Artigo - Os Direitos Indígenas Como Direitos Culturais Fundamentais

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Braslia Volume 16 Nmero 108 Fev. 2014/Maio 2014

108



Presidenta da Repblica

Dilma Vana Rousseff

MinistroChefe da Casa Civil da Presidncia da Repblica

Aloizio Mercadante Oliva

Subchefe para Assuntos Jurdicos da Casa Civil e

Presidente do Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia

Ivo da Motta Azevedo Corra

Coordenadoras do Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia

Daienne Amaral Machado

Raquel Aparecida Pereira

Revista Jurdica da Presidncia / Presidncia da Repblica

Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia Vol. 1, n. 1, maio de 1999.

Braslia: Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia, 1999.

Quadrimestral

Ttulo anterior: Revista Jurdica Virtual

Mensal: 1999 a 2005; bimestral: 2005 a 2008.

ISSN (at fevereiro de 2011): 18082807

ISSN (a partir de maro de 2011): 22363645

1. Direito. Brasil. Presidncia da Repblica, Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia.

CDD 341

CDU 342(81)

Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia

Praa dos Trs Poderes, Palcio do Planalto

Anexo II superior Sala 204 A

CEP 70.150900 Braslia/DF

Telefone: (61)34112047

Email: [email protected]://www.presidencia.gov.br/revistajuridica

Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia 2013



uma publicao quadrimestral do Centro de Estudos Jurdicos da Presidncia voltada divul-gao de artigos cientcos inditos, resultantes de pesquisas e estudos independentes sobre

a atuao do Poder Pblico em todas as reas do Direito, com o objetivo de fornecer subsdios

para reexes sobre a legislao nacional e as polticas pblicas desenvolvidas na esfera federal.

Equipe Tcnica

Fotgrafo

Andr Villaro

Conselho Editorial

Claudia Lima Marques

Claudia Rosane Roesler

Fredie Souza Didier Junior

Gilmar Ferreira Mendes

Joo Maurcio Leito Adeodato

Joaquim Shiraishi Neto

Jos Claudio Monteiro de Brito Filho

Luis Roberto Barroso

Maira Rocha Machado

Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi

Vera Karam Chueiri

Apropriate articles are abstracted/indexed in:

BBD Bibliograa Brasileira de Direito

LATINDEX Sistema Regional de Informacin

en Linea para Revistas Cientcas de Amrica

Latina, el Caribe, Espaa y Portugal

ULRICHS WEB Global Serials Directory

Revista Jurdica da Presidncia

Coordenao de Editorao


Gesto de Artigos

Mariana Figueiredo Cordeiro da Silva

Projeto Grfco e Capa

Brbara Gomes de Lima Moreira

Diagramao

Vicente Gomes da Silva Neto

Reviso Geral



Reviso de Idiomas



Fotografa da CapaPainel de Azulejos, Cobertura do Anexo II,

Palcio do Itamaraty

Athos Bulco, 1983

Acervo do Palcio do Planalto



Colaboradores da Edio 108

PareceristasAdegmar Jos Ferreira- Universidade Federal de Gois

Adrualdo de Lima Cato- Universidade Federal de Alagoas

Alexandre Coutinho Pagliarini - Universidade Tiradentes

Alexandre Garrido da Silva - Universidade Federal de Uberlndia

Alexandre Kehrig Veronese Aguiar- Universidade de Braslia

Andra Borghi Moreira Jacinto- Universidade do Estado do Amazonas

Belinda Pereira da Cunha- Universidade Federal da ParabaCarlos Bolonha - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Cristiano Paixo Arajo Pinto- Universidade de Braslia

Daniela de Freitas Marques- Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Dinor Adelaide Musetti Grotti- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de So Paulo

Edimur Ferreira de Faria- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais

Edinilson Donisete Machado - Universidade Estadual do Norte do Paran

Eliane Cristina Pinto Moreira- Universidade Federal da Paraba

Elisabete Maniglia - Universidade Estadual Paulista Jlio de Mesquita Filho

Eriberto Francisco Bevilaqua Marin- Universidade Federal de Gois

Fabricio Macedo Motta- Univesidade Federal de Gois

Fernando Basto Ferraz- Universidade Federal do Cear

Fernando de Brito Alves- Universidade Estadual do Norte do Paran

Fernando Facury Scaff- Universidade de So Paulo

Fernando Horta Tavares- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais

Gabriela Maia Rebouas- Universidade Tiradentes

Guilherme de Souza Nucci- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de So Paulo

Guilherme Scotti Rodrigues- Universidade de Braslia

Helena Regina Lobo da Costa- Universidade de So Paulo

Hugo de Brito Machado Segundo - Universidade Federal do Cear

Ingrid Zanella Andrade Campos- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Jane Felipe Beltro- Universidade Federal do Par

Joo Glicrio de Oliveira Filho- Universidade Federal da Bahia

Jos Claudio Monteiro de Brito Filho- Universidade Federal do ParJos Duarte Neto- Universidade Estadual Paulista Jlio de Mesquita Filho



Jos Heder Benatti - Universidade Federal do Par

Katya Kozicki- Universidade Federal do Paran

Lilian Marcia Balmant Emerique- Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Liziane Paixo Silva Oliveira- Universidade TiradentesLuciana Barbosa Musse - Centro Universitrio de Braslia

Marcelo de Oliveira Fausto Figueiredo Santos- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de So Paulo

Mrcia Carla Pereira Ribeiro- Pontifcia Universidade Catlica do Paran

Mrcia Correia Chagas- Universidade Federal do Cear

Margareth Vetis Zaganelli- Universidade Federal do Esprito Santo

Maria Edelvacy Marinho- Centro Universitrio de Braslia

Nestor Eduardo Araruna Santiago- Universidade Federal do Cear

Paulo Csar Corra Borges- Universidade Estadual Paulista Jlio de Mesquita Filho

Paulo Hamilton Siqueira Junior - Faculdades Metropolitanas Unidas

Paulo Henrique Blair de Oliveira - Universidade de Braslia

Paulo Roberto Colombo Arnoldi - Universidade Estadual Paulista Jlio de Mesquita Filho

Paulo Srgio Weyl Albuquerque Costa - Universidade Federal do Par

Regina Clia Martinez - Faculdades Metropolitanas Unidas

Ricardo Maurcio Freire Soares- Universidade Federal da Bahia

Ricardo Sebastin Piana- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do NorteSayonara Grillo Coutinho Leonardo da Silva - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

Sebstian Borges Albuquerque Mello - Universidade Federal da Bahia

Vladimir da Rocha Frana- Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Walter Piva Rodrigues - Universidade de So Paulo

Yvete Flvio da Costa - Universidade Estadual Paulista Jlio de Mesquita Filho

Demais colaboradores da Edio 108

Andr Luiz Dornelas Brasil de Freitas

Gustavo Vicente Daher Montes

Mariana Barbosa Cirne

Maria Paula Amorim de Barros Lima

Marcelo de Lima e Souza

Marcilandia de Ftima Arajo

Regis Anderson Dudena



Autores Convidados

Wim Voermans

HOLANDA - Leiden

Wim Voermans professor de Direito Constitucional e de Direito Administrativo na Universida-

de de Leiden, na Holanda. Diretor do Instituto de Direito Pblico da Faculdade de Direito da

Universidade de Leiden e Presidente daInternational Association of Legislation IAL.

Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi

BRASIL Belo Horizonte/MG

Professora Titular de Direito Tributrio e Financeiro da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.

Professora Titular de Direito Tributrio das Faculdades Milton Campos. Doutora em Direito pela

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.

Autores

Ana Carolina Wolff

BRASIL Franca/SP

Graduada em Direito pela Unesp-Franca.

Mestranda no Programa de Ps-Graduao

em Direito da Unesp.

[email protected]

Andr Kirchheim

BRASIL - Santa Cruz do Sul/RS

Mestre em Direito pela Universidade de

Santa Cruz do Sul - UNISC. Especialista em

Direito do Estado pela Universidade Catlica

de Braslia - UCB. Auditor Federal de Contro-le Externo do TCU.

[email protected]

Elisabete Maniglia

BRASIL Franca/SP

Professora livre-docente de

Direito Ambiental da Unesp.

[email protected]

Joo Pedro Schmidt

BRASIL - Santa Cruz do Sul/RS

Doutor em Cincia Poltica pela Universida-

de Federal do Rio Grande do Sul - UFRGS.

Docente do Programa de Ps-Graduao em

Direito da Universidade de Santa Cruz do

Sul UNISC.

[email protected]

Joo Vitor Rodrigues Loureiro

BRASIL Braslia/DF

Graduado em Direito pela Universidade Fe-

deral de Minas Gerais. Mestrando em Direi-tos Humanos e Cidadania pela Universidade

de Braslia - UnB. Coordenador de Estudos e

Pesquisas na Secretaria de Assuntos Legisla-

tivos do Ministrio da Justia.

[email protected]



Lucas Fucci Amato

BRASIL So Paulo/SP

Graduado em Direito pela Universidade de

So Paulo (USP). Doutorando em Direito(Filosoa e Teoria Geral do Direito) pela

Universidade de So Paulo (USP).

[email protected]

Paulo Svio Peixoto Maia

BRASIL - Fortaleza/CE

Mestre em Direito, Estado e Constituio

pela Universidade de Braslia (UnB). Inte-grante do grupo de pesquisa Percursos, nar-

rativas e fragmentos: Histria do Direito e

do Constitucionalismo (UFSC/UnB CNPq).

Professor na Universidade de Fortaleza

(UNIFOR) e na Escola Superior da Magistra-

tura do Estado do Cear (ESMEC TJ/CE).

[email protected]

Rafael Rosa Cedro

HOLANDA - Roterd

Doutorando na Universidade Erasmus Roter-

d, na Holanda. Mestre em Direito (Econ-

mico Internacional) e Polticas Pblicas pelo

Centro Universitrio de Braslia, com estudos

no Instituto de Altos Estudos Internacionais

e do Desenvolvimento, Universidade de

Genebra, Sua.

[email protected]

Rodrigo Augusto Lazzari Lahoz

BRASIL - Curitiba/PR

Mestrando em Direito Econmico e So-

cioambiental pela Pontifcia UniversidadeCatlica do Paran PUC/PR. Especialista

em Direito Administrativo pelo Instituto

Romeu Felipe Bacellar. Bacharel em Direito

pela Universidade Positivo. Advogado.

[email protected]

Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho

BRASIL - So Paulo/SP

Mestranda em Direito e Desenvolvimento

pela Escola de Direito da Fundao Getlio

Vargas de So Paulo. Bolsista de Ps-Gradu-

ao da Coordenao de Aperfeioamento

de Pessoal de Nvel Superior - Capes. Gra-

duada em Direito pela Universidade Federaldo Cear.

[email protected]



Editorial________________________________________________________________ 13

Autores Convidados ________________________________________________ 15

1 Motive-based enforcement

Wim Voermans___________________________________________________________ 17

2 Guerra scal, Bolsa Famlia e Silncio (Relaes, efeitos e regressividade)

Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi_________________________________________ 39

Artigos _________________________________________________________________ 65

3 Retaliao cruzada em propriedade intelectual: PL-1893/2007

(Lei de Retaliao Cruzada) luz do marco da OMCRafael Rosa Cedro________________________________________________________ 67

4A poltica industrial e os procedimentos falimentares:

o caso do investimento na LBR-Lcteos

Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho_______________________________________ 91

5A nova regulamentao do setor porturio e as autorizaes para

explorao dos terminais privadosRodrigo Augusto Lazzari Lahoz___________________________________________ 119

6A contribuio da legislao espanhola para o aperfeioamento do

tombamento no Estado Socioambiental de Direito

Elisabete Maniglia e Ana Carolina Wolff__________________________________ 141

7Polticas comunitrias no Brasil

Joo Pedro Schmidt e Andr Kirchheim ___________________________________ 165

Sumrio



8 Os direitos indgenas como direitos culturais fundamentais

Lucas Fucci Amato ________________________________________________________ 193

9 O Supremo Tribunal Federal e a ADI 4277: entre o contra-majoritrioe o ativismo judicial

Joo Vitor Rodrigues Loureiro___________________________________________ 221

10 Em busca da ordem perdida: o ataque de Carl Schmitt ao liberalismo

como crtica modernidade.

Paulo Svio Peixoto Maia________________________________________________ 245

Normas de submisso _____________________________________________ 267



Cara leitora, caro leitor,

A Revista Jurdica da Presidncia apresenta sua 108 edio e inaugura

seu 16o volume.

Abre esta edio o texto Motive-based Enforcement, de autoria de Win Voer-

mans, professor de Direito Constitucional e Direito Administrativo da Universidade de

Leiden, na Holanda, e Presidente da International Association of Legislation. O traba-

lho foi disponibilizado no mbito da pesquisa Pensando o direito e a pesquisa em-

prica no Brasil: a elaborao e reelaborao legislativa como elemento e problema

de poltica legislativa, desenvolvido pelo Instituto de Pesquisa Econmica Aplicada

(IPEA) e pela Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos (SAL) do Ministrio da Justia. Nele,

Voermans reete sobre o que promove e o que no promove o comportamento de

observncia das normas e sobre o que deve ser levado em conta pelos formuladores

de leis e de poltica pblicas quando do desenho de mecanismos de enforcement.

Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi, integrante do Conselho Editorial da RJP, tam-

bm autora convidada desta edio. Em seu artigo, a professora titular de DireitoTributrio e Direito Financeiro da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, argumenta

sobre a importncia do Programa Bolsa Famlia e tenta estabelecer e explorar uma

relao entre o Programa e caractersticas do sistema tributrio brasileiro.

Rafael Rosa Cedro, da Universidade Erasmus Roterd, contribui com o debate so-

bre retaliao cruzada em propriedade intelectual. Alm de apresentar um histrico

sobre o instituto luz das normas da Organizao Mundial do Comrcio, sua utilizao

em casos recentes, analisa o Projeto de Lei no1.893, de 2007, que pretende regular

a retaliao cruzada no Brasil. Na sequncia, Sarah Marinho, da Fundao GetlioVargas de So Paulo, analisa o nanciamento da empresa LBR-Lcteos pelo BNDES do

ponto de vista jurdico, e a falncia de empreendimentos luz da poltica industrial

adotada pela instituio.

A nova regulamentao do setor porturio, decorrente da Lei no 12.818, de 2013,

o objeto da anlise de Rodrigo Lahoz, da Pontifcia Universidade Catlica do Paran.

O autor aponta as principais inovaes legislativas e tenta identicar seus possveis

desdobramentos. Elisabete Maniglia e Ana Carolina Wolff, da Unesp/Franca, por suavez, exploram as relaes entre direito ambiental, direito constitucional e direito ad-

ministrativo para a proteo dos bens culturais e comparam os meios disponveis no

Editorial



sistema jurdico brasileiro para a proteo do patrimnio cultural e aqueles do sistema

espanhol. A partir desse cotejo, sugerem a adoo da gura de uma espcie de tomba-

mento cautelar pelo ordenamento brasileiro.

Joo Pedro Schmidt, da UFRS, e Andr Kirchhein, da Unisc, exploram os conceitosde comunidade e de comunitarismo, com base, sobretudo, na teoria de Amitai Etzioni,

e tentam identicar no Plano Plurianual 2012-2015 polticas pblicas que atendam

formalmente os pressupostos do comunitarismo. Lucas Fucci Amato, da Universidade

de So Paulo, apoiando-se na teoria dos sistemas, apresenta os direitos indgenas

como direitos culturais fundamentais no marco do constitucionalismo brasileiro. Ade-

mais, busca referncias sobre o tema no direito internacional e no direito constitu-

cional de outros pases da Amrica Latina. A atuao do Supremo Tribunal Federal no

julgamento da ADI 4277 o tema do trabalho de Joo Vitor Loureiro, da Universidade

de Braslia. Nele, o autor tenta responder sobre o carter da deciso, se contra-majori-

tarismo ou ativismo judicial.

At aqui, predominam textos que debatem aspectos jurdicos de polticas pbli-

cas, inovaes legislativas, decises judiciais, e que se debruam sobre questes emp-

ricas - sem deixar de lado os necessrios embasamentos tericos. J o dcimo artigo,

que naliza esta edio, fruto de uma interessante pesquisa terica, em que Paulo

Peixoto Maia, da Unifor (CE) discorre sobre liberalismo e modernidade e as contribui-es da obra de Carl Schmitt.

Para a anlise de artigos pelo sistema duplo cego (peer blind review), a Revista Jur-

dica conta com a parceria de Instituies de Ensino Superior e de professores doutores

dessas Instituies que integram o Conselho de Consultores e o Conselho Editorial.

Agradecemos a contribuio mpar desses parceiros. Expressamos nossos agradeci-

mentos tambm SAL e ao IPEA que, nesta edio, contriburam para a publicao do

artigo do Professor Win Voermans.

Por m, registramos nossos agradecimentos aos autores que optaram por subme-

ter seus trabalhos ao peridico e aos colegas da Subchea para Assuntos Jurdicos que

colaboraram com esta edio.

tima leitura a todos!



Autores

Convidados



Revista Jurdica da Presidncia Braslia v. 16 n. 108 Fev. 2014/Maio 2014 p. 17 a 38.

17

1 Motive-based enforcementWIM VOERMANS

Professor de Direito Constitucional e de Direito Administrativo na

Universidade de Leiden, na Holanda. Diretor do Instituto de Direito Pblico da

Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Leiden e Presidente da International

Association of Legislation IAL.

CONTENTS: 1 Compliance as a prerequisite for effective regulation 2 Understanding compliance:rational and constructivist compliance theories 3 Implementation & enforcement: legal standards

4 Enforcement strategies 5 Enforcement strategies in legislative and policy practice 6 Enforce-

ment debate in the Netherlands: the Michiels Commission 7 Instruments of compliance: enforce-

ment and sanctions 8 Conclusion 9 References.

ABSTRACT: What can public authorities do in order to promote regulatory com-

pliance? This paper argues that understanding the compliance motives is key toany enforcement strategy. Simply stepping up the enforcement effort or stiffening

penalties is most of the time quite ineffective. Especially attempts at engineer-

ing criminal law rules to achieve a heightened deterrence effects will generally be

ineffective, social science research suggests. And much in the same vein raising

administrative enforcement efforts does not automatically raise compliance rates

proportionally. There is not a one-on-one relation between enforcement effort and

compliance outcome, although this idea seems to be underpinning a lot of present-day enforcement strategies. Enforcement efforts are but one of the many norm-sup-

port cues to comply. Recent research rather suggests that a sort of bandwagon-ef-

fect exists as regards regulatory compliance. Compliant behaviour, or enforcement

activities that reminds us of (or merely point out) the existence of a norm, prompt

(more) compliant behaviour. Designers of enforcement strategies need to keep

this in mind.

KEYWORDS: Regulation Compliance Enforcement.



Motive-based enforcement


18

Enforcementbaseado em motivos

SUMRIO: 1 Observncia das normas como pr-requisito para uma regulao efetiva 2 Enten-dendo a observncia das normas: teorias racionais e construtivistas 3 Implementao e en-

forcement: padres legais 4 Estratgias para enforcement 5 Estratgias para enforcement na

prtica legislativa e na prtica das polticas 6 O debate sobre enforcement na Holanda: a Co-

misso Michiels 7 Instrumentos para obter a observncia das normas: enforcement e sanes

8 Concluso 9 Referncias.

RESUMO: O que autoridades pblicas podem fazer para promover a observncia as

normas? Este artigo argumenta que o entendimento das razes para a observncia

as normas essencial para qualquer estratgia de enforcement. Simplesmente au-

mentar medidas de enforcementou endurecer penalidades, na maioria das vezes,

bastante inefetivo. Pesquisas de cincias sociais sugerem que tentativas de dese-

nhar leis penais para que tenham efeito de dissuaso de certos comportamentos se-

ro geralmente inefetivas. E, da mesma forma, aumentar medidas de enforcementde

natureza administrativas no aumenta automaticamente os nveis de observncia

das normas. No existe uma relao de correspondncia entre medidas de enforce-

mente resultados de observncia das normas, ainda que essa ideia parea embasar

muitas medidas atuais. Pesquisas recentes sugerem que um tipo de comportamento

de manada existe em relao observncia da regulao. O comportamento de ob-servncia das normas ou atividades de enforcementque nos lembrem da existncia

de uma norma podem aumentar um comportamento de observncia das normas.

Aqueles que desenham estratgias de enforcementprecisam ter isso em mente.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Regulao Cumprimento Enforcement.




Wim Voermans 19

Enforcement basado en motivos

CONTENIDO:1 Cumplimiento como prerrequisito para una regulacin efectiva 2 Comprensindel cumplimiento: teoras racionalistas y constructivistas 3. Implementacin y enforcement: es-

tndares legales 4 Estrategias para enforcement 5 Estrategias para enforcement en la prctica

legislativa y en la prctica de las polticas 6 El debate sobre el enforcement en Holanda: la Co-

misin Michiels 7 Instrumentos para el cumplimiento: enforcement y sanciones 8 Conclusin

9 Referencias.

RESUMEN: Qu pueden hacer las autoridades pblicas para promover el cumpli-

miento de las normas? Este artculo plantea que la comprensin de las razones para

el cumplimiento de las normas es esencial para cualquier estrategia de enforcement.

Simplemente aumentar las medidas de enforcement o endurecer las penalidades, en

la mayora de las veces, es bastante inefectivo. Investigaciones en ciencias sociales

sugieren que las tentativas de construir leyes penales para que tengan efecto de

disuasin de ciertos comportamientos son generalmente inefectivas. No existe una

relacin de correspondencia entre medidas de enforcement y resultados de cum-

plimiento de las normas, aunque esa idea sustente muchas medidas actuales. Las

acciones de enforcement son slo una de las varias orientaciones a ser cumplidas.

Investigaciones recientes sugieren que existe un tipo efecto de arrastre en relacin

al cumplimiento de las normas. Aquellos que elaboran estrategias de enforcementdeben tener eso en cuenta.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Regulacin Cumplimiento Enforcement.





20

1Compliance as a prerequisite for effective regulation

There are not enough jails, not enough policemen, not even enough courts

to enforce a law not supported by the people.

HUMPHREY (vice-president USA 1964-1968)

Compliance is essential for the operation of regulation1. Rules and regulations

that are not systematically observed are in the end pointless and futile. The

overarching aim of all regulation is to have an effect on (social, economic, or institu-

tional) behaviour; to impact behaviour by means of legal effect. To be authoritative,

Tom Tyler argues, legal rules and decisions must affect the actions of those toward

whom they are directed (TYLER, 2006, p. 19). If they do not, the authority of the

legal rules themselves may be compromised. Lon Fuller observes that:

On the one hand, the lawgiver must be able to anticipate that the citizenryas a whole will accept as law and generally observe the body of rules hehas promulgated. On the other hand, the legal subject must be able toanticipate that government will itself abide by its own declared rules whenit comes to judge his actions, as in deciding, for example, whether he hascommitted a crime or claims property under a valid deed. A gross failure

in the realization of either of these anticipations - of government towardcitizen and of citizen toward government - can have the result that themost carefully drafted code will fail to become a functioning system of law(FULLER, 1969, p. 24)

Compliance, in fact, is the double-edged sword of all regulation: it is crucial

for the effect of law and it reinforces the authority of law, while non-compliance

cripples the effectiveness of law and undermines the authority of it.

As a result legal authorities all over the world are interested in securing compli-

ance with the law, Tom Tyler notes legal authorities want to establish and maintain

conditions lead the public generally their decisions and policies (TYLER, 2006, p. 19).

This is not easy, because legal authorities cannot, as we all know from experi-

ence, take pub-lic compliance for granted (TYLER, 2006, p. 19).

How do public authorities set these conditions to inspire and optimize compli-

ance with regulations? What kind of problems do they face, what kind of standards

1 There is a wide variety of denitions of the concept of regulation. For this contribution I will use avery wide ranging denition of the concept of regulation and understand it as every public or state-based (as opposed to market-based) intervention in the form of a legal act of a general nature (i.e. not

merely directed at one individual or a single event).




Wim Voermans 21

are they subject to? What strategies do they employ? And can anything be said about

the success of these strategies? Do best practices exist? These are the question

that are central to this contribution. Before we deal with the standards, strategies,

instruments and best practices of compliance in my experience in most cases theill-advised starting point of policy debates on compliance we need to understand

why people (including institutions, market operators, etc.) comply with rules. Every

compliance policy, strategy or instrument that fails to take the motives and attitudes

of addressees into account, risks being ineffective in the end2.

2Understanding compliance: rational and constructivist compliance theories

Why do people actually obey the law? A host of theories have attempted tosolve this riddle3. According to one line of thinking one that is quite common in

present-day administrative and regulatory practice the answer to these questions

is quite straightforward. It departs from the notion that the principle actor in com-

pliance is the administration itself. Compliance with enacted regulation is inspired

by a combination of due process when enacting and proper communication of the

rules (publication and promulgation) and making administrative efforts to ensure

the acceptance of rules (by giving additional information, dialogue, monitoring, etc.)

or other methods that could contribute to voluntary or spontaneous compliance

with these rules4. If compliance does not ensue, according to this line of thinking,

the administration can be held to account. It needs to gather information with re-

gard to compliance and non-compliance with the regulation (monitor & inspect)

and react to nonconformity (enforce, sanction). This line of thinking branches out

into two different perspectives on the issue in modern compliance theory. The rst

is the rational perspective (believing that regulatory addressees are rational actors

2 See also R.A.J. van Gestel (2013), De wetgever als keuzearchitect (Regulating as the art of choicearchitecture), RegelMaat (Journal for Legislative Studies v. 28, n. 1, p. 22-38.

3 Most of these theories have originated in international law, an area of law where compliance isespecially hard to enforce. Although originally devised to understand the behaviour of states, or

state-based institutions these theories can also be used to gain a better understanding of (non)compliant behaviour of actual people. See for an overview MITCHELL, Ronald B. Compliance Theory:An Overview. In: CAMERON, James; WERKSMAN, Jacob; RODERICK, Peter. Improving Compliance with

International Environmental Law. Earthscan, p. 3-28, 1996.

4 This line of thinking can be found in the compliance toolbox the Dutch government uses, called theTable of 11. The number refers to the eleven dimensions of compliance the instruments use as steps

that help users to assess the chances of success of their compliance strategy of instrument.





22

that weigh cost and benets and believing therefore that only a coercive strategy

of monitoring and sanctioning will induce compliance, hence also known as the en-

forcement school)(CHECKEL, Jeffrey T., 2001, p. 555-557)5. The second perspective

is the management perspective which also perceives regulatory addressees as ratio-nal beings, but recognizing that non-compliance is not always per se the result of

deliberate deance of the regulation. It also occurs as a result of capacity limitations

on the part of the addressee, as a result of ambiguity of rules, or involuntary and in-

advertently for a number of other reasons (VERSLUIS, 2005, p. 8-9). Non-compliant

behaviour therefore does not always need to be cured, remedied or followed by

administrative enforcement or sanctions, but may be secured by remedial forms of

administrative action (information, administrative assistance, legislative simplica-

tion, etc.) (TALLBERG, 2002, p 613). According to both perspectives though, compli-

ance is largely dependent on administrative action. In the constructivist perspective

on the other hand compliance is dependent on the way regulatory norms tie in

with or align with the beliefs of the addressee. According to constructivist theory

the main driver for the change of behaviour (or preferences) is not external (e.g.

administrative action), but rather more the socialization or internalization of rules

by the addressees6. Internalization, as it were. Socialization and internationalization

of rules, in turn, are predominantly brought about by persuasion and/or persuasiveappeals to inner morality. If regulators succeed in convincing addressees that rules

are right, good, necessary, legitimate or whatever successful appeal can be made to

the inner motivation or belief system of the addressee and spontaneous compliance

might ensue. And if we may believe the evidence our own eyes bring us, spontane-

ous compliance is the general effect in established liberal democracies at least

in absolute terms - whatever persistent non-compliance problems these political

systems face. Versluis (2005, p. 11) makes clear, however, that constructivism, on

the other hand, does not provide clear-cut short-term solutions to solve compli-

ance problems. Internalization and socialization, and thus compliance, will only take

place in the long run; no quick xes here.

5 See also: VERSLUIS, Esther. Compliance Problems in the EU: What potential role for agencies in secur-ing compliance, Paper prepared for the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest 2005. To be retrieved

at: http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/eversluis.pdf (last visited on 4 February 2013).

6 Or as Raustiala and Slaughter put it: From a constructivist perspective, compliance is less a matter ofrational calculation or imposed constraints than of internalized identities and norms of appropriate

behavior (RAUSLTIALA; SALUGHTER. 2002, p. 540).




Wim Voermans 23

3Implementation & enforcement: legal standards

Although we do not want to dwell on legal theory too long, it would seem we

must admit that in essence law is a belief system. We abide by the law because webelieve we have to and/or other members of our societies, or state actors remind us

we ought to7. Regulation uses the law as its vehicle and by that appeals to the beliefs

of its addressees (BEETHAM, 1991, p.69-70; p. 91). In liberal democracies, based on

the rule of law, the law system itself calls upon the public authorities to act and to

implement, i.e. guarantee the effect of law, if necessary by way of enforcement. The

duty to implement8and enforce laws is generally perceived as something required

by the rule of law. Compliance fosters the basic trust people can have in the law,

it reinforces the authority of the law and thereby its overall legitimacy. Although

public authorities in the rule of law-based jurisdictions are under the obligation to

implement law, and enforce it if necessary, they do not have total discretion in do-

ing so. Implementation and enforcement activities generally need to have a basis in

law as well, and the law itself sets conditions for implementation. A legal principle

that is quite well known and common to most rule-of-law-based jurisdictions is the

nulla poena sine lege priori-principle entailing that no one shall be held guilty of

any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute acriminal offence under national or international law at the time it was committed;

nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time

the criminal offence was committed. This principle is enshrined in article 7 of the

European Convention on Human Rights ECHR, but also in article 15 of Internation-

al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other documents. Closely related to

this principle is the lex certa-principle which requires that in particular criminal

offences must be clearly specied, that they must be foreseeable and that it must

be possible to clearly determine, on the basis of the relevant legal provisions, theacts or omissions prohibited. Another principle derived from article 7 ECHR is the

7 These beliefs in turn are very important, because they are legitimate rules and government action isrequired to enforce them. If rules and government action is perceived as legitimate (in terms of ef-

fectiveness and fairness) the more it will possess the potential to elicit compliance without excessivemonitoring or punitive action. See: LEV, Margret; SACKS, Audrey. Legitimating beliefs: Sources andindicators. Regulation & Governance. 2009 v.3, n. 4, p. 311.

8 I use the term implementation in a broad sense comprising of all efforts and activities involved inachieving the goals of legislation. These efforts cover a wide range of actions, ranging from issuinglicenses, policing, inspecting, to enforcing (sanctioning, etc.). In my view enforcement, therefore, is a

part of implementation.





24

principle of non-retroactivity holding that an act cannot be designated as criminal

by the courts if it has not been punishable previously, and the denition of existing

criminal offences cannot be extended to acts which have not previously constituted

an offence. It is not our aim here to give an exhaustive overview of legal require-ments, principles and standards that are relevant for implementation and enforce-

ment activities, but we will deal with two more that are especially relevant in ECHR

and EU Member States. The rst one is the proportionality-principle, requiring that

enforcement action (including sanctions) may not be disproportionate to the goals

served. Another important principle especially in the EU context requires that EU

Member States act loyally and effectively when it comes to observing, implement-

ing/enforcing EU law. EU Member States are under a legal obligation to implement

and enforce EU law9 and ECJ case law on enforceability of EU law requires that

penalties for violation (of EU Law) should be effective, proportionate, non-discrim-

inatory and dissuasive10. Effectiveness requires that the set sanction furthers the

goals set by the legislature, dissuasive understood here in terms of deterrence

means that sanctions should be of such a type and magnitude that the expected

costs are higher than expected benets to the perpetrator, proportionality requires

that the sanctions are no severer than they strictly should be. Finally sanctions may

not be discriminatory, meaning that conditions attached to the national rules maynot be less favourable than those attached to similar national actions. And second,

the national rules may not be framed in a manner that would render the exercise of

Community rights virtually impossible.

4Enforcement strategies

There is a substantial body of literature nowadays on enforcement and com-

pliance strategies11. Most of the literature departs from the notion that regulatoryagencies have considerable administrative discretion when carrying out their en-

forcement tasks (GUNNINGHAM, 2010, p. 121.). Even if we take into account that en-

forcement discretion is curtailed by legal standards (as we have seen in the former

9 Art. 4 (3) Treaty of the European Union.

10 ECJ C-68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2979 (Greek Corn-case).

11 See for an overview e.g. GUNNINGHAM, Neil. Enforcement and Compliance Strategies. In: BALDWIN,Robert; CAVE, Martin; LODGE, Martin (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Regulation. Oxford UniversityPress, 2010, p. 120-145. And MORGAN, Bronwen; YEUNG, Karen Yeung. An Introduction in Law and

Regulation. Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 151-220.




Wim Voermans 25

paragraph), this is a fair assessment of the position of regulatory agencies in most

European countries. This leaves regulatory agencies in broad terms a choice of

enforcement styles or strategies. There are basically two enforcement strategies (or

styles). The rst is the deterrence strategy which in the words of Gunningham:

Emphasizes a confrontational style of enforcement and the sanctioning ofrule-breaking behaviour. It assumes that those regulated are rational ac-tors capable of responding to incentives, and that if offenders are detectedwith sufcient frequency and punished with sufcient severity, then theyand other potential violators, will be deterred from violations in the future.(GUNNINGHAM, 2010, p. 121).

The compliance strategy on the other hand, seeks to prevent harm rather than

punish it and focuses on cooperation between regulator, enforcement authority and

addressee rather than confrontation, and conciliation rather than coercion (GUN-

NINGHAM, 2010, p. 121). Compliance strategies adhere to communication, bargain-

ing and negotiating, using enforcement more or less as a mere threat, a big stick in

the background. Recent research has shown that both strategies in their basic form

are not very effective. Basically though it does have a signicant impact the

deterrence strategy is vulnerable with regard to the costs, incompetent or non-ra-

tional actors and it sometimes has counterproductive consequences (e.g. in the formof a culture of regulatory resistance) (GUNNINGHAM, 2010, p. 139). Compliance

strategies on the other hand although they encourage and facilitate those will-

ing to comply with the law are vulnerable to the strategic behaviour of those not

wanting to comply voluntarily (GUNNINGHAM, 2010, p. 139). What then is the best

way to go? On the basis of game theory analysis, Scholz has demonstrated that a

tit-for-tat TFT enforcement strategy most probably yield the best result (SCHOLZ,

1984, p. 179-224). A TFT strategy entails that the regulator refrains from a deterrent

response so long the addressee is cooperating, but when the addressee begins to

exploit the cooperative posture of the regulator and cheats on compliance, then the

regulator shifts from a cooperative to a deterrent response. One way to operational-

ize this notion of a third way that lies between deterrence and cooperation is that of

responsive regulation (AYRES; BRAITHWAITE, 1992, p. 35). Responsive regulation is

an approach that encourages authorities to read motivational postures, understand

the sensibilities that shape them, and tailor a regulatory intervention accordingly.

A carrot and stick approach, rewarding voluntary compliance and cooperation andpunishing if necessary conscious and determined offenders. Ayres and Braith-





26

waite have tried to come up with a mechanism to solve this problem, their so-called

Enforcement Pyramid (AYRES; BRAITHWAITE, 1992, p. 35). The pyramid departs

from a cooperative stance with regard to non-compliance but gradually gears up to

a more deterrent response if the desired compliance result is not forthcoming.

Source: Ayres and Braithwaite (1992)

The pyramid, at least the notion underlying it, is widely adopted in

enforcement practice.

Gunningham and Grabosky have noted that enforcement strategies that rely

solely on action by regulatory authorities do come with drawbacks when it comes

down to costs and internalization even when cooperative and deterrent elementsare mixed. They have advocated the concept of Smart regulation. Smart regulation

not to be confused with the EU better regulation strategy12 refers to a form of

regulatory pluralism that embraces exible, imaginative and innovative forms of so-

cial control which seeks to harness not just government but also business and third

parties. It uses self-regulation and co-regulation, forms of private enforcement and

a host of other policy instruments to improve the overall effectiveness of more con-

ventional forms of direct government action (GUNNINGHAM; GRABOSKY; SINCLAIR.

12 See the Smart Regulation Communication COM (2010) 543 nal http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-

UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0543:FIN:EN:HTML . Last consulted on 7 Feb. 2013.




Wim Voermans 27

1998). A last enforcement strategy to be discussed here is the meta-regulation or

meta-risk management. This latter strategy involves the government not regulat-

ing directly to ward off risks (to health, safety, public order, markets, etc.) but rather more

overseeing (risk-managing) the risk management of individual enterprises. In such asystem government inspectors when checking compliance encourage industry to put

an internal risk control and management system in place which is in turn scrutinized by

regulators. It is the control and management systems that are inspected rather than the

actual behaviour of the enterprises (GUNNINGHAM, 2010, p. 135-139).

Although the strategies mentioned here are very relevant to our topic, they do

not answer the question as to how these strategies can be put to use when actually

setting up and drafting legislation. The literature at hand tends to focus on regula-

tory agencies and their strategies. What can be learnt from this that could be helpful

to set up a course of action for the practice of legislative drafting?

5Enforcement strategies in legislative and policy practice

When it comes to regulation, the philosophers stone is of course: are there

any failsafe compliance controls around in regulation and if so, where are they to

be found? And, more so, how do you turn them on or off? Or up and down? These

are highly relevant questions in times where there are frequent calls for higher and

more stringent penalties and more intensive enforcement as a means to combat

regulatory non-compliance.

How can one exert inuence on regulatory compliance? According to a well-

known recipe from the legislators cookery book, regulatory compliance is primar-

ily promoted through proper communication of the rules (publication, provision of

information) and making an effort to ensure the acceptance of rules and to apply

other methods that could contribute to voluntary or spontaneous compliance withthese rules13. This is what we would obviously prefer and it chimes well with the

theory and evidence that legitimation is the key to compliance (paragraph 3) and

that mixed enforcement strategies, that start with investing in a persuasive compli-

ance strategy, but can escalate the response as the situation may require, probably

work best.

Indeed in many cases regulators cannot simply rely on voluntary compliance

with rules, but need to do more. Especially when regulating cases in which non-compli-

13 See, again, for example, the Dutch Table of 11.





28

ance may yield nancial benets, compliance monitoring (through forms of supervision

or investigation) according to wisdom gained through legislative practice the threat

and actual application of sanctions is necessary to ensure effective compliance14.

The guiding notion in Dutch regulatory practice which we will discuss here asan example is that, where a government makes extra efforts to ensure regulatory

compliance by exercising effective supervision and/or using private law, criminal

law or administrative means of coercion (sanctions) this will increase regulatory

compliance, more or less in a linear way15. In the Netherlands, as in many other

countries, the enforcement debate has consequently been captured by discussion on

the way government can and must step up its enforcement efforts and in paral-

lel on the use of techniques and instruments by government agencies. As a result,

toolboxes are rampant in Dutch public administration. For the sake of the discussion

we will label this line of reasoning as administrative logic.

As we have seen, however, there is at best an uncertain relationship between

enforcement efforts by government agencies on the one hand and their impact on

compliance on the other. If we want to predict the impact public enforcement efforts

and instruments have on compliance it does not sufce to simply focus on toolbox-

es, strategies and techniques. As we have demonstrated in the former paragraphs,

any policy or strategy trying to improve regulatory compliance must not start with adiscussion on the toolkit, but with an understanding of why citizens and companies

comply with rules and what role is played by enforcement efforts in this context. In

other words, we should when devising compliance policies not merely rely on

administrative logic but also think in terms of the logic of motives16.

14 On this subject, see also EIJLANDER, P.;VOERMANS, W. Wetgevingsleer(Legislative drafting). Boom

Legal Publishers; The Hague, 2000, p. 156 et seq.

15 This approach can also be found in the case law of the European Court of Justice in which the Courtsets out the enforcement principles in explicit terms. Reactions to non-compliance with EU rulesmust be effective, proportional, have a deterrent effect and satisfy the assimilation principle as it is

called. See: EIJLANDER; VOERMANS. 2000, p. 288.

16 Picking up on this latter line of thinking Van Gestel argues that regulatory policies which includecompliance policies could benet from behavioural approaches to law and economics; an increas-

ingly important and relevant eld of academic research. He bases his views on a.o. JOLLS, C.; SUN-STEIN, C.; THALER, R. A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics. Stanford Law Review, 1998,v. 50, p. 1476. THALER, R.H.; SUNSTEIN, C.R. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and

Happiness. Yale University Press, 2008. See also Van Gestel, 2013, p. 25-26.




Wim Voermans 29

6Enforcement debate in the Netherlands: the Michiels Commission

Paying due attention to compliance motives, however, seems to be tough going

in politics and policy making. Enforcement debates often utterly fail to deal with theeffect caused by an enforcement incentive on the addressee but in quite a one-

sided fashion they rather more address the question of what kind of enforcement

incentive should be offered by what law enforcement agency. This is as we have

seen based on the axiom that enforcement has a benecial effect on compliance.

Always and universally. The proof for this assumption is often found by pointing out

the opposite: non-enforcement in any case results in non-compliance or a greater

chance of non-compliance. Keen observers will, of course, immediately recognize

this reversal as a fallacy.

Allow us to give an illustrative Dutch example. In the 1990s, the Dutch gov-

ernment was much concerned with so-called enforcement decits, i.e. a situation of

regulatory non-compliance in situations where there was a demonstrable existing

enforcement capacity. Obviously in these situations administrative capacity was at

the face of things not well aligned with the relevant needs. In order to tackle this

problem the Government set up the Michiels Commission17. In its nal report from

1998,18

this Commission, too, assumes the existence of the presumably benecialbut essentially unknown and unproved relationship between enforcement efforts

and compliance. The commission adopts a risk-based approach, however, by stat-

ing that where there is no enforcement, the risk of non-compliance is substantial.

Therefore the Commission advises, somewhat unsurprisingly, that in the case of

non-compliance, administrative enforcement efforts should be intensied. Always.

Compliance policies in the Netherlands followed suit. An action programme set up

by the Dutch Government in response to the report entitled Handhaven op niveau

(Quality Enforcement) underlining the importance of strenuous administrativeefforts. Better cooperation and ongoing professionalization of enforcement efforts

were supposed to result in potential enforcement decits being made up or re-

17 The Dutch Commission for Administrative and Private Law Enforcement (Michiels Commission).

18 The Commission for Administrative and Private Law Enforcement, Handhaven op Niveau (Quality

Enforcement). Deventer, 1998, p. 47.





30

duced, the elimination of the risks of non-compliance, and apotentially benecial

effect on compliance19.

Dealing with risks in this way resembles homeopathy or the effects of aspirin:

we assume that enforcement works; indeed, we know that it works, but we do notknow how it works or the extent to which it works. And any physician will tell you

that there is the risk of a wrong dose in cases like that.

This administrative approach to the relationship between enforcement and com-

pliance can also be found in the evaluation report about the yield of the Quality

Enforcement programme. At the closing conference of the programme, which was

held in The Hague on 24 November 2006, the many successes of the programme

were recalled. It was pointed out that since 1999, administrative bodies had de-

voted greater attention to the enforcement of statutory and other rules. The pro-

gramme project monitor showed that by then, 83 percent of Dutch municipalities

had a great deal of attention for enforcement. In specic policy elds including

compulsory education and prostitution policy, for example, being policy elds that

involved hardly any inspections ve years ago there was an increase in inspection

efforts from 20 to 70 percent. Special enforcement programmes had been set up

by 63 percent of the municipalities. Five years before, it was claimed, not a single

municipality had been engaged in such programmes. In addition, half of the munici-palities had by 2006 identied the risks of disasters as a result of non-compliance

with statutory rules.

The Quality Enforcement programme also promoted theprofessionalization of

enforcement and mutual cooperation between municipalities, provinces and water

boards and cooperation with the police and inspection bodies. The Project Moni-

tor from 2005 showed that these bodies had actually started to cooperate more

closely, especially in the elds of the environment, public space enforcement, living

conditions, re safety and building control. According to 95 percent of the Dutch

municipalities in 2006, the Quality Enforcement action programme had improved

enforcement to a signicant extent20.

All of the results were expressed in terms of administrative efforts while little

could be said apparently about the extent to which and the manner in which the

19 See also the Government position paper on Handhaven op level, Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000,

26800 VI Adoption of the budget of the income and expenses of the Ministry of Justice (VI) for theyear 2000, no. 67.

20 See www.rijksoverheid.nl/.. .en.. ./samenwerken-daar-zit-muziek-in.pdf




Wim Voermans 31

enforcement incentive worked on actual compliance. The principle effects of pro-

gramme-based enforcement were primarily to be found in the area of awareness

and risk control. In his letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, the Minister of

the Interior at the time, Mr Remkes, was therefore not altogether convinced of thesuccess of the programme, aside the evidence produced by the evaluation report.

He quite realistically stated that:

Even though attention for specic topics (such as re safety, outlying ar-eas, compulsory education) has resulted in greater awareness, the practi-cal contribution of Quality Enforcement is limited in many cases. Peoplesopinions on the matter differ but many are critical. Its potential has not yetbeen realised in most cases. (REMKES, 2006).

7Instruments of compliance: enforcement and sanctions

7.1The deterrent effect of punishment as a motive for regulatory compliance

But how then to use the enforcement capacity to good effect? As we have ar-

gued this requires some understanding of the effects of enforcement efforts on

regulatory compliance. As a rst step we need to know something about the why of

regulatory compliance. As this is a wide-ranging issue, that cannot be dealt with to

the full extent in this contribution, we will restrict ourselves to the element of the

effectiveness of sanctioning, and, in particular, to the threat of punishment. Does

the threat of punishment deter non-compliers, does it inspire them to comply with

rules? And, for example, will higher penalties as an expression of increased en-

forcement activity be more effective than lower ones? For centuries, legal scholars

have had disputes and debates on the question of whether penalties are an effec-tive means to ensure regulatory compliance. In recent years criminologists, legal

economists and forensic psychologists, in particular, have dealt with these issues.

The participants in the debate are somewhat like doctors gathered round a sickbed:

there are many differences of opinion about the diagnosis and treatment, and there

seems little prospect of any recovery.

The debate is erce at times. Certainly where recent research plays down the

effects of punishment or more severe penalties, this occasionally triggers erce re-

actions and touches a raw nerve. A Dutch journalist, for example, wrote in an ar-

ticle entitled More Severe Punishments Are Effective (STURMAN, 2003) that our





32

intuition, our common sense, tells us that more severe punishments are effective.

Perhaps not because this is really the case, but because we think this should be the

case. As a result, punishments and the threat of punishment are not only an instru-

mental but also a moral issue, not just for non-compliers but also for compliers.

7.2Explanations for compliance and non-compliance

It is not easy to explain why rules are complied with and what role punishment

plays in this respect. It is already a problem to dene humans in this context. If we

assume that humans are rational, calculating beings (homo economicus)21, punish-

ments and threats of punishment that make the chance of a loss (sanction or anoth-

er disadvantage) greater than the benet gained as a result of any non-compliance areeffective. According to this line of reasoning, stiffer penalties and an increased chance

of being caught will deter potential non-compliers to a greater extent than lower pen-

alties. The legislator could latch on to this by developing compliance mathematics.

In 1994, the Dutch economist Van Velthoven conducted an amusing study of the

economy of crime and punishment22. Based on the reference year 1990, he made a

calculation of the expected punishment and benets per crime for the Dutch situ-

ation. The clear-up rate for the crimes registered by the police was 22.3 percent

in the Netherlands at the time23. The Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics CBS es-

timate however that the actual number of crimes committed against private indi-

viduals (6.3 million) and institutions and companies (5.4 million) actually is ten

times higher than the number of the registered crimes. On that basis Van Velthoven

calculated that the actual chance of being caught for a crime in the Netherlands

was only about 2.2 percent. If we take into consideration that only six percent of

the criminals caught were given a prison sentence, this results in an actual chance

of imprisonment of 1 out of 758 per crime committed. In addition to imprisonment,nes were imposed, but these were very low, too. Van Velthovens nal conclusion

is that the expected threat of punishment per crime equals a ne of only NLG 3.60

21 Econs as Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call them. But recent research shows that human (market)behaviour is not only guided by reason and logic but also by predictable irrational choices. See Jolls,

Sunstein & Thaler (1998) as cited by Van Gestel (2013), p. 25-26.

22 He reiterates the method of calculation and outcomes in his newest book. VAN VELTHOVEN, B. C.J.

Economie van misdaad en straf (The Economy of Crime and Punishment). Boom Lemma Publishers,2012, p. 39-44.

23 The clear-up rate did improve somewhat over time, at present (2013) it is about 25%.




Wim Voermans 33

(approx. 1.50 present-day value) plus four hours imprisonment. On the other hand,

the expected benets per crime were more than NLG 400 (approx. 180). If the

nancial implications are assessed in more general terms, crime beneted everyone

who earned less than NLG 100 (approx. 45) per hour in a normal job in 1990. Thatis to say, more than 95% of the population24.

The present-day gures for the Netherlands will probably be a little more fa-

vourable, though perhaps not signicantly different. According to the calculations

of Van Velthovens study, a calculating person econs will always consider non-

compliance to be the more advantageous option. And yet, most citizens are law-

abiding people. Why?

Perhaps, this is because we are all different. It is a fact of life that there are

good guys and bad guys. Threat of punishment would then be especially effective

for calculating and prospective criminals. This may also be connected with the fact

that citizens and companies do not calculate their chances in this simple manner,

but include more factors in their calculation than the mere threat of punishment

and the chance of being caught25. These factors include reputation, the information

at hand (most people do not know the sanctions or the exact gures of the chance of

being caught, etc.), culture, morality, (VAN VELTHOVEN, 2012, p. 49-52) the subjec-

tive chance of being caught. As Van Velthoven in his latest book argues, it is not theobjective chance of being caught that is most important to prospective delinquents

but the subjective chance of it, i.e. the chance of being caught as the prospective

delinquent perceives it (VAN VELTHOVEN, 2012, p. 41).

In recent years, Henk Elffers, a forensic psychologist, has tried to address these

questions as well. In 1997, Elffers, together with Hessing, examined the role of the

threat of punishment related to compliance with tax legislation (income tax) (ELF-

FERS; HESING. 1997, p. 490-196). They drew the following remarkable conclusions:

1. Statutory sanctions are ineffective for what they call the conformistcompliers, i.e. those who comply with rules only because they fear punish-ment. There is only an effect if and that does not seem feasible, andperhaps not desirable either the punishment threatened is certain, quickand severe.

24 Source that reported on the research Het Parool(a Dutch newspaper) 28 June 2002.

25 On this subject, see ELFFERS, H. De rationele regelovertreder(The Rational Delinquent), inaugural

address for Antwerp University, 26 October 2004, Boom Legal Publishers, 2005.





34

2. Statutory sanctions have an indirect effect on the identiers, those whocomply with rules because they want to belong to a social group for whichcompliance is the norm; imposing sanctions on the others, those who breakthe rules, is necessary and useful for the identiers, because this serves

to maintain the social norm for them, the norm that keeps them on thestraight and narrow.

3. Statutory sanctions are superuous for the internalisers, those who complywith rules because they have made these rules part of their own world view.

That the threat of punishment has an indirect effect on identiers is an important

research nding, which is also conrmed in other recent studies, like the one con-

ducted by the Swede Lennart Wittberg in his contribution to the recent conferencepublication entitled Managing and maintaining compliance (ELFFERS; VERBOON;

HUISMAN. 2006, p. 25-43). He concludes from his experiences of Swedish tax leg-

islation that punishment voices a signicant signal. The importance of that signal

does not primarily lie in the deterrence of the prospective non-complier but in the

fact that the punishment of non-compliers conrms the existence and operation

of rules to those other than the non-complier. Punishment impresses the relevant

rule on the minds of people and programmes our willingness to comply with rules.

In other words: a sort of bandwagon-effect exists as regards regulatory compliance.

7.3Differential Attributions

This pattern is also conrmed by Catherine Sanderson and John Darley, who

published a report in the Journal for Applied Social Psychology in 2002 about four

experiments in which they asked respondents about their motives for complying

with rules. The interesting aspect is that, even if they are notorious non-compliers,

many of these respondents indicate that they themselves are restrained from non-

compliance as a result of internal factors (morality, internalisation) and not because

of the supposed consequences of non-compliance. However, and this brings us to

the crux of the matter: they do assume at the same time that others certainly other

non-compliers are probably restrained from non-compliance only because of the

risk of punishment or the consequences (external factors) (SANDERSON; DARLEY.

2002, p. 375-405). In other words, a distrust model, which is well in line with the

arrangement nature that underlies the law and the condence that parties under




Wim Voermans 35

the law derive from that. Accordingly, punishment and the threat of punishment are

primarily intended to ensure that others will adhere to the arrangement made.

The survey conducted by Sanderson and Darley is particularly amusing if the

results are applied to legislators. Let us assume, for the sake of convenience, thatthese are just ordinary people, too. If this is so, they will probably devise punishment

threats which they believe they do not need themselves but which will deter others.

Yet, these threats do not deter others very much because the experiment shows that

deterrence through the threat of punishment is not the principal motive for compliance.

8Conclusion

What can we learn from all this? Quite a lot you would think, but not muchthat can be used for ready-made toolboxes that might be helpful in designing ef-

fective compliance strategies and policies. It does, however, make one reconsider

whether stepping up enforcement activity or stiffening sanctions as a reaction to

non-compliance, will automatically deliver a better result. There is even some dis-

heartening evidence to the contrary. In answer to the question: Does criminal law

deter? Robinsons and Darleys short answer is no if we consider the behavioural

science data (ROBINSON; DARLEY. 2004, p. 173-205). Especially attempts at engi-

neering criminal law rules to achieve heightened deterrence effects are generally

ineffective social science research suggests. Potential offenders commonly do not

know the legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even those rules that have been

explicitly formulated to produce a behavioural effect, Robinson and Darley conclude

(ROBINSON; DARLEY. 2004, p. 204). And even if they know the legal rules, potential

offenders commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear to guide their

conduct in their own best interests, such failure stemming from a variety of social,

situational, or chemical inuences (ROBINSON; DARLEY. 2004, p. 204).Does this mean that all hope is lost for legislators and enforcement agencies

when they try to effect behaviour and guide it in some way or other? Certainly not.

We have seen that strategies that take the motives of addressees of the rules into

account, that capitalize on these motives or beliefs26 (e.g. by way of nudges or

26 See LEVI, Margaret; SACKS, Audrey. Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators. Regulation & Gov-

ernance, 2009, v. 3, n. 4, p. 311-333. Levi and Sacks demonstrate that there is reason to believe thatthe more effective a government is in serving its citizens, or is perceived to be (addition WV), themore likely it is to produce a virtuous cycle of citizens compliance with its extractions, leading to

better government and greater compliance. Levi & Sacks (2009), p. 328.





36

reecting a deeper understanding of why addressees will of will not comply with

rules) may generally produce a better result.

A second conclusion that follows from the analysis is that administrative en-

forcement efforts do not at least not automatically equate compliance rates.There is not a one-on-one relation here, although this idea seems to be underpin-

ning some present-day enforcement strategies. Enforcement efforts are but one of

the many norm-support cues to comply (KEIZER. 2010, p. 90)27. We do know there

is a relationship between administrative enforcement efforts and compliance, but

we do not know precisely how it works. Enforcement efforts, in other words, work

like aspirin28on compliance. This sobering truth has not kicked in everywhere still.

We still have great condence in administrative enforcement efforts as a means

in a lot of cases as the single method to promote compliance. In sum we can

conclude that in many cases the threat of punishment does not directly as a mo-

tive for regulatory compliance. Punishment and the threat of punishment have an

indirect effect on regulatory compliance. Recent research also suggests that a sort

of bandwagon-effect exists as regards regulatory compliance (KEIZER, 2010). Com-

pliant behaviour, or enforcement activities that reminds us of (or merely point out)

the existence of a norm, prompt (more) compliant behaviour. And nally, we believe,

these insights may act as a wake-up call for the ill-advised, received wisdom soprominently at the heart of a lot of government enforcement and compliance strat-

egies nowadays that it is easy to guarantee compliance by adopting a system of

sanction-based compliance mathematics that allow us to calculate the compliance

outcome by merely adding up (and mixing) administrative action.

Annex Table of 11

In 1994, the Dutch Ministry of Justice studied the possibility of periodicallymonitoring the level of compliance with legislation. In the course of that project the

Table of Eleven originated. The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioural

sciences, consisting of eleven dimensions. Together, these dimensions are decisive

for the level of compliance with legislation. The eleven dimensions are formulated

27 Keizers research shows that compliant behaviour of norm addressees is greatly inuenced by the

fact whether or not they observe care and respect of others (fellow citizens) for these and indeed

more generally other norms.

28 A popular and effective painkiller, prescribed and used for decades although we did not understand

exactly how it worked until quite recently.




Wim Voermans 37

with a view to as high a practicability as possible in the elds of policy making

and law enforcement. The dimensions provide criteria with which we can assess

whether or not it is possible to enforce draft legislation. These criteria, however, can

also be used to evaluate existing legislation.In subsequent years, the Table of Eleven was rened and improved. In addition,

we gained the necessary experience in using it. These days, the Table of Eleven is

a household name among policy makers, jurists drafting legislation, supervisors and

enforcers within the Dutch government.

9References:

AYRES, I.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulationdebate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

BEETHAM, David. The Legitimation of Power. Palgrave MacMillan, 1991, p. 69-70and p. 91.

CHECKEL, Jeffrey T. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change,International Organization, Massachusetts, v.55, n. 3, p. 555557, 2001.

ELFFERS, Henk; HESSING, Dick J. Hessing. Het nut van sanctions(The Usefulness of

Sanctions).Ars Aequi (Dutch Student Law Magazine), 1997, 46, p. 490-496.EIJLANDER, P.;VOERMANS, W. Wetgevingsleer. Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague,2000.

FULLER, Lon L. Human Interaction and the Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence,Oxford,v. 14, n. 1, p. 24, 1969.

GUNNINGHAM, N.; GRABOSKY, P.; SINCLAIR, D. Smart Regulation, Designing Environ-mental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

KEIZER, Kees. The Spreading of Disorder, PhD-thesis. Groningen: University of Gro-ningen, 2010, p. 90.

LEVI, Margaret; SACKS, Audrey. Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators. Regula-tion & Governance,2009, v. 3, n. 4, p. 311-333.

RAUSTIALA, Kal; SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. International Law, International Relationsand Compliance. In: CARLNAES, W.; RISSE, T.; SIMMONS, B.A. Handbook of Internatio-nal Relations. London: Sage, 2002, p. 540.

REMKES, J. W. Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Dutch House of Represen-tatives, dated 6 November 2006, offer of evaluation of action programme QualityEnforcement. Available at:





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ven%20op%20Niveau_6534_tcm34-25550.pdf>

ROBINSON, Paul H.; DARLEY, John M. Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Scien-ce Investigation. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2004, v. 42, n. 2.

SANDERSON, Catherine A.; DARLEY, John M. Darley. I Am Moral, but You Are Deterred:Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law.Journal of Applied Psycho-logy, 2002, v. 32, n. 2, p. 375-405.

SCHOLZ, J. Deterrence, cooperation and the ecology of regulatory enforcement. Lawand Society Review. Utah: Wiley, 1984, v. 18, n. 2, p. 179-224.

STURMAN, Henry. Zwaarder straffen werkt.Elsevier,17 January 2003. Available at:.

TALLBERG, Jonas. Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the Europe-an Union. International Organization. Massachusetts, v.56, p. 609-643, 2002

TYLER, Tom R. Why do People Obey the Law.Princeton: Princeton University Press,2006.

VAN VELTHOVEN, B. C.J. Economie van misdaad en straf(The Economy of Crime andPunishment). Boom Lemma Publishers, 2012.

VERSLUIS, Esther. Compliance Problems in the EU: What potential role for agenciesin securing compliance, Paper prepared for the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Bu-dapest 2005. Available at:

Visited on 4 Feb. 2013.

WITTBERG, Lennart. Can Communication Activities Improve Compliance? In: EL-FFERS, H.; VERBOON, P.; HUISMAN, W. (ed.). Managing and Maintaining Compliance.Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague 2006, p. 25-43.




39

2 Guerra fiscal, Bolsa Famlia e Silncio(Relaes, efeitos e regressividade)

MISABEL DE ABREU MACHADO DERZI

Professora Titular de Direito Tributrio e Financeiro (UFMG).

Professora Titular de Direito Tributrio das Faculdades Milton Campos.

Doutora em Direito (UFMG).

SUMRIO:1 Introduo 2 Sobre a justia tributria distributiva e como a Constituio probea omisso do Estado face desigualdade e misria 3 O Programa Bolsa Famlia e o silncio

4 A guerra scal nacional e internacional. Conexes com a regressividade 5 Concluso

6 Referncias.

RESUMO:Este artigo busca romper o silncio sobre as relaes entre o programa

Bolsa Famlia e a justia scal, demonstrando como o programa em questo

impe-se, no como uma medida assistencialista ou um favor estatal, mas como um

direito fundamental insusceptvel de restrio e um instrumento fundamental para

compensar a regressividade tributria existente no sistema tributrio brasileiro e

intensicada pela guerra scal nacional e internacional.

PALAVRAS CHAVE: Bolsa Famlia Direito Fundamental Tributao RegressividadeJustia.



Guerra scal, Bolsa Famlia e Silncio


40

Fiscal Competition, Bolsa Famlia and Silence (Relations, effects andregressive taxation)

CONTENTS:1 Introduction to the regressive taxation system 2 On scal distributive justiceand how the Constitution forbids the omission of the State in the light of inequality and penury

3 The Cash Conditional Transfer Program Bolsa Famlia and the silence 4 International and natio-

nal scal competition. Connections with regressive taxation system 5 Conclusions 6 References.

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to break the silence on the relations between the

Program Bolsa Famlia and the Brazilian scal justice. I shows how this Program

is necessary not only as a measure of social assistance or a legal favor, but also as

a Fundamental Right that cannot be limited. The program represents also a fun-

damental means to compensate theregressive taxation that exists on the Brazilianlegal system and that is intensied by the scal competition at the national and

international levels.

KEYWORDS: Bolsa Famlia Fundamental Rights Regressive Taxation Justice.

Guerra fiscal, Beca Famlia y Silencio (Relaciones, efectos y la tributacin regresiva)

CONTENIDO: 1 Introduccin a la tributacin regresiva 2 Acerca de la justicia distributiva tributa-ria y cmo la Constitucin prohbe la omisin del Estado en virtud de la desigualdad y la miseria

3 Programa Beca Familia y silencio 4 Competicin tributaria nacional e internacional. Conexiones

con la tributacin regresiva 5 Conclusiones 6 Referencias bibliogrcas.

RESUMEN: Este artculo busca quebrar el silencio sobre las relaciones entre el Pro-

grama Beca Familia y la justicia tributaria, demostrando como ello es necesario nocmo una medida asistencialista o cmo un favor estatal, sino como un Derecho

Fundamental no susceptible de restriccin y tambin como un instrumento scal

para corregir la regresividad tributaria existente en el sistema tributario brasileo y

que es intensicada por la competicin scal nacional e internacional.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Beca Familia Derecho Fundamental Tributacin RegresividadJusticia.




Misabel de Abreu Machado Derzi 41

1Introduo regressividade do sistema tributrio

Este artigo trabalha os conceitos de regressividade tributria, justia distributiva

e pobreza, e os relaciona ao programa Bolsa Famlia dentro do enquadramentoclssico keynesiano-westfaliano aplicado aos Estados territoriais, to criticado por

Nancy Fraser (2009). Embora os problemas contemporneos da mobilidade do capi-

tal, do mercado global e da competio internacional no sejam ignorados, nenhu-

ma soluo mundializada aventada, nem se analisam as solues propostas por

economistas e demais acadmicos no que tange instituio de impostos globais

com objetivo de combate pobreza humana. Sobretudo, no se discute uma nova

teoria da justia, que possa incorporar uma dimenso poltica da representao ao

lado da dimenso econmica da distribuio e cultural do reconhecimento, como

faz a citada autora.

que a interconexo entre regressividade, guerra scal e o programa Bolsa Fa-

mlia, mesmo no plano domstico brasileiro, considerado o Estado nacional, est to

distante de um reconhecimento poltico ou cultural, que pareceria fugir do problema

esperar uma representao mundializada mais abstrata. Raramente se atribuem os

efeitos redutores da regressividade do sistema tributrio brasileiro ao benefcio do

programa Bolsa Famlia, exatamente porque ele foi institudo em carter assistencial.Mais raramente ainda, se estabelece uma relao entre guerra scal e Bolsa Famlia.

O artigo visa demonstrar tais conexes e efeitos, mas, sobretudo, defender a

transformao do programa em tela em permanente restituio de tributos sobre o

consumo, altamente regressivos, como o Imposto sobre Operaes relativas Circu-

lao de Mercadorias e Prestao de Servios de Transpor

Artigo - Os Direitos Indígenas Como Direitos Culturais Fundamentais

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