinks with the UN (although its director general does

participate in high-level UN executive discussions).

The IBRD was also geared toward supporting therecovery of the industrialized world from the ravages ofwar; lending at market and near-market rates of interestput IBRD resources out of the reach of most developingcountries. Accordingly, its main clients remained Europeanfor a decade after the Bretton Woods Conference ended(see Figure 1). Even the first major organizational change,the creation of the International Finance Corporation(IFC) in 1956, was geared to identifying investible projectsin the private sector, and thus complicated lending todeveloping countries during a period when a strong

government hand in industry and enterprise prevailed. Itwasnt until the creation of the World Banks soft loanarm, the International Development Association (IDA), in1962 that development concerns truly became pre-eminentin the operations of what was now the World Bank Group.6

The IMF was initially even further removed from thedevelopment realm than were the GATT/ITO and theIBRD. This organization was created to address the twinissues of the availability of international liquidity for tradeand investment, and adjusting to balance-of-paymentsdifficulties. The pivotal debate between John MaynardKeynes and Harry Dexter White on whether the core of

the IMFs functions should be driven by the hybrid unitof account bancor or the American dollar as the globalreserve currency was both technical (about the relativeefficiency of various adjustment mechanisms) and political(about the cementing of status of the United States as the

6 The early years of the World Bank are covered in Kapur, Lewis andWebb (1997); for the evolution in lending patterns see Table 1-1 therein.


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Figure 1: Regional Distribution of IBRD/IDA Lending Commitments

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1946-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2009 2010-2012

Sub-Saharan Africa

Middle East & North

Africa

LaDn America &

Caribbean

Europe & Central

Asia

South Asia, East Asia

& Pacific

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013); Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997).

global hegemon).7The suggestion from Indias delegationthat an additional purpose of the IMF as set out in Article Ibe to assist in the fuller utilization of the resourcesof economically under-developed countries wasrejected (James 2009, 16).The Bretton Woods Conferenceconsciously avoided distinguishing between developed

and developing countries (or indeed any other groupingof attendees), but in so doing, it reinforced this distinctionsince non-distinction was not value neutral.8

With such roots, two things followed in all three BrettonWoods organizations. First, time, trends and events(mostly related to decolonization and the wretched state inwhich the colonial powers left their former dependencies)ensured that development concerns came to the foredramatically during the early 1960s. Second, they did sowithin institutions seen very much as creatures of thedeveloped countries.

7 Although accounts of the discussion at the conference abound, seeMikesell (1994) for a readable, first-hand memoir.

8 Helleiner (2014) is an important exception to this view. He arguesthat developing countries, particularly Latin American countries, hadstrong representations at the conference, and previously, in their dealingson this subject with the Americans. However, once the conference wasover, the world changed quite dramatically.... Very quickly after the war,US officials turned their backs on much of the development content ofthe Bretton Woods agreement. In any case, the end result remains thatdeveloping countries were a disaffected group after the Bretton Woodsorder was established.

Following its distinctly non-developmental first decadthe GATT commissioned a study (the Haberler Reporthat was even-handed in its assessment of the detrimeneffects of developed country policies, particularly agriculture, on developing countries and on the goof misguided inward-looking policies in developi

countries themselves. Despite the intent of a new PaIV in the agreement to more purposefully recognize ttrade anddevelopment agenda, measures that developicountries saw as concrete were few. The Kennedy Rou(19641967) was disappointing for developing countrias it did little to penetrate the thicket of agricultuprotectionism in developed countries and tariff escalatiby degree of manufacturing at exactly the time whdeveloping countries saw higher value added as the routo greater levels of development. But by the end of tround, the fissure had already occurred, with the creatiin 1964 of the UN Conference on Trade and Developme(UNCTAD), a group seen by all concerned as betreflecting developing country views and interests, bone bereft of financial resources and possessing few the practical results-oriented negotiating attributes of tGATT, unsatisfactory as these were. At the United Nationdebates (often limited to calling for further debatetended to be claims-based and advocate redress as muas a political matter looking to establish concrete measuron the ground.

9 See GATT (1958).


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Still, developing country membership of the GATTcontinued to grow. More importantly, the global tradingregime was increasingly seen as a vehicle that couldbenefit developing countries disproportionately ifappropriately reformed. The Uruguay Round provided aperverse impetus to the development agenda by yieldingdisappointing results for developing countries in a rangeof issues intellectual property, investment, agriculture

and services that went well beyond the emphasis inprevious rounds on simple tariff reduction. These concerns,and the creation of the WTO with its dispute settlementmechanism, set the stage for the Doha (Development)Round, launched in the shadow of the 9/11 attacks inNovember 2001. But if this round was supposed to beabout winning hearts and minds by demonstrating theinherent advantages to developing countries of belongingto the liberal global economic order, it has failed. Whilethe definitive assessment of why this is the case has yet tobe completed, it appears that the rich countries could notbring themselves to make the sorts of changes to the statusquo that the post-Uruguay Round development agendaimplied, while developing countries, now with a clear setof emerging countries among them, still saw themselvesas uniformly poor and deserving of concessions likely dueto only a small number among them.

In 2013, three-quarters of the 159 members of the WTOwere developing countries. Among the Bretton Woodstroika, only the director general of the WTO is selectedfree of considerations pertaining to nationality or regionof nationality; two of the six heads have been nationalsof a developing country, including the current one(Roberto Azevdo from Brazil.) Developing countries areincreasingly using the WTOs dispute resolution system tolitigate developed countries and each other. But developingcountries are also leaders in negotiating the approximately550 regional trade and investment agreements in force orunder negotiation, which, whatever the rhetoric abouttheir being WTO-conformant, suggests countries arehedging their bets when it comes to their reliance on theWTO. The latters Doha Round of negotiations to achievefurther liberalization of international trade across a rangeof sectors has been marked by continued dominance ofthe United States and the European Union, although thedeveloping countries have, this time, played a blockingrole, which they either could not or did not adopt in earlier

such rounds.In the World Bank Group (which, in addition to the IBRD,IDA and IFC, also includes the Multilateral InvestmentGuarantee Agency and the International Centre for theSettlement of Investment Disputes), there is less ambiguitythan there is in the cases of the WTO and the IMF aboutit being a developmental organization. Following thedominance of postwar reconstruction in Europe and Japanin the IBRDs operations at its creation, and the success ofthe US-led reconstruction plans in Europe (the Marshall

Plan) and war-torn Asia, it appeared self-evident thatthe same route of infrastructure financing and policydevelopment was the key to overcoming poverty in thepoor countries of the world (see Kapur, Lewis and Webb1997, Table 1-1). The sectoral pattern of lending by the WorldBank reflects the evolution of thinking on the developmentparadigm over time, from agriculture and infrastructure inthe early years to the soft sectors including governance,

and a resurgence in belief in infrastructure more recently(see Figure 2).

Before long, complementing the Washington-basedinternational financial institutions (IFIs) were a range ofRDBs, starting with the Inter-American DevelopmentBank, created in 1959, which, with the Asian DevelopmentBank (created in 1964) offers the greatest lending capacityamong the RDBs. In 2009, the African DevelopmentBank made total commitments of US$12.6 billion, not farbehind the others. After years of internal wrangling andmanagement dysfunction, the African Development Bankhas been on an upswing of credibility and effectiveness for

the past decade. These banks lower key, better integratedin their regions and less preachy than the IMF andWorld Bank tend to attract less attention and to courtless controversy than the IMF and World Bank (sometimesunwittingly) have. Put another way, despite efforts bysuccessive waves of management reform to turn them intoknowledge institutions, the RDBs have not succeededin breaking the dominance of the World Bank and theIMF in the arena of ideas, research and outreach. Some ofthe regional economic commissions of the UN have beenmore successful in this regard, with the UN EconomicCommission for Africa and the Economic Commissionfor Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) renownedfor their think tank and technical assistance roles. Eversince the pioneering leadership of its first director RalPrebisch, ECLAC, in particular, has come to define thestructuralist school of thinking and, more broadly, thenotion of a locally owned and credible institution thatproduces ideas that are counterpoints to externally drivenvisions of development.10

The question of how development-oriented the IMFis has persisted throughout its history. At its outset, thisreflected the state of the discipline of economics, whereinthe development stream had yet to be credibly fleshedout both in theory and in its empirical applications.Nevertheless, in practice, there are several reasons toconsider the IMF a part of any discussion on internationalorganizations concerned with development. First, forsignificant periods of time, use of the IMFs borrowingfacilities has been dominated by developing countries.

10 For an account of the interplay between leadership, ideas andorganizational development at ECLAC and UNCTAD, see Dosman(2008), especially chapters 12, 13 and 18.


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Figure 2: Sectoral Distribution of IBRD/IDA Lending Commitments

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1946-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2009 2010-2012

Agriculture Finance and Industry Infrastructure Social Other

Source: Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997); World Bank Annual Reports (2004, 2007, 2012).

Current World Bank sectoral classifications have been placed into Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997) classifications as follows: Agriculture, fishing, and forestry aAgriculture; Finance and Industry and Trade as Finance and Industry; Information and Communications and Transportationas Infrastructure

Education, Health and other social services and Water, sanitation and flood protection as Social; and Energy and Mining, Public Administration, Laand Justiceas Other.

Developing countries are especially prominent amongits repeat, long-term clients (see Figure 3). Second,the organizations technical assistance and capacity-building activities have concentrated on developing

countries (especially if one includes the former SovietUnion and Eastern Europe in this category). Third, IMFlending is frequently the catalyst for other financialflows into developing countries, concessionary and non-concessionary, private and public.

Controversy around the IMF does not centre on whetherit is a development organization, but on charges that ithas imperfectly integrated such concerns into its approachto financial and macroeconomic policy and its operations.Although its external critics are legion,11 it is the IMFsown arms-length evaluation office that has producedthe most telling critiques of the organization. A report of

the IMFs relations with its member countries, publishedin 2013, concludes: The degree to which the Fund isviewed as a trusted advisor is found to differ by regionand country type, with authorities in Asia, Latin America,and large emerging markets the most skeptical, andthose in large advanced countries the most indifferent(Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF [IEO] 2013, 1).

11 The Group of Twenty-Four Research Program has produced thelongest-standing (since 1971) and most compelling critical analyses of theIMF and the World Bank. A representative compendium is Buira (2005).

In the aftermath of the current economic crisis, the IMhas become more flexible for example, on the degrof fiscal restraint that is required during adjustment, ain its historic antipathy to capital controls. But it has n

gone unnoticed that the flexibility has come in the facecrisis in Western Europe, not the developing world, whethe IMF is the junior partner in the troika of organizatioaddressing the rescue effort. Other evaluations modirectly concerned with IMF operations in developicountries provide the fodder for the overarching conclusiabout the IMF in the developing world cited above

The research programs at the IMF and the World Bannominally the driver for the tone and content of theorganizations lending and technical assistance activitihave also recently come under criticism for being variedtheir technical merit, message-driven and often lacki

in their understanding of local context.13 This contrawith an earlier era when these institutions were seen leaders in areas such as the framework for macroeconomanalysis, cost-benefit analysis and the interplay betwegrowth and distribution.14

12 See, for example, IEO (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2010).

13 See IEO (2011) and Banerjee et al.(2006).

14 For a recent account of the heyday of intellectual leadership at IMF and World Bank, see Leipziger (2014).


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Figure 3: Recidivism Remains a Major Concern for Developing Countries

(% of Time under Fund Program)

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Source: IMF (2013).

Both the IMF and IBRD were tarnished by backlashagainst the so-called Washington Consensus of the late1980s and early 1990s urging structural adjustment ondeveloping countries facing acute financial difficultiesin ways that paid too little attention to local conditions,income distribution, regional differences and whatdisciplines other than economics might have added totheir analysis. Both institutions were unprepared for theinternational storm they unleashed. The narrow outlookof the IMF is hardly surprising, nor inappropriate, but asseveral of the IBRDs recent presidents have noted, theWorld Bank Groups staff, enjoying a wider remit, havenot been sufficiently multidisciplinary. Rightly or wrongly,the World Bank has come to be seen by many as retrenchedbehind walls of privilege and self-regard, and has oftenseemed tone-deaf to the sensitivities and aspirations of

other communities, including, at times, the Banks clients.Paradoxically, the Bank and the Fund were right at the levelof principle and practice in arguing that sound financialmanagement needed to be restored as a cornerstone ofany long-range development plan; while their staffs canbe assessed in many ways, flattering and otherwise, it isworth noting that many of the most impressive leaders ofthe developing world have served on the staff of one orthe other, sometimes both. Indeed, perhaps the greatestcontribution of the IBRD to development has been in

shaping several generations of technocrats and leaders whobrought evidence-based policy to bear on the challenges oftheir countries when given an opportunity to do so.

The unbalanced and increasingly controversial governancestructure of the IFIs effectively the power relationships at the apex of the IMF and the World Bank complicates anyattempt to evaluate their performance. The industrializedcountries are heavily favoured (which explains thepreference of the latter for these institutions over UNagencies and programs in which the developing countrieshave a greater voice). Each organization is run by a boardcomprised of countries that are allocated voting sharesbased on a formula that combines size of GDP, wealth andopenness. Quota reform has been contentious throughoutthe history of these organizations and, not surprisingly,requires the assent of both gainers and losers. As a resultof the inherent inertia in this process, and the anxietyaroused in key Western capitals over the emergence ofserious competition for international influence, the UnitedStates and, in particular, Western Europe, continue to beoverrepresented at the expense of the emerging economiesin the developing world. With some nods toward a moreopen and transparent selection process, the head of eachorganization is still determined as if it were 1950. The headof the World Bank is reliably an American national, andthat of the IMF a Western European. In todays world,


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particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, whichoriginated in and severely damaged the industrializedworld, this state of play undermines the global standing ofthe IFIs. Indeed, it demeans both institutions.15

Further irritating the sensitivities of countries rapidlyemerging from poverty to global significance (while oftenstill harbouring many poor individuals) was the trend

established in the 1970s for the meetings of the consultativeGroup of Five, then Seven, then Eight to establish subtly and otherwise policy priorities for the IFIs andto commission work from them. The creation of the Groupof Twenty (including a number of emerging powers) atthe leaders level in the heat of the financial and economiccrisis in 2008, intended to play a similar role, has, after apromising start, produced disappointing results. However,it serves as a signal of accommodation with the GlobalSouth not yet reflected in such bodies as the UN SecurityCouncil.16

NON-TRADITIONAL ACTORS

Although private money meaning the combination ofinvestment, philanthropy and remittances has alwaysoperated alongside official flows to developing countries,its size and impact has grown in recent years. Technically, itsurpassed official flows during the 1990s (Hudson Institute2012, 15 and Figures 4 and 5; see also Figure 4 in thispaper), but this is mostly due to the growth in remittancesand investment, which responds to an invisible handrelative to the deliberate programming of developmentinstitutions. The activities of the major US foundations do,however, bear mention, as they have been impactful, albeitduring certain periods and in certain sectors, in a mannerthat is disproportionate to the size of their operations.

The activities of philanthropic organizations domiciledin developing countries and operating nationally areincreasingly important, but beyond the purview of thischapter. Although reliable data is scarce, it is unlikely thatthey yet compete seriously with the funding levels of otheractors such as the IFIs and the US foundations.

15 There exists one salient case from a previous generation of animperfect but not failed attempt to deal with changing global powerstructures. The still well-regarded International Fund for Agricultural

Development was created in 1977 largely to recycle petrodollars to thedeveloping world and, in its governance structure and operations, providea large role to the oil-producing world. A less desirable development inthis regard is the growth in the number and size of trust funds at the IFIs.They are an inefficient way to account for the rise of other powers asthey multiply objectives, funders and procedures.

16 Ironically, further to severe financial strains within the EuropeanUnion in the run-up to 2012, emerging countries agreed to contributeadditional funds to the IMF (for the second time since 2009) in orderto meet any contingencies that the institution might face in supportingcrisis-riven countries, while Canada and the United States declined to doso, arguing that European actors had done too little to help themselves towarrant further outside support.

Of total US philanthropic flows for development US$39 billion in 2010, foundations accounted fUS$4.6 billion or about 12 percent (ibid., 8 and Table But unlike the atomized nature of the other 88 perceof non-official US international assistance, a few weorganized, determined and effective organizations habeen instrumental in creating the brand that this streaof aid and impact has come to represent. The Carneg

Corporation (established in 1911), the RockefelFoundation (1913), the Ford Foundation (1936) and tMacArthur Foundation (1970) have broad remits advance human welfare, unconstrained by strictures the geographic or thematic scope of operations. The B& Melinda Gates Foundation, initiated in 1994 in anothform and eventually building the largest endowmeof any private foundation, is motivated by the ethembodied in its slogan all lives have equal value anwith its bold approach to programming allied to the quefor quantifiable results, is a leader in its field and alinfluences the views of government donors.

In practice, this has resulted in sustained investments inlimited number of well-defined program areas, supportby strong staff and management and excellent governanstructures at the apex. During its formative years, tRockefeller Foundation supported research on malarhookworm and yellow fever, starting with pilot sites Arkansas and Mississippi, and soon expanding to sites across the developing world. In China, it created tChina Medical Board to modernize the health system that country. This seminal work still has echoes in curreefforts to eradicate tropical and neglected diseases.

Similarly, the first Green Revolution, which sa

agricultural productivity rise in Mexico and South Asparticularly in the late 1960s, began 25 years earlier asseries of initially uncoordinated and later coordinatinvestments by the Ford and Rockefeller FoundationThe Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the RockefelFoundation are leading a second generation of theffort, focussed on Africa. The Ford and RockefelFoundations, along with the World Bank, the Foand Agricultural Organization (FAO) and CanadInternational Development Research Centre (IDRC), wealso instrumental in the creation of CGIAR, a netwoof 15 research centres around the world working on tscience and policy of agriculture. These donors asome aid ministries have worked hard to support tcreation and expansion of indigenous capacity for poliformulation in developing countries across a wide ranof fields, including economics, for example, through tAfrican Economic Research Consortium and the EconomResearch Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkin Cairo.

The CGIAR is emblematic of a number of hallmarks the foundations role in international development. O a start via a far-sighted, well-executed pilot investme


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has already been noted. The other is the capability toattract larger, less agile players (in this case, the FAO,World Bank, the US government and later a host of otherofficial bilateral funders) to bring an initiative to truescale. A third is for the creation to become its own entity,not just through its financial strength, but also throughits own operations and ideas. In many parts of the world,the CGIAR is seen as a funder and/or international

organization just like its procreators. Finally, the activitiesof the foundations are known to value and draw on localparticipation and ownership in ways that many projectsof the bilateral funders and the IFIs are not. This localinstitutional development is largely what the foundationsare valued for most in countries such as Brazil and India,in which they have a long track record.

In addition to investments in health and agriculturalresearch, some foundations have come to be known andsometimes criticized for their support for liberal visionsof society and democracy. Through subtle modalities suchas scholarships in Western universities and support for

future leaders, but also through more explicitly politicalmeans such as the creation of or support for existing civilsociety organizations dedicated to human rights, freedomof speech and democracy, the Carnegie Corporationand the Ford and MacArthur Foundations (and, morerecently, the Soros Foundation/Open Society Institute)have nurtured communities that very much hold liberalWestern mores on social and political matters.17 Theiroffices in many parts of the developing world are hubsfor the small, though influential, elite that are preoccupiedwith such concerns. A classic example of this facet of thefoundations activities is the support the Ford Foundation(along with the IDRC) provided to academics and civilsociety leaders and their organizations in the SouthernCone of Latin America during the years of dictatorshipthere in the 1970s and 1980s. This support was experiencedpersonally and later recalled by several presidents whocame to power in the region (Muirhead and Harpelle 2010,14752).18

In recent years, the foundations have been parties toorganizational innovation in development in two otherinstances that bear mention. The first is in the creation ofthe so-called vertical or global funds, of which the twolargest are the GAVI Alliance (formerly the Global Alliancefor Vaccines and Immunization) and the Global Fund toFight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. These funds haveaccounted for much of the increase in foreign aid in recentyears. In keeping with principles on aid coordination andeffectiveness agreed to by the worlds major development

17 They are today joined by local philanthropists with similar aims,such as Mo Ibrahim in Africa and Nandan Nilekani in India.

18 For an account of the evolution of the main foundations see Adelmanand Spantchak (2014); Atwater and Walsh (2012); Berman (1983); Bresnan(2006); Farley (2004); Fosdick (1988); and Parmar (2012).

funders, these funds bring together a variety of fundingorganizations to work on a particular sector or sub-sectorin a limited number of countries. By its very nature, sucha fund is both a complement to and competition for themore established multilateral development organizations,and typically bypasses existing national governmentsand agencies. Their newness and nature have meant thatit would be premature to place any weight on the early

evaluations of these endeavours, which, not surprisingly,highlight the tentative nature of successes, if any, and theteething pains of a new organizational form superimposedon rather than genuinely integrated with an existing one.19

A second innovation is the bringing to proof-of-conceptstage of an idea, which was first proposed in 2004 byMichael Kremer (2004), to use public funds to pre-createa market for advances in health where the risks to investin research and development without such a guarantee aretoo high for private sector firms. The first such AdvanceMarket Commitment (AMC), for pneumococcal vaccines,was funded by five countries and the Bill & Melinda

Gates Foundation. Initial reports indicate that vaccinessuited to developing country conditions have indeedbeen forthcoming, and that the main constraint is excessdemand relative to supply. The principle underlying theAMC approach is a broad one, and can be applied to otherareas, for example, agriculture and energy, both of whichhave featured in commentary on the subject. To be sure,the question is one of the availability of resources, but themore fundamental underlying question is organizational.The first two conclusions of Bezanson, Isenman andShakows(2012) review of the vertical funds bear mentionhere too: Think twice: global action does not necessarilymean a new vertical fund and Use existing institutionalcapacity.

With such a changing ecology, the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Developments (OECDs)Development Assistance Committee (DAC), comprising 27official donor agencies from the traditional rich countries,is anachronistic as a forum for anything more than thegeneration of data on development assistance. No tableexists that brings together the traditional players with thenew official and established non-official funders, and if itwere required, it is not clear that the OECD would be theobvious host. The DACs credibility has suffered from thewhiplash-inducing correctives to aid policy its membersadvocated in Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011),suggesting incoherence at best, near-panic at worst, andperhaps brought about by the relentless short-term (andoften domestically driven) perspective that OECD politicalfigures have brought of late to debates on aid.

19 See Bezanson, Isenman and Shakow (2012) and Isenman and Shakow(2010) for a meta assessment of evaluations of the individual funds.


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TRANSITIONS

That the world, including and especially the developingworld, is a different place today than it was in 1944 whenthe worlds economic statesmen convened at BrettonWoods, letalone in 1913 when the Rockefeller Foundationstarted work in China, is an axiom. The ecosystem ofinternational organizations that address development has

also evolved, although the evolution has been additive,not integrative. Examples abound of changing prioritiesand even exits from a certain line of work or region,however, few of the major organizations have gone outof business. And this is a serious problem, confusingpublics, dispersing resources and often underperforming

relative to the potential impact of leaner and more focusmachinery, such that in much of the developing world (anelsewhere) internationals are often seen as essentiallyprivileged parasitical class profiteering from the poverof others, a frequently unfair caricature, but one rootedinescapable perceptions. Increasingly, these perceptioalso attach to some humanitarian NGOs.20This is mainbecause after 60 years of being in the business of fighti

poverty, poverty remains (albeit with less severity ain relatively smaller concentrations within countries andeveloping continents).

20 The title of a recent piece on the subject, The NGO RepublicHaiti (Klarreich and Polman 2012), is tell ing.

Figure 4: The Evolving Magnitude and Composition of Developing World Financial Flows

(Low- and Middle-income Countries, Net, % of Regional GDP, 19702011)

-1.0%

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

Official Lending, Bilateral Official Lending, Mullateral Private (long-term)

Public and Publically Guaranteed (long-term) Short-Term (Public and Private Debtors) IMF

FDI Porolio Equity Personal Remiances (net)

Private Grants Total Net External Resources

197 1 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 19 85 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1 999 2001 2003 200 5 2007 2009 2011

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2013).


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With increases in private capital inflows and remittances,the financial resources of the organizations cited in thispaper form a dwindling proportion of international flowsinto developing countries (see Figure 4). This, coupled withthe increase in the capacity within developing countriesthemselves to mobilize finance, suggests that, for the mostpart, the leverage of international organizations derivesnot from money, but from their ideas and their way of

pursuing outcomes.

Consider the Bretton Woods twins the World Bankand the IMF. So far, the World Bank has successfullytransformed itself numerous times, from a vehicle forfinancing infrastructure and leading in the intellectualcontributions to development thought to managing debtrelief to sector-specific lending and policy advice and, morerecently, to harnessing information and communicationstechnologies for development and adapting to climatechange. It is not clear, though, where exactly the WorldBank dominates relative to its varied competitors, or whatits comparative advantage is and will be going ahead.

The RDIs, the private financial sector, the foundations,other official bilateral funders and developing countriesthemselves all have considerably more financial andintellectual capacity (thanks, in part, to the World Bank)than they did when the Bank was created 65 years ago. Itmight be the very success of the development enterprisethat has created this state of affairs. If current President JimYong Kims prediction that, save for a core three percentafflicted by war and natural disasters, global poverty(defined as living on US$1.25 or less per day) can be endedby 2030 comes to fruition, then the question about theorganizations future is already a live one.

The IMF is in a similar existential situation, although fordifferent reasons. Unlike the decreasing poverty levelsthat make the World Banks remit shrink, the frequencyand magnitude of financial crises is not decreasingunambiguously.21But following the crisis in Asia in 1997,many countries have been voting with their feet andself-insuring by ramping up their own reserve holdingsrather than relying on the IMF to tide them througha similar event in future. They are augmenting thiscapacity with regional reserve pooling and currency swaparrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative in EastAsia, an additional cushion before they might ever have to

21 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009, 2010) provide the mostcomprehensive historical analysis of financial crises currently available.In a rich, wide-ranging assessment of crises dating back centuries, theseassertions stand out: the proportion of world income represented bycountries in default or rescheduling exhibits strong cyclical tendencies

but the peaks have barely changed through history including the post-World War II era (2008, 36); using several measures, the duration ofa crisis has not decreased in the post-World War II era (2010); and thecurrent crisis is the only one since the Great Depression that meets thedefinition of a global crisis (2009, chapter 14). The sum of the evidencedoes not sustain the conclusion that the financial world is any more stableon account of its modern-day multilateral stewards.

access IMF resources in the future. In Europe, it is not clearwhat meaningful contribution the IMF can make as theguardian of the global financial system when it plays thirdfiddle to the European Commission and the EuropeanCentral Bank, and telegraphs publicly both its resentmentof, but also its powerlessness to seriously influence, theselarger players.22

Both the IMF and the World Bank experienced theirheyday in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Unionand its satellite countries in the late 1980s. Fraught as thatperiod was and discussion of it remains contentious money and ideas flowed from the two organizations, earlyand effectively, to transform the region. No such globalgrand challenges remain and as Leipziger (2014) pointsout, intellectual leadership has migrated away from theIFIs just as the development paradigm offered by bothIFIs has lost its glamour. A study of the World Bank andthe regional development banks completed in 1997, aptlytitled Titan or Behemoths?, prophetically reached asimilar conclusion The banks were created, after all,

as meansto certain desired ends. The question, What are thedesirable outcomes of development?is no longer as simple asit used to be, and thus, does not command the same degreeof consensus (Culpepper 1997, 166).

Regaining their earlier prominence will require aregression in poverty of epic proportions or an insightinto development that is both unique and not amenableto borrowing by other organizations. Neither of these isa likely scenario. If poverty did suddenly and universallyincrease, it is not clear that the world would turn backthe clock and vest its financial resources in one or twoinstitutions. And the advances in development practice

and in financial management have not come from theWorld Bank or the IMF but, in keeping with a multipolarworld, from everywhere. Marshalling these for the globalgood and adapting them for local needs requires a globalinstitution, but this would be a far cry from what currentlyexists.

At the very least, a reckoning is likely to occur in theforeseeable future, as the marginal dollar devoted toglobal poverty reduction will face numerous choices a bilateral aid program, the World Bank and some of theIMFs facilities, one or more of the regional developmentbanks, and new endeavours such as the proposed BRICS

Development Bank. When the marginal dollar is generatedin a developing country, the choices will frequently bedifferent.

Never a primarily financial institution, the WTO is ina happier space, providing a forum for multilateraltrade liberalization (although this too competes with theplethora of regional trade initiatives) and, more solidly,

22 The discussion of this plays out daily in the financial press andwill for some time. For a snapshot, see Financial Times(2013).


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the creation of a basis for global case law via the disputesettlement body. Perhaps a lesson from the WTO and theearlier era of the ITU and GPU is that it is easier to gainglobal consensus around facilitation of the use of a newtechnology or norm than it is to bring development viaa master plan.

By dint of their smaller size (although at about

US$2.6 billion the annual outlays of the Bill & MelindaGates Foundation rival those of some mid-sized nationalforeign aid budgets) and innovative corporate culture, thefoundations might well continue to thrive internationallyand indeed spawn counterparts in the developing world.This would be in keeping with the notion that it is ideas,not money, that matter most to development, now and inthe future.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of international organizations focusingon development has been primarily institutional, but it is

important to point out that transformational individualscan galvanize organizations, indeed whole communities,well beyond organizations. Even the most hideboundorganizations can yield to a strong drive for change andreform, as the UNDP did under the energetic leadershipof Mark Malloch-Brown. Sadako Ogata was a superbadvocate, and defender of principle, when serving inthe thankless position of UN High Commissioner forRefugees. Government leaders of all types quailed ather approach and she admirably energized a seriouslyoverworked team. Melinda Gates complements herhusbands technocratic drive with independent insight,and together they take impressive risks for development,supported by their admirable philanthropic investment.Robert McNamara largely redeemed his tarnishedreputation as a dangerously indecisive US Secretary ofDefense with a superb, thoughtful run as World Bankpresident. Jim Grants 15 years at the helm of UNICEFare still considered the agencys golden age. All downthe line, in international organizations as elsewhere,individuals matter crucially.

The familiar world of international organizationsprincipally devoted to development has been upendedby two phenomena: the emergence of sustained economicsuccess in the developing world (mostly in Asia, butincreasingly also in Africa and, in a less spectacular way,Latin America) amidst compelling continuing need amongthe worlds poor, many of them located in India, itself arising power; and the slow-moving, serious financialand economic crisis of the industrialized world since2008, which has reordered priorities in many of theircapitals toward domestic spending and away from costlyinternational projects.

The basic needs of the remaining poorest countries willcontinue to command support globally, but calls from

the industrialized countries for increased burden-sharifrom emerging powers, for example, in mitigaticlimate change, have not yet been answered, whseveral industrialized powers continue to cling outdated privileges within a number of internationforums that should open up to reflect a new wororder. A new set of institutions (the BRICS DevelopmeBank, if and when it comes into being, the Chiang M

Initiative and new philanthropic foundations centrin developing countries) will complement but not sosupplant the activities of traditional multilateral actoFailure to reform governance in traditional internationorganizations is bound to lead to the rise and strengtheniof the alternatives. The prognosis for institutions caugin this transitional stage in global economic governanceuncertain.

One challenge for the field of development, as for nationgovernments, is that policy success in responding togiven set of ideas simply yields new policy challengrequiring new ideas and methodologies. This is one

several reasons that the project of development is oftviewed by cynics as perpetually disappointing. A neinterest in quantifying development outcomes relatito specific spending arises, in part, from a desire effectively challenge critics of the development bizHowever, in our experience, development is somewhmysterious, responding in different ways to the samtherapies in different parts of the world and in differecircumstances. The quest for certainty favours a dedrill approach (often an expensive one) to developmeresearch informing policy, but one that may be relevaonly to a small area or community and, thus, potentiamisleading more widely.23

Informing this insight is the reality that the globdevelopment success stories are very different froeach other. During their boom years, China and Indhad little in common, and each of them had even less common with Brazil. Consequently, the quest for a singmodel of development may always have been a fooerrand, one too often indulged within developmeorganizations devoid of sufficiently robust internchallenge functions. Overarching statements, such as tMillennium Development Goals (MDGs), put a spotligon the issue. But what issue? The MDGs ignore importaelements of the development enterprise, such as freedoand technological innovation, while framing a mosbasic needs agenda. With the objective itself contesteit is little wonder that neither an overarching statemeabout development like the MDGs nor a common table

23 The current vogue for randomized control trials (RCTs) as a meanestablishing developmental proof and truth may prove ephemeparticularly if the zeal of its proponents succeeds in marginalizing otresearch instruments and methods. RCTs are a valuable asset in research tool kit but reliance on them would seem short-sighted if narrow-minded.


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la OECD DAC is likely to be central to the discourse andaction around international development in the future.24

Development organizations doubtless face a significantshakeout generated by traditional donor governmentsintent on cutting their contributions to international causeswhile they tend to distress among their fellow citizens onthe domestic front, which compels their urgent attention.25

Emerging countries, beset by varying degrees of economicuncertainty, are unlikely to pick up the slack for now.Logically, this shakeout should take on a Darwinian edge,with many smaller, weaker institutions disappearing ormerging with others while the stronger ones hunker downand retool as best they can. In the long run, the outcomeof such a rationalization may be a positive one, even if, fornow, anxiety and fear stalk the international sections of thedevelopment community. If the dysfunction of excessivesprawl in the institutional architecture of internationaldevelopment research, policy and programming iseffectively addressed in the years ahead, few beyond thoseimmediately affected will complain.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to thank, without implicating, Keith Bezanson,Barry Carin, Gerry Helleiner, Ravi Kanbur and DomenicoLombardi for their comments on earlier versions of thispaper, and Kevin English at CIGI for excellent researchassistance.

24 Equally deleterious has been the tendency of aid organizations,both official and in the non-governmental sphere, to stampede towardwhatever programming direction funders appear (however temporarily)to favour. This has provoked at least one long-term trend that may proveto have undermined both development and humanitarian organizations

overlooking their core mandate to invade each others turf, withthe UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (with a strong agency)shading into work on development, and a large number of UN agencieswhose mandates have little to do with humanitarian relief claiminga mission to provide it. These pathologies were greatly exacerbated

by the so-called CNN effect of 24/7 coverage of telegenic natural andmanmade disasters and violence provoking a political drive to respond

by reorienting development funding towards shorter-term humanitarianobjectives. The resulting incoherence of many agencies trying to do a bitof everything (while increasingly not standing strongly for anything) isstriking.

25 Even some US foundations chose, during the recent crisis, toaccentuate domestic rather than international grant-making.

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Weiss, Thomas G., Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emme

and Richard Jolly, eds. 2005. UN Voices: The Struggle fDevelopment and Social Justice. Bloomington, IN: IndiaUniversity Press.


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ABOUT CIGI

The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on internationalgovernance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks,advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agendaof research, events and publications, CIGIs interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business andacademic communities around the world.

CIGIs current research programs focus on three themes: the global economy; global security & politics; and internationallaw.

CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with andgratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and theGovernment of Ontario.

Le CIGI a t fond en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui tait alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Ilcollabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratgiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reu de ceux-ci, notammentde lappui reu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de lOntario.

For more information, please visit www.cigionline.org.

CIGI MASTHEAD

Managing Editor, Publications Carol Bonnett

Publications Editor Jennifer Goyder

Assistant Publications Editor Vivian Moser

Media Designer Steve Cross

EXECUTIVE

President Rohinton Medhora

Vice President of Programs David Dewitt

Vice President of Public Affairs Fred Kuntz

Vice President of Finance Mark Menard

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications Specialist Kevin Dias [email protected] (1 519 885 2444 x 7238)

Public Affairs Coordinator Erin Baxter [email protected] (1 519 885 2444 x 7265)


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Anexo Reporte CIGI.pdf

Documents

Transcript of Anexo Reporte CIGI.pdf