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    Project Brazil

    February 2009

    Brasil

    Feasibility studyl

    Feasibility study

    Brasil

    High speed line Sao Paulo Rio de Janeiro

    Feasibility study

    Signalling and Telecommunication

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    Index

    Brasil 1

    1 General...................................................................................................................... 41.1.1 Stations ...............................................................................................................................................................4

    1.1.2 Speed...................................................................................................................................................................41.1.3 Headways.............................................................................................................................................................4

    1.1.4 Level crossings ...................................................................................................................................................4

    1.1.5 Rooms................................................................................................................................................................. 51.1.6 Points.................................................................................................................................................................. 5

    2 Train protection systems.......................................................................................... 52.1 Suitable ATP systems for this project. .............................................................................................................. 52.2 Suggested ATP system....................................................................................................................................... 5

    2.3 Overview of ETCS................................................................................................................................................ 5

    2.4 Recommended ETCS Level...................................................................................................................................72.5 ETCS Level 2 in this project................................................................................................................................ 8

    2.5.1 Trackside............................................................................................................................................................ 8

    2.5.2 Onboard .............................................................................................................................................................. 8

    3 Operational Philosophy / System functions ............................................................. 83.1 Assumptions / preconditions ............................................................................................................................ 8

    3.2 Standard operation............................................................................................................................................ 83.2.1 Starting process ................................................................................................................................................ 8

    3.2.2 Regular train movements .................................................................................................................................. 9

    3.2.3 Train movements in specific situations............................................................................................................. 9

    3.3 Degraded Operation ........................................................................................................................................... 93.4 Depots / Shunting............................................................................................................................................. 10

    3.5 Telecom / SCADA .............................................................................................................................................. 10

    3.5.1 Railway Operation Telecommunication System (ROTS) ................................................................................... 103.5.2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)......................................................................................... 10

    3.5.3 Passenger information, Ticketing and Closed Circuit Television ...................................................................... 11

    4 System Technologies ................................................................................................ 114.1 Signalling / Interlocking..................................................................................................................................... 11

    4.1.1 CTC...................................................................................................................................................................... 11

    4.1.2 CBI....................................................................................................................................................................... 114.1.3 ACC / OSM......................................................................................................................................................... 12

    4.1.4 Trackside elements ........................................................................................................................................... 12

    4.2 Automatic Train protection ............................................................................................................................... 134.3 Telecom ............................................................................................................................................................. 13

    4.3.1 ROTS .................................................................................................................................................................. 13

    4.3.2 Passenger Information Systems (TD, Clock, PA).............................................................................................. 144.3.3 CCTV................................................................................................................................................................... 14

    4.3.4 Ticketing ............................................................................................................................................................ 14

    4.4 SCADA................................................................................................................................................................ 154.4.1 Hot axle box detection (HABD).......................................................................................................................... 15

    4.4.2 Fire and Intrusion detection systems............................................................................................................... 15

    4.4.3 Structure gauge detection................................................................................................................................ 164.5 GSM-R ................................................................................................................................................................ 16

    4.6 Overall system components.............................................................................................................................. 16

    4.6.1 Power Supply..................................................................................................................................................... 16

    4.6.2 Transmission......................................................................................................................................................174.7 Required rooms / Land take............................................................................................................................. 18

    4.7.1 CTC..................................................................................................................................................................... 18

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    4.7.2 CBI..................................................................................................................................................................... 20

    4.7.3 ACC ................................................................................................................................................................... 204.7.4 Land take ........................................................................................................................................................... 21

    5 Summary / Remarks .............................................................................................. 22

    6 List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 23

    7 List of Figures .........................................................................................................24

    Version Date Designed Approved State / changes

    1.0 2009/02/13 Baethge Gnther Handover phase 1, overview and documentstructure

    1.1 2009/02/20 Baethge Gnther Subchapter 4.8 added

    1.2 2009/03/13 Baethge Gnther Delivery: draft report

    1.3 2009/03/23 Baethge Gnther Revised study without Jundiai, Resende,

    Aparecida

    1.4 2009/05/18 Baethge Gnther Japanese ATP system added

    2.0 2009/06/15 Baethge Gnther Delivery: Review after comments P.Grant

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    1 General

    The purpose of this study is to broadly describe the requirements and forecast costs needed to ensure a safe and

    reliable traffic operation. For this, the high speed line system has to fulfil the following three tasks:

    1. For safety reasons high speed operation requires an automatic train protection system which will underpin

    the operation of trains.

    2. The train protection system directly affects the protection and supervision of the track side equipment, whichis to be operated by the signalling/interlocking system.

    3. To allow a safe, efficient and convenient passenger operation, appropriate telecommunication systems have

    to be considered.

    This section is prepared as a high-level functional study. It is based on the information and assumptions listed in item 1.1.1to 1.1.5 and mentioned in the appropriate subchapters.

    Costs estimated for signalling and telecommunication equipment are listed in TAV Volume 5. In this report it will be

    referred to in the respective paragraphs in chapter 4 with a remark, e.g. ( D.12).

    1.1.1 Stations

    The stations proposed to be equipped with telecommunication and signalling technique for this assessment are:

    Rio de Janeiro / Barao de Maua km 0,,0

    Galeao Airport: km 15,2

    Barra Mansa/Volta Redonda: km 118,3

    Sao Jose dos Campos: km 328,7

    Guarulhos Airport: km 390,4

    Sao Paulo: km 412,2

    Viracopos Airport km 487,6

    Campinas km 510,7

    1.1.2 Speed

    The system should be capable operating at speeds up to 330 km/h

    1.1.3 Headways

    The study is based on the assumption of 3 min headway.

    A reliable statement can only be made with more information available, e.g. braking curves of the respective vehicles,

    gradient of tracks.

    1. 1.4 Level crossings

    It is assumed that no level crossing will be installed on the whole line.

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    1.1.5 Rooms

    It is assumed that due to the appropriate requirements new station buildings will be erected ensuring enough space to

    install signalling and telecommunication equipment and working places for technical operation.

    1.1.6 Points

    It is assumed that on the main line high speed points for crossings and junctions will be installed. This kind of point allows

    speeds greater than 200 km/h in the facing direction.

    2 Train protection systems

    All over the world there are several different train protection systems in use. This chapter is to discuss and decide which

    system is likely to be the most suitable for the new Brazilian high-speed line.

    The key parameters which reduce the variety of possible systems to a small number are the required speed, which shallbe, as mentioned in 1.1.2 at least 330km/h and the tight time schedule of 3min headway.

    2.1 Suitable ATP systems for this project.

    Presently, amongst others, the following automatic train protection systems are capable of operating with speeds up to330 km/h:

    LZB Linienfrmige Zugbeeinflussung (German) = continuous automatic train control

    (installed for instance in Germany, Austria, Spain) TVM - System based on coded track circuits

    (installed for instance in France and Japan)

    ETCS

    (installed in various European countries as well as in countries outside of Europe e.g. in Australia, Taiwan,Korea)

    2.2 Suggested ATP system

    For this study ETCS as the most future oriented train protection system has been chosen. ETCS meets the requirements

    for high speed lines in the most suitable way. ETCS is a European standard, used in many European and also other railway

    companies all over the world.

    Since at least 6 signalling companies are ETCS-suppliers, the implementation of ETCS will result in cost saving due tocompetition between the suppliers.

    Due to the above mentioned facts, a considerable advantage for future tendering is that all established signalling

    companies are able to submit an offer for the future ATP system based on ETCS.

    2.3 Overview of ETCS

    ETCS supports five general levels:

    Level 0, level STM, Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

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    Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 will be described below. Level 0 and Level STM are used only for areas not equipped with ETCS

    and will not be considered here.

    Level 1: Equipment w ith lineside S ignals, lineside Electronic Units (LEU), switchable and non-switchable balises

    (transponders, mounted on the track between the rails), transmission of Movement authorities via switchable balises.

    ETCS

    Eurobalise end of track segment

    LEU

    Interlocking

    Figure 1: Characteristics of ETCS Level 1 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0

    Level 2: Equipment with Marker Boards (optional line side Signals if required for operational reasons), Radio BlockCentre (RBC), non-switchable balises only, transmission of Movement authorities via Radio Block Centre

    ETCS

    Eurobalise

    Radio Block Centre

    Interlocking

    end of track segment

    Optional

    Figure 2: Characteristics of ETCS Level 2 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2 .3.0

    Level 3: In general the same characteristics as level 2 w ith the following specifics:

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    - Train integrity proving system replaces trackside vacancy detection,

    - It is not imperative to have an underlying signaling system

    Remark:

    Since a reliable train integrity proving system does not exist yet, ETCS Level 3 is not installed in any country so far.

    ETCS

    Eurobalise

    Radio BlockCentre

    train

    integrity

    Interlocking

    Figure 3: Characteristics of ETCS Level 3 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0

    2.4 Recommended ETCS Level

    Based on our experience and the features outlined below, we recommend that ETCS Level 2 is implemented for the high

    speed line Rio de Janeiro - Sao Paulo - Campinas:

    A 3 min headway requires a short block distances, it consequently also requires a huge amount of block posts

    on the open line. Compared to Level 1, Level 2 requires a reduced amount of track side equipment (e.g. no

    Lineside Electronic Units and switchable balises. Light signals are not necessarily required), which is,

    regarding the prime costs, a great economical advantage.

    Reduced line side equipment (including cabling) also reduces maintenance costs and costs resulting from

    theft and vandalism. In Level 2, movement authorities for the trains are generated by Radio Block Centres (RBC) and transmitted

    by radio. Thus a continuous update/ extension of a movement authority is possible. Therefore the operationalcapacity of the line is higher than for a Level-1-Line.

    In case of future extension of the line, ETCS level 2 allows the integration of further block posts or stations by adjustingthe data base for the field elements; there is therefore no need for a complete programming of the system.

    Since no reliable train integrity proving system exists at present, a level-3-solution is not considered here. ETCS Level 3

    has not been installed in any country so far.

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    2.5 ETCS Level 2 in this project

    2.5.1 Trackside

    The double track high speed line will be divided into several block sections. The length of every section will beapproximately 1,5 km.

    Every block section will be

    defined by an axle counter system

    announced to the driver with stop marker boards (SMB)

    equipped with fixed balise groups to determine the trains position

    In stations where trains start regularly there should be SMBs with "overrun light". This ensures a simple start up

    procedure for ETCS-guided trains. Also, SMBs with white overrun lamps should be placed at certain locations to use in

    case of fall back/fall safe and degraded operation. See chapter 3.3 degraded operation

    2.5.2 Onboard

    The train driver does not receive information from lineside s ignals. The train will be equipped with in cab signalling; this

    is achieved by arranging that the onboard equipment communicates with the Radio Block Centre via GSM-R to supervise

    the train movements.

    The train sends its position to the Radio Block Centre, based on the balise groups it has passed.

    The Radio Block Centre analyses these data and sends movement authorities (MA) with instructions how to proceed.

    3 Operational Philosophy / System functions

    3.1 Assumptions / preconditions

    In the following subchapters the proposed operational philosophy is described. In order to implement such kind of

    operation the following assumptions/ preconditions have to be fulfilled:

    All trains have to be equipped with ETCS-L2. Mixed operation (ETCS and non ETCS trains) should not be allowed

    in regular operation.

    The necessary equipment of the Radio Block Centre (RBC) should be placed in the main control centre.

    The trackside elements belonging to the signalling system will be controlled and operated from a Central Train

    Control (CTC). The CTC has to be occupied permanently. In standard operation controlling of the whole high

    speed line from one CTC is possible.

    There will be a local Computer based interlocking (CBI) in every station. The CBI is not occupied in standard

    operation.

    There will be an area control computer (ACC) supervising a certain number of the blocks sections At every block post there is an operating and supervision module (OSM).

    Please see Configuration 001.-0.1 page 4

    3.2 Standard operation

    3.2.1 Starting process

    For starting trains in the stations the stop marker board (SMB) in regular direction of running shall be equipped with

    SMBs with overrun lights. This light has the function of a proceed aspect, it is to allow the driver to run over the balise

    placed in front of the next SMB. Now the onboard equipment can send its position to the RBC to receive furtherinstructions.

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    All other SMBs shall be constructed as a metal plate with a reflective foil. The sign on the plate shall be according to

    international rules for ETCS. These SMBs are to show the virtual signals used in the RBC to define the track section.

    3.2.2 Regular train movements

    The operator in the CTC will determine train movements from the signalling side. Here, in correspondence with the

    trackside equipment, routes are set according to the required timetable or to react in exceptional cases.

    As the route is set in standard operation, the train movements are guided in ETCS full supervision mode after theentrance of the train into the ETCS area or after the start procedure described in 3.2.1 above. In Full Supervision mode

    the ERTMS/ETCS on-board equipment is fully responsible for train protection, thus the highest level of safety is ensured.

    The train receives movement authorities from the RBC which include the speed allowed and other important information

    for the following block sections e.g. gradient profile, track conditions. The RBC receives route setting information from

    the signaling (interlocking) and position of trains from the appropriate onboard equipment to supervise the train

    movements.

    As shown in the overall configuration (sheet 001-0.1) the track equipment is designed for two way operation, to ensure ahigh operational flexibility.

    3.2.3 Train movements in specific situations

    Train movements in specific situations, such as joining and splitting of trains; reversing movements; operation inside of

    tunnel areas in case of hazardous situations etc, require detailed operational procedures to be defined by the rail

    operator. ETCS offers different operational modes to cover such specific situations.

    In order to prepare suitable ETCS modes for these circumstances, specific operational rules have to be defined. These

    rules ensure that movements which cannot completely be technically supervised by ETCS are still operable in a safe

    manner.

    3.3 Degraded Operation

    3.3.1 Degraded Operation in case of disturbed connection to the CTC

    For fallback situations a local control from the station interlocking shall be possible (see configuration sheet 001-0.1 page

    3). In these situations every stations interlocking has to be staffed with operators. Once the station interlockings are

    staffed, a regular traffic is possible except some overall functions, e.g. train dispatching, timetable management and

    rolling stock management, which will not be available.

    3.3.2 Degraded Operation in case of failed trackside equipment

    In case of failed trackside equipment (e.g. failed track circuit), the interlocking is not able to set a regular route. Thus the

    RBC cannot generate movement authorities for the failed section.

    It is in the responsibility of the operator, working within pre-determined procedures, to permit the train to enter intosuch a section. If he cannot ensure that the track is free, he can give the order to the train driver to drive with a reduced

    speed, ensuring that the train can stop before an obstacle.

    For such operational situations the ETCS onboard equipment can switch into the following ETCS modes:

    Staff Responsible This mode allows the end of a movement authority to be overridden and to continue train

    movement without a movement authority. The admissible speed is restricted by a predetermined value

    these are called ETCS National Values.

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    On Sight In this mode the RBC sends the train a mode profile with a certain speed (e.g. 40 km/h). The driver

    is responsible for stopping the train before any obstacle, since the track may be occupied. Additionally the

    admissible speed is restricted by a predetermined value so called ETCS National Values.

    3.3.3 Degraded Operation in case of disturbed ETCS onboard equipment

    In case of a disturbed ETCS onboard equipment the driver has to isolate it. In such situation only an operation without any

    train protection is possible. For these cases the SMB with the overrun lights act as a simplified trackside signalization.

    In this case an operation w ith a reduced headway and a reduced speed is possible (e.g. 100 km/h).

    3.4 Depots / Shunting

    The depots are not to be equipped with ETCS Level 2. At the border between the regular line and the depot, the

    installation will have border balises, transmitting a level transition order for operation in the depot or yard.

    Due to expected busy operation and a large amount of rolling stock in the depots, these areas shall be controlled by localinterlocking systems with separate operation control centers (OCC) on site.

    Similar to the main line, the depot shall be equipped with a track vacancy detection system based on axle counters. For

    signaling purposes the depot / shunting areas shall be equipped with shunting signals.

    3.5 Telecom / SCADA

    3.5.1 Railway Operation Telecommunication System (ROTS)

    For railway operation, specific communication networks are required which, on the one hand, correspond with thecontinuous character of railways and, on the other hand, ensure that more than two staff members can communicate.

    These communication networks have the following fundamental properties:

    Continuous connections along the line,

    A connection for several subscribers (party telephone line),

    Appropriate telephone connection for each case of application or operational task.

    3.5.2 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

    The SCADA-System is to be provided for both, remote control and supervision of alarms for:

    Smoke/fire and burglary detection systems,

    Hot axle box detection (HABD)

    communication systems ( e.g. transmission, CCTV)

    power supply equipment.All relevant status indications shall be monitored continuously. When tolerable limits are exceeded or other irregularities

    are indicated, an alarm shall be raised at the relevant S+D terminal (at the local station control and/or in the CTC

    centre). From there it is possible to diagnose the detailed status and establish a correction and maintenance strategy.

    Specific to every station, indication and recording shall always be available.

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    3.5.3 Passenger information, Ticketing and Closed Circuit Television

    Train Destination Indication System (TD): Each platform in every station has to be equipped with train destination

    indicators to inform the passengers about current train status information.

    Public Address System (PA): All passenger stations and halts shall be equipped with a public address system. For each

    platform one loudspeaker circuit is to be provided. With this system the operator in the CTC or the local traffic manager

    can make normal or emergency announcements. In addition, an automatic announcement system has to be provided.

    Ticketing: Every station shall be equipped with an automatic ticketing system. These systems have to be connected via a

    data network with a central computer located in the CTC for accounting services.

    Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) System: Every station shall be equipped with a CCTV system, on every platform thereshall be two cameras installed. Also, the technical equipment in the stations shall be supervised by one camera pointing

    at the entrance of the building in which it is located.

    In the CTC all supervisory information shall be available.

    4 System Technologies

    4.1 Signalling / Interlocking

    All block posts shall be controlled by Area Control Computer (ACC). In every station there shall be a Computer Based

    Interlocking system (CBI) to control the ACCs. All CBI shall be controlled remotely, since the entire network shall bedispatched and controlled from a Centralised Traffic Control (CTC).

    4.1.1 CTC

    ( D1-1) For fallback reasons there are two CTCs required. Both shall be placed in the main station building but indifferent rooms. The main station building is suggested to be placed in Sao Paulo.

    The CTCs main functionalities are:

    Dispatching of all trains on the whole line (excluding depots and yards);

    Controlling and monitoring of all signalling devices including having an overview of the complete line and train

    tracking system

    Rolling Stock Management (fault detection management in cooperation with the operation control centers

    (OCC)of the depots;

    Automatic route setting in connection w ith timetable management / time line Graph;

    Service and diagnostics (S&D);

    Event recording;

    Facility management / supervision of the stations and platforms (Safety and Security);

    4.1.2 CBI

    ( D1-2) The CBI contains the interlocking logic for a defined track area (Configuration page 4) and is responsible forcontrolling and monitoring of a certain area of ACC.

    The CBI are occupied only as required.

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    4.1.3 ACC / OSM

    (included in D1-2)

    The ACC (area control computer) are responsible for the control of point machines, signals and to obtain informationabout the track vacancy. Furthermore, it is to set the routes according to CBI demands.

    An OSM (Operating and supervision module) can be considered as a subsystem of the ACC used as decentralized devicenot needing an individual power supply

    4.1.4 Trackside elements

    Points ( D1-2)

    All points in tracks used by regular trains will be operated electrically and equipped with point detectors to ensure thatthe switch blades are fully in place before a train can be allowed to pass the point. High speed points require up to 10

    point machines which will be controlled as one point.

    Axle Counter ( D1-2)

    The Axle counter (AXC) is a system using counting heads (double wheel detectors) and an evaluator to monitor the status

    of a track section by comparing the number of wheels (axles) which enter the section with the number of wheels which

    leave the section. Parity of the numbers is essential to provide a not occupied-output.

    Stop marker board (SMB) ( D1-2)

    SMBs with and without overrun lights are placed on the borders of block sections and are the places where a Stop can

    be imposed.

    Signals ( D1-2)

    Signals are placed in the depots to control local shunting movements.

    Balise ( D1-3)

    A Balise is a passive or active device normally mounted in proximity to the track for communications with passing trains.

    In this project passive balises for ETCS Level 2 are required. Balises are standardized according to European regulations.

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    Figure 4: Example of an SMB and Balises (HSL Zuid, Netherlands)

    4.2 Automatic Train protection

    ( D1-3, except onboard equipment, which is part of the loco suppliers delivery)

    As already described in chapter 2.4, the ATP system ETCS Level2 provides cab signalling and works in general without any

    line-side signals. The train operation on the line is controlled directly via radio from the RBC.

    To initiate a train movement the RBC is to provide Movement Authorities (MA) to the train. Whilst moving the train is to be

    protected against exceeding of the maximum line speed limits or of temporary and permanent speed restrictions.

    ETCS protects the train against passing an End of Authority (virtual signal in stop position) or initiates service brakes /emergency brakes in case of non-compliance with restrictions given to the driver.

    4.3 Telecom

    4.3.1 ROTS

    ( D2-3) In every station and at every depot, a telephone system shall be installed. It shall mainly be used for

    operational demands and for connecting the station and the depots with the CTC. At the CTC, each operator work place is

    equipped with a console, which enables the operator to directly connect to every station and depot subscriber withoutrequiring a connection over the public network.

    In the station areas, every relevant location such as platforms, technical rooms, local control room and/or substations

    will be equipped with telephones for direct calling and maintenance conference calling (collecting lines). Regardingweather and noise protection, the equipment will be different between indoor and outdoor installation.

    Interactions between the stations will be realized via ROTS trunk lines switched via the transmission system. The trunklines are connected redundantly. Also, trunk lines from ROTS to the public phone network will be provided to allow a

    direct telephone connection outside the Railway network.

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    4.3.2 Passenger Information Systems (TD, Clock, PA)

    For the passenger information on the platforms there are different systems for different types of information.

    The trains destination (TD) will be monitored via two displays per track side on each platform. The display indicates thetrains destination with intermediate stations, the track number and wagon arrangements (class, numbers). At the main

    stations an additional display board indicating all trains with their next departures is to be installed. These displays will

    be controlled based on programmed time tables and the actual train traffic. The operator in the CTC can modify the

    displays indication manually. ( D2-9)

    In addition to the destination indicator one clock will be installed on each platform. This clock is connected to the mainclock of the station, controlled via GPS-signals. A master clock system will provide a synchronized signal for all systems

    (signalling, train destination, transmission system etc.) throughout the railway. ( D2-7)

    Furthermore in each station one public address (PA) system is necessary for passenger information ( D2-10). This isdone by loudspeakers which are to be installed every 4m. The control of this public address system is done by either the

    local station master or by the costumer information operator of the CTC centre. In this system precast text and voice

    messages will be integrated which will be controlled via the movement of the train. Due to the speed of the trains thepublic address system should be planned in accordance with the guide line for emergency announcement systems EN

    60849 or similar rules.

    4.3.3 CCTV

    ( D2-6) Supervisory cameras are installed for surveillance of platforms and accesses to technical rooms. Thus, on

    the platform, passenger movements on the train and platform surveillance against vandalism shall be monitored. Allcamera installations shall be fixed installations (no Pan&Tilt or Zoom). The advantage is that the camera has the same

    picture for operation observation every time (no manipulation possible).

    The output of all cameras can be evaluated by the operators in the CTC. On the monitors pictures can be changed due tothe view required, also, several pictures can be showed on one monitor (quadruple or more).

    The controlling of the camera picture can be done automatically or via manual controlling through the operators console.

    The camera live stream will be compressed and transmitted via the Backbone network from the stations to the CTC.

    Outside of the rail operational areas, such as passenger circulation areas, building exteriors and approaches, parking

    and drop-off areas etc. CCTV will be provided as agreed with the client.

    Key lineside installations, depots and yards shall also have CCTV facilities to allow security monitoring.

    Yards and Depots will also require operational CCTV to allow supervisory staff to monitor time critical activities such as

    train washing and movements.

    4.3.4 Ticketing

    ( D2-11) The ticketing system should be an automated fare collection system. This kind of system is being used in many

    public transport systems, e.g. London, Paris or Moscow. Such a system reduces the count of free-riders and othercauses of fraud. This system works as a closed system with gates or turnstiles.

    The system itself has a central system for administration of ticketing and fare collection and decentralised systems for

    the supervision of gates, the ticketing counter and automatic ticket machines.

    The system for fare collection is standardised.

    Please see below the following standards describing the systems or the components for the electronic fare collection

    system:

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    ISO/EN 24014-1 Public transport -- Interoperable fare management system -- Part 1: Architecture

    EN 15320 Identification Card Systems

    ISO/IEC 7816 and 14443 Specifications for identification cards, especially smart cards

    4.4 SCADA

    SCADA monitors power supply of the system and the following trackside equipment ( D2-8)

    4.4.1 Hot axle box detection (HABD)

    ( D2-12) The HABD System will ensure early detection of a hot axle or hot bearing to prevent the danger of derailmentor damage to trains by the consequences of a bearing failure at speed. The HABD system itself is not required to be fail

    safe in railway signalling terms. It does nevertheless play an important part in the safe operation of railways and shallthus be reliable and trustworthy and comply with the relevant CENELEC standards.

    HABD will be installed approaching large stations such as Campinas, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and additionallybetween the stations Sao Jose dos Campos and Barra Mansa / Volta Redonda. The distance between the HBAX and the

    station should be more than 10 km.

    The HABD will be normally dormant, activated by an approaching train.

    The axle boxes of passing vehicles (powered and unpowered) shall be scanned by a direction discriminating system to

    avoid spurious alarms. Alarms will be displayed in the CTC to give the operator the opportunity to change the route of thetrain, or other action as appropriate.

    The HABD system must have a connection to the transmission network for monitoring on the SCADA system in the CTC.

    4.4.2 Fire and Intrusion detection systems

    ( D2-5)

    4.4.2.1 Station fire detection system

    Fire and intrusion detection is to be provided for all technical rooms on each station, all depots and the CTC. In case of

    detecting fire an alarm message will be showed in the CTC on the SCADA system. The same procedure will be used for the

    burglary alarm. In addition one camera will be installed for observing the access to the technical room. With access ofpersons to these technical rooms by using the access code at the door the camera picture in the CTC will be activated

    Additional warning signals (alarm and flashing light) shall be installed directly on the protected building to inform the

    local fire brigade and police. The alerting of the fire brigade shall be performed through the operator in the CTC.

    4.4.2.2 Tunnel fire detection system

    The high speed line leads through 181 tunnels, with an overall length of 502 metres. For every tunnel exceeding a length of

    500m a fire detection system shall be installed. In this project 21 tunnels are affected.

    In these tunnels a fire detection system is to be installed, which requires a sensor cable to be led along the complete

    length of the tunnel. The alerting of the fire detection system shall be connected to the SCADA system in common with

    other station installations. The alarm signal will be monitored on the SCADA operator console. (See Supervision SCADA

    on layout 001-0.1, page 3).

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    4.4.3 Structure gauge detection

    Due to the fact, that there will be no goods traffic in this project to be considered, no structure gauge detection is

    required.

    4.5 GSM-R

    ( D2-4) For communication between the traffic manager / dispatcher and the train driver or the train conductor it is

    planned to build a radio system along the line. The standard of the new radio system shall be GSM-R regarding theEuropean specification EIRENE - MORANE which guarantee performance at speeds up to 500 km/h (310 mph), without any

    communication loss.

    GSM-R permits new services and applications for mobile communications in several domains:

    control and protection (Automatic Train Control/ETCS and ERTMS)

    communication between train driver and control centre,

    communication between on-board staff

    communication between train stations and maintenance staff

    The GSM-R equipment contains three main components:

    BTS (base transceiver station) responsible for radio supplying on the line w ithout signal loss

    BSC (base system controller) responsible for handling of several BTS and with connecting to the MSC

    MSC Mobile switching centre with different local databases administrating and managing the data andconnection between the GSM-R users

    The connection between the BTS and the BSC will be performed via the fibre optic cable. The data from the BSC to the

    MSC will be transmitted via the Backbone transmission system. The location of the MSC should be in the CTC.

    4.6 Overall system components

    4.6.1 Power Supply

    The choice of an appropriate solution for the power supply system depends on mains availability.

    Stations

    In the station buildings it is assumed, that the local mains is capable of providing the required power for the signallingand telecommunication equipment.

    An uninterrupted power supply shall be guaranteed from local mains. For fallback batteries and diesel generator shall be

    used.

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    Figure 5: Power supply at stations

    Open line

    On the open line in rural areas it is assumed that there will not be a connection to the local supply network.

    An uninterrupted power supply shall be guaranteed from solar-power which will be implemented on the container that ishousing the ACC devices. For fallback batteries and diesel generator shall be used.

    Figure 6: Power supply on the line

    Supervision and controlling

    The supervision and controlling for the local power supply to the interlocking system will be made by the interlocking

    system itself. Error and fault messages will be transmitted to the CTC via digital transmission network.

    The controlling and supervision of the power supply for the catenary or other consumer should be controlled andsupervised from a separate technical control centre.

    4.6.2 Transmission

    ( D1 / D2) The Digital Transmission Network has to provide the most reliable and speedy transmission of data fordifferent purposes for the needs of the railways. For these needs a dedicated OFC based Network is to be provided

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    4.6.2.1 Signalling / ATP

    Operational line side and station data, such as signalling and telecommunication information from the local interlocking

    (CBI) and block posts, will be transmitted by optical fibre cable (OFC) (as described below: telecommunication system) tothe centralized train control (CTC) and radio block centre (RBC).

    Resulting operational information from the CTC will be transmitted back to the local interlocking (CBI) by OFC.

    Resulting onboard information will be transmitted from the RBC to the train by GSM-R.

    4.6.2.2 Telecommunication

    For the transmission of communication signals along the complete line (Rio de Janeiro Campinas) one Backbone

    network with fibre optic cable, laid on both sides of the track to provide redundancy will be installed. To provide accessto this Backbone each station will be equipped with one access. The transmission rate should be 622MBit/s or more. For

    collecting of all signals in each station it is necessary to install a Crossconnect-Multiplexer on each station. The following

    signals will be transmitted via the transmission system ( D2-1):

    Communication connections for ROTS/PABX

    Data connections for PIS (Passenger information system)Ticketing, SCADA and CCTV

    Data connections for supervision and controlling of the w hole power supply (excluding interlocking) and also

    Signalling data from CBI to CTC (see chapter 4.6.2.1)

    The CTC is to provide one management centre computer terminal for monitoring and remote controlling of the lines

    complete transmission system.

    4.7 Required rooms / Land take

    4.7.1 CTC

    The CTC is to be placed in the building of the main station in Sao Paulo.

    According to our experience in similar projects and basked on the dimension of the line and the forecast number of

    passengers we suggest the following structure of working places to be considered:

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    Figure 7: Structure of the CTC / building

    For central operation all working places shall be located in one room in the CTC. This room will be equipped withworkstations and corresponding MMI. Each working place for an operator shall include up to 6 monitors. For central

    operation, including RBC operation, there shall be 4 working places.

    At regular operation the line will be operated by 2 members of staff.

    At peak hours we suggest 3 operators (working places) for operating of the whole line

    There should be a fourth working place to ensure operational stability in special situations with advancedtraffic.

    For the whole overview with train tracking, which will be provided from the interlocking system, and presentation of thecount of the passenger, which will be provided from the ticketing system, we suggest an extra panorama wall.

    For the Security task the CTC shall have an open booth with approx. 30 m. This booth will be equipped with an additional

    panorama wall for a fast overview of the data of the CCTV. The detailed view of the CCTV will be displayed on theworkstation of the working place of the security staff. The booth shall be closed for emergency task.

    Under consideration of the staff and the dimension of the working places we suggest a room for the CTC with about

    minimum 150 m space. Additional rooms will be smaller.

    It is suggested that in the CTC building a separate room for fallback situation is provided. The room shall not have the full

    functionality of the CTC, for this room two work places for operation are sufficient.

    For central dispatching we suggest separate rooms closed to the CTC.

    1 Room for Rolling stock management technicians (approx. 15-20 m)

    1 Board room (approx. 50m)

    1 Room for data batch processing (approx. 20m)

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    Figure 8: ACC Shelter with BTS mast, Container with Equipment

    4.7.4 Land take

    In station area

    It has to be considered that for power and data transmission there has to be copper ( D1+D2 cable plant) and optical

    fibre cables ( D2-2) led in cable ducts.

    The distance cable duct to centre of track is to be 2.50 m 5.00 m.

    Along the line

    It has to be considered that for data transmission reasons there has to be an optical fibre cable (OFC) ( D2-2) laidalong the line.

    For redundancy reasons, on both sides of the track with a distance of at least 3.10 m from the track centre a cable

    trench has to be excavated. The cable will be laid on a sand layer and the trench will be refilled.

    Every 50m a concrete cable marker shall mark the position of the trench.

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    5 Summary / Remarks

    This study gives an overview on how the new TAV line can be equipped with signaling and telecommunication systemswhich not only ensure safe, fast and convenient operation but also provide state of the art systems that can easily be

    adjusted to changing requirements or future demands.

    Furthermore it is designed to help all parties to understand the complex of requirements, which have to be taken intoaccount in planning the technology systems for a high speed operation in railway service.

    For train protection we have suggested ETCS Level 2 to combine fast and safe service with an economical and future

    oriented system, which minimizes the outside equipment to only that which is absolutely necessary.

    For the signaling part we have suggested a decentralized electronic interlocking system, to efficiently combine the block

    post into the interlocking logic. The possibility of remote controlling this interlocking system from the CTC allows very

    economic and flexible operation.

    For the telecommunication part we have suggested systems which are state of the art in modern railway operation,using the large range of transmission media available in cable based and wireless transmission.

    The cost estimation is necessarily based on a high level approach.

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    6 List of Abbreviations

    Abbreviation Description

    ATP Automatic train Protection

    ACC Area Control Computer

    BSC Base station controller

    BTS Base tranceiver station

    CBI Computer Based Interlocking

    CCTV Closed Circuit Television

    CENELEC Comit Europen de Normalisation E lectrotechnique

    CTC Centralized Traffic Control

    DG Diesel Generator

    EN European Norm

    ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System

    ETCS European Train Control System

    GSM-R Global System for Mobile communication Rail

    HABD Hot axle box detection

    ISO International Organization for Standardization

    LEU Line side Electronic Units

    MA Movement authority

    MMI Man Machine Interface

    MSC Mobile sw itching centre / Main system controller??

    OFC Optical fibre cable

    OCC Operation Control Centre

    OSM Operating and supervision Module

    PA Public address

    PS Power supply

    RBC Radio Block Center

    ROTS Railway Operation Telecommunication System

    SMB Stop marker board

    SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition

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    TD Train destination

    TVM Transmission voice-machine

    UNISIG Union Industry of S ignaling, working group of the UNIFE (Union des IndustriesFerroviaires Europenne)

    UPS Uninterrupted power supply

    7 List of Figures

    Figure 1: Characteristics of ETCS Level 1 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0............... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .. 6

    Figure 2: Characteristics of ETCS Level 2 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0............... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... 6

    Figure 3: Characteristics of ETCS Level 3 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0.......... ........... ........... ........... .......... ........... .......7Figure 4: Example of an SMB and Balises (HSL Zuid, Netherlands).............. ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .......... 13

    Figure 5: Power supply at stations............................................................................................................................................17

    Figure 6: Power supply on the line ............................................................................................................................................17Figure 7: Structure of the CTC / building................................................................................................................................. 19

    Figure 8: ACC Shelter with BTS mast, Container with Equipment.................. ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........ 21