Regimes Híbridos

8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos

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Regimes híbridos

Introdução (1 página)

3ª vaga de democratização

pergunta de partida

defnição de robert dahl e schumpeter

huntington

reedom house

há várias abordagens que exploram este enómeno. ários termos

dierentes sugeridos por autores dierente. !iamond ala das " categorias e

de como se dierenciam# $igell ala de outra%& levints'( et al. )oncentram*seno termo +competitive authoritarianism,& -reedom house ala de

semiconsolidated authoritarian regimes# a'aria reere*se a +iliberal

democracies, e /chendler +electoral authorianisms,

You ask whether Russia is a hybrid regime or not, but the

definition of a hybrid regime itself is not clear. It mixes democratic

and authoritarian elements, but this mixture can take different

forms.

O que são regimes hibridos (2 páginas)

Tipos de regimes hibridos (texto wige) (2

páginas)

https%00ah'(ee.fles.$ordpress.com0124020levits'(*122*

competitive*authoritarianism.pd

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?@ difcil alar em regimes hibridos porque há muitas variaçAesB

!aso "rgentina (2 páginas)

https%00$$$.researchgate.net0publication013C827C996>ender6and6path*shiting6changes6in6a6h(brid6$elare6regime6;rgentina6in6comparative6perspectiv

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!aso R#ssia (2 páginas)

http%00$$$.sciencedirect.com0science0article0pii0/89C3""42C222214

http%00imrussia.org0en0anal(sis0politics01112*marc*plattner*i*russia*had*become*

democratic*the*$orld*$ould*loo'*ver(*diDerent*no$

http%00carnegieendo$ment.org0fles0overmanaged6democrac(61.pd

!aso $aásia

http%00$$$.amo.cz0$p*content0uploads0124020amocz*rp*12*24.pd

!aso %ene&uea

https%00$$$.amherst.edu0media0vie$032870original02"*27C9*3


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*+%I,'-.

Ihe end o the )old Jar posed a undamental challenge to authoritarian

regimes. /ingle*part( and militar( dictatorships collapsed throughout ;rica#post*communist :urasia# and much o ;sia and Katin ;merica in the late C82s

and earl( CC2s. ;t the same time# the ormal architecture o democrac( L

particularl(

multipart( elections L diDused across the globe.

Iransitions did not al$a(s lead to democrac(# ho$ever. Gn much o ;rica

and the ormer /oviet Fnion# and in parts o :astern :urope# ;sia# and the

;mericas# ne$ regimes combined electoral competition $ith var(ing degrees o

authoritarianism. Fnli'e single*part( or militar( dictatorships# postL)old Jar

regimes in )ambodia# Men(a# =ala(sia# =exico# Nigeria# 5eru# Oussia# /erbia#

Iai$an# F'raine# imbab$e# and else$here $ere competitive in that opposition

orces used democratic institutions to contest vigorousl( L and# on occasion#successull( L or po$er. Nevertheless# the( $ere not democratic. :lectoral

manipulation# unair media access# abuse o state resources# and var(ing degrees

o harassment and violence s'e$ed the pla(ing feld in avor o incumbents. Gn

other $ords# competition $as real but unair. Je characterize such regimes as

competitive authoritarian. )ompetitive authoritarian regimes prolierated ater the

)old Jar. E( our count# 33 regimes $ere competitive authoritarian in CC4 L

a fgure that exceeded the number o ull democracies in the developing and

post*communist $orld.1

Ihe stud( o postL)old Jar h(brid regimes $as initiall( mar'ed b( a pronounced

democratizing bias.3 ie$ed through the lens o democratization#

h(brid regimes $ere requentl( categorized as Pa$ed# incomplete# or +transitional,democracies.7 -or example# Oussia $as treated as a case o +protracted,

democratic transition during the CC2s#4 and its subsequent autocratic turn

$as characterized as a +ailure to consolidate, democrac(." Ki'e$ise# )ambodia

$as described as a +nascent democrac(, that $as +on the road to

democratic consolidation,9& )ameroon# >eorgia# and Maza'hstan $ere labeled

+democratizers,8& and the )entral ;rican Oepublic and )ongo*Erazzaville $ere

called +$ould*be democracies.,C Iransitions that did not lead to democrac(

$ere characterized as +stalled, or +Pa$ed., Ihus# ambia $as said to be +stuc'

in transition,2& ;lbania $as labeled a case o +permanent transition,& and

Haiti $as said to be undergoing a +long#,1 +ongoing#,3 and even +unending,7transition.

/uch characterizations are misleading. Ihe assumption that h(brid regimes

are ?or should beB moving in a democratic direction lac's empirical oundation.

H(brid regimes ollo$ed diverse traQectories during the postL)old Jar period.

;lthough some o them democratized ?e.g.# >hana# =exico# and /lova'iaB# most

did not. =an( regimes either remained stable ?e.g.# =ala(sia and IanzaniaB or

became increasingl( authoritarian ?e.g.# Eelarus and OussiaB. Gn other cases#

autocratic

governments ell but $ere succeeded b( ne$ authoritarians ?e.g.# >eorgia#

=adagascar# and ambiaB. Gndeed# some regimes experienced t$o or more

transitions

$ithout democratizing.4 ;s o 122# more than a dozen competitive

authoritarian regimes had persisted or 4 (ears or more." Oather than +partial#,


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+incomplete#, or +unconsolidated, democracies# these cases should be

conceptualized

or $hat the( are% a distinct# nondemocratic regime t(pe. Gnstead

o assuming that such regimes are in transition to democrac(# it is more useul

to as' $h( some democratized and others did not. Ihis is the goal o our

stud(. Ihis boo' examines the traQectories o all 34 regimes that $ere or became

competitive authoritarian bet$een CC2 and CC4.9 Ihe stud( spans fve regions#

including six countries in the ;mericas ?the !ominican Oepublic# >u(ana# Haiti#

=exico# 5eru# and NicaraguaB& six in :astern :urope ?;lbania# )roatia# =acedonia#

Oomania# /erbia# and /lova'iaB& three in ;sia ?)ambodia# =ala(sia# and

Iai$anB& six in the ormer /oviet Fnion ?;rmenia# Eelarus# >eorgia# =oldova#

Oussia# and F'raineB& and 7 in ;rica ?Eenin# Eots$ana# )ameroon# >abon#

>hana# Men(a# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ali# =ozambique# /enegal# Ianzania#

ambia# and imbab$eB.

Ihe boo' as's $h( some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized

during the postL)old Jar period# $hile others remained stable and authoritarianand still others experienced turnover $ithout democratization. Rur central

argument# $hich is elaborated in )hapter 1# ocuses on t$o main actors% ties to

the Jest and the strength o governing*part( and state organizations. Jhere

lin'age to the Jest $as high# competitive authoritarian regimes democratized.

Jhere lin'age $as lo$# regime outcomes hinged on incumbentsS organizational

po$er. Jhere state and governing part( structures $ere $ell organized and

cohesive# regimes remained stable and authoritarian& $here the( $ere

underdeveloped

or lac'ed cohesion# regimes $ere unstable# although the( rarel( democratized.

Ihis introductor( chapter is organized as ollo$s. Ihe frst section defnes

competitive authoritarianism and presents the case or a ne$ regime t(pe. Ihesecond section examines the rise o competitive authoritarianism. Gt attributes

the prolieration o competitive authoritarian regimes to the incentives and

constraints

created b( the postL)old Jar international environment. Ihe third section

sho$s ho$ competitive authoritarian regime traQectories diverged ater CC2

and provides an overvie$ o the boo'Ss central argument and main theoretical

contributions.

what is ompetiti/e authoritarianism0

+5olitics . . . is not li'e ootball# deserving a level pla(ing feld. Here# (ou tr( that and

(ou

$ill be roasted.,L !aniel arap =oi# 5resident o Men(a8

)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in $hich ormal democratic

institutions exist and are $idel( vie$ed as the primar( means o gaining

po$er# but in $hich incumbentsS abuse o the state places them at a signifcant

advantage vis*Ta*vis their opponents. /uch regimes are competitive in that

opposition

parties use democratic institutions to contest seriousl( or po$er# but the( are

not democratic because the pla(ing feld is heavil( s'e$ed in avor o incumbents.

)ompetition is thus real but unair.

'ituating the !onept

)ompetitive authoritarianism is a h(brid regime t(pe# $ith important characteristicso both democrac( and authoritarianism.C Je emplo( a +midrange, defnition


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o democrac(% one that is procedural but demanding.12 -ollo$ing !ahl#

scholars have converged around a +procedural minimum, defnition o democrac(

that includes our 'e( attributes% ?B ree# air# and competitive elections&

?1B ull adult suDrage& ?3B broad protection o civil liberties# including reedom

o speech# press# and association& and ?7B the absence o nonelected +tutelar(,

authorities ?e.g.# militaries# monarchies# or religious bodiesB that limit elected

oUcialsS po$er to govern.1 Ihese defnitions are essentiall( +/chumpeterian,

in that the( center on competitive elections.11 Ho$ever# scholars have

subsequentl(

+precised, the concept o democrac( b( ma'ing explicit criteria L such

as civil liberties and eDective po$er to govern L that are implicitl( understood to

be part o the overall meaning and $hich are vie$ed as necessar( or competitive

elections to ta'e place.13

;lthough $e remain committed to a procedural*minimum conception o

democrac(# $e precise it b( adding a fth attribute% the existence o a reasonabl(

level pla(ing feld bet$een incumbents and opposition.17 Rbviousl(# a

degree o incumbent advantage L in the orm o patronage Qobs# por'*barrelspending# clientelist social policies# and privileged access to media and fnance L

exists in all democracies. Gn democracies# ho$ever# these advantages do not

seriousl( undermine the oppositionSs capacit( to compete.14 Jhen incumbent

manipulation o state institutions and resources is so excessive and one*sided

that it seriousl( limits political competition# it is incompatible $ith democrac(.

1"

; level pla(ing feld is implicit in most conceptualizations o democrac(.

Gndeed# man( characteristics o an uneven pla(ing feld could be subsumed into

the dimensions o +ree and air elections, and +civil liberties., Ho$ever# there

are at least t$o reasons to treat this attribute as a separate dimension. -irst# some

aspects o an uneven pla(ing feld L such as s'e$ed access to media and fnance Lhave a maQor impact bet$een elections and are thus oten missed in evaluations o

$hether elections are ree and air. /econd# some government actions that s'e$

the pla(ing feld ma( not be vie$ed as civil*liberties violations. -or example#

$hereas closing do$n a ne$spaper is a clear violation o civil liberties# de acto

governing*part( control o the private media L achieved through inormal prox(

or patronage arrangements L is not. Ki'e$ise# illicit governmentLbusiness ties

that create vast resource disparities vis*Ta*vis the opposition are not civil*liberties

violations per se. ;ttention to the slope o the pla(ing feld thus highlights ho$

regimes ma( be undemocratic even in the absence o overt raud or civil*liberties

violations.

Gt is important to distinguish bet$een competitive and noncompetitiveauthoritarianism.

Je defne full authoritarianism as a regime in $hich no viable

channels exist or opposition to contest legall( or executive po$er.19 Ihis categor(

includes closed regimes in $hich national*level democratic institutions

do not exist ?e.g.# )hina# )uba# and /audi ;rabiaB and hegemonic regimes in

$hich ormal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to acVade

status in practice.18 Gn hegemonic regimes# elections are so marred b( repression#

candidate restrictions# and0or raud that there is no uncertaint( about their

outcome.

=uch o the opposition is orced underground and leading critics are otenimprisoned or exiled. Ihus# in postL)old Jar :g(pt# Maza'hstan# and Fzbe'istan#

elections served unctions ?e.g.# a means o enhancing regime legitimac(#


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generating inormation# or distributing patronageB other than determining $ho

governed1C& opponents did not vie$ them as viable means to achieve po$er.

)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished rom ull authoritarianism

in that constitutional channels exist through $hich opposition groups compete

in a meaningul $a( or executive po$er. :lections are held regularl( and

opposition parties are not legall( barred rom contesting them. Rpposition activit(is above ground% Rpposition parties can open oUces# recruit candidates# and

organize campaigns# and politicians are rarel( exiled or imprisoned. Gn short#

democratic procedures are suUcientl( meaningul or opposition groups to ta'e

them seriousl( as arenas through $hich to contest or po$er.

Jhat distinguishes competitive authoritarianism rom democrac(# ho$ever#

is the act that incumbent abuse o the state violates at least one o three defning

attributes o democrac(% ?B ree elections# ?1B broad protection o civil liberties#

and ?3B a reasonabl( level pla(ing feld.32

Elections

Gn democracies# elections are free# in the sense that there is virtuall( no raud or

intimidation o voters# and fair # in the sense that opposition parties campaign on

relativel( even ooting% Ihe( are not subQect to repression or harassment# and the(

are not s(stematicall( denied access to the media or other critical resources.3

Gn ull( authoritarian regimes# multipart( elections are either nonexistent or

noncompetitive. :lections ma( be considered noncompetitive $hen ?B maQor

candidates are ormall( barred or eDectivel( excluded on a regular basis31&

?1B repression or legal controls eDectivel( prevent opposition parties rom running

public campaigns& or ?3B raud is so massive that there is virtuall( no observable

relationship bet$een voter preerences and oUcial electoral results.

)ompetitive authoritarian regimes all in bet$een these extremes. Rn the one

hand# elections are competitive in that maQor opposition candidates are rarel(

excluded# opposition parties are able to campaign publicl(# and there is no massiveraud. Rn the other hand# elections are oten unree and almost al$a(s unair.

Gn some cases# elections are marred b( the manipulation o voter lists# ballot*box

stuUng# and0or alsifcation o results ?e.g.# the !ominican Oepublic in CC7 and

F'raine in 1227B. ;lthough such raud ma( alter the outcome o elections# it is

not so severe as to ma'e the act o voting meaningless.33 :lections also ma( be

marred b( intimidation o opposition activists# voters# and poll $atchers# and even

the establishment o opposition +no*go, areas ?e.g.# )ambodia and imbab$eB.

Ho$ever# such abuse is not suUcientl( severe or s(stematic to prevent the

opposition

rom running a national campaign. Gn other cases ?e.g.# Eots$anaB# voting

and vote*counting processes are reasonabl( clean but an uneven pla(ing feldrenders the overall electoral process maniestl( unair. Gn these cases# unequal

access to fnance and the media as $ell as incumbent abuse o state institutions

ma'e elections unair even in the absence o violence or raud.37 Ihus# even

though =exicoSs CC7 election $as technicall( clean# s'e$ed access to resources

and media led one scholar to compare it to a +soccer match $here the goalposts

$ere o diDerent heights and breadths and $here one team included pla(ers

plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven pla(ers.,34

Civil Liberties

Gn democracies# civil liberties L including the rights o ree speech# press# and

association L are protected. ;lthough these rights ma( be violated periodicall(#

such violations are inrequent and do not seriousl( hinder the oppositionSs capacit(to challenge incumbents. Gn ull( authoritarian regimes# basic civil liberties


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are oten violated so s(stematicall( that opposition parties# civic groups# and the

media are not even minimall( protected ?e.g.# :g(pt and Fzbe'istanB. ;s a result#

much opposition activit( ta'es place underground or in exile.

Gn competitive authoritarian regimes# civil liberties are nominall( guaranteed

and at least partiall( respected. Gndependent media exist and civic and opposition

groups operate above ground% =ost o the time# the( can meet reel( andeven protest against the government. Wet# civil liberties are requentl( violated.

Rpposition politicians# independent Qudges# Qournalists# human*rights activists#

and other government critics are subQect to harassment# arrest# and L in some

cases L violent attac'. Gndependent media are requentl( threatened# attac'ed#

and L in some cases L suspended or closed. Gn some regimes# overt repression L

including the arrest o opposition leaders# the 'illing o opposition activists# and

the violent repression o protest L is $idespread# pushing regimes to the brin' o

ull authoritarianism.3"

=ore requentl(# assaults on civil liberties ta'e more subtle orms# including

+legal repression#, or the discretionar( use o legal instruments L such as tax# libel#

or deamation la$s L to punish opponents. ;lthough such repression ma( involvethe technicall( correct application o the la$# its use is selective and partisan

rather than universal. ;n example is 5utinSs Oussia. ;ter =i'hail Mhodor'ovs'(#

the o$ner o OussiaSs largest oil compan(# began to fnance opposition groups

in 1223# the government Qailed him on tax charges and seized his compan(Ss

propert( and stoc'.39 Rn a more modest scale# the -uQimori government in 5eru

+perected the technique o Xusing the la$ to trample the la$#S,38 transorming

Qudicial and tax agencies into +a shield or riends o the regime and a $eapon

against its enemies.,3C Oivals L oten internal ones L also ma( be prosecuted

or corruption. Gn =ala(sia# =ahathir =ohammad used corruption and sodom(

charges to imprison his chie rival# ;n$ar Gbrahim& in =ala$i# 5resident Eingu $a

=uthari'a had his chie rival# ex*5resident Ea'ili =uluzi# arrested on corruptioncharges& and in F'raine# Keonid Muchma used corruption charges to derail 5rime

=inister 5avlo Kazaren'oSs presidential candidac(.72

5erhaps the most $idespread orm o +legal, repression is the use o libel or

deamation la$s against Qournalists# editors# and media outlets. Ihus# in =ala(sia#

the =ahathir government entered into a +suing craze, in the $a'e o the CC8L

CCC political crisis# ma'ing $idespread use o deamation suits to silence critical

reporting7& in )ameroon# more than 42 Qournalists $ere prosecuted or libel in

the late CC2s and several ne$spapers $ere orced to close due to heav( fnes71&

and in )roatia# independent ne$spapers $ere hit b( more than 132

governmentsponsored

libel suits as o CC9.73 Gn some cases ?e.g.# Eelarus# )ambodia# andOussiaB# the repeated use o costl( la$suits led to the disappearance o man(

independent media outlets. Gn other cases ?e.g.# =ala(sia and F'raineB# the threat

o legal action led to $idespread sel*censorship.

;lthough +legal, and other repression under competitive authoritarianism is

not severe enough to orce the opposition underground or into exile# it clearl(

exceeds $hat is permissible in a democrac(. E( raising the cost o opposition

activit(

?thereb( convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelinesB and

critical media coverage ?thereb( encouraging sel*censorshipB# even intermittent

civil*liberties violations can seriousl( hinder the oppositionSs capacit( to organize

and challenge the government. An Uneven Playing Field


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-inall(# nearl( all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized b( an

uneven pla(ing feld.77 Rbviousl(# a degree o incumbent advantage exists

in all democracies. Gndeed# man( ne$ democracies in :astern :urope and

Katin ;merica are characterized b( extensive clientelism and politicization o

state bureaucracies. Io distinguish such cases rom those o unair competition#

$e set a high threshold or unairness. Je consider the pla(ing feld uneven

$hen ?B state institutions are $idel( abused or partisan ends# ?1B incumbents are

s(stematicall( avored at the expense o the opposition# and ?3B the oppositionSs

abilit( to organize and compete in elections is seriousl( handicapped. Ihree

aspects o an uneven pla(ing feld are o particular importance% access to

resources# media# and the la$.

access to resources. ;ccess to resources is uneven $hen incumbents use the

state to create or maintain resource disparities that seriousl( hinder the

oppositionSs

abilit( to compete.74 Ihis ma( occur in several $a(s. -irst# incumbents

ma( ma'e direct partisan use o state resources. Gn a e$ cases# this unding is

legal. Gn >u(ana and imbab$e in the C82s# governing parties $ere fnancedb( special public ministries and0or oUcial state subventions to the exclusion o

other parties. =ore requentl(# state fnance is illicit. Gn =exico# or example# the

Gnstitutional Oevolutionar( 5art( ?5OGB reportedl( dre$ Y billion in illicit state

fnance during the earl( CC2s7"& in Oussia# tens o millions o dollars in

government

bonds $ere diverted to WeltsinSs CC" reelection campaign.79 Gncumbents

also ma( s(stematicall( deplo( the machiner( o the state L or example# state

buildings# vehicles# and communications inrastructure L or electoral campaigns#

and public emplo(ees and securit( orces ma( be mobilized en masse on behal o

the governing part(. Gn ormer /oviet states such as Eelarus# Oussia# and F'raine#

this mobilization included not onl( lo$*level bureaucrats but also teachers# doctors#and other proessionals.78 Gn underdeveloped countries $ith $ea' private

sectors# such abuse can create vast resource advantages.

Gncumbents also ma( use the state to monopolize access to private*sector

fnance. >overning parties ma( use discretionar( control over credit# licenses#

state contracts# and other resources to enrich themselves via part(*o$ned

enterprises

?e.g.# Iai$anB# beneft cron(* or prox(*o$ned frms that then contribute

mone( bac' into part( coDers ?e.g.# =ala(siaB# or corner the mar'et in privatesector

donations ?e.g.# =exico and OussiaB. Gn =ala(sia and Iai$an# or example#

governing parties used control o the state to build multibillion*dollar business

empires.7C Ihe state also ma( be used to den( opposition parties access toresources. Gn F'raine# or example# businesses that fnanced the opposition $ere

routinel( targeted b( tax authorities.42 Gn >hana# entrepreneurs $ho fnanced

opposition parties +$ere blac'listed# denied government contracts# and Zhad[

their businesses openl( sabotaged,4& in )ambodia# the opposition /am Oains(

5art( ?/O5B $as +starved or unds b( a business communit( told b( Zthe

government[

that fnancing /O5 $as committing economic suicide.,41

Gn these cases# resource disparities ar exceeded an(thing seen in established

democracies. Gn Iai$an# the Y122 million to Y422 million in annual profts

generated b( the Y7.4 billion business empire o the Muomintang ?M=IBgave the part( a fnancial base that $as +unheard o . . . in an( representative

democrac(#,43 $hich allo$ed it to outspend opponents b( more than 42*to*


9/44

during elections.47 Gn =exico# the 5OG admitted to spending 3 times more than

the t$o maQor opposition parties combined during the CC7 election# and some

observers claim that the ratio ma( have been 12*to*.44 Gn Oussia# the Weltsin

campaign spent bet$een 32 and 42 times the amount permitted the opposition in

CC".4"

access to media. Jhen opposition parties lac' access to media that reachesmost o the population# there is no possibilit( o air competition. =edia access

ma( be denied in several $a(s. -requentl(# the most important disparities exist in

access to broadcast media# combined $ith biased and partisan coverage. Gn man(

competitive authoritarian regimes# the state controls all television and most L i

not all L radio broadcasting. ;lthough independent ne$spapers and magazines

ma( circulate reel(# the( generall( reach onl( a small urban elite. Gn such cases#

i radio and television are state*run and state*run channels are biased in avor o

the governing part(# opposition orces are eDectivel( denied access to the media.

Ihus# even ater the Eanda dictatorship in =ala$i gave $a( to elected 5resident

Ea'ili =uluzi# incumbent control o the media $as such that one Qournalist

complained# +Eeore it $as Eanda# Eanda# Eanda L ever( da(. No$ it is =uluzi#

=uluzi# =uluzi.,49

Gn other cases# private media is $idespread but maQor media outlets are lin'ed to

the governing part( L via prox( o$nership# patronage# and other illicit means. Gn

F'raine# or example# 5resident Muchma controlled television coverage through

an inormal net$or' o private media entities. Ihe head o the 5residential

;dministration# $ho also o$ned the popular \ television station# issued orders

?+temn('i,B to all maQor stations dictating ho$ events should be covered.48 Gn

=ala(sia# all maQor private ne$spapers and private television stations $ere

controlled

b( individuals or frms lin'ed to the governing Barisan Nasional ?ENB.4C

Gn ;lberto -uQimoriSs 5eru# private television stations signed +contracts, $ith the

state intelligence service in $hich the( received up to Y.4 million a month in

exchange or limiting coverage o opposition parties."2

biased reerees% uneven access to the la$. Gn man( competitive authoritarian

regimes# incumbents pac' Qudiciaries# electoral commissions# and other

nominall( independent arbiters and manipulate them via blac'mail# briber(#

and0or intimidation. ;s a result# legal and other state agencies that are designed to

act as reerees rule s(stematicall( in avor o incumbents. Ihis allo$s incumbents

to engage in illicit acts L including violations o democratic procedure L $ith

impunit(. Gt also ensures that critical electoral# legal# or other disputes $ill be

resolved in the incumbentSs avor. Ihus# in =ala(sia# a pac'ed Qudiciar( ensured

that a schism in the ruling Fnited =ala(s National Rrganization ?F=NRB $asresolved in 5rime =inister =ahathirSs avor in C88& a decade later# it allo$ed

=ahathir to imprison his main rival# ;n$ar Gbrahim# on dubious charges. Gn

5eru# -uQimoriSs control over Qudicial and electoral authorities ensured the

legalization

o a constitutionall( dubious third term in 1222. Gn Eelarus in CC"#

the constitutional court terminated an impeachment process launched b(

parliamentar(

opponents o 5resident Ku'ashen'a# $hich acilitated Ku'ashen'aSs

consolidation o autocratic rule. Gn enezuela# the electoral authoritiesS 1223

ruling invalidating signatures collected or a recall reerendum against 5resident

Hugo )havez dela(ed the reerendum long enough or )havez to rebuild publicsupport and survive the reerendum.


10/44

Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty

in Nondemocracies

Iable . summarizes the maQor diDerences among democratic# ull authoritarian#

and competitive authoritarian regimes ?or a ull operationalization# see ;ppendix

GB. ;s suggested in the table# a distinguishing eature o competitive

authoritarianismis unfair competition. Jhereas ull authoritarian regimes are characterized

b( the absence o competition ?and# hence# o uncertaint(B and democrac( is

characterized

b( air competition# competitive authoritarianism is mar'ed b( competition

that is real but unair. Rpposition parties are legal# operate aboveground#

and compete seriousl( in elections. Ho$ever# the( are subQect to surveillance#

harassment# and occasional violence& their access to media and fnance is limited&

electoral and Qudicial institutions are politicized and deplo(ed against them&

and elections are oten marred b( raud# intimidation# and other abuse. Wet such

unairness does not preclude serious contestation L or even occasional opposition

victories." /tated another $a(# $hereas oUcials in ull authoritarian regimes

can rest eas( on the eve o elections because neither the( nor opposition leaders

expect an(thing but an incumbent victor(# incumbents in competitive authoritarian

regimes cannot. >overnment oUcials ear a possible opposition victor(

?and must $or' hard to th$art itB# and opposition leaders believe the( have at

least some chance o victor(. Gn competitive authoritarian regimes# incumbents

are orced to s$eat.

Jhat this suggests is that uncertaint( and even incumbent turnover are not

defning eatures o democrac(. GnPuential scholars# particularl( ;dam 5rze$ors'i

and his collaborators# have argued that uncertaint( o outcomes and the

possibilit( o electoral turnover are $hat distinguish democratic rom nondemocratic

regimes."1 /uch a conceptualization ignores the real possibilit( that seriousviolation o democratic procedure ma( occur in competitive elections. ;t times

during the CC2L1228 period# elections in ;lbania# ;rmenia# Eelarus# )ameroon#

)ambodia# >abon# Men(a# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ozambique# Oussia# F'raine#

ambia# and imbab$e $ere characterized b( considerable uncertaint( and# in

some cases# incumbent deeat. Ho$ever# none o them $as democratic and some

$ere not even remotel( so. Je thereore must be able to conceptualize regimes

that are suUcientl( competitive to generate real uncertaint( ?and even turnoverB

but $hich all short o democrac(. ;s this boo' demonstrates# such regimes $ere

$idespread during the postL)old Jar period.

"ternati/e !oneptuai&ations o 3brid Regimes4 5o 6e ,eed

a ,ew 'ubt3pe0/cholars should create ne$ regime subt(pes $ith caution. /tudies o

democratization

in the C82s and CC2s generated hundreds o ne$ subt(pes o democrac(."3

;s )ollier and Kevits'( $arned# such an +excessive prolieration o ne$ terms and

concepts, is li'el( to result in +conceptual conusion.,"7 /imilarl(# Oichard /n(der

has called or a +conservative bias $ith regard to concept ormation., Oather

than all pre( to the +naturalistsS temptation to proclaim the discover(# naming#

and classifcation o ne$ political animals#, /n(der argues# scholars should

+careull(

evaluate the null h(pothesis that the political phenomena o interest . . . are


11/44

actuall( not suUcientl( novel to $arrant ne$ categories and labels.,"4

Je contend that competitive authoritarianism is a ne$ phenomenon and that

no existing term adequatel( captures it."" -irst# these regimes routinel( proved

diUcult or scholars to categorize during the postL)old Jar period. -or example#

the /andinista regime in Nicaragua $as described as +a h(brid perhaps unique

in the annals o political science,"9& -uQimoriSs 5eru $as said to be a +ne$ 'indo h(brid authoritarian regime,"8& and the 5OG regime in =exico $as labeled a

+h(brid# part*ree# part authoritarian s(stem, that does +not conorm to classical

t(pologies.,"C

Jhich existing regime categories might be appropriate or these cases] Rne

scholarl( response has been simpl( to label them as democracies. Oegimes in

>hana# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ozambique# 5eru# Oussia# F'raine# and ambia

$ere routinel( labeled democracies during the CC2s. :ven extreme cases such as

Eelarus# )ambodia# Haiti# and Oussia under 5utin occasionall( earned a democratic

label.92 Ihe problem $ith such a strateg( is straightor$ard% Oegimes $ith

serious electoral irregularities and0or civil*liberties violations do not meet procedural

minimum standards or democrac(. Io label such regimes democracies

is to stretch the concept virtuall( be(ond recognition.

;nother conceptual strateg( has been to use generic intermediate categories#

such as h(brid regime#9 semi*democrac(#91 or -reedom HouseSs +partl( ree#,93

or cases that all bet$een democrac( and ull authoritarianism. Ihe problem

$ith such categories is that because democrac( is multidimensional# there are

multiple $a(s to be partiall( democratic. )ompetitive authoritarianism is onl(

one o several h(brid regime t(pes. Rthers include ?B constitutional oligarchies or

exclusive republics# $hich possess the basic eatures o democrac( but den(

suDrage

to a maQor segment o the adult population ?e.g.# :stonia and Katvia in the

earl( CC2sB97& ?1B tutelary regimes# in $hich elections are competitive but the

po$er o elected governments is constrained b( nonelected religious ?e.g.# GranB#

militar( ?e.g.# >uatemala and 5a'istanB# or monarchic ?e.g.# Nepal in the CC2sB

authorities& and ?3B restricted or semi-competitive democracies# in $hich elections

are ree but a maQor part( is banned ?e.g.# ;rgentina in C49LC"" and Iur'e( in

the CC2sB. Ihe diDerences among these regimes L and bet$een them and

competitive

authoritarianism L are obscured b( categories such as semi*democratic

or partl( ree. -or example# :l /alvador# Katvia# and F'raine $ere classifed b(

-reedom House as partl( ree L $ith a combined political and civil*liberties score

o " L in CC1LCC3.94 Wet# $hereas in Katvia the main nondemocratic eature

$as the denial o citizenship rights to people o Oussian descent# in :l /alvadorit $as the militar(Ss tutelar( po$er and human*rights violations. F'raine possessed

ull citizenship and civilian control over the militar(# but it $as competitive

authoritarian. +/emi*democratic, and +partl( ree, are thus residual categories

that reveal little about regimes other than $hat the( are not.

;nother strateg( is to classi( h(brid regimes as subt(pes o democrac(.9" -or

example# Karr( !iamond used the term electoral democracy to reer to cases in

$hich reasonabl( air elections coexist $ith a $ea' rule o la$ and uneven

protection

o human and civil rights# such as in )olombia# Erazil# Gndia# and the

5hilippines.99 /imilarl(# -areed a'aria applied the term illiberal democracy to

+democraticall( elected regimes, that +routinel( ignore constitutional limits ontheir po$er and Zdeprive[ their citizens o basic rights and reedoms.,98 /ubt(pes


12/44


13/44

+!onSt (ou 'no$ ho$ these Jesterners are] Ihe( $ill ma'e a uss Zabout electoral

raud[

or a e$ da(s# and then the( $ill calm do$n and lie $ill go on as usual.,

L :duard /hevardnadze# 5resident o >eorgia8"

)ompetitive authoritarianism is a postL)old Jar phenomenon. ;lthough a e$

competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the inter$ar and )old Jar

periods#89 the( prolierated ater the all o the Eerlin Jall. Ihis $as not a

coincidence.

Eeginning in the late C82s# maQor changes in the international environment

undermined the stabilit( o man( closed regimes and encouraged the rise

o electoral ones. -irst# the end o the )old Jar led to a $ithdra$al o external

support or man( superpo$er*sponsored dictatorships. /oviet*bac'ed Keninist

regimes and F./.*bac'ed anti*communist regimes aced a precipitous decline in

external militar( and economic assistance. Gn man( cases# the elimination o )old

Jar subsidies coincided $ith mounting economic crises# $hich undermined the

stabilit( o man( autocracies. /tates became ban'rupt# patronage resources

disappeared#and L in man( cases L coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate# leaving

autocrats $ith little choice but to liberalize or abandon po$er.88

Ihe collapse o the /oviet Fnion also led to a mar'ed shit in the global

balance o po$er# in $hich the Jest L particularl( the Fnited /tates L emerged

as the dominant center o economic and militar( po$er. Gn the postL)old Jar

era# as in inter$ar :astern :urope#8C the disappearance o a militar(# economic#

and ideological alternative to the liberal Jest had a maQor impact on peripheral

states. -or example# it created an +almost universal $ish to imitate a $a( o lie

associated $ith the liberal capitalist democracies o the core regimes#,C2 $hich

encouraged the diDusion o Jestern democratic models.C Wet diDusion $as also

rooted in an instrumental logic% Ihe primar( sources o external assistance $ereno$ located almost exclusivel( in the Jest. :Dectivel( +Zr[eading the hand$riting

on the ?EerlinB $all#, man( autocrats adopted ormal democratic institutions

in an eDort to +position their countries avorabl( in the international contest or

scarce development resources.,C1

Ihe end o the )old Jar $as also accompanied b( a maQor shit in Jestern

oreign polic(.C3 Jith the disappearance o the /oviet threat# the Fnited /tates

and other Jestern po$ers stepped up eDorts to encourage and deend democrac(

through a combination o external assistance# militar( and diplomatic pressure#

and unprecedented political conditionalit(.C7 Gn CC2# the Fnited /tates# Fnited

Mingdom# and -rance announced that the( $ould lin' uture economic assistanceto democratization and human rights. Jestern governments and multilateral

institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding o elections and

respect or human rights.C4 ;lthough it $as never applied consistentl(# the +ne$

political conditionalit(, induced man( autocrats to hold multipart( elections.C"

5olitical conditionalit( $as accompanied b( eDorts to create permanent

international

legal rame$or's or the collective deense o democrac(.C9 Ihus# the

CC2s sa$ the emergence o an +international architecture o collective institutions

and ormal agreements enshrining both the principles o democrac(

and human rights.,C8 Ihese eDorts $ent arthest in :astern :urope# $here ull

democrac( $as a requirement or :uropean Fnion ?:FB membership.CC Ho$ever#the( also $ere seen in the ;mericas# $here the Rrganization o ;merican

/tates ?R;/B adopted ne$ mechanisms or the collective deense o democrac(.22


14/44

-inall(# the postL)old Jar period sa$ the emergence o a transnational

inrastructure

o organizations L including international part( oundations# electionmonitoring

agencies# and a plethora o international organizations ?GRsB and nongovernmental

organizations ?GN>RsB L that $ere committed to the promotion o

human rights and democrac(.2 /trengthened b( ne$ inormation technologiessuch as the Gnternet# transnational human*rights and democrac( net$or's dre$

international attention to human*rights abuses# lobbied Jestern governments

to ta'e action against abusive governments# and helped protect and empo$er

domestic opposition groups.21 !ue to the presence o these net$or's# rights

abuses requentl( triggered a +boomerang eDect%, the( $ere $idel( reported b(

international media and human rights groups# $hich oten led Jestern po$ers

to ta'e punitive action against violating states.23 ;t the same time# the gro$ing

number and sophistication o international election*observer missions helped

call international attention to raudulent elections# $hich deterred an increasing

number o governments rom attempting raud.27

Ihese changes in the international environment raised the external cost

o authoritarianism and created incentives or elites in developing and

postcommunist

countries to adopt the ormal architecture o Jestern*st(le democrac(#

$hich L at a minimum L entailed multipart( elections. Ihe change

$as particularl( stri'ing in sub*/aharan ;rica# $here the number o de jure

single*part( regimes ell rom 1C in C8C to zero in CC7#24 and in postcommunist

:urasia# $here onl( one de jure one*part( regime ?Iur'menistanB

endured through the CC2s.

Wet i the postL)old Jar international environment undermined autocracies

and encouraged the diDusion o multipart( elections# it did not necessaril( bring

democrac(. :xternal democratizing pressure $as limited in several $a(s. -irst# it$as applied selectivel( and inconsistentl(# $ith important countries and regions

?e.g.# )hina and the =iddle :astB largel( escaping pressure.2" /econd# external

pressure $as oten superfcial. Gn much o the $orld# Jestern democrac( promotion

$as +electoralist, in that it ocused almost exclusivel( on multipart( elections

$hile oten ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level pla(ing feld.29

;s a'aria observed%

Gnthe end. . . elections trump ever(thing. G a countr( holds elections# Jashington

and the

$orld $ill tolerate a great deal romthe resulting government. . . . Gn an age o

images and

s(mbols# elections are eas( to capture on flm. ?Ho$ do (ou televise the rule o la$]B.28

Ihe international communit(Ss ocus on elections let man( autocrats L both

old and ne$ L $ith considerable room to maneuver.2C >overnments +learned

that the( did not have to democratize, to maintain their international standing.2

5artial liberalization L usuall( in the orm o holding passable elections L $as oten

+suUcient to dePect international s(stem pressures or more complete political

opening., Gn short# the postL)old Jar international environment raised the

minimum standard or regime acceptabilit(# but the ne$ standard $as multipart(

elections# not democrac(.

:ven in the postL)old Jar international environment# thereore# ull democratization

oten required a strong domestic +push., Jhere avorable domesticconditions such as a strong civil societ( and eDective state institutions $ere absent


15/44

?e.g.# much o the ormer /oviet Fnion and sub*/aharan ;ricaB# transitions $ere

more li'el( to result in regimes that combined multipart( elections $ith some

orm o authoritarian rule.1 Gn other $ords# the( $ere li'el( to result in

competitive

authoritarianism.

Ihe prolieration o competitive authoritarian regimes in the earl( CC2s $asstri'ing. Gn C84# $hen =i'hail >orbachev became the /oviet leader# onl( a

handul o competitive authoritarian regimes existed in the $orld.3 E( CC4#

nearl( three dozen countries $ere competitive authoritarian. Ihus# although the

end o the )old Jar triggered a $ave o democratization# it also triggered a $ave

o h(bridization. Ihe +ourth $ave, $as at least as competitive authoritarian as

it $as democratic.7

di/erging outomes4 ompetiti/e authoritarian regime

tra7etories8 199:;2::<

)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are mar'ed b( an inherent tension. Iheexistence o meaningul democratic institutions creates arenas o contestation

through $hich oppositions ma( legall( L and legitimatel( L challenge incumbents.

;t times# authoritarian governments manage these arenas o contestation $ithout

diUcult(. Jhen incumbents enQo( broad public support ?e.g.# Eots$ana and

5eru in the mid*CC2sB and0or ace ver( $ea' opposition ?e.g.# IanzaniaB# the(

ma( retain po$er $ithout egregiousl( violating democratic institutions. Ho$ever#

the existence o multipart( elections# nominall( independent legislatures#

Qudiciaries# and media creates opportunities or periodic challenges# and $hen

incumbents lac' public support# these challenges ma( be regime*threatening.

=ost requentl(# opposition challenges ta'e place at the ballot box# as in /erbia

?1222B# Men(a ?1221B# F'raine ?1227B# and imbab$e ?1228B. Ho$ever# the( alsoma( emerge rom parliament ?e.g.# Oussia in CC3 and Eelarus in CC"B or the

Qudiciar(.4

/uch contestation poses a serious dilemma or incumbents. Rn the one hand#

th$arting the challenge oten requires a blatant assault on democratic institutions

?i.e.# stealing elections or closing parliamentB. Eecause such challenges are legal

and generall( perceived as legitimate ?both at home and abroadB# openl( repressing

them ma( be quite costl(. Rn the other hand# i incumbents allo$ democratic

procedures to run their course# the( ris' losing po$er. Gn eDect# such challenges

orce incumbents to choose bet$een egregiousl( violating democratic rules# at

the cost o international isolation and domestic conPict# and allo$ing the challenge

to proceed# at the cost o possible deeat. Ihe result is oten a regime crisis#as occurred in )ambodia and Oussia in CC3# the !ominican Oepublic in CC7#

;rmenia in CC"# =ala(sia in CC8LCCC# 5eru and /erbia in 1222# =adagascar

in 122# F'raine in 1227# Men(a in 1229# and imbab$e in 1228. Gt is perhaps

or this reason that Huntington $rote that +liberalized authoritarianism, is +not

a stable equilibrium. Ihe hal$a( house does not stand.,"

Wet competitive authoritarian regimes $ere not bound to collapse& in act#

man( o them proved stri'ingl( robust. Gn several cases# incumbents either

repeatedl( th$arted opposition challenges or maintained such eDective control

that no serious challenge emerged. Gn other cases# incumbents $ere deeated b(

opposition challenges but successors ruled in a competitive authoritarian manner

L in other $ords# the government changed but the regime did not. Gndeed#

C o our 34 cases remained competitive authoritarian or 4 (ears or more#9


16/44

a liespan that is comparable to even the most durable bureaucratic authoritarian

regimes in /outh ;merica.8 Hence# it appears that man( hal$a( houses do

stand.

)ompetitive authoritarian regimes ollo$ed three distinct paths bet$een CC2

and 1228 ? Iable .1B. Ihe frst is democratization# or the establishment o ree

and air elections# broad protection o civil liberties# and a level pla(ing feld.C!emocratization ma( be overseen b( authoritarian governments# as in >hana#

=exico# and Iai$an# or the( ma( occur ater those governments all rom po$er#

as in )roatia# Nicaragua# 5eru# /erbia# and /lova'ia. ;lthough the removal o

authoritarian incumbents is not necessar( or democratization#12 all o our

democratizing cases experienced turnover. Eet$een CC2 and 1228# 4 o our 34

cases democratized% Eenin# )roatia# the !ominican Oepublic# >hana# >u(ana#

=acedonia# =ali# =exico# Nicaragua# 5eru# Oomania# /erbia# /lova'ia# Iai$an#

and F'raine.

Ihe second outcome is unstable authoritarianism# or cases that undergo one or

more transition but do not democratize. Gn these cases# authoritarian incumbents

$ere removed at least once but ne$ governments $ere not democratic. /uccessorsinherited a s'e$ed pla(ing feld and politicized state institutions# $hich the( used

to $ea'en and0or disadvantage their opponents.1 Ien cases ell into the unstable

authoritarian categor(% ;lbania# Eelarus# >eorgia# Haiti# Men(a# =adagascar#

=ala$i# =oldova# /enegal# and ambia.

Ihe third outcome is stable authoritarianism. Gn these cases# authoritarian

incumbents or their chosen successors remained in po$er or at least three

presidential0

parliamentar( terms ollo$ing the establishment o competitive authoritarian

rule.11 Ihis categor( includes cases that became more closed over time

?e.g.# OussiaB. !uring the CC2L1228 period# 2 o our 34 cases remained stable

and nondemocratic% ;rmenia# Eots$ana# )ambodia# )ameroon# >abon#=ala(sia# =ozambique# Ianzania# Oussia# and imbab$e.

Ihis diversit( o outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that

underlie much o the postL)old Jar literature on regime change. Neither the

brea'do$n o authoritarian regimes nor the holding o multipart( elections

necessaril(

led to democratization during the postL)old Jar period.13 Gndeed#

most ?12 o 34B o our cases ailed to democratize bet$een CC2 and 1228. Ihese

regime patterns suggest that L contra Kindberg and others L multipart( elections

are not b( themselves an independent cause o democratization.17 Ihe(

also ma'e it clear that electoral turnover L even $here longtime autocrats are

removed L should not be equated $ith democratic transition. Gn man( cases Lrom ;lbania# Eelarus# =ala$i# =oldova# F'raine# and ambia in the CC2s

to >eorgia# Men(a# /enegal# and =adagascar in the 1222s L the removal o

expaining di/ergent outomes4 the argument in brie

Ihis boo' explains the diverging traQectories o competitive authoritarian regimes

since CC2. ;s a starting point# $e assume that incumbents see' to retain po$er

and that the( are $illing to use extralegal means to do so. Je argue that

incumbentsS

capacit( to hold onto po$er L and the ate o competitive authoritarian

regimes more generall( L hinges primaril( on t$o actors% ?B linkage to the West #

or the densit( o ties ?economic# political# diplomatic# social# and organizationalBand cross*border Po$s ?o capital# goods and services# people# and inormationB

bet$een particular countries and the Fnited /tates and the :F& and ?1B incumbentsS


17/44

organizational power # or the scope and cohesion o state and governing*part(

structures.

Je ma'e a three*step argument. -irst# $here lin'age to the Jest $as extensive#

as in :astern :urope and the ;mericas# competitive authoritarian regimes

democratized during the postL)old Jar period. E( heightening the international

salience o autocratic abuse# increasing the li'elihood o Jestern response#expanding the number o domestic actors $ith a sta'e in avoiding international

isolation# and shiting the balance o resources and prestige in avor o oppositions#

lin'age raised the cost o building and sustaining authoritarian rule. High

lin'age created po$erul incentives or authoritarian rulers to abandon po$er#

rather than crac' do$n# in the ace o opposition challenges. Gt also created

incentives or successor governments to rule democraticall(. ;mong high*lin'age

cases# not a single authoritarian government remained in po$er through 1228 and

nearl( ever( transition resulted in democrac(. Ihis outcome occurred even $here

domestic conditions or democrac( $ere unavorable ?e.g.# >u(ana# =acedonia#

and OomaniaB.

Jhere lin'age $as lo$# as in most o ;rica and the ormer /oviet Fnion#

external democratizing pressure $as $ea'er. )onsequentl(# regime outcomes

$ere driven primaril( b( domestic actors# particularl( the organizational po$er

o incumbents. Jhere state and0or governing parties $ere $ell organized and

cohesive# as in =ala(sia and imbab$e# incumbents $ere able to manage elite

conPict and th$art even serious opposition challenges ?both in the streets and at

the ballot boxB# and competitive authoritarian regimes survived. Gndeed# in nearl(

all lo$*lin'age cases in $hich incumbents had developed coercive and0or part(

organizations# autocrats or their chosen successors remained in po$er through

1228.

Jhere state and governing*part( structures $ere underdeveloped and lac'ed

cohesion# regimes $ere less stable. Eecause incumbents lac'ed the organizational

and coercive tools to prevent elite deection# steal elections# or crac'

do$n on protest# the( $ere vulnerable to even relativel( $ea' opposition

challenges.

)onsequentl(# regimes $ere more open to contingenc( than in other

cases.

Gn this context# a third actor L statesS vulnerabilit( to Jestern democratizing

pressure ?$hich $e call Western leverageB L $as oten decisive. Jhere countriesS

strategic or economic importance inhibited external pressure ?e.g.# OussiaB# or

$here assistance rom counter*hegemonic po$ers blunted the impact o that

pressure ?e.g.# )ameroon# >abon# and post*CC7 EelarusB# even relativel( $ea'

regimes survived. Jhere Jestern leverage $as high# such governments $eremore li'el( to all. Gn these cases# turnover created an opportunit( or

democratization.

Gndeed# ragile democracies emerged in Eenin# =ali# and F'raine.

Ho$ever# in the absence o close ties to the Jest or a strong domestic push or

democrac(# transitions requentl( brought to po$er ne$ authoritarian governments

?e.g.# >eorgia# =ala$i# and ambiaB. Gn lo$*lin'age cases# thereore# lo$

organizational po$er $as associated $ith unstable competitive authoritarianism.

Ki'e all theories o regime change# ours cannot explain all cases. Oegime outcomes

are inPuenced b( a variet( o actors L including economic perormance#

the strength and strategies o opposition movements# leadership# and historical

contingenc( L that lie outside o our theoretical rame$or'. Gt is not surprising#thereore# that some o the regimes anal(zed in this stud( ollo$ traQectories not


18/44

predicted b( our theor( ?e.g.# democratization in Eenin# >hana# and F'raineB.

Nevertheless# lin'age# leverage# and organizational po$er explain a stri'ing number

o cases.

theoretia impiations

Rur research has a range o implications or the stud( o contemporar( political

regimes and regime change. -or example# it contributes to the emerging literatureon the international dimension o regime change. Ihe massive $ave o

democratization that s$ept across the developing $orld in the C82s and CC2s

defed nearl( all established theories o democratization. -ramed in terms o

!ahlSs cost o toleration versus cost o suppression#14 man( leading theories

expect stable democrac( to emerge $hen either ?B increased societal $ealth or

equalit( reduces the cost o toleration1"& or ?1B a strengthening o civil societ( or

opposition orces L oten a product o socioeconomic modernization L increases

the cost o repression.19 Neither o these phenomena occurred on a large scale

prior to the transitions in Katin ;merica# ;rica# or communist :urasia. Jhat

did change $as the international environment. )hanges in the postL)old Jar

international environment heightened the cost o suppression in much o the

developing $orld. Ihus# it $as an externall( driven shit in the cost o suppression#

not changes in domestic conditions# that contributed most centrall( to the

demise o authoritarianism in the C82s and CC2s.18

Ihis boo' presents a ne$ rame$or' or anal(zing the international inPuences

on regime change. Ihe recent literature highlights a dizz(ing arra( o international

inPuences including diDusion# demonstration eDects# conditionalit(#

transnational civil societ(# and ne$ inormation technologies. Je organize these

various mechanisms into t$o dimensions% Jestern leverage and linkage to the

Jest. Ihis rame$or' enables us to capture cross*national variation in the natureand degree o external democratizing pressure. Je fnd that the impact o the

international environment varied considerabl( across cases and regions# and that

this variation $as rooted# to a large degree# in the extent o countriesS ties to the

Jest. Jhere lin'age $as high ?e.g.# :astern :urope and the ;mericasB# regimes

oten democratized L even in the absence o avorable domestic conditions& $here

it $as lo$ ?e.g.# ;rica and the ormer /oviet FnionB# domestic actors

predominated.

=oreover# $e fnd that although political conditionalit( and other orms

o direct ?or leverage*basedB pressure ma( be eDective# the democratizing impact

o conditionalit( is ar greater in countries $ith extensive lin'age to the Jest.

/econd# this boo' highlights the role o incumbent organizational po$er inshaping regime outcomes. Oecent studies o democratization have given

considerable

attention to the role o societal or opposition*centered actors# including

civil societ(#1C organized labor#32 mass protest#3 and opposition cohesion#31

in undermining authoritarianism and0or installing democrac(. Ho$ever# in much

o post*)old Jar ;rica# ;sia# and post*communist :urasia# civil societies and

opposition parties $ere $ea' and ragmented& as a result# the societal push or

democratization $as meager.33 Gn man( o these cases# regime outcomes $ere

rooted less in the character or behavior o opposition movements than in

incumbentsS

capacit( to th$art them. Jhere incumbents possessed a po$erul coerciveapparatus and0or part( organization# even $ell*organized and cohesive opposition

challenges oten ailed. E( contrast# $here incumbents lac'ed the organizational


19/44

tools needed to steal elections# co*opt opponents# or crac' do$n on

protest# transitions occurred even $hen oppositions $ere $ea'. Gndeed# this boo'

sho$s that successul opposition movements $ere oten rooted in state and part(

$ea'ness. =uch o the fnancial and organizational muscle behind successul

opposition challenges in ambia ?CC2LCCB# Men(a ?1221B# >eorgia ?1223B#

and F'raine ?1227B $as provided b( ex*government oUcials $ho had deectedonl( $ee's or months beore the transition.

I$o implications are $orth noting. -irst# although strong parties and states

are $idel( L and correctl( L vie$ed as critical to democratic stabilit(# the( also are

critical to stable authoritarianism.37 Jhere incumbents lac'ed strong state and

part( organizations# the( rarel( survived during the postL)old Jar period. Gn a

competitive authoritarian context# thereore# successul state* or part(*building

?e.g.# imbab$e in the C82s# ;rmenia and )ambodia in the CC2s# and Oussia

in the 1222sB ma( contribute not to democratization but rather to authoritarian

consolidation. /econd# man( postL)old Jar transitions $ere rooted more in

the $ea'ness o incumbent governments than in the strength# strategies# or

mobilization o opposition orces. /uch transitions $ere mar'ed b( a paradox% Ihe $ea'ness o state and governing*part( organizations made it more li'el( that

an autocrat $ould be orced rom po$er but less li'el( that the transition $ould

result in democrac(. Iransitions b( collapse generall( occurred in a context o

$ea' states# parties# and civil societies L conditions that $ere hardl( propitious

or democratization. Eecause both institutional and societal chec's on successor

governments tended to be $ea'# transitions oten gave rise to ne$ authoritarian

incumbents.

the distinti/e ogi o ompetiti/e

authoritarian poitis

Ihis boo' also highlights the importance o ta'ing seriousl( the d(namics o

contemporar(authoritarian regimes.39 Fntil recentl(# the assumption that h(brid

regimes $ere +in transition, to democrac( biased anal(ses in important $a(s.

/cholars gave disproportionate attention to actors that shaped the perormance

and stabilit( o democrac(# such as constitutional design# executiveLlegislative

relations# electoral and part( s(stems# and voting behavior. ;s a result# the actors

that contribute to building and sustaining contemporar( nondemocracies#

as $ell as the internal d(namics o these regimes# $ere let underexplored.38 Gn

treating competitive authoritarian regimes as +transitional, democracies# scholars

oten assumed that political processes ?e.g.# candidate selection# electoral

campaigns#and legislative politicsB $or'ed more or less as the( do under democracies.

Wet such assumptions are oten misguided. Ihe coexistence o meaningul

democratic

institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities

and constraints or actors# $hich L in important areas o political lie L generate

distinct patterns o political behavior. Je examine some o these areas in the

ollo$ing sections.

Inorma Institutions

Rne characteristic o competitive authoritarianism is the centralit( o inormal

institutions.3C Gnormal institutions exist in all regimes but# given the disQuncture

bet$een ormal ?i.e.# democraticB rules and actual behavior that is inherentto competitive authoritarianism# their role in such regimes ma( be particularl(

important. Oecent $or' suggests that actors requentl( emplo( inormal


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institutions as a +second*best, strateg( $hen the( cannot achieve their goals

through ormal institutions but fnd the cost o changing those institutions to be

prohibitive.72 E( raising the cost o ormal ?e.g.# single*part(B authoritarian rule#

the postL)old Jar international environment created incentives or incumbents

to emplo( inormal mechanisms o coercion and control $hile maintaining the

ormal architecture o democrac(. Eecause inormal means o coercion are morediUcult or international observers to identi( than ormal mechanisms o repression

?e.g.# press censorship or bans on oppositionB# the( $ere oten critical to the

survival o postL)old Jar autocracies.

Ihis boo' highlights a range o inormal rules# practices# and organizations

used b( incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes. Gn the electoral arena#

or example# incumbents $ho cannot cancel elections or ban opposition candidates

requentl( turn to illicit strategies such as vote bu(ing# ballot*box stuUng#

and manipulation o the vote count.7 ;lthough the( are requentl( ad hoc#

practices such as ballot*box stuUng ?e.g.# =exicoB and vote*bu(ing ?e.g.#

Iai$anB ma( be institutionalized.

;nother inormal institution ound in man( competitive authoritarian regimesis organized corruption. Eriber(# blac'mail# prox( o$nership# and other illicit

exchanges are oten critical to sustaining authoritarian governing coalitions.71

-or example# in )ambodia# 5eru# Oussia# F'raine# and else$here# corruption

net$or's pla(ed a central role in ensuring the compliance o state actors during

the CC2s.73 Gn =ala(sia# =exico# 5eru# /enegal# Oussia# and Iai$an#

institutionalized

corruption and patronage and prox(*o$nership net$or's bound 'e(

economic# media# and civil*societ( actors to governing parties.

)ompetitive authoritarian governments also emplo( inormal mechanisms o

repression. -or example# man( o them use +legal, repression# or the discretionar(

use o legal instruments L such as tax authorities and libel la$s L to targetopposition and the media. ;lthough such repression is ormal in the sense that

it entails the ?oten technicall( correctB application o the la$# it is an inormal

institution in that enorcement is $idel( 'no$n to be selective. Ihe value o this

orm o repression is its legal veneer% 5rosecution or tax raud or corruption can

be presented to the $orld as enorcement o the rule o la$ rather than repression.

-inall(# authoritarian incumbents emplo( inormal or +privatized, violence

to suppress opposition.77 Jhen the cost o imposing martial la$ or banning

opposition activit( is prohibitivel( high# incumbents ma( opt or violence that

is +orchestrated b( the state . . . but carried out b( nonstate actors# such as

vigilantes#

paramilitaries# and militias.,74 :xamples include organized $ar veteransin ;rmenia and imbab$e# +ethnic $arriors, in Men(a# miners in Oomania# part(

+(outh $ings, in Men(a and =ala$i# +'ic'*do$n*the*door gangs, in >u(ana#

chim´eres in Haiti# and +divine mobs, in Nicaragua. Eecause such thug groups are

not ormall( lin'ed to state securit( orces# the( provide a +certain invisibilit( as

ar as international opinion is concerned.,7" Ihe( thereore help incumbents

achieve the goal o +containing the broad popular challenge to their government#

$hile attempting to distance themselves rom human*rights abuses.,79

'uession =oitis

)ompetitive authoritarianism also generates distinct challenges in the realm o

executive succession. /uccession poses a serious challenge to most autocracies.78

Fnli'e most democracies# authoritarian succession is oten a high*sta'es game.Rutgoing incumbents oten ace serious ris's# including possible seizure o


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$ealth and prosecution or corruption or human*rights violations.7C Gndeed#

man( ormer rulers in competitive authoritarian regimes have been exiled or

imprisoned ater leaving oUce.42 -or this reason# incumbents oten see' a

successor

$ho the( can trust to protect them.4 ;t the same time# ho$ever# the(

ace a challenge that does not exist in other authoritarian regimes% the need to $in

competitive elections. ; lo(al successor is o no value i he or she loses elections.

Irust$orthiness and electabilit( are oten in tension $ith one another. Rn the

one hand# the most electorall( viable candidates are oten fgures $ith independent

resources and0or support bases# $hich ma'e them more diUcult to control.

Rn the other hand# regime insiders L particularl( those $ho lac' independent

stature or resources L are more li'el( to remain lo(al# particularl( i their close

connection to the regime ma'es them vulnerable to blac'mail. Ho$ever# such

politicians oten lac' the voter appeal to $in elections.41

-inding a successor $ho is both electable and trust$orth( is oten diUcult. Gn

=ala$i ?CC7B# Men(a ?1221B# and F'raine ?1227B# outgoing rulers erred on the

side o saet(# choosing lo(al but $ea' candidates $ho lost elections. Gn F'raine#or example# 5resident Muchma chose i'tor Wanu'ov(ch L a corrupt oUcial $ith

a criminal past L apparentl( because he could be controlled via blac'mail# but the

unpopular Wanu'ov(ch lost the 1227 election. E( contrast# in =ala$i ?1227B

and ambia ?122B# successors $on elections but subsequentl( turned on their

patrons. Gn 5eru# the inabilit( to fnd a viable successor contributed to -uQimoriSs

decision to see' an illegal ?and# ultimatel(# ill*atedB third term in 1222.

=art3 >eha/ior

-inall(# part( behavior is distinct under competitive authoritarian regimes. ;s

/cott =ain$aring has noted# standard assumptions about part( behavior L or

example# that parties are vote*maximizing L hold onl( $here elections are the

+onl( game in to$n.,43 Gn such a context# parties ta'e the political regime asgiven and $or' $ithin it% Ihe( participate in elections# see'ing to maximize

votes& i the( lose# the( turn to parliamentar( opposition. Gn unconsolidated

democracies and h(brid regimes# ho$ever# parties oten pla( a +dual game, that

encompasses both electoral and regime obQectives.47 Gn other $ords# conventional

vote*maximizing strategies are complemented L and sometimes trumped L

b( strategies aimed at shoring up or undermining the existing regime.

5arties clearl( pla( a dual game in competitive authoritarian regimes.44 Rn

the one hand# unli'e most authoritarian regimes# parties must ta'e seriousl(

elections

and other democratic institutions& their abilit( to gain or maintain po$er

hinges L at least# in part L on their abilit( to $in votes and control legislatures.

Rn the other hand# ho$ever# competing on a s'e$ed pla(ing feld oten requires

strategies that have little to do $ith vote*maximization. Ihus# in all but a e$ o

our cases#4" opposition parties combined conventional ?i.e.# electoral or

parliamentar(B

strategies $ith extra*institutional ones. -or example# oppositions

ma( bo(cott elections in an eDort to undermine their domestic or international

legitimac(.49 =aQor opposition parties bo(cotted at least one round o presidential

or parliamentar( elections in >hana ?CC1B# )ameroon ?CC1 and CC9B#

Haiti ?CC4 and 1222B# ambia ?CC"B# imbab$e ?CC" and 1228B# =ali ?CC9B#

/erbia ?CC9B# 5eru ?1222B# Eenin ?122B# and /enegal ?1229B.Jhen opposition parties participate in elections# conditions ma( induce them

to adopt strategies that diDer mar'edl( rom those seen in democratic regimes.


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Rne is thug mobilization.48 Gn a context o $idespread violence or la$lessness#

candidatesS abilit( to $in votes ma( be Qust as important as their abilit( to

ph(sicall(

protect or deliver them. Ihus# although recruiting and deplo(ing armed

thugs rarel( enhances partiesS electoral appeal# it can be critical to their abilit( to

campaign and protect the vote. ;s oran !ind_ic`# the main architect o /erbiaSs+bulldozer revolution, in 1222# stated# oppositions must +clearl( sho$ the( are

read( to use violence to fght bac' in case o repression. . . . /ecurit( orces must

realize the( cannot resort to violence $ithout ris's.,4C Gndeed# successul

oppositions

mobilized both votes and thugs in Eenin ?CCB# =ala$i ?CC7B# /erbia

?1222B# and Men(a ?1221B.

Rpposition strategies also diDer bet$een elections. Oather than confne its

activities to parliament# oppositions in competitive authoritarian regimes ma(

engage in mass protest aimed at toppling the government ?or orcing it to

underta'e

democratizing reormB beore the end o its mandate. /uch tactics $ere

adopted in )ameroon ?CCB# =adagascar ?CC and 122CB# ;lbania ?CC and

CC9B# F'raine ?CC3B# enezuela ?1221B# Haiti ?1223B# and >eorgia ?1223 and

1229B.

;lternativel(# opposition parties ma( adopt a coalitional strateg(# Qoining the

government in pursuit o state resources# media access# protection# and other

benefts."2 ;lthough oten characterized as +na'ed opportunism#," coalitional

strategies ma( be critical to part( survival. Gn countries characterized b( extreme

underdevelopment ?e.g.# )ambodia and =ala$iB or extensive state control o

the econom( ?e.g.# Eelarus and >abonB# civil societ( and the private sector are

generall( small and impoverished# leaving the opposition $ith limited access to

resources. Fnless parties have a generous external patron ?e.g.# Nicaragua and/lova'iaB or established organizations# identities# and core constituencies ?e.g.#

;lbania# >u(ana# and =ala(siaB# Qoining the government ma( be the onl( viable

means o securing the resources and media access necessar( to remain a viable

political orce.

-rom a vote*maximizing standpoint# coalitional strategies are oten suboptimal.

^oining an unpopular ?and# in man( cases# corrupt and repressiveB government

ma( erode opposition partiesS electoral and activist bases."1 Ho$ever#

$here access to resources is so limited that our or fve (ears in opposition can

be tantamount to political suicide ?e.g.# much o ;rica and the ormer /oviet

FnionB# politicians ma( conclude that Qoining the governments is the best means

o preserving their organizations in order to +pla( another da(.,)oalitional strategies at times have been successul. Gn F'raine# ater oligarch

Wulia I(moshen'oSs ban' accounts $ere rozen in the late CC2s# she abandoned

the opposition and created the progovernment -atherland 5art(. ;n alliance

$ith the government allo$ed I(moshen'o to regain her assets and build a po$erul

organization beore moving bac' into opposition# $here she $ould become

a maQor pla(er in the Rrange Oevolution."3 /imilarl(# the entr( o ;bdoula(e

JadeSs /enegalese !emocratic 5art( ?5!/B entr( into government coalitions in

CC and CC4 brought the part( access to patronage resources that it used or

organization building# $hile other opposition parties languished."7 Jade $on

the presidenc( in 1222. Gn Men(a# opposition leader Oaila Rdinga led his National

!evelopment 5art( ?N!5B into a +partnership, $ith the =oi government duringthe late CC2s in exchange or police protection and access to patronage


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resources."4 Gn 122# the N!5 Qoined the cabinet# $hich +permitted Rdinga

to organize dissent rom $ithin.,"" ; (ear later# Rdinga led a massive deection

that helped ensure the 1221 electoral deeat o the Men(a ;rican National Fnion

?M;NFB.

Fnder competitive authoritarianism# thereore# opposition parties pla( a dual

game# tr(ing to $in b( the existing rules $hile simultaneousl( see'ing to change

them. Ihis means that although opposition parties must ta'e seriousl( electoral

competition and vote*maximization# the( ma( also pursue strategies ?e.g.# electoral

bo(cotts# mass protestB aimed at undermining the regime. =oreover# the(

ma( adopt strategies ?e.g.# thug mobilization# alliances $ith unpopular

governmentsB

that L although suboptimal rom a vote*see'ing standpoint L allo$ them

to compete and survive on a s'e$ed pla(ing feld.

ase seetion and methods

Rur stud( examines all 34 regimes in the $orld that $ere or became competitive

authoritarian bet$een CC2 and CC4. Je exclude rom the anal(sis other t(pes

o h(brid ?or +partl( ree,B regimes# including a variet( o regimes in $hich politicalcompetition exists but nonelected oUcials retain considerable po$er# such as

?B those in $hich the most important executive oUce is not elected ?e.g.# Gran#

^ordan# Mu$ait# and =oroccoB"9& ?1B regimes in $hich top executive positions

are flled via elections but the authorit( o elected governments is seriousl(

constrained

b( the militar( or other nonelected bodies ?e.g.# >uatemala# 5a'istan#

Ihailand# and Iur'e( in the earl( CC2sB"8& and ?3B competitive regimes under

oreign occupation ?e.g.# Kebanon in the earl( CC2sB. Gn all o these regimes# the

po$er o actors outside the electoral process generates a distinct set o d(namics

and challenges not ound under competitive authoritarianism. Je also exclude

+illiberal, electoral regimes# in $hich mainstream parties compete on a reasonabl(level pla(ing feld but $idespread human* or civil*rights abuse L oten targeting

nonmainstream political parties or ethnic groups L persist ?e.g.# )olombia and /ri

Kan'a in the earl( CC2sB. Eecause violations do not directl( aDect mainstream

political competition# such h(brid regimes are not competitive authoritarian.

Je also exclude cases in $hich competitive authoritarianism collapses beore

the completion o a single presidential or parliamentar( term#"C as $ell as cases

in $hich state collapse ma'es it diUcult to identi( any 'ind o organized political

regime.92 -inall(# $e limit our stud( to regimes that $ere competitive

authoritarian

prior to CC4 in order to evaluate the impact o our variables over a signifcant

period ?at least 3 (earsB. Ihus# cases that became competitive authoritarian aterCC4 ?e.g.# Nigeria and enezuelaB are excluded rom the sample.9

Rur criteria or scoring cases ?and the actual codingB are elaborated in

;ppendix G. Rur criteria or democrac( are strict. Oegimes +cross the line, rom

democratic to competitive authoritarian i $e fnd evidence o centrall( coordinated

or tolerated electoral manipulation# s(stematic civil*liberties violations

?i.e.# abuse is a repeated rather than an exceptional event and is orchestrated or

approved b( the national governmentB# or an uneven pla(ing feld ?i.e.# opposition

parties are denied signifcant access to fnance or mass media or state institutions

are s(stematicall( deplo(ed against the oppositionB.

Rur method o scoring ma( be illustrated $ith reerence to a e$ cases that allnear the border bet$een competitive authoritarianism and democrac(. !uring

the initial period ?CC2LCC4B# $e scored Eots$ana as competitive authoritarian


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due to extreme inequalities in access to media and fnance& the !ominican Oepublic

as competitive authoritarian due to the Ealaguer governmentSs pac'ing o the

electoral commission and large*scale manipulation o voter rolls& and /lova'ia

as competitive authoritarian due to =eciarSs abuse o media and harassment o

parliamentar( opposition. Rn the other side o the line# Erazil and the 5hilippines

suDered serious problems o democratic governance L including extensiveclientelism# corruption# and0or a $ea' rule o la$ L in the earl( CC2s# but $e

ound no evidence o s(stematic electoral abuse# civil*liberties violations against

political opposition# or s'e$ed access to media or fnance. Hence# these cases

$ere scored as democratic and excluded rom the anal(sis.

Iurning to regime outcomes in 1228# $e scored /enegal as competitive

authoritarian due to harassment and arrest o opposition politicians and Qournalists#

and $e scored >eorgia as competitive authoritarian due to harassment

o maQor media in the 1227 elections and closure o television stations during

the 1229 state o emergenc(. Rn the other side o the line# $e scored Eenin

as democratic because the 122" election $as $idel( characterized as clean and

$e ound no evidence o serious abuse under 5resident Wa(i Eoni. Ki'e$ise#

>u(ana# =acedonia# Oomania# /erbia# and F'raine $ere scored as democratic

because L not$ithstanding repeated institutional crises and serious problems o

corruption L elections $ere clean# critics suDered no s(stematic harassment# and

opposition parties enQo(ed access to media and fnance.

Jith respect to the line bet$een competitive and ull authoritarianism# our

main criterion is $hether opposition parties can use democratic institutions to

compete seriousl( or po$er. G parties or candidates are routinel( excluded# either

ormall( or eDectivel(# rom competing in elections or the national executive#91

or i electoral raud is so extensive that voting is essentiall( meaningless# then

regimes $ere scored as noncompetitive and excluded rom anal(sis.93 Eased on

these criteria# )ambodia# /erbia# and imbab$e in the CC2s $ere scored as

competitive because L not$ithstanding $idespread state violence L opposition

parties $ere able to seriousl( contest national elections. Ki'e$ise# =ala(sia

$as scored as competitive because# despite highl( institutionalized authoritarian

controls# opposition parties operated legall( and seriousl( contested nearl( al

parliamentar( seats. E( contrast# /ingapore $as scored as ull( authoritarian

because restrictions on speech and association made it nearl( impossible or

opposition groups to operate publicl( and because legal controls and other

institutional

obstacles prevented opposition parties rom contesting most seats in parliament.

:g(pt $as scored as noncompetitive because the =uslim Erotherhood

$as banned and thousands o its activists $ere imprisoned. ;zerbaiQan $as scoredas ull( authoritarian because all maQor opposition candidates $ere excluded rom

the CC3 election# allo$ing He(dar ;li(ev to $in $ith CC percent o the vote.97

I$o points are $orth noting here. -irst# as in an( stud( o this t(pe# there

exist borderline cases that arguabl( could be included in the sample but that $e

Qudged to be either insuUcientl( authoritarian ?e.g.# Namibia and 5hilippinesB or

insuUcientl( competitive ?e.g.# ;zerbaiQan# /ingapore# and FgandaB or inclusion.

Nevertheless# e$ o these borderline cases appear to run counter to our theor(

?see )hapter 8B. /econd# competitive authoritarianism is a broad categor( that

ranges rom +sot#, near*democratic cases ?e.g.# the !ominican Oepublic and

/lova'ia in the earl( CC2sB to +hard#, or near*ull authoritarian cases ?e.g.# Oussia

and imbab$e in the mid*1222sB. Gndeed# despite considerable political reorm inMen(a and /enegal bet$een CC and 1228# both cases $ere scored as competitive


25/44

authoritarian throughout the given period. ;lthough this ma( be unsatis(ing#

the problem is hardl( unique to competitive authoritarianism% >erman(# /$eden#

:l /alvador# and =ongolia $ere all $idel( considered democracies in 1228.

Ihe medium*n anal(sis emplo(ed in this stud( has both limitations and advantages.

Rur anal(sis is bounded in t$o $a(s. -irst# it is bounded b( regime t(pe.

Ihe act that our sample includes onl( competitive authoritarian regimes L andthus is not representative o the broader universe o regimes L limits our abilit(

to ma'e general claims about the eDects o lin'age and organizational po$er. Je

do not# thereore# oDer a general theor( o regime change. /econd# our stud( is

bounded historicall(. Rur theor( o lin'ageSs democratizing eDects is relevant

onl( or periods o Jestern liberal hegemon(. Je do not expect ties to the Jest

to have had similar eDects during the )old Jar period. ;s this boo' suggests#

the causes o democratization changed considerabl( ater C8C# $ith the

international

dimension having a ar more important role than in earlier periods. Hence#

it appears that the actors that explain regime outcomes during the Cth centur(

or the )old Jar era diDer rom those that explain regime outcomes during the

postL)old Jar era. G that is the case# then the generalizabilit( o theories based

on anal(ses o other historical periods also ma( be limited.9

Rur research design also has important advantages. -irst# intensive case anal(sis

(ields greater measurement validit( than is possible in most large*n crossnational

studies.9" Oather than rel(ing on preexisting datasets that $ere not

designed to measure competitive authoritarianism ?e.g.# -reedom House# 5olit(

GB# or prox( variables $hose measurement validit( is oten questionable ?e.g.# per

capita militar( spending as a prox( or coercive capacit(B# $e developed measures

that closel( approximate our concepts. Ihe indicators used or each variable# as$ell as the actual coding o cases# are provided in the appendices. Ihus# although

our coding process is +subQective#, in the sense that $e ma'e the scoring decisions

in each case# it is transparent# consistent across cases and regions# and easil(

alsifable

L characteristics that are not shared# or example# b( -reedom House.99

Ihis method allo$s us to maximize measurement validit( $hile retaining a level

o rigor and standardization that is sometimes lac'ing in more qualitative studies.

/econd# detailed case studies allo$ us to examine and test or causal relationships

in a $a( that large*n cross*national studies generall( ail to do.98 Rur

research design sets a high bar or testing our h(potheses. Oather than simpl(

sho$ a correlation bet$een theor( and outcome among the universe o competitiveauthoritarian regimes# $e must demonstrate that the predicted causal

processes are at $or' in each case. Ihus# our case anal(ses sho$ L over multiple

observations L ho$ lin'age shapes actorsS behavior in $a(s that ma'e democratic

outcomes more li'el(. Ki'e$ise# the case studies demonstrate the causal processes

b( $hich lo$ state or part( cohesion undermines regime stabilit( ?e.g.#

b( preventing governments rom crac'ing do$n or acilitating elite deectionB

during crises. Gntensive case anal(sis also allo$s us to test alternative explanations

b( examining $hether the causal mechanisms posited b( rival approaches ?e.g.#

inequalit(# economic crisis# institutional designB are at $or'.

;t the same time# our medium*n anal(sis (ields considerable variation in terms

o both the dependent variable ?i.e.# regime outcomesB and various potentialexplanator( actors. Jhereas most small* and medium*n anal(ses are limited

to one or t$o regions# this stud( compares cases across fve regions#9C $hich


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$OR*I,O

Gt is $ell 'no$n that the principal macropolitical phenomenon o the last hal

centur( or thereabouts has been democratisation# that is# the transition rom

nondemocratic to democratic regimes in various parts o the $orld# rom /outhern

:urope to Katin ;merica and rom :astern :urope to man( areas o ;sia and ;rica.

Ihroughout the same period# literature on this topic has become predominant in the

feld o comparative politics. Gn more recent times# the gro$th o democratisation

and the development o associated research has aroused considerable interest in

the more specifc theme o the spread o h(brid or XtransitionalS regimes. ;s a result#

the vie$ o )roissant and =er'el that +partial t(pes o democrac( are the dominant

trend in democratic theor( and democratisation studies, comes as no surprise.

Neither does the assertion b( :pstein and colleagues that Xpartial democraciesS

+account or an increasing portion o current regimes and the lionSs share o regime

transitions,# though the( add that there is little available inormation about +$hat

prevents ull democracies rom sliding bac' to partial democracies or autocracies#

and $hat prevents partial democracies rom sliding bac' to autocrac(, and that

+the determinants o the behaviour o the partial democracies elude our

understanding,.1 Gt is no surprise either that such a variet( o labels have been

coined or these regimes b( diDerent authors% Xsemi*consolidated democraciesS#

Xh(brid regimesS ?in the strict sense o the termB# Xsemiconsolidated authoritarian

regimesS ?-reedom HouseB&3 Xpartial democraciesS ?:pstein et al.B& Xelectoral

democraciesS ?!iamondB& Xilliberal democraciesS ?a'ariaB& Xdeective democraciesS

?)roissant and =er'elB& Xcompetitive authoritarianismsS ?Kevits'( and Ja(B& Xsemi*

authoritarianismsS ?Rtta$a(B& and Xelectoral authoritarianismsS ?/chedlerB. Ihese are

Qust some o man( the expressions used b( scholars investigating the phenomenon

that $il

Regimes Híbridos

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