GRUPO DE ESTUDOS E DIFUSÃO DA ANÁLISE DO COMPORTAMENTO (GEDAC)

MATERIAL DE ESTUDOS PARA O 5º ENCONTRO

DATA: 27/09/2014

LEITURA BÁSICA

Texto 01: “Personal agency in feminism theory: evicting the illusive dweller”

RUIZ, MARIA R. Personal agency in feminism theory: evicting the illusive

dweller. The Behavior Analyst, n. 21, 1998.

LEITURA COMPLEMENTAR

Texto 02: “Introdução: o que é feminismo?”

GARCIA, CARLA C. Introdução: o que é feminismo? IN: GARCIA, CARLA C.

Breve História do Feminismo. São Paulo: Claridade, 2011.

The Behavior Analyst 1998, 21, 179-192 No. 2 (Fall)

Personal Agency in Feminist Theory:Evicting the Illusive Dweller

Maria R. RuizRollins College

The growing impact of feminist scholarship, activism, and politics would benefit substantially frominput by radical behaviorists. The feminist community, broadly defined, and radical behavioristsshare interesting commonalities that suggest a potentially fruitful alliance. There are, however, pointsof divergence that must be addressed; most prominently, the construct of personal agency. A be-havioral reconstruction of personal agency is offered to deal with the invisible contingencies leadingto gender-asymmetric interpretive repertoires. The benefits of a mutually informing fusion are dis-cussed.Key words: feminist theory, gender, person-situation dualism, agency, invisible contingencies,

interpretive repertoires, verbal communities

In her book Mismeasure of Woman,Carol Tavris (1992) documents the of-ten-cited work of Samuel Cartwright, anoted American physician who in theearly 1 800s studied and described amental illness that was prevalentamong slaves. He named this conditionDrapetomania. The interesting thingabout this condition was that it was di-agnosed by a single symptom, namely,the uncontrollable tendency to runaway from slavery (pp. 176-177).Could we write fiction to be this inter-esting? Alas, Cartwright pathologizedthe reasonable response of the slave,and in so doing, left the institution ofslavery unexamined. Tavris goes on toshow, as others have, how psycholog-ical science has historically followed asimilar approach in its construction ofwoman and gender.The feminist critique of science

came to my attention several years agoas I began to explore disciplinary fron-tiers in order to develop a new elective

This article is a revised version of an invitedaddress presented at the 23rd annual meeting ofthe Association for Behavior Analysis, Chicago,May 1997.

I thank Guillermo V. Ruiz for inspiration andJudi Addelston for her insightful suggestions onan earlier version of this manuscript.

Please address correspondence and reprint re-quests to Maria R. Ruiz, Department of Psy-chology, Rollins College, 1000 Holt Ave - 2760,Winter Park, Florida 32789-4499 (E-mail:MRuiz@rollins.edu).

course for our undergraduate psychol-ogy curriculum. As a behavior analystteaching undergraduates in a liberalarts institution, I realized that some ofmy most engaging intellectual conver-sations were with feminist colleaguesfrom disciplines other than psycholo-gy. I decided to focus on the existingfeminist psychological literature andeventually developed a course I enti-tled "Women: Psychology's Chal-lenge."As I explored the feminist psycho-

logical literature, particularly its cri-tique of traditional psychological sci-ence, I realized two things. First, and Ifelt very enthusiastic about this point,the feminist critique of traditional psy-chological science was, in some ways,remarkably consistent with the radicalbehaviorist critique.

The second point was distressing yetironically familiar. Radical behaviorism,the philosophy of science articulated bySkinner and the conceptual frameworkfor behavior analysis, was among the"traditional" psychological models mostpoignantly criticized by feminists. I saythat this last point was ironically familiarbecause as Todd and Morris (1983,1992) have documented, Skinner's radi-cal behaviorism has been consistentlymisrepresented as Watsonian method-ological behaviorism throughout thepsychological literature. It was thereforenot surprising, and perhaps to be ex-

179

180 MARIA R. RUIZ

pected, that this culturally received viewof radical behaviorism be the one incor-porated in feminist critiques as well.Rhoda Unger (1988), whose work hasbeen inspirational to my own eventhough we have divergent points ofview, perhaps better than anyone artic-ulates this culturally received view. Al-though not as widely quoted by femi-nists as reflections on her years at Har-vard as a graduate student in Skinner'slaboratory where "even the rats weremale" (Unger, 1989, p. 15), Unger's ob-servation that "the juxtaposition of thewords 'behaviorism' and 'the study ofwomen' seems to some of us to be acontradiction in terms" (p. 125) suc-cinctly captures the spirit of the feministreaction to behaviorism.My first reaction to Unger and other

feminists was to shut my eyes and plugmy ears as children sometimes do inthe hopes that something annoying willgo away, but when I released my sens-es the received view was still there. Soit seemed not only reasonable, but theindicated course in terms of my teach-ing, to begin by addressing the unfor-tunate problem of mistaken identities.Therefore, part of my work in this areahas been aimed at clarifying the dis-tinctions between the two strains of be-haviorism. But what is more interestingis to move beyond clarification to elab-orate on substantive issues on whichradical behaviorism and feminist think-ing are congenially aligned.

In this paper I will illustrate how afeminist critique combined with a rad-ical behavioral analysis can yield pro-ductive results. Specifically, the differ-ential effects of discriminative contin-gencies invisibly embedded in somecultural practices often result in gen-der-asymmetric interpretations of thosepractices. An example that most of usare familiar with is the notion of polit-ically correct talk. The insistence byfeminists that we change our verbalpractices to become more inclusive hasbeen trivialized and satirized, as typi-fied by Rush Limbaugh's descriptionof "femi-nazis." Have feminists gonetoo far, or do the gender-specific exclu-

sionary effects of our verbal practicesrequire change? A behavioral analysisof invisible contingencies and interpre-tive repertoires can lead to a cohesiveunderstanding of the dynamics of thisproblem that can help us begin to an-swer the question. There are numerouspoints of convergence between radicalbehaviorism and the feminist perspec-tive, broadly defined, that suggest a po-tentially productive merger. I will be-gin by discussing these. At the sametime there are fundamental tensionsthat must be addressed as a precondi-tion to a successful synthesis, and adiscussion of these follows. I then ex-amine the merits of a merger and pre-sent the case of invisible contingenciesand interpretive repertoires. I concludewith a preliminary construction of afeminist radical behaviorist perspec-tive.

CONVERGENCE OFFEMINIST THEORY ANDRADICAL BEHAVIORISM

I begin by highlighting what I un-derstand to be the most importantpoints of convergence between radicalbehaviorism and feminist theory (Ruiz,1995). This will give us a context fromwhich to address specific details on theways, means, and benefits of workingtowards a mutually informing alliance.

First, radical behaviorists and femi-nists agree on the importance of con-text in understanding human action.Thus, both reject psychological ap-proaches that decontextualize individ-uals and fail to take into account theconditions of people's lives. A secondand related point is their rejection ofthe notion that the scientist, or knower,is separate from the subject of inquiry,or that which is known. Both radicalbehaviorists and feminists emphasizethe relational character of the processof knowing, and recognize that the sci-entist and the perspectives that he orshe brings to bear on the subject areimportant considerations.

Consequently, and as a final point tohighlight, radical behaviorists and fem-

PERSONAL AGENCY 181

inists recognize the social nature of sci-entific knowledge, the status of whichis inextricably connected to and notseparate from the activity of scientists.Therefore, the work of science is notabout establishing ultimate and tran-scendental truths, but is rather a prac-tical matter and is about determiningwhat works given the problem and thequestions that it raises.

Besides these conceptual junctures,there are other common groundsshared by these two scholarly com-munities that I have discussed in detail(Ruiz, 1992, 1995, 1996; Ruiz & Tal-len, 1993) and are worth mentioninghere. Originating from common intel-lectual roots, both communities sharethe assumption that experience plays acentral role in human development. Assuch, both share a belief in the trans-formative possibilities of human lifeand an optimistic philosophy of socialchange. Both feminism and radical be-haviorism advocate a view of humanbehavior and development that empha-sizes the contextual interconnectednessof individuals with their social andphysical realities. Both groups wouldagree on the value of an educated un-derstanding of our mutual intercon-nectedness in promoting humanisticpractices and values. Accordingly, bothcommunities have challenged the dom-inant worldview that deemphasizes orignores altogether the powerful influ-ences of external forces, and both haveconsequently faced similar problems ofacceptance. In fact, both communitieshave been and continue to be margin-alized by gatekeepers of mainstreampsychology, but both have defied mar-ginalization. In so doing, both com-munities have endeavored to create so-cial changes and advocated the restruc-turing of environments across thewhole spectrum of social institutions,from the classroom to the work placeto the family unit, to create betterlearning opportunities for all partici-pants.

Indeed, a mutually informing fusionbetween feminist psychology and rad-ical behaviorism has much promise. I

will elaborate on what I see as key as-pects of this fusion, and why it wouldbe in our mutual interests to look toone another as allies, both intellectu-ally and pragmatically. But before do-ing so let us to pause to examine majorpoints of divergence between our ver-bal communities.

MAJOR POINTS OFDIVERGENCE BETWEENFEMINIST THEORY ANDRADICAL BEHAVIORISM

Before elaborating on key distinc-tions, it is prudent to remind the readerthat the feminist community is highlydiverse (cf. Herrmann & Stewart,1994; Kirk & Okazawa-Rey, 1998;Reinharz, 1992). Any attempt to speakof this group as a monolithic entitywould be misguided. Nevertheless,there are themes that predominate infeminist discourse, one of which is theconstruct of personal agency. The per-vasive influence of this illusive dwellerin feminist theory is related to the em-phasis on individualism, at the expenseof context, within traditional psycho-logical models. Within the psychologyof women and feminist theory, thisprejudice manifests itself as a "perva-sive but implicit emphasis" on liberalfeminism (Crowley-Long, 1998, p.113). Disparate views on personalagency represent a fundamental tensionbetween radical behaviorism and fem-inist theory. Ironically, although theresolution of this conceptual tensionpresents a formidable challenge, it is anecessary step if we are to achieve asuccessful merger and a widely ac-cepted working alliance. Despite theconceptual problems that our standardwestern understanding of personalagency poses for feminists, many fem-inists nevertheless retain this concep-tualization as a working assumption.Let us examine the problems moreclosely.

Person-Situation Dualism andPersonal Agency

Similar to its function in mainstreampsychology, the self-actional agent as

182 MARIA R. RUIZ

locus of awareness and action hasplayed the role of guardian of personalchoice in feminist theory. Feministslook to the agent as the ultimate sourceof feminist resistance, a crucial processin feminist activism. At the same timefeminists believe in the power of socialcontrols and are committed to exposingthe external sources of power and con-trol that limit opportunities for individ-uals in society. Feminists want tochange our society's institutions in or-der to create better opportunities for allwho live in it. As such, feminists arecommitted to the transformative pos-sibilities of human life and an optimis-tic philosophy of social change.

Feminists then find themselves in aunique position to be arguing for the ex-istence of what appears to be conceptu-ally conflicting sources of behavioralcontrol, namely, the power of socialforces to oppress the individual and thepower of the individual or agent to resistsuch oppression. The conceptual ten-sions created by these coexisting beliefshave served as a great challenge to fem-inist scholars, some of whom have at-tempted to reconcile the two within con-ceptual paradigms that simply cannotprovide adequate grounds for reconcili-ation. Specifically, feminist scholarshave struggled to find solutions within aconceptual framework that assumes per-son-situation dualism as the mechanismfor preserving the Cartesian agent whilearguing for social control. But in thestruggle to retain that Cartesian agent,these feminists run into serious concep-tual conflicts. Let me briefly mentionfour.

Conceptual conflicts in feminist the-ory. First, a hallmark of feminist schol-arship has been its challenge of Car-tesian dualities and the false dichoto-mies and myths that are based on thesedualities. The feminist critique of sci-ence, for example, has exposed thepervasive impact of gender ideologyon our scientific knowledge base. Sci-ence's masculinist perspective includesvalue-laden Cartesian splits betweenwho can know (the scientist vs. thesubject), what can be known and the

relative status of such knowledge (ob-jective vs. subjective reality), and howwe can come to know it (intuition vs.reason as tools for acquiring knowl-edge). The generic feminist critique ofdualism on epistemological groundsnotwithstanding, person-situation du-alism is well embedded in much fem-inist writing.

Second, person-situation dualism iskindred with another form of dualismthat is of special interest and poses spe-cific concerns to feminists and behav-iorists alike, namely the nature-nurturedichotomy. In psychological science,essentialist ideologies such as biologi-cal determinism have historically mas-queraded as the self-actional agent inthe person-situation duality. This cam-ouflage, as I will illustrate, has escapedeven some feminists who reject essen-tialism in favor of social construction-ism, making claims that are conceptu-ally indefensible and unsustainable.

Third, the self-actional agent hasbeen a convenient locus of proximalcausation in psychological theory. In-voking it as such feeds into and pro-motes the "billiard ball" mechanisticmodel of causation, which has been theprevalent explanatory model in psy-chology and which feminist criticshave widely and ardently attacked.

Finally, the self-actional agent cre-ates some serious conceptual traps forthe feminist critique of traditional psy-chological models that focus on the in-dividual and exclude or ignore socialand political influences on develop-ment. Specifically, many feministsmaintain that the individual as agentconstructs reality and creates personalchange in spite of social controls. Letme elaborate on the conceptual trapswith an illustration.

Unger (1988), for example, caststhe problems in terms of personal epis-temologies. The conceptual dilemmashe elaborates goes something likethis: If we extend the argument that theindividual as agent constructs his orher own reality, it is possible to con-clude that "reality is all in one's head."Unger herself notes the problem that if

PERSONAL AGENCY 183

reality is all in one's head, how do weexplore a shared reality, including so-cial controls that affect members ofsome social groups uniformly and se-lectively (e.g., how sexist practices af-fect women's behavior)? In reconcilingagency and social control, Ungerwrites that it is noteworthy that femi-nists who are social activists andagents of social change appear to beable to maintain a contradictory cog-nitive schema, which may be particu-larly adaptive to a contradictory reali-ty.From a behavioral perspective I

would argue that the agent-based cog-nitive solution spoken in terms of con-tradictory cognitive schemas and real-ities is itself problematic. For one, itleaves open the question "under whatconditions or situations is a particularcognitive schema activated?"

Feminist praxis. But even if wecould determine the conditions that"call forth" or set the occasion for aparticular cognitive schema, we wouldstill have some practical questions toanswer. That is, the cognitive solutionis at worst problematic and at best in-complete from the perspective of fem-inist praxis. Consider, for example, twopractical goals of feminist practice.One is to empower individuals and in-crease individual resistance to oppres-sive cultural practices. A second goalis to create a feminist epistemology orway of knowing that gives voice tohow women experience the world andwith which to analyze how gender asan epistemological system works toframe our experiences as women (Kas-chak, 1992; Unger, 1990).

Returning to Unger's solutions,knowing the conditions that set the oc-casion for a particular cognitive sche-ma to come into play still leaves un-answered the questions of just howcontradictory cognitive schemas andrealities develop. It also leaves unan-swered the question of how these ac-tually operate to facilitate or mediatefeminist resistance or what we mightcall agentic action.

WHAT DOES FEMINISMHAVE TO OFFER

RADICAL BEHAVIORISTSAND BEHAVIOR ANALYSTS?

Let us consider how a feminist per-spective might contribute to work con-ducted in the behavior-analytic tradi-tion. This is an important area ofdiscussion to me because behavioristcolleagues often reply to feminist anal-ysis by asking "Well, do we reallyneed feminism? What can it add? Afterall, when properly understood behavioranalysis is gender neutral and does notpresuppose any particular set of val-ues." So let me share why I believethat we would benefit from a feministperspective, in spite of the fact thatthese claims may be true in principle ifnot in practice.

In addressing how a feminist per-spective might contribute to work con-ducted in the behavior-analytic tradi-tion, I will not focus on the specifictypes of research questions that a fem-inist researcher might address usingbehavior analysis as the methodologi-cal tool. Although in all honesty thismight be the easier task, what I actu-ally want to focus on is how the ori-enting assumptions that guide feministwork might affect how a behavior an-alyst looks at and approaches potentialquestions to research in virtually anyarea. With that in mind, let me spellout two such assumptions that I willwork from in addressing the pertinenceof a feminist perspective. First is thenotion that scientific activity is not val-ue free or gender neutral, and that sci-entific inquiry must include examina-tion of both values and gender. Thesecond assumption is that scientific ac-tivity is a means to achieving solutionsto practical problems and as such it isalso political activity.

Although these orienting assump-tions do not themselves define or de-lineate research areas, they certainlyinfluence the researcher's point ofview. As such, they can encourage usto ask certain questions about the re-search setting or context of discovery,

184 MARIA R. RUIZ

for example "is our environmentalconfiguration gendered, and if so, howmight this influence our outcomes?"We might also ask questions about theresearch process itself. For instance, inrelation to the context of justificationand in keeping with our "truth criteri-on" of effective action, we might ask,"What are the cultural values reflectedin our definitions of effective actionwith respect to discriminatory culturalpractices?" Here feminists wouldagree with Rogers (1966) that "the val-ue or purpose that gives meaning to aparticular endeavor must always lieoutside that endeavor" (p. 310). Wemight also ask "On whose behalf arewe functioning effectively, and whobenefits directly? Who benefits indi-rectly?" Along the same lines wemight continue, "Are there any hiddencosts to particular individuals orgroups resulting from this effective ac-tion?" As I will illustrate later, "invis-ible" contingencies are most problem-atic to identify and deal with in thisarea. Finally, "What classes of culturalpractices are we selecting and what, ifany, gender-related metacontingenciesare we affecting?" Certainly behavioranalysts concerned with social validityask these general types of questions(Kazdin, 1977; Wolf, 1978). But I be-lieve, and will try to show, that a fem-inist perspective brings a special prismto bear and leads to specific types ofquestions that might not otherwise sug-gest themselves as obvious pauses forfurther inquiry.

I will be more specific later when Idiscuss a concrete illustration, but firstlet me say a couple of words about theassumptions themselves. One of thethings I have found most enlighteningin reading the feminist critique of sci-ence is its sophisticated unveiling ofwell-hidden assumptions that demandnew interpretations of old "facts." Fem-inists have analyzed and disentangledcontrolling relations in scientific workto expose how gender and gendered ar-rangements affect our scientific know-ing. Moreover, they have shown howgender can influence our research find-

ings while remaining invisible as asource of control (e.g., Broverman,Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, &Vogel, 1970; Collins, 1998; Eagly &Mladinic, 1989). If a feminist perspec-tive were to do no more than set theoccasion for identifying such sourcesof invisible control, then this would besufficient grounds for encouraging thefeminist perspective among behavioranalysts. But there is more to offer.Of even more immediate practical

importance is feminists' focus on howdiscriminatory cultural practices workto disempower certain groups. Of par-ticular interest to feminists is how dis-criminatory practices are invisibly andseamlessly woven into well-establishedcultural practices that are widely ac-cepted and, it would seem, acceptableto the mainstream in our culture. Fem-inist analyses are designed to dissectsuch practices and expose the prob-lems.

But doing so is often easier said thandone, because the literal invisibility ofdiscriminatory practices makes the ex-posing a difficult challenge. Specifical-ly, discriminatory practices may bevisible to or discriminated by some,though not all, members of a socialgroup who by virtue of their member-ship in that group are adversely affect-ed by the practice. Members of thedominant group, on the other hand, forwhom the practice is established andwho are favored or accommodated bythe practice are less likely to see thepractice as discriminatory in the socio-political sense. This social blindness bymembers of the dominant group whoare accommodated by the practice islikely related to the absence of discrim-inative contingencies that might makethe differentially oppressive effects ofthe practice visible.

But the problem grows even furtherin complexity as individuals who aredifferentially affected engage in verbalexchanges about such practices. Spe-cifically, the highly selective effects ofsubtle discriminatory practices maymake it difficult, if not impossible, fora member of a group adversely affect-

PERSONAL AGENCY 185

ed by the practice to actually commu-nicate effectively about it with a mem-ber of the dominant group not adverse-ly affected. The notion of the so-called"chilly climate" in the classroom forfemale students is a good illustration ofthis because of the subtlety of the prac-tices that create such a climate. Thecourts have now come to appreciatethis very point. Whereas in the pastsuch perceptions might have been putto the "reasonable person test," theNinth Circuit Court of Appeals recog-nized the need for a "reasonable wom-an standard" in Ellison v. Brady(1991). In this decision the court rec-ognized that the perception of a subtlediscriminatory practice as such mightbe different for men and women. Thatis, what a reasonable woman may"see" and interpret as sexist and op-pressive, a reasonable man might not.Writing for the majority, Circuit JudgeBeezer explains that

A complete understanding of the victim's viewrequires, among other things, an analysis of thedifferent perspectives of men and women. Con-duct that many men consider unobjectionablemay offend many women.... We adopt the per-spective of a reasonable woman primarily be-cause we believe that a sex-blind reasonable per-son standard tends to be male-biased and tendsto systematically ignore the experiences ofwomen. (p. 7)

Justice Beezer clearly recognized thatthe nuances of interpretation are relat-ed to a person's experiences. His artic-ulation of this important point is com-patible with a behavior-analytic inter-pretation of interpretive repertoires.Specifically, whether an individual in-terprets a cultural practice as offensive,oppressive, or objectionable has every-thing to do with the effects of thosepractices on the person's behavior. Al-though direct experience may be suf-ficient, it is not necessary, becauserules concerning those relations mayalso reveal the practice to be objection-able. To better understand how mem-bers of different social groups maycome to see and label cultural practicesdifferently, it is helpful to examine the

interactive dynamics of interpretiverepertoires with concrete examples.

ON THE INVISIBILITY OFDISCRIMINATORYPRACTICES AS

STIMULUS CLASSES

Hineline's (1992) analysis of inter-pretive repertoires as they relate to dif-ferent situations is extremely helpful inunderstanding how environmental ar-rangements might render discrimina-tory practices "invisible" to some in-terpreters but not others. Hineline asksus to consider the case of a color-blindexperimenter who attempts to assessand interpret the wavelength sensitivi-ties of a participant with trichromaticvision without the benefit or aid of spe-cialized instruments. Imagine furtherthat you are an observer who, like theparticipant of the experiment, has tri-chromatic vision, and who is unawarethat our experimenter is color-blind. Asyou try to make sense of the experi-menter's interpretations of the partici-pant's discriminations, you may con-clude that our experimenter is dense orfoolish in denying the validity of thediscriminations the participant is obvi-ously making. And you might askyourself, in a figurative sense, "Is sheblind?"On the other hand, imagine if our

experimenter was the only individualwith trichromatic vision. Imagine fur-ther that everyone else was color-blind,including the participant and you, theobserver who is trying to make senseof the experimenter's interpretations. Inthis case you would be justifiably like-ly to conclude that there must be some-thing wrong with the experimenterwho is after all insisting on distinctionsthat do not make sense to anyone else.In this case you might ask yourself, "Isshe crazy?"

Hineline's illustrations provide help-ful examples of complexities that canemerge when stimulus control relationsthat influence repertoires of discrimi-nation and generalization of the inter-preter and the participant whose dis-

186 MARIA R. RUIZ

criminative responding he or she is in-terpreting (i.e., the interpretee) are dif-ferent. In Hineline's examples certainwavelength values will remain invisi-ble to the individual who is color-blind.And the participant with trichromaticvision may not be able to appropriatelyaffect her listener as she tries to com-municate to the color-blind interpreterthe stimulus classes that are operativefor her. Conversely, a color-blind inter-preter may simply not see, and there-fore, not get the stimulus control rela-tions that are operative for the partici-pant with trichromatic vision whoserepertoire he or she is interpreting.Now I want to borrow Hineline's il-

lustration and apply the terms trichro-matic vision and color blindness in arather loose metaphor to illustrate howthe same types of complexities, or dis-equilibria, may emerge with stimuluscontrol relations that involve culturalpractices, rather than wavelength, asthe stimulus class. This scenario illus-trates how cultural practices may cometo be labeled discriminatory, or inter-preted as different, by individuals fromone group while remaining invisible assuch to members of another.

The Bathroom

This scenario comes from a storythat my father tells about a personalexperience. Our family emigrated fromCuba to the United States in the 1960s,and once in the U.S. my father entereda residency program in pathology in acentral Florida hospital in order to val-idate his medical degree. At the time,the men's bathrooms in the hospitalwere labeled in one of two ways: either"men", or "colored men."' The bath-room closest to the laboratory wheremy father worked and the one he usedconsistently was designated "coloredmen." The racial designation and thecultural practices signified by the la-bels were not familiar to my father atfirst; that is, he could not tact these.Our family is of Euro-American de-scent, and it wasn't long before he dis-

covered that, culturally speaking, hewas entering the wrong bathroom.

Applying the term trichromatic vi-sion in a loose metaphor, if my fatherwere the subject of observation in aninvestigation, and the experimenter orinterpreter were a North American sci-entist with trichromatic vision, cultur-ally speaking, the experimenter mightwell wonder whether my father was"colored blind." This question wouldbe most likely if the interpreter had noinformation about my father's culturalhistory. The resulting disequilibrium instimulus control relations governingtheir respective repertoires in this caseinvolves a class of environmentalevents that are culturally peculiar toand characteristic of the interpreter'sbehavior (i.e., the experimenter ob-serving and describing my father) butnot of the interpretee's (i.e., my fa-ther's) behavior.Now imagine the reverse, that is, my

father observing a colleague, also ofEuro-American descent but with cul-turally sensitive lenses. This colleaguewalks three times as far as he to go tothe bathroom for no apparent reason.My father might interpret his behavioras strange, and wonder why this col-league is "going out of his way" to usethe bathroom. It is unlikely that my fa-ther would interpret his colleague's be-havior as "sensitive" to subtle culturalexpectations.

INTERPRETIVE REPERTOIRESAPPLIED TO INVISIBILITY

Discriminatory cultural practices areseldom as conspicuously labeled aswere the segregated bathrooms in the1960s. As sources of behavioral con-trol, these practices tend instead to beinconspicuously embedded in standardcultural practices. Feminist psycholo-gists' primary research interest hasbeen the analysis of gender, as well asother socially constructed categoriessuch as race and class. They have ar-gued that gender and other culturallyconstructed categories are transmittedthrough cultural practices. Moreover,

PERSONAL AGENCY 187

one's gender or race strongly influenc-es the conceptual classes that come tocontrol one's behavior in keeping withsuch practices. In fact, researchershave shown that these conceptualclasses are, in many instances, differ-ent for men and women (Bosmajian,1995; Richardson, 1997) and forblacks and whites (Moore, 1995;Scheurich, 1993).

The Classroom

Consider a more typical example ofthe subtlety and invisibility of discrim-inatory cultural practices. This scenar-io comes from a story that a colleagueof mine tells about a graduate studentat her university. My colleague and an-other department member, both ofwhom teach in their university's wom-en's studies program, held an informaldiscussion group for graduate studentsinterested in feminist issues. The groupmet weekly, and Sandy, a doctoral stu-dent in psychology, came to the groupon a regular basis. One afternoonSandy came into the meeting a fewminutes late. She was upset and havinga difficult time connecting with the dis-cussion, rare in her case because shewas typically an energetic and asser-tive leader in discussions.The group asked Sandy what was

the matter and she gasped for words.She was upset about some things thathad happened in her Individual Psy-chotherapy class, but she was not clearabout what specifically had upset her.She talked with some friends afterclass to see if they had had similar re-actions. They too were feeling strange,but were not sure why. This lack ofclarity in the students' understandingturns out to be a very important pointthat I'll return to.The group continued to listen and to

ask questions. "What happened inclass today?" The professor had shownan old but classic film on the topic ofpsychotherapy that was upsetting toSandy. The film was made in the early1960s (same period as the bathroomsigns) and displayed outdated fashions

and outdated cultural stereotypes thathave changed over the past 30 someyears. Nevertheless, the film is a clas-sic and contains three segments withFritz Perls, Carl Rogers, and Albert El-lis working with the same female pa-tient whose name is Gloria, and illus-trating how their particular brand oftherapy-gestalt, client-centered, andrational emotive therapy, respective-ly-is done. The group tried to helpSandy decipher her feelings and relatethem to what had gone on in the class.It was not simple for her to make con-nections. She knew "how" she felt,but she was having a very difficulttime specifying why and putting wordsto it. This is, once again, an importantpoint for our analysis.

Eventually the group discovered thatthere were two aspects of the class-room situation that had set the occa-sion for her reaction. First was the con-tent of the film. The film depicted ayoung female patient who came totherapy because she felt depressed.Gloria was a divorced mother with twochildren to care for. The divorce hadcreated financial circumstances thatforced her to work outside the home.She felt guilty about having to leavethe children to go to work. She also feltguilty because she had begun to datefor the first time since her divorce, andwas concerned that working and datingmade her a "bad mother."

All three therapists responded to thepatient by directing their attention atstrategies for coping with the guilt anddepression. Sandy pointed out that thispoor woman had a right to be de-pressed given the situation she was in,and it added insult to injury that sheshould feel guilty that the situation ren-dered her a "bad mother." Yet none ofthe therapists focused on or evenpicked up on the patient's problematicsituation or context. None challengedthe notion that a working mother is a"bad mother" or that a single motherwho dates is irresponsible. The culturalstereotypes that help to create and ex-acerbate this woman's stress remainedinvisible to the therapists, and her pa-

188 MARIA R. RUIZ

thology was the exclusive focus oftheir respective therapeutic interven-tions.The group suggested to Sandy that

the film was outdated, it was filmed inthe 1960s, after all, and things hadchanged. My colleague then asked herif she had shared her misgivings withthe professor and the rest of the class.The group then discovered the secondaspect of the situation that had upsetSandy. After the film ended, the pro-fessor asked the class to determinewhich of the three therapists each stu-dent would pick to go to for therapy,and why. Sandy was sure that shewould not pick any of them. She madean attempt to communicate this to theprofessor and the class, but she was un-clear when she tried to explain why shewas having negative reactions. In factshe realized that she did not have aclear understanding herself of the rea-sons for her reactions. The professorgently steered Sandy and the class tofocus on the question he had posed,"Of the three alternatives, whichwould you pick, and why?" Sandy feltsilenced, disempowered, and confused."Not only had the therapists in the filmmissed the point," said Sandy to thegroup, "but so did our professor."The scenario is a powerful illustra-

tion of how hidden assumptions lead-ing to subtle discriminatory practicescan remain invisible as such. Thesemay be particularly likely to remain in-visible to members of a group not di-rectly affected by them. In this scenar-io Gloria's "problems" were under-stood by all authority figures, the ther-apists and professor alike, in much thesame way that Cartwright had under-stood the problems of runaway slavesnearly 200 years ago. That is, theywere legitimate problems that the in-dividual should address and solve forherself in this case, with the help of atherapist. Sandy's view that the wom-an's troubles are related to the prob-lematic nature of women's roles in oursociety and the social construction ofthe "good mother" remained unartic-ulated. The locus of the problem, as

defined by the authority figures in thefilm and the classroom, was the patientherself. A focus on the patient as thesource of the problem is tacit if not ex-plicit acceptance of the assumptionsthat a working divorced mother whodates is a bad mother in our culture.Moreover, it is also implicitly assumedthat she does well to seek individualpsychotherapy to deal with the anxie-ties and depression that such behaviorsnot surprisingly occasion.

Note the complementary treatmentsof this situation by feminist theory andradical behaviorism. A feminist analy-sis of the scenario exposes the assump-tions embedded in these cultural prac-tices, whereas a behavioral analysis ofthe interpretative repertoires of the ob-jecting student and the affirming pro-fessor helps us to understand thesources of the disequilibrium in thetwo repertoires. Specifically, and to putit in terms of the metaphor we usedbefore, the disequilibrium involves therepertoire of a student with culturallyspeaking trichromatic vision who"sees," subtle discriminatory practicesand tacts them as such. It also involvesthe repertoire of a professor who is inturn "color blind" and for whom thesepractices, as such, remain invisible.

AGENCY: A RADICALBEHAVIORIST

RECONSTRUCTION

Sandy's dilemma brings into focus aclass of educational practices feministsrefer to as the hidden curriculum. Theterm is somewhat misleading in that itmay suggest gratuitous intentionalityon the part of the educational estab-lishment. In fact, the hidden curricu-lum can be described as a class of ed-ucational practices that have differen-tial effects on the behavior of male andfemale students (Association of Amer-ican University Women, 1995). How-ever, the overwhelming majority ofteachers are unable to tact the differ-ential reinforcement contingencies theyadminister (e.g. Eccles, 1992; Spender,1982). Therefore, differential selection

PERSONAL AGENCY 189

as a practice transmitted through thehidden curriculum remains largely in-visible to students and teachers of bothsexes. Feminist praxis encourages us toask questions such as "How do weteach students and teachers to becomeaware of these effects? How do wepromote resistance to these practicesby students and teachers alike?"

It is my contention that a behavior-analytic perspective is the appropriatetool with which to address these fem-inist concerns. Moreover, this presentsan opportune juncture for radical be-haviorists to engage the feminist verbalcommunity in a conversation. Howev-er, for the conversation to proceed pro-ductively, a complete reworking of theview of the individual as self-actionalagent is necessary. The view of the in-dividual as locus of agency and aware-ness must be transformed so that wecan begin to speak about tacting rep-ertoires as potentially agentic actionand the role of the verbal communityin their emergence. Let us be more spe-cific.When we speak of agency from a

radical behaviorist perspective, wespeak of acts in context. Agency is notseen as a characteristic of the individ-ual, but rather as a characteristic ofacts. Agency, therefore, is action, andagent acts can be distinguished fromnonagent acts in that agent acts includeawareness or "knowing that" one's ac-tions are related to key aspects of thecurrent circumstance, and the individ-ual can give an explanation relating theact in context. In other words, agentacts incorporate a verbal repertoire fornaming or, as Skinner referred to it,tacting stimulus conditions that set theoccasion for the act as well as its func-tions.

Feminist Praxis

Given this reworking of agency, letus return briefly to issues of feministpraxis, which I raised earlier in this pa-per. The development of feminist voiceor resistance, or to use Skinner's termcountercontrol, is critical in the femi-

nist agenda. Therefore, a key questionto ask is "can the behavioral reconcep-tualization of agency help us under-stand how to facilitate the developmentof these agentic acts?" I believe it canin the following way. Feminist resis-tance requires the convergence of twodistinct but related repertoires whichtogether function as the locus of agen-cy. First, the repertoire "knowinghow" is acquired through direct expe-rience. Second, the repertoire "know-ing that" enables us to explain an actof resistance and its functional relationto external, contextual circumstances.Beyond direct experience, verbalexplanations require socially mediatedlearning and a verbal community thatcan mediate such learning.

I now return to the case of Sandy toillustrate. First, Sandy experiencedfeelings of discomfort in the classroombut she could not explain them; that is,she knew "how" she felt, but she couldnot articulate why. So when she triedto speak in the classroom, she was un-clear to the professor. The professor, inturn "not seeing" her point, steered theclass back to what he wished them tofocus on, that is "which therapistwould you choose and why?" Therewas no opportunity in this situation forSandy to come to "know that" herfeelings were specifically related to thedisequilibrium between her own inter-pretation of Gloria's problems and thetherapists'.The second important point is that

following the classroom discussionSandy felt even worse, because nowher interpretative repertoire was out ofsync with that of yet another authorityfigure, the professor. Far from facilitat-ing the emergence of agentic voice, inthe behavioral sense, the classroom ex-perience inadvertently silenced Sandy'svoice and blocked the emergence ofwhat feminists call resistance.

This takes us back to the issuesraised earlier. We know that an over-arching goal of feminist research is todevelop a feminist epistemology thatcan address how gender operates as anepistemological system to frame wom-

190 MARIA R. RUIZ

en's experiences and their interpreta-tions of those experiences (Kaschak,1992; Unger, 1990). The behavioristconceptual framework and behavior-analytic tools can be brought to bearon this problem in a number of ways.To illustrate, radical behaviorists un-derstand subjective knowledge or self-knowledge to be socially constructedand originating within the verbal com-munity. Skinner's (1974) treatment ofself-knowledge is particularly usefulhere as he described thatSelf knowledge is of social origin. It is onlywhen a person's private world becomes impor-tant to others that it is made important to him(sic). [Nonetheless] self-knowledge has a specialvalue to the individual himself. A person whohas been made "aware of himself" by the ques-tions he has been asked is in a better position topredict and control his own behavior. (p. 31)

The focus of analysis, in turn, is on thecontingencies set up by the verbalcommunity in the development of suchknowledge. The tools of behavior anal-ysis may prove to be valuable in un-veiling relations that work to establishand transmit gender as an epistemolog-ical system influencing how womenand men live, become aware of theirexperiences, and interpret them.

Sandy's small but critical feministverbal community kept probing andasking her the kinds of questions thatled her to become aware of the rela-tions between her private responsesand the events in the classroom. Thesequestions set the occasion for her"knowing that" she was responding torelationships the professor did not see.Not only did her feminist verbal com-munity help Sandy tact important stim-ulus control relations, but membersalso validated these through shared ex-periences of disequilibrium and silenc-ing.

Mediating Tacting Repertoires orHelping the Blind to "See"

Because feminists and behavioristsare interested in effective action, wemust reflect on what sorts of effectiveaction this conceptual analysis mightrecommend. Specifically, what kinds

of experiences might be sufficient tofacilitate the acquisition of tacting rep-ertoires or the double vision that wehave discussed? For example, whatminimal experiences might we exposeour professor to in order to bring hisinterpretive repertoire and Sandy's intoequilibrium? This is the type of ques-tion that feminists involved with con-sciousness raising have asked for over30 years.

Having defined the task as involvingthe emergence of tacting repertoires,we might proceed to recommend theuse of training films with scenariossimilar to Sandy's that set the occasionfor gender-related asymmetrical inter-pretations. Viewing the film wouldthen be followed by verbal interactionsdesigned to bring into focus and tactgender-related stimulus classes embed-ded in the actors' repertoires. Ultimate-ly, the emergence and maintenance ofsuch repertoires, or double visions, willrelate back to the metacontingenciesthat are operative within organizationsthat select for them. Behavior analystswho work within organizations includ-ing education, industry, and the mili-tary are in a unique position to affectrelevant cultural practices beyond ear-lier efforts at simple consciousnessraising with the tools of cultural anal-ysis (Biglan, 1988; Glenn, 1985, 1988;Glenn & Malagodi, 1991; Malagodi &Jackson, 1989; Mattaini, 1996).

CONCLUSION

The time is ripe for radical behav-iorists to join the conversation on fem-inist issues that is entering its fifth de-cade of development. The growing im-pact of feminist scholarship, activism,and politics will continue without ourinput, but for behaviorists to remain si-lent would mean a loss for all. Ourcommonalities include historical roots,visions of the transformative possibili-ties of human behavior, and the com-mitment to create optimal environ-ments for behavioral development. Amerger is indeed in the interest of bothcommunities. Feminists can use our

PERSONAL AGENCY 191

tools to good effect, and we can inte-grate the feminist orientation in impor-tant areas in which effective action issorely needed. This is a fine opportu-nity to forge a potentially valuable al-liance, as many of our colleagues haveurged us to do (Allen, Barone, &Kuhn, 1993; Foxx, 1996; Neuringer,1991).Forging this alliance will be a chal-

lenging task, but the products of ourefforts are highly promising. The mostdifficult impasse will be the reconcep-tualization of personal agency calledfor by a behavioral analysis. Yet thistransformative act can have liberatingeffects on feminist theory and practice.Specifically, the behavioral perspectiveshifts the focus from agency as a qual-ity of the person to agency as a char-acteristic of acts. This perspective dis-misses the distinction between personand situation and the conceptual trapsembedded in this false dichotomy. Thatis, the person and the situation are nolonger understood as separate or evendistinct from one another, but rather asrelational coparticipants in a behavioralprocess.

This behavioral process entails thedevelopment of what we might callagentic voice, or said in other terms,interpretive repertoires. From a femi-nist radical behaviorist perspective,agency is said to emerge not in oppo-sition to cultural practices or in spite ofthese. Rather, agency emerges as theunderstanding of the very behavioraldynamics of such controlling practices.So, to speak of agency is to speak ofemergent verbal process. The verbalcommunity creates the conditions un-der which we learn to name and inter-pret our experiences, viewing and de-scribing ourselves not as isolated andinsulated loci of information choiceand power but as relational and dy-namic selves in process. Finally, thedevelopment and maintenance of agen-tic action can then be understood as acollective process that properly resideswithin the verbal community.

REFERENCES

Allen, K. D., Barone, V. J., & Kuhn, B. R.(1993). A behavioral prescription for promot-ing applied behavior analysis within pediat-rics. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis,26, 493-502.

Association of American University Women.(1995). How schools short change girls. NewYork: Marlowe.

Biglan, A. (1988). Behavior analysis and thelarger context. Behavior Analysis, 23, 25-32.

Bosmajian, H. (1995). The language of sexism.In P S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class, andgender in the United States: An integratedstudy (pp. 386-392). New York: St. Martin.

Broverman, I. K., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson,F E., Rosenkrantz, P. S., & Vogel, S. R.(1970). Sex-role stereotypes and clinicaljudgements of mental health. Journal of Con-sulting and Clinical Psychology, 34, 1-7.

Collins, L. H. (1998). Illustrating feminist the-ory: Power and psychopathology. Psychologyof Women Quarterly, 22, 97-112.

Crowley-Long, K. (1998). Making room formany feminisms: The dominance of the lib-eral political perspective in the psychology ofwomen course. Psychology of Women Quar-terly, 22, 113-130.

Eagly, A. H., & Mladinic, A. (1989). Genderstereotypes and attitudes towards women andmen. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-letin, 15, 543-558.

Eccles, J. (1992). Bringing young women tomath and science. In M. Crawford & M. Gen-try (Eds.), Gender and thought (pp. 36-59).New York: Springer-Verlag.

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F2d 872, C.A.9 (Cal.)1991.

Foxx, R. (1996). Translating the covenant: Thebehavior analyst as ambassador and translator.The Behavior Analyst, 19, 147-162.

Glenn, S. S. (1985). Some reciprocal roles be-tween behavior analysis and institutional eco-nomics in post-Darwinian science. The Be-havior Analyst, 8, 15-27.

Glenn, S. S. (1988). Contingencies and meta-contingencies: Toward a behavior analysis andcultural materialism. The Behavior Analyst,11, 161-179.

Glenn, S. S., & Malagodi, E. F. (1991). Processand content in behavioral and cultural phe-nomena. Behavior and Social Issues, 1, 1-14.

Hermnann, A. C., & Stewart, A. J. (1994). The-orizing feminism: Parallel trends in the hu-manities and social sciences. Boulder, CO:Westview.

Hineline, P. (1992). A self-interpretive behavioranalysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1274-1286.

Kaschak, E. (1992). Engendered lives: A newpsychology of women's experience. NewYork: Harper Collins.

Kazdin, A. E. (1977). Assessing the clinical orapplied importance of behavior change

192 MARIA R. RUIZ

through social validation. Behavior Modifica-tion, 1, 427-451.

Kirk, G., & Okazawa-Rey, M. (1998). Women'slives: Multicultural perspectives. MountainView, CA: Mayfield.

Malagodi, E. F, & Jackson, K. (1989). Behav-ior analysis and cultural analysis: Troublesand issues. The Behavior Analyst, 12, 17-34.

Mattaini, M.A. (1996). Envisioning culturalpractices. The Behavior Analyst, 19, 257-272.

Moore, R. B. (1995). Racism in the English lan-guage. In P. S. Rothenberg (Ed.), Race, class,and gender in the United States: An integratedstudy (pp. 376-386). New York: St. Martin.

Neuringer, A. (1991). Humble behaviorism. TheBehavior Analyst, 14, 1-13.

Reinharz, S. (1992). Feminist methods in socialresearch. New York: Oxford.

Richardson, L. (1997). Gender stereotyping inthe English language. In L. Richardson, V.Taylor, & N. Whittier (Eds.), Feminist fron-tiers (Vol. 4, pp. 115-122). New York: Mc-Graw-Hill.

Rogers, C. (1966). Some issues concerning thecontrol of human behavior: A symposium. InR. Ulrich, T. Stachnik, & J. Mabry (Eds.),Control of human behavior (pp. 301-316).Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Ruiz, M. R. (1992, March). Feminism and be-haviorism in historical perspective: Kindredsin the challenge of a worldview. Paper pre-sented at the 16th annual meeting of theSoutheastern Women's Studies Association,Tampa, FL.

Ruiz, M. R. (1995). B. F Skinner's radical be-haviorism: Historical misconstructions andgrounds for feminist reconstructions. Psychol-ogy of Women Quarterly, 19, 161-179.

Ruiz, M. R. (1996, June). Re-conceptualizingagency in feminist theory: A radical behav-iorist perspective. Paper presented at the 17thannual meeting of the National Women'sStudies Association, Saratoga Springs, NY

Ruiz, M. R., & Tallen, B. S. (1993, March).Modem feminist theory and psychology: Re-bellious twinsfrom a dysfunctionalfamily. Pa-per presented at the 18th annual meeting ofthe Association for Women in Psychology,Atlanta, GA.

Scheurich, J. J. (1993). Toward a white dis-course on white racism. Educational Re-searcher, 22, 5-10.

Skinner, B. F (1974). About behaviorism. NewYork: Knopf.

Spender, D. (1982). Invisible women: Theschooling scandal. London: Writers and Read-ers Publishing.

Tavris, C. (1992). Mismeasure of woman. NewYork: Simon & Shuster.

Todd, J. T., & Morris, E. K. (1983). Miscon-ceptions and miseducation: Presentations ofradical behaviorism in psychology textbooks.The Behavior Analyst, 6, 153-160.

Todd, J. T., & Morris, E. K. (1992). Case his-tories in the great power of misrepresentation.American Psychologist, 47, 1441-1453.

Unger, R. K. (1988). Psychological, feminist,and personal epistemology: Transcending con-tradiction. In M. M. Gergen (Ed.), Feministthought and the structure of knowledge (pp.124-141). New York: University Press.

Unger, R. K. (1989). Sex in psychological par-adigms-from behavior to cognition. In R. K.Unger (Ed.), Representations: Social con-structions of gender (pp. 15-28). New York:Baywood.

Unger, R. K. (1990). Imperfect reflections ofreality: Psychology constructs gender. In R.Hare Mustin & J. Marecek (Eds.), Making adifference: Psychology and the construction ofgender (pp. 102-149). New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press.

Wolf, M. M. (1978). Social validity: The casefor subjective measurement, or how appliedbehavior analysis is finding its heart. JournalofApplied Behavior Analysis, 11, 203-214.

Introdução: O que é o feminismo?

Nós, que nos dedicamos a estudara vida das mulheres, necessi­tamos e queremos basear nossa autoridade em uma linha de pen­samento feminina. Reivindicamos uma genealogia de mulheres pensadoras que nunca se interrompeu, mas quefoi escamoteada sis­tematicamente pelopatriarcado e que a universidade com seu andro- centrismo continua escondendo ou condenando à excepcionalidade ou à marginalidade, o que vem a ser mais ou menos a mesma coisa.

Fina Birulés

Estamos vivendo um fato muito curioso na sociedade contem­porânea: políticos, pesquisadores, organizações públicas e privadas afirmam que estào introduzindo a perspectiva de “gênero” em seus trabalhos, pesquisas e nas relações de trabalho. Praticamente ninguém nega que é necessário o enfoque de “gênero” no desen­volvimento de políticas públicas. Entretanto muitas dessas mesmas pessoas torcem o nariz quando a palavra feminismo é mencionada. Por que isso acontece? Por que a palavra “gênero” parece menos perigosa do que feminismo?

A resposta mais óbvia é porque desconhecem o que é o femi­nismo e todas as suas realizações, mas talvez a mais realista seja a de que essas pessoas foram “desinformadas”, pois o feminismo ao longo de sua história foi alvo de campanhas que fizeram com

Carla Cristina Garcia

que a população de modo geral acreditasse que o feminismo era um inimigo a combater e não que segundo a época e a realidade de cada país existiram e coexistiram muitos tipos de feminismo com um nexo comum: lutar pelo reconhecimento de direitos e oportunidades para as mulheres e, com isso, pela igualdade de todos os seres humanos.

É preciso ressaltar que, ao longo da história da sociedade ocidental, muitos discursos de legitimação da desigualdade entre homens e mulheres foram produzidos. A mitologia e as religiões são bons exemplos. Na Grécia Clássica e na tradição judaico-cristã, Pandora e Eva respectivamente desempenham o mesmo papel: o de demonstrar que a curiosidade feminina é a causa das desgraças humanas e da expulsão dos homens do Paraíso.

A ciência e a filosofia ocidentais também têm funcionado com o legitimadores da desigualdade e continuam, em maior ou menor medida, cumprindo essa tarefa.

O ocultamento do trabalho feminista foi tão intenso e eficaz que temos consciência de que este livro logo precisará ser atualizado e isso não apenas porque novas tendências irão aparecer, mas porque o trabalho das feministas dos últimos anos tem produzido material suficiente para rastrearmos a história escondida e silen­ciada e recuperarmos os textos e as contribuições das feministas que acrescentarão nomes, ações e textos até hoje desconhecidos.

Por esta razão, é preciso mostrar que feminismo tem uma longa história como movimento social emancipatório. Este é um discurso capaz de impugnar, criticar, desestabilizar e mudar essa relação injusta por conta de sua força crítica.

O termo feminismo foi primeiro empregado nos Estados Unidos por volta de 1911, quando escritores, homens e mulheres, come­çaram a usá-lo no lugar das expressões utilizadas no século XIX tais como movimento das mulheres e problemas das mulheres, para descrever um novo movimento na longa história das lutas pelos direitos e liberdades das mulheres. Esse novo feminismo visava ir

além do sufrágio e de campanhas pela moral e pureza social bus­cando uma determinação intelectual, política e sexual. O objetivo das feministas americanas era um equilíbrio entre as necessidades de amor e de realização, individual e política, o que parecia algo muito difícil de conseguir.

Em um sentido amplo, pode-se afirmar que sempre que as mulheres - individual ou coletivamente - criticaram o destino injusto e muitas vezes amargo que o patriarcado lhes impôs e rei­vindicaram seus direitos por uma vida mais justa estamos diante de uma ação feminista. Porém, neste livro, aborda-se o feminismo de maneira mais específica: trataremos os diferentes momentos his­tóricos em que as mulheres articularam, tanto na teoria quanto na prática, um conjunto coerente de reivindicações e se organizaram para consegui-las.

Desse modo, o feminismo pode ser definido como a tomada de consciência das mulheres como coletivo humano, da opressão, dominação e exploração de que foram e são objeto por parte do coletivo de homens no seio do patriarcado sob suas diferentes fases históricas, que as move em busca da liberdade de seu sexo e de todas as transformações da sociedade que sejam necessárias para este fim. Partindo desse princípio, o feminismo se articula como filosofia política e, ao mesmo tempo, como movimento social.

Como veremos, não existe apenas um tipo de feminismo, mas vários, pois são muitas as correntes de pensamento que o compõem, isto porque uma das características que diferencia o feminismo de outras correntes de pensamento político é que está constituído pelo fazer e pensar de milhares de mulheres pelo mundo todo.

Além de ser uma teoria política e uma prática social o femi­nismo é muito mais. O discurso, a reflexão e a prática feminista carregam também uma ética e uma forma de estar no mundo. A tomada de consciência feminista transforma - inevitavelmente - a vida de cada uma das mulheres que dela se aproximam, pois a consciência da discriminação supõe uma postura diferente diante

Breve História do Feminismo

Carla Cristina Garcia

dos fatos. Supõe dar-se conta das mentiras - pequenas ou grandes - em que a história, a cultura, a economia, os grandes projetos, os pequenos detalhes do cotidiano estão alicerçados. Supõe enxergar os micromachismos, as pequenas manobras realizadas por muitos homens todos os dias para manter sob seu poder as mulheres e a estafa que supõe manter duplas ou mais jornadas de tarefas. Ser consciente de que estamos infrarrepresentadas na política e ver como a mulher é coisificada dia a dia na publicidade. Supõe saber que segundo a ONU uma em cada três mulheres no mundo já sofreu algum tipo de maus-tratos ou abuso.

Nisso consiste a capacidade emancipadora do feminismo. Ele é como um motor que vai transformando as relações entre homens e mulheres e seu impacto é sentido em todas as áreas do conhe­cimento. O feminismo é uma consciência crítica que ressalta as tensões e contradições que encerram todos esses discursos que intencionalmente confundem o masculino com o universal.

O feminismo engloba muitas expectativas e muitas vontades operantes. Incide em todas as instâncias e temas relevantes desde as questões sobre os novos processos produtivos até os desafios impostos pelo meio ambiente. Sua importância é de tal calibre que não podemos conhecer todas as suas consequências, cada um de seus efeitos pontuais seja a diminuição na taxa de nata­lidade, a transformação industrial, a organização do trabalho. O feminismo é uma lanterna que mostra as sombras de todas as grandes ideias gestadas e desenvolvidas sem a participação das mulheres e muitas vezes à custa das mesmas: democracia, desen­volvimento econômico, Estado de Bem-Estar Social, justiça, família, religião. As feministas empunham esta lanterna com orgulho por ser a herança de milhões de mulheres que partindo da submissão forçada - enquanto eram atacadas, ridicularizadas, vilipendiadas - souberam construir uma cultura, uma ética e uma ideologia nova e revolucionária para enriquecer e democratizar o mundo. Esta é a luz que ilumina os quartos escuros da intolerância dos precon­ceitos e dos abusos.

Breve História do Feminismo

Por fim, o feminismo é uma lanterna cuja luz é lilás. Ninguém sabe ao certo por que o lilás é a cor do feminismo. Diz-se que esta foi adotada em honra às 129 mulheres que morreram em uma tecelagem norte-americana no dia 8 de março de 1857 quando o dono da fábrica, diante da greve realizada pelas operárias, ateou fogo ao galpào com todas as mulheres presas dentro do prédio. Esta é a versão mais aceita sobre a origem das comemorações do Dia Internacional das Mulheres. Esta história conta que os tecidos em que estavam trabalhando eram dessa cor. Outra, que esta era a cor da fumaça que saía da chaminé que se podia ver a quilômetros de distância. Existem outras versões sobre esta história, mas tanto a cor quanto a data são compartilhados por feministas do mundo todo.1

Para analisar, explicar e modificar essas realidades, a teoria feminista desenvolveu quatro conceitos-chave: androcentrismo, patriarcado, sexismo e gênero, intimamente relacionados e que servem como instrumentos de análise para examinar as sociedades atuais, detectar os mecanismos de exclusão, conhecer suas causas e propor soluções para modificar essa realidade.

Androcentrismo

O mundo se define em masculino e ao homem é atribuída a representação da humanidade. Isto é o androcentrismo: considerar o homem como medida de todas as coisas. O androcentrismo distorceu a realidade, deformou a ciência e tem graves consequências na

1 A data foi proposta pela alemã Clara Zetkin, uma das organizadoras daII Conferência Internacional das Mulheres Socialistas, em Copenhague/ Dinamarca, em 1910. Nessa reunião ficou estabelecido que o dia 8 de março seria uma data marcada para as grandes manifestações em toda a Europa, em homenagem às operárias da fábrica de Nova York. Mas foi apenas em 1977, quando mais de 1 milhào de mulheres se reuniram nas ruas, que a data passou a ser reconhecida pela ONU como o dia internacional de luta pelos direitos de igualdade das mulheres.

vida cotidiana. Enfocar um estudo, uma análise ou pesquisa a partir unicamente da perspectiva masculina, e utilizar os resultados como válidos para todo o resto do mundo, faz com que todo o conhecimento produzido nào seja confiável ou, no mínimo, tenha enormes lacunas e confusões. Um bom exemplo de androcentrismo sào os meios de comunicação. A visão androcêntrica do mundo decide e seleciona quais fatos, acontecimentos ou personalidades sào noticias, quais serão primeira página e a quem ou ao que dedicar tempo e espaço. Essa mesma visão também decide quem o explicará diante dos microfones, quem dará a chave dos aconteci­mentos. Como os meios de comunicação configuram a visão que a sociedade tem do mundo, perpetuam, em pleno século XXI, a visão androcêntrica. A distorção do androcentrismo e suas consequên­cias também são sentidas em outras áreas como a medicina. Outro exemplo: popularmente sabe-se que os sintomas do infarto sào dor e pressào no peito e dor intensa no braço esquerdo. Mas poucas pessoas sabem que esses sào os sintomas masculinos. Nas mulheres os sintomas sào dor abdominal, náuseas e pressão no pescoço.

Patriarcado

Até que a teoria feminista o redefiniu, se considerava o patriar­cado como o governo dos patriarcas, cuja autoridade provinha de sua sabedoria. A partir do século XIX, quando começaram a ser desenvolvidas teorias que explicam a hegemonia masculina, passou- -se a utilizar o termo em seu sentido crítico. É o feminismo radical, a partir dos anos 70 do século XX que o utiliza como peça-chave de suas análises. Para este o patriarcado pode ser definido como.-

Forma de organização política, econômica, religiosa, social baseada na ideia de autoridade e liderança do homem, no qual se dá o predomínio dos homens sobre as mulheres; do marido sobre as

Carla Cristina Garcia

esposas, do pai sobre a mãe, dos velhos sobre os jovens, e da linhagem paterna sobre a materna. O patriarcado surgiu da tomada de poder histórico por parte dos homens que se apropriaram da sexualidade e reprodução das mulheres e seus produtos: os filhos, criando ao mesmo tempo uma ordem simbólica por meio dos mitos e da religião que o perpetuam como única estrutura possível.2

Analisar o patriarcado como um sistema político significou enxergar até onde se estendiam o controle e o domínio sobre as mulheres. Boa parte da riqueza teórica do feminismo procede daí. Ao se dar conta de que o controle patriarcal se estendia também às famílias, às relações sexuais, trabalhistas e outras esferas, as feminis­tas popularizaram a ideia de que o pessoal épolítico. As mulheres se deram conta de que aquilo que pensavam ser problemas individuais eram experiências comuns a todas, fruto de um sistema opressor. Essa consciência foi determinante, por exemplo, para a análise da violência de gênero. Durante séculos as mulheres acreditaram que a culpa pela violência que sofriam era delas. No Brasil, esse sentimento ainda é comum e até que os movimentos feministas conseguissem que esse tema aparecesse nos meios de comunicação, milhares de mulheres pensavam que sofrer maus-tratos era normal.

É importante ressaltar que a existência do patriarcado não quer dizer que as mulheres não tenham nenhum tipo de poder ou direito. Mas as feministas chamam as conquistas políticas das mulheres neste sistema de vitórias paradoxais. Um exemplo: nas sociedades ocidentais contemporâneas, as mulheres conseguiram o direito à educação e ao trabalho remunerado, mas a maioria daquelas que trabalham fora de casa, tanto as assalariadas quanto as autônomas, continua encarregada do trabalho doméstico e do cuidado com os

Breve História do Feminismo

2 REGUANT, Dolores. La mujer no existe. Bilbao: Maite Canal, 1996, p. 20. In: Victoria Sau. Diccionario ideologicofeminista, vol. III. Barcelona: Içaria, 2001 .

p Carla Cristina Garcia

filhos. É a dupla jornada ou a dupla presença. Mesmo aquelas que conseguem delegar essa tarefa também o fazem sobre outras mulhe­res mais pobres ou mais velhas: as empregadas domésticas e as avós.

As formas do patriarcado variam. Em um país como a Arábia Saudita, por exemplo, onde as mulheres não possuem nenhum direito fundamental, sua realidade não se parece com a das euro­peias que, ao menos formalmente, conseguiram seus direitos. Na Europa, o patriarcado utiliza outros instrumentos para manter os estereótipos e os papéis sexuais, a discriminação no mundo do trabalho e a violência de gênero que continuam a existir em núme­ros assustadores. Por isso, é habitual encontrar ideias opostas em relação à atual situação das mulheres no mundo. Aqueles que não levam em conta o patriarcado asseguram que as coisas mudaram tremendamente, mas quem o percebe com nitidez afirma que as coisas não mudaram tanto assim: são os problemas que mudam sem desaparecer O objetivo fundamental do feminismo é acabar com o patriarcado como forma de organização política.

Sexismo

O machismo é um discurso da desigualdade. Consiste na dis­criminação baseada na crença de que os homens são superiores às mulheres. Na prática utiliza-se esse conceito para qualificar atos ou palavras com as quais normalmente de forma ofensiva ou vulgar se demonstra o sexismo subjacente à estrutura social. Desse modo, há situações em que uma expressão, uma piada, uma desqualificação, uma observação são machistas sem que a pessoa que o disse seja sexista. Por isso, um machista não é forçosamente um sexista e vice-versa. Então o que é o sexismo?

O sexismo se define como o conjunto de todos e cada um dos métodos empregados no seio do patriarcado para manter em situa­ção de inferioridade, subordinação e exploração o sexo dominado:

o feminino. O sexismo abarca todos os âmbitos da vida e das relações humanas. Ou seja, nào se trata de costumes, piadas ou manifestações do poderio masculino em um momento determinado, mas de uma ideologia que defende a subordinação das mulheres e todos os métodos utilizados para que essa desigualdade se per­petue. Um exemplo é a divisão da educação por sexos, constante na nossa sociedade e que tem oscilado entre ensinar as meninas unicamente a costurar e a rezar até a proibição de ingressarem na universidade ou exercerem certas profissões.

Gênero

Quando falamos de gênero, fazemos referência a um conceito construído pelas ciências sociais nas últimas décadas para analisar a construção sócio-histórica das identidades masculina e feminina. A teoria afirma que entre todos os elementos que constituem o sistema de gênero - também denominado “patriarcado” por algumas correntes de pesquisa - existem discursos de legitimação sexual ou ideologia sexual. Esses discursos legitimam a ordem estabe­lecida, justificam a hierarquização dos homens e do masculino e das mulheres e do feminino em cada sociedade determinada. São sistemas de crenças que especificam o que é característico de um e outro sexo e, a partir daí, determinam os direitos, os espaços, as atividades e as condutas próprias de cada sexo.

O conceito de gênero é a categoria central da teoria feminista. Parte da ideia de que o feminino e o masculino nào são fatos naturais ou biológicos, mas sim construções culturais. Por gênero entendem-se todas as normas, obrigações, comportamentos, pen­samentos, capacidades e até mesmo o caráter que se exigiu que as mulheres tivessem por serem biologicamente mulheres. Gênero nào é sinônimo de sexo. Quando falamos de sexo estamos nos referindo à biologia - as diferenças físicas entre os corpos - e ao

Breve História do Feminismo

falar de gênero, as normas e condutas determinadas para homens e mulheres em funçào do sexo.

Deve-se acrescentar a essa descrição que as diferenças bioló­gicas homem-mulher são deterministas, são dadas pela natureza, mas como seres culturais, a biologia não determina nossos com­portamentos. O propósito principal dos estudos de gênero ou da teoria feminista é o de desmontar o preconceito de que a biologia determina o feminino enquanto o cultural ou humano é uma cria­ção masculina. Foi Robert J. Stoller quem, em 1968, utilizou pela primeira vez o conceito de gênero:

Os dicionários assinalam principalmente a conotação biológica da palavra sexo, manifestada por expressões tais como relações sexuais ou o sexo masculino. Segundo este sentido, o vocábulo sexo se referirá nesta obra ao sexo masculino ou feminino e aos componentes biológicos que os distinguem; o adjetivo sexual se relacionará, pois, com a anatomia e a fisiologia. Agora bem, esta definição não abarca certos aspectos essenciais da conduta - a saber, os afetos, os pensamentos e as fantasias - que, mesmo estando ligados aos sexos, não dependem de fatores biológicos. Utilizaremos o termo gênero para designar alguns destes fenômenos psicológicos: assim como cabe falar de sexo feminino e masculino, também se pode aludir á masculinidade e à feminilidade sem fazer referência alguma a anatomia ou a fisiologia. Desse modo, mesmo que o sexo e o gênero se encontrem vinculados entre si de modo inexpugnável na mente popular, este estudo propõe, entre outros fins, confirmar que não existe uma dependência biunívoca e inelutável entre ambas as dimensões (o sexo e o gênero) e que, ao contrário, seu desenvolvimento pode tomar vias independentes.3

Carla Cristina Garcia

3 STOLLER, Robert. Sex and gender: On the development o f masculinity and feminity. New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. VIII e IX.

Depois deste trabalho, as feministas passaram a utilizar o con­ceito no desenvolvimento de suas teorias:

Em inrtude das condições sociais em que nos vemos submetidos, o masculino e o feminino constituem, com certeza, duas culturas e dois tipos de vivências radicalmente distintos. O desenvolvimento da identidade genérica depende, no decorrer da infância, da soma de tudo aquilo que os pais, os companheiros e a cultura em geral consideram próprio de cada gênero no que concerne ao temperamento, ao caráter, aos interesses, à posição, aos méritos, aos gestos e às expressões. Cada momento da vida de uma criança implica uma série de pautas sobre como deve pensar ou comportar- se para satisfazer as exigências inerentes ao gênero. Durante a ado­lescência, se recrudescem os requerimentos de conformismo, desen­cadeando uma crise que costuma acalmar-se na idade adulta.4Os estudos de gênero começaram nas universidades norte-

-americanas na década de 1970 e se espalharam por universidades de todo o mundo incorporados às ciências humanas.

Para as estudiosas do gênero, nenhuma das correntes teóricas (marxismo, funcionalismo, estruturalismo) tinha conseguido dar conta de explicar a opressão das mulheres. Nesse sentido, uma das conse­quências mais significativas que esses estudos provocaram foi uma crise de paradigmas: quando as mulheres apareceram nas ciências sociais, sejam como objeto de investigação ou como pesquisadoras, colocaram em xeque todas as teorias estabelecidas. Questionavam a validade das pesquisas, a suposta neutralidade dos termos, das teorias e as pretensões de universalidade de seus modelos. A introdução dos estudos de gênero supôs uma redefinição de todos os grandes temas das ciências sociais.

Breve História do Feminismo

4 MILLETT, Kate. Política sexual. Madrid: Cátedra, 1995, p. 80.

Carla Cristina Garcia

Mas a construção de tal conceito também gerou discussões e conflitos entre as teóricas feministas. Começando pelo problema central. O conceito de gênero se constituiu como via de acesso dos estudos sobre mulheres na universidade. Desse modo o termo parece indicar seriedade e rigor, e como críticas francesas afirmaram se tornou uma espécie de folha de parreira, que oculta muito mais do que mostra, como uma caixa de costureira onde cabe quase tudo.

De qualquer modo, como afirma Scott o termo gênero passou a indicar a qualidade fundamentalmente social das distinções basea­das no sexo e a ressaltar todos os aspectos relacionais das definições normativas da feminilidade. Assim, o uso do termo parecia situar quem o utilizava em um dos lados do debate que com frequência se travava nas diversas controvérsias dos discursos feministas dos últimos anos e que se pode sintetizar de forma esquemática com a pergunta: Deve-se entender o feminino em termos de constru­ção social ou há que se falar de uma essência feminina definida biológica ou filosoficamente?

Laurents propõe interrogar-se acerca das relações mantidas por mulheres reais enquanto agentes históricos com o conceito normativo de mulher, produto do discurso hegemônico. Ou seja, antes de tentar dar a resposta à pergunta “O que é uma mulher?”, deve-se deixá-las falar para que nos digam quem são ou quem eram. E isso não só porque às mulheres foram impostos o silêncio e a exclusão, mas também porque a construção do gênero é ao mesmo tempo resultado de um processo de representação e de autorrepresentaçào.

Teóricas do conceito de gênero foram as encarregadas de descrever um território novo que alterou radicalmente as teorias antropológicas androcêntricas da discussão sobre a realidade e a experiência; essas teóricas forçaram o reconhecimento da diferença que marcam o gênero e o reconhecimento da política sexual como princípio fundamental do patriarcado.

Sem dúvida, desde meados dos anos 1980, o novo sujeito “generado” (ou seja, permeado pelo conceito de gênero) também se manifestou muitas vezes como uma ficção unitária, que encobria, ao não considerar, outras dimensões da construção da identidade individual e social.

Se nos anos 1970 as feministas haviam reagido contra a razão patriarcal, agora as primeiras a denunciar que o gênero havia se convertido em uma nova totalizaçào excludente foram as margina­lizadas dos relatos feministas: as mulheres negras e as lésbicas que encontravam sua história e sua cultura ignorada. O termo “mulher” usado no discurso feminista dos anos 70 com frequência se referia a experiência das mulheres ocidentais, brancas, burguesas e heteros­sexuais como se fosse uma totalidade, ao que Spillers denominou uma “metonímia mortal” que relegava ao silêncio a experiência individual e coletiva de muitas mulheres.

O feminismo dos anos 70 acreditava que se podia definir uma categoria chamada “mulher” e que as elas compartilhavam certas experiências e perspectivas trans-históricas e transculturais e as práticas discursivas nos textos literários ou nas análises críticas procediam diretamente dessas experiências.

Se por um lado a crítica feminista dessa época foi determinante na hora de desmascarar a razão patriarcal ao denunciar que as pretensões de neutralidade e objetividade se faziam à custa das mulheres e contra elas mantendo como pilar do sistema patriarcal a sua exclusão da esfera da razão transcendente, por outro manteve alguns supostos essencialistas sobre a natureza dos seres humanos e as condições da vida social utilizando conceitos e teorias como se fossem ferramentas permanentes e invariáveis, que as condu­ziram a compartilhar algumas noções essencialistas e a-históricas das metanarrativas.

A investigação feminista recente parte da noção de que a sexua­lidade humana é uma construção social em que se entrecruzam

Breve História do Feminismo

estruturas econômicas, sociais e políticas do mundo material. A sexualidade nào é um fato natural como sugerem as teorias essen- cialistas; ainda que esteja materialmente no corpo, o funcionamento fisiológico do mesmo não determina a configuração ou o significado da sexualidade de uma forma direta e simples.

A ciência e o senso comum que pretendem dar a entender que os usos culturais e sexuais dominantes são resultado da biologia e que portanto são intrínsecos, eternos e imutáveis nào são senão expressões ideológicas que assinalam as relações de poder domi­nantes. Identidades profundamente sentidas, tais como feminina/ masculina ou hetero/homossexual, nào sào privadas nem produto exclusivo da biologia, mas se criam no espaço de encontro e tensão de forças políticas, sociais e econômicas e variam com o tempo.

A partir do entendimento desses conceitos, dividiremos esta breve história do feminismo em quatro grandes blocos: o feminismo pré-moderno: em que podemos encontrar as primeiras manifesta­ções da polêmica feminista; o feminismo moderno ou a primeira onda: que começa com a obra de Poulain de la Barre e o movi­mento de mulheres da Revolução Francesa que ressurge com toda a força nos grandes movimentos sociais do século XIX chamado também de segunda onda e o feminismo contemporâneo - ou a terceira onda - que abarca o movimento dos anos 60 e 70 e as novas tendências que nasceram no final dos anos 80.5

Carla Cristina Garcia

5 Pela riqueza de sua história, o desenvolvimento do movimento feminista no Brasil nào caberia em apenas um capítulo e por essa razão ele nào é aqui mencionado.