Crise Financeira 2007 2008

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20072007 20082008The first World financialThe first World financial

crisiscrisis

Michael R. KrMichael R. Kräätketke

University of AmsterdamUniversity of Amsterdam



Chronology of a world event Chronology of a world event

20062006 the first warningsthe first warnings Summer 2007Summer 2007 the first hedge funds fallthe first hedge funds fall August 2007 collapse of the market for mbas August 2007 collapse of the market for mbas

-- the credit crunch beginsthe credit crunch begins From september 2007 to august 2008From september 2007 to august 2008 banksbanks

tumbling down all over the worldtumbling down all over the world September 2008September 2008 the black september of the black september of

financial marketsfinancial markets October 2008October 2008 fighting the Big Bangfighting the Big Bang The world economic crisisThe world economic crisis the next Great the next Great

DepressionDepression coming closercoming closer



Not the first (probably not the last)Not the first (probably not the last)

international financial crisisinternational financial crisis The US stock market crash of 1987The US stock market crash of 1987 The US savings and loans crisis of 1986The US savings and loans crisis of 1986 --9696 The Japanese real estate and banking crisisThe Japanese real estate and banking crisis

19901990 20002000 The EMS crisis in Europe 1992The EMS crisis in Europe 1992 The MexicoThe Mexico crisis of 1994crisis of 1994--9595 The Asian crisis 1997The Asian crisis 1997 19981998

The Russian crisis 1998The Russian crisis 1998 The dot.com crisis 2000The dot.com crisis 2000 20022002 The Argentina crisis 2001The Argentina crisis 2001



The new pattern of cycles andThe new pattern of cycles and

crises since the 1980scrises since the 1980s The business cycle is still there, butThe business cycle is still there, but

The short term erratic cycle of financial bubbles andThe short term erratic cycle of financial bubbles andcrises prevailscrises prevails

On average: one major international financial crisis everyOn average: one major international financial crisis everythree yearsthree years

From one bubble to the next From one bubble to the next the flight of internationalthe flight of internationalcapital from one object of speculation to the next (fromcapital from one object of speculation to the next (fromITC to real estate, from real estate to world tradeITC to real estate, from real estate to world trade

commodities like oil)commodities like oil) Booms are driven by bubbles / bursting bubbles triggerBooms are driven by bubbles / bursting bubbles trigger

off major crisesoff major crises



What is new today?What is new today?

All previous financial crises were regional /local crises All previous financial crises were regional /local crises

In all previous financial crises the effects could beIn all previous financial crises the effects could becontainedcontained

The present financial crisis is the first truly world crisisThe present financial crisis is the first truly world crisisof financial markets / financial capitalismof financial markets / financial capitalism

It hits all the stock markets in the world / all financialIt hits all the stock markets in the world / all financialcentres of the world (more or less at the same time)?centres of the world (more or less at the same time)?

It hits all internationally operating banks /financialIt hits all internationally operating banks /financial

concerns / institutional investorsconcerns / institutional investors There are no safe havens (not even Zwitserland)There are no safe havens (not even Zwitserland)

A real world crisis starts in the USA (like it did before) A real world crisis starts in the USA (like it did before)



Has Capitalism changed recently?Has Capitalism changed recently?

Capitalism with derivativesCapitalism with derivatives the explosion of finance in generalthe explosion of finance in general and of the trade in derivatives in particularand of the trade in derivatives in particular

Stock markets as multinationalsStock markets as multinationals International banksInternational banks-- present on all the major financial markets (aspresent on all the major financial markets (as

capital markets perform the traditional function of banks)capital markets perform the traditional function of banks) Institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, insuranceInstitutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, insurance

companies)companies) Shift from Commercial Banking to InvestmentbanksShift from Commercial Banking to Investmentbanks and theirand their

structured investment vehicles and conduitsstructured investment vehicles and conduits Rise of the Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (completelyRise of the Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (completely

different from traditional longdifferent from traditional long--only mutual funds / investment only mutual funds / investment

funds)funds) The waning divide between banks and nonThe waning divide between banks and non--banksbanks



FinancializationFinancialization

What financialization means:What financialization means: The predominance of financeThe predominance of finance the relative risethe relative rise

of the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate)of the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate)sector which becomes more important thansector which becomes more important thanmanufacturing (22,6 % of GDP in the US tomanufacturing (22,6 % of GDP in the US to14,9% in 2005)14,9% in 2005)

households are urged to behave like businesseshouseholds are urged to behave like businesses businesses are urged to behave like banksbusinesses are urged to behave like banks banks are urged to behave like hedge fundsbanks are urged to behave like hedge funds basic rationale: creating profits without creatingbasic rationale: creating profits without creating

new value (thriving on mere price differentials)new value (thriving on mere price differentials)



SecuritizationSecuritization

basic logic: transforming illiquid loans in banks basic logic: transforming illiquid loans in banks portfolios into marketable / tradeable /portfolios into marketable / tradeable /negotiable assetsnegotiable assets

expanding the secondary markets forexpanding the secondary markets forderivatives / creating new derivative marketsderivatives / creating new derivative markets

inventing / creating compound (structured)inventing / creating compound (structured)financial derivativesfinancial derivatives

inventing / creating off inventing / creating off--balance sheet conduitsbalance sheet conduits SIVs (structured investment vehicles) to holdSIVs (structured investment vehicles) to holdsuch assetssuch assets



For instance: creating a MBSFor instance: creating a MBS

(mortgage backed security)(mortgage backed security) first step: a new mortgage is issuedfirst step: a new mortgage is issued second: the mortgage bank /company sells it to a firmsecond: the mortgage bank /company sells it to a firm

specialized in buying and reselling mortgages (likespecialized in buying and reselling mortgages (likeFannie or Freddie)Fannie or Freddie)

third: the buyer aggregates many such loans into a poolthird: the buyer aggregates many such loans into a pooland issues a new bond based upon this pool (a right to aand issues a new bond based upon this pool (a right to aprofit arising from payments for the original loans)profit arising from payments for the original loans)

fourth: the buyer (Fannie or Freddie) sells this newfourth: the buyer (Fannie or Freddie) sells this newpaperpaper the MBSthe MBS to othersto others typically institutionaltypically institutional

investors and /or hedge fundsinvestors and /or hedge funds Fifth: the hedge funds (or other buyers) start tradingFifth: the hedge funds (or other buyers) start tradingthese papers on the secondary markets (making profitsthese papers on the secondary markets (making profitsfrom rising prices / price differentials arising on thosefrom rising prices / price differentials arising on thosemarketsmarkets



The explosion of the trade inThe explosion of the trade in

derivativesderivatives Since the 1970s the volume of international trade inSince the 1970s the volume of international trade inderivatives has explodedderivatives has exploded

The real news: the rise of financial derivatives to theThe real news: the rise of financial derivatives to theforefront forefront

Among them: structured products like mbs / the most Among them: structured products like mbs / the most important class of new structured financial assetsimportant class of new structured financial assetsbeing the CDOs (collaterized debt obligations) and CMOsbeing the CDOs (collaterized debt obligations) and CMOs(collaterized mortgage obligations)(collaterized mortgage obligations) rapidly growingrapidly growingbetween 2000 and 2006between 2000 and 2006

For instance: volume of outstanding interest swaps,For instance: volume of outstanding interest swaps,currency swaps and interest options was 3450bn $ incurrency swaps and interest options was 3450bn $ in19901990286000 bn $ end 2006 (six times global gross product)286000 bn $ end 2006 (six times global gross product)



The explosion of the trade inThe explosion of the trade in

structured financial productsstructured financial products different types: the alphabet soupdifferent types: the alphabet soup



The brave new world of The brave new world of

international finance: Deregulationinternational finance: Deregulation The race to reduce / abolish capital controls and foreignThe race to reduce / abolish capital controls and foreign

exchange controls started in the 1970sexchange controls started in the 1970s

It continued throughout the 1980s and 1990sIt continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s

Two US examples: the repeal of the GlassTwo US examples: the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act Steagall Act of 1933 (in 1999) and the passing of the Futuresof 1933 (in 1999) and the passing of the FuturesModernization Act in 2000 (both still under Clinton)Modernization Act in 2000 (both still under Clinton)

By midBy mid 20th century the financial sector was20th century the financial sector waseverywhere highly regulatedeverywhere highly regulated

Today, the global financial sector is as liberalized as it Today, the global financial sector is as liberalized as it was before 1914was before 1914



The brave new world of The brave new world of international finance: Beyondinternational finance: Beyond

regulationregulation Shift towards nonShift towards non--regulated areasregulated areas The rise of shadowThe rise of shadow--bankingbanking NonNon--banks becoming banks (like GM, Chryslerbanks becoming banks (like GM, Chrysler

f.i.f.i. making more profits with their financialmaking more profits with their financialactivities than by producing cars)activities than by producing cars) Intermediaries aboundIntermediaries abound The explosion of OTC The explosion of OTC transactionstransactions

The rise and multiplication of offshoreThe rise and multiplication of offshore--marketsmarketsand offshoreand offshore--finance (offshorefinance (offshore--markets and taxmarkets and taxhavens throughout the worldhavens throughout the world more than half of more than half of them in good old Europe)them in good old Europe)



The rise of financial engineersThe rise of financial engineers

the new science of finance in economicsthe new science of finance in economics In the 1960s Fischer Black with associatesIn the 1960s Fischer Black with associates

(among them Nobel prize winnars Scholes and Merton) developed(among them Nobel prize winnars Scholes and Merton) developednew models to describe / analyze asset pricing in financial marketsnew models to describe / analyze asset pricing in financial markets

Their major finding was quickly forgotten: no empirical evidenceTheir major finding was quickly forgotten: no empirical evidence

whatsoever that the activity of funds managers added anything towhatsoever that the activity of funds managers added anything tothe value of the funds assets (more embarrassing findings)the value of the funds assets (more embarrassing findings)

However, the new generation of funds managers claimed to beHowever, the new generation of funds managers claimed to bescientifically trained expertsscientifically trained experts

Fischer Black rethinking the efficient market hypothesisFischer Black rethinking the efficient market hypothesis referring to values and very wide marginsreferring to values and very wide margins

Fischers science of finance is not exact at allFischers science of finance is not exact at all Fischer was a market radical, but clearFischer was a market radical, but clear--sighted enough to see thesighted enough to see the

futures exchanges as gambling houses (if people wanted tofutures exchanges as gambling houses (if people wanted togamble there, the state should tax their gains heavily as he doesgamble there, the state should tax their gains heavily as he doeswith other forms of gambling)with other forms of gambling)



The peculiar riddle of todays worldThe peculiar riddle of todays world

financial crisisfinancial crisis It started in one relatively small segment It started in one relatively small segment

of the USof the US real estate and mortgagereal estate and mortgagemarket (the socalled subprime segment)market (the socalled subprime segment)

and it ended up as a world financial crisisand it ended up as a world financial crisis

affecting all international financialaffecting all international financialmarkets and all capitalist countries in themarkets and all capitalist countries in theworldworld

How was this possible?How was this possible?



Subprime and primeSubprime and prime the USthe US--

housing market housing market What is peculiar about the subprime segment What is peculiar about the subprime segment

Selling properties to the ninjas (no income, no job, noSelling properties to the ninjas (no income, no job, noassets)assets)

Teaser rates and other tricksTeaser rates and other tricks apparently very lowapparently very lowcosts (at the beginning)costs (at the beginning) but renewal of the loan due at but renewal of the loan due at variable conditionsvariable conditions variable interest rates to begin withvariable interest rates to begin with

Credit default Credit default no problem as long as the bubbleno problem as long as the bubblethrivesthrives

Credit default swapsCredit default swaps decoupling the loan from thedecoupling the loan from thedefault riskdefault risk

subprime mortgagessubprime mortgages 160 billion $ in 2001 to more160 billion $ in 2001 to morethan 600 billion $ in 2006than 600 billion $ in 2006



The brave new world of structuredThe brave new world of structured

financial productsfinancial products From the simple IOY (I owe you) to the alphabet soupFrom the simple IOY (I owe you) to the alphabet soup

Investment banks buying and reselling structuredInvestment banks buying and reselling structuredfinancial products all over the worldfinancial products all over the world

packaging and repackaging debts (poor and good, of packaging and repackaging debts (poor and good, of very different origins) into cdos (collaterized debt very different origins) into cdos (collaterized debt obligations) and other productsobligations) and other products

selling and reselling / trading cdos all over the worldselling and reselling / trading cdos all over the world

Hence: the risk of bad loans (subprimes) and / or theHence: the risk of bad loans (subprimes) and / or the

default insurance risk is everywheredefault insurance risk is everywhere



The housing bubbleThe housing bubble risingrising

mountains of debt mountains of debt Bubble driven by rising house prices (at double digit Bubble driven by rising house prices (at double digit rate)rate)

House prices driven by increasing demandHouse prices driven by increasing demand Increasing demand driven by the permanent expansionIncreasing demand driven by the permanent expansion

of mortgage financeof mortgage finance from prime to subprimefrom prime to subprime expansion of the market expansion of the market stagnant labour incomesstagnant labour incomes explosive growth of privateexplosive growth of private

debt, but alsodebt, but also growth of pirvate wealth (making moneygrowth of pirvate wealth (making moneyby selling a house / by refinancing the mortgage basedby selling a house / by refinancing the mortgage based

upon ever higher real estate / house prices)upon ever higher real estate / house prices) the US consumption levels based upon rising mountainsthe US consumption levels based upon rising mountains

of debt (with stagnant wages for the large majority of of debt (with stagnant wages for the large majority of workers)workers)



The making of an internationalThe making of an international

speculation bubblespeculation bubble SecuritizationSecuritization the chance to sell any sort of the chance to sell any sort of debt and loans immediately at a good price isdebt and loans immediately at a good price isthe base for the expansion of mortgage financethe base for the expansion of mortgage finance

Huge amounts of capital flow into theHuge amounts of capital flow into thesecondary markets all over the world (mostlysecondary markets all over the world (mostlyOTC transactions)OTC transactions)

Investment banks playing the gameInvestment banks playing the game pass thepass theparcel (with mbas, cdos etc.)parcel (with mbas, cdos etc.) amongamong

themselves, the financial markets follow theirthemselves, the financial markets follow theirexampleexample not one housing bubble, but several (Spain, UK,not one housing bubble, but several (Spain, UK,

Ireland, Belgium and so on)Ireland, Belgium and so on)



The importance of high leverageThe importance of high leverage

All these transactions are financed by credit All these transactions are financed by credit basicbasicrule: you dont risk your own money, you risk otherrule: you dont risk your own money, you risk otherpeoples moneypeoples money

Speculators (hedge funds in particular) use very highSpeculators (hedge funds in particular) use very high

leverage (up to 1 : 26) to finance their transactionsleverage (up to 1 : 26) to finance their transactions Hence: if the asset purchased is losing its market Hence: if the asset purchased is losing its market

value or becoming worthless, all that remains is a huge value or becoming worthless, all that remains is a hugeamount of debt!amount of debt!

Intermediaries flock to the markets as long as theIntermediaries flock to the markets as long as themarkets are on the risemarkets are on the rise helping to establish highhelping to establish highleverage for more and more participantsleverage for more and more participants



The dubious role of rating agenciesThe dubious role of rating agencies

The structure of the market for ratingsThe structure of the market for ratings The big threeThe big three Standard & Poors, Moodys and Fitch (together,Standard & Poors, Moodys and Fitch (together,

they control nearly 90% of the market for ratings world wide)they control nearly 90% of the market for ratings world wide) How they make their moneyHow they make their money creating structured financialcreating structured financial

products and evaluating themproducts and evaluating them while the issuing agent who wantswhile the issuing agent who wants

to bring these products on the markets pays them a fee for theirto bring these products on the markets pays them a fee for theirdouble servicedouble service Impressive ratings were a prerequesite for the rising demand forImpressive ratings were a prerequesite for the rising demand for

such productssuch products At the height of the cdos /cdss boom, rating agencies received At the height of the cdos /cdss boom, rating agencies received

more than half their income from such feesmore than half their income from such fees

Such papers were rated as high as state / treasury bonds, but Such papers were rated as high as state / treasury bonds, but yielded much higher returnsyielded much higher returns hence the frenzy of institutionalhence the frenzy of institutionalinvestorsinvestors



The bubble burstsThe bubble bursts

Credit defaults happenCredit defaults happen first and foremost in thefirst and foremost in thesubprime sectorsubprime sector

Rising interest ratesRising interest rates rising levels of foreclosuresrising levels of foreclosures -- aafaltering market (rapid decline of new mortgages)faltering market (rapid decline of new mortgages)

More and more subprime mortgage loans get foulMore and more subprime mortgage loans get foul

Declining house prices make refinance ever moreDeclining house prices make refinance ever moredifficult difficult

Credit rationing by the banks (flight from mortgageCredit rationing by the banks (flight from mortgage

finance)finance) And And flight from trash and into quality, rapid selling off flight from trash and into quality, rapid selling off

of mbas, cmos and other structured productsof mbas, cmos and other structured products thethemarket for these derivatives crashesmarket for these derivatives crashes



Fear spreadsFear spreads

Everybody in the financial world isEverybody in the financial world isinvolvedinvolved

The mortgage backed securities haveThe mortgage backed securities havebeen traded world widebeen traded world wide

Mortgage backed securities have beenMortgage backed securities have beenbought by banks all over the worldbought by banks all over the world

But where are the foul creditsBut where are the foul credits They can be everywhere, everyone isThey can be everywhere, everyone is

probably at riskprobably at risk



The first banks fallThe first banks fall the case of the case of Northern RockNorthern Rock

The fifth largest mortgage financier in theThe fifth largest mortgage financier in theUK UK

One of the major actors in the BritishOne of the major actors in the Britishhousing bubblehousing bubble

Credit defaultsCredit defaults falling price of NR sharesfalling price of NR shares

The reaction: A classical run on theThe reaction: A classical run on the

bank in october 2007bank in october 2007 followed by a bailfollowed by a bail out (laterout (later

nationalization in early 2008)nationalization in early 2008)



The big credit crunchThe big credit crunch a crisis of a crisis of the money market the money market

Interbank lendingInterbank lending the central part of the money market the central part of the money market From september 2007 onwards: banks restrict or refuse interbankFrom september 2007 onwards: banks restrict or refuse interbank

lending (sharp rise of interbank interest rates like the LIBOR and/orlending (sharp rise of interbank interest rates like the LIBOR and/orcredit rationing)credit rationing)

There is no liquidity crisisThere is no liquidity crisis -- banks are not lacking liquidity but banks are not lacking liquidity but

hoarding it hoarding it because they dont trust each others solvency in thebecause they dont trust each others solvency in thelonger runlonger run Institutional investors rush to state papers (and commodityInstitutional investors rush to state papers (and commodity

exchanges)exchanges) There is an insolvency crisisThere is an insolvency crisis hidden bankruptcies because of thehidden bankruptcies because of the

losses still undisclosedlosses still undisclosed

Since october 2007 central banks have stepped in several timesSince october 2007 central banks have stepped in several times sometimes in joint actionssometimes in joint actions -- as money market lenders of the last as money market lenders of the last resort resort



The big BailThe big Bail--out begins: Banks first,out begins: Banks first,women and children last!women and children last!

Bailing out Bailing out an old and common practicean old and common practice

An ever increasing volume of bail outs An ever increasing volume of bail outs

First stage (september 2007First stage (september 2007 august august 2008)2008) selective bail outs for individualselective bail outs for individualbanks in distress (ad hoc rescues)banks in distress (ad hoc rescues)

Second stage (from september/octoberSecond stage (from september/october2008 onwards): bailing out the whole2008 onwards): bailing out the wholebanking sectorbanking sector



The return of state socialismThe return of state socialism

Nationalizing the banks, socializing the lossesNationalizing the banks, socializing the losses UK leads the move: First nationalizing singleUK leads the move: First nationalizing single

banks (at least temporarily)banks (at least temporarily)

now: nationalizing the junk papers of all thenow: nationalizing the junk papers of all thebanksbanks US plan following the same pattern: helping theUS plan following the same pattern: helping the

banks to get rid of the junk papersbanks to get rid of the junk papers no rescue for the shareholders, rescues for theno rescue for the shareholders, rescues for the

managers are restrictedmanagers are restricted tens of thousands of bank employees havetens of thousands of bank employees have

already lost their jobs, much more to comealready lost their jobs, much more to come



The return of central bankingThe return of central banking

A series of individual and collective actions taken by A series of individual and collective actions taken bycentral banks of the major capitalist countries (Fed, BoE,central banks of the major capitalist countries (Fed, BoE,ECB, BoJ, Swiss National Bank) to provide liquidity (short ECB, BoJ, Swiss National Bank) to provide liquidity (short term credits) for the banking systemterm credits) for the banking system

A few days ago: the first concerted action to pump A few days ago: the first concerted action to pumpliquidity into the markets and to reduce the bank rateliquidity into the markets and to reduce the bank rate

Lowering the standards: More and lower rated papersLowering the standards: More and lower rated papersare accepted as collaterals for central bank creditsare accepted as collaterals for central bank credits

To no availTo no avail actually, the central banks are nowactually, the central banks are nowsubstituting the private banks as providers of interbanksubstituting the private banks as providers of interbankloansloans

How long can the central banks go on?How long can the central banks go on?



The meaning of this crisis: The endThe meaning of this crisis: The endof the Wall Street Regimeof the Wall Street Regime

A month ago, only two of the big Five A month ago, only two of the big Fiveinvestmentbanks at Wall Street were left investmentbanks at Wall Street were left

TodayToday nonenone

The last two giants have chosen to transformThe last two giants have chosen to transformthemselves into commercial banks!themselves into commercial banks!

The stock markets crash worldwideThe stock markets crash worldwide but Wallbut Wall

Street even more (last week a series of Street even more (last week a series of unprecedented stock market crashs all over theunprecedented stock market crashs all over theworld)world)



The meaning of this crisis: The endThe meaning of this crisis: The endof Neoliberalism?of Neoliberalism?

Certainly the end of the myth of the self Certainly the end of the myth of the self--regulating marketsregulating markets

Probably the end of the myth of financialProbably the end of the myth of financialmarket efficiency under minimal or nomarket efficiency under minimal or noregulation at allregulation at all

Rising doubts and second thoughts about Rising doubts and second thoughts about

freedom for speculators freedom for speculators The myth of the superiority of the USThe myth of the superiority of the US--

model of capitalism is shakenmodel of capitalism is shaken



When will the financial crisis tearWhen will the financial crisis teardown the real economy?down the real economy?

In March 2008 the world economy seemed still growingIn March 2008 the world economy seemed still growing

Except in the USA (where a severe recession hadExcept in the USA (where a severe recession hadalready begun / the US consumer is broke)already begun / the US consumer is broke)

But now it s completely different:But now it s completely different:

-- four major and several smaller EUfour major and several smaller EU--economies are ineconomies are incrisiscrisis

-- Germanys export industry (the leading export Germanys export industry (the leading export economy of the world) is slowing downeconomy of the world) is slowing down

-- Japans banks are profiting an buying the spoils of theJapans banks are profiting an buying the spoils of thefinancial crisis in the US and elsewhere, while thefinancial crisis in the US and elsewhere, while theJapanese real economy is stagnant Japanese real economy is stagnant

-- the crisis will continue during 2009!the crisis will continue during 2009!



Will the financial crisis affect theWill the financial crisis affect theNICs and N ACs of today?NICs and N ACs of today?

The financial crisis has already hit the ChineseThe financial crisis has already hit the Chinesebanks and big insurance concernsbanks and big insurance concerns

Asias stock markets are hit by a series of Asias stock markets are hit by a series of

crashes as wellcrashes as well

The slow down of world trade in raw materialsThe slow down of world trade in raw materialshas already begun (as several indicators show)has already begun (as several indicators show)

The BRIC

countries will be affected (how much,The BRIC

countries will be affected (how much,depends on the relative size of their domesticdepends on the relative size of their domesticmarkets)markets)



Long term effectsLong term effects

A new architecture of world finance in the A new architecture of world finance in themakingmaking

A World Financial Authority A World Financial Authority

A new role for the IMF? A new role for the IMF?

The shift between financial markets / financialThe shift between financial markets / financialcentres of the worldcentres of the world

An end to offshore financial centra? An end to offshore financial centra? The end of banking as private business as weThe end of banking as private business as we

knew it?knew it?



When and where will the next When and where will the next bubbles rise?bubbles rise?

Financial market capitalism Anglosaxon styleFinancial market capitalism Anglosaxon stylehas only one chance to survive:has only one chance to survive:

Finding new objects for worldwide speculation,Finding new objects for worldwide speculation,

creating the next bubblecreating the next bubble Candidats: Alternative energies, biotechnologyCandidats: Alternative energies, biotechnology

But new bubbles will not solve the underlyingBut new bubbles will not solve the underlyingproblem: a bifurcation between a stagnant realproblem: a bifurcation between a stagnant real

economy (with huge overcapacities all over theeconomy (with huge overcapacities all over theworld) and a hyperactive financial economyworld) and a hyperactive financial economy(with still huge surplus capital all over the world)(with still huge surplus capital all over the world)

Crise Financeira 2007 2008

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