Cosmopolitanism Aff UM 7wk

7/31/2019 Cosmopolitanism Aff UM 7wk

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FILE NOTES:


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This aff is meant to be a critical/supplemental version to the environmental monitoring aff. Any team runningthis affirmative should be prepared to debate the substance of that aff as well (and in fact should strive tointegrate those arguments as much as possible).

Any team negating this aff should use the environmental monitoring neg as a starting point to supplement thecosmopolitanism-specific evidence in this file. Hegemony good and every space mil good affirmative andargument (and their attendant K answers) are on-point impact turns to this affI did not reproduce that work here as we already have it in a bunch of different places.

*** 1AC


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Contention one(Inner)Space Colonization

What is space? What is its purpose? Who owns it?

In a globalized world, the way we answer these questions effects and shapes the way we think about politics in general. Space is both a blank canvas and a mirrorhow we theorize space canaid or abet our thinking about sovereignty, cooperation, and violence

Stuart 2009 [Jill, Dr . Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and PoliticalScience, Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory, and the State in Outer Space, from Securing Outer Space, edited by Bormann and Sheehan]

As well as considering ongoing events in outer space politics (such as cooperation, militarization and commercialization), this text explores the ways in which we continue to evaluate and develop conceptual frameworks to help us understand outer space politics This chapter furthers the engagement withhow political ideas are reconceptualized in relation to outer space , and also how outer space hasimplications for our understanding of those political ideas . The ways in which we approach thestudy of outer space politics helps to construct the meanings by which it is imbued, and to suggest waysof developing our theoretical approaches . One area in which outer space both challenges traditionalpolitical notions and also political and legal practice is in the definition and practice of sovereignty . This chapterargues that Westphalian sovereignty (also "modern" or "classical" sovereignty), which delineates a clear relationship between sovereignty,territory and the state, does not conceptually grasp sovereignty in outer space (and by a normative account, how sovereignty shouldand could be transforming). As such I argue that sovereignty has been "unbundled" in outer space, both practically through

legal approaches which allow for a different relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state, and alsotheoretically in terms of leaving open the potential to reconceptualize sovereignty in a way that better embracessovereignty in a globalized world (and indeed, going one step further, in a world where not all politics even occur within the "globe", i.e. inouter space).

The challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty can be seen partly as a product of (and reconstitutive of) globalization, whereby transterritorial issuesand the "shrinking" of the planet challenge the straightforward relationship between sovereignty, territory and the state. l The reality of spaceexploration can be seen as another radical and unique issue-area in which theoretical approaches to "global"politics must be reconceived . This chapter explores the ways in which outer space poses unique challenges to conceptual and legal approaches togovernance. I also argue that there may also be a dialectical relationship between territorially-based politics andouter space politics, whereby notions of sovereignty are mutually reconstituting globalization and its conceptual challenge to classical notions of sovereignty. There are several different practical and theoretical approaches tounbundling sovereignty in outer space. The two approaches used here are regime theory and cosmopolitan sovereignty. The approaches are very different

the first taking a practical and conservative but perhaps static and a historical view of the international system, to understand how territory is de-linkedfrom sovereignty in the governance of outer space; and the second suggesting a fairly radical departure from Westphaliansovereignty, in delinking it from the state itself, and normatively repositioning "humanity" as the central unit of analysis in law. The chapter takes each approach in rum, applying it generally to outer space and then ro a common example of the internationalSpace Station (ISS), and then critiques the individual approaches. The final section of the chapter considers the tWO approaches in relation to each other,and draws three broad conclusions in relation to sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space: first, that understanding politics in thespace age requires moving beyond Westphalian conceptualizations of sovereignty, and unbundling therelationship between sovereignty, territory and the state; second, that exploration of outer space itself may be contributing to a wider shift in the practice and understanding of sovereignty; and, third, that future developments in outer space exploration will continue to influence our conceptualization of sovereignty (perhaps further validating some approaches and undermining others).

Sadly, the radical potential to think differently about space and sovereignty has been hijacked by militarization. This is not just a militarization of OUTER spaceit is also a militarization of ourINNER space. Status quo politics and rhetoric is an attempt to militarize both space and the

American psyche in order to maintain imperial dominance.

Orr 04, Jackie Orr, from the department f sociology at Syracuse University, The Militarization of InnerSpace, Critical Sociology, March 2004, volume 2, issue 30, pg. 451-481.


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The editorial warns: "This war against terrorism, should it come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and responsibility as planetary policemen." 7 , the militarization of outer space is an essential component of Full Spectrum Dominance, and if the so-called 'war against terrorism' must be situated within broader U.S. ambitions for global empire,8 it is perhaps useful for today's civilian-soldier to wonder just how wide and deep is a"full spectrum" of dominance? What borders must be crossed to fully dominate such an infinity of space? Perhaps the domination of outer space in the interests of militarized technologies and intelligence requires themilitarization of a somewhat more covert spatial territory -a territory more spectral, less smoothly operationalized but no less necessary to global dominion. What happens in that elusive terrain of 'inner space' as outer space becomes an overt field for fully militarized commandposts? Is the 'inner' psychic terrain of today's U.S. civilian-soldier another battlefield on the way to full spectrum dominance of the globe? What kind of militarized infrastructure is needed 'inside' the soldierly civilian called upon to support the establishment of military superiority across the spectrum of

spaces 'outside'? To what extent might Full Spectrum Dominance depend intimately on commanding 'space power' in both outer and inner space? The psychology of the civilian-soldier, the networks of everyday emotional and perceptual relations, constitute an'inner space' that is today , I suggest, one volatile site of attempted military occupation. But the occupying forces I'm concerned with here are not those of an invasive, enemy 'other.' Rather, a partial and urgent history of attempts by the U.S. government, media, military, and academy to enlist the psychological life of U.S. citizens as a military asset -this is the embodied story that occupies me here. The militarization of inner space, a complex, discontinuous story that nowhere crystallizes into the clear knot of conspiracy but which leaves 20th its uneven traces throughout the scattered archives of the century United States, is now as it has been before a major concern of those most responsible for the business of war. Militarization , defined by historian Michael Geyer as "the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence," constitutes at its core a border-crossing between military and civilian institutions , activities I aims (1989: 79). The militarization of inner space can be conceived , 1, as the psychological organization of civil society for the production of violence , an important feature of a broader -tense and contradictory -social process. It got my intention to reify 'psychology' or psychological processes as if they would be separated from social, historical, or economic contexts. Quite the contrary. By naming the constructed 'innerspace' of psychological activities increasingly militarized -with the events of September 11 serving as an accelerator and intensifier of processes that are by no means new - my purpose is to deepen a critical sociological commitment to contesting the :e' of psychology as the radically social matter of politicalstruggle, as radically material weapon of war. Or its refusal. While I refer to this psychological space as 'inner,' it of course is not exclusively individual, and is never confined to a neat interiority. Inner space both produces and is produced by deeply social ways of seeing, profoundly cultural technologies of perception . And though I want to reject notion of a homogeneous collective psyche, I do want to conjure or condense sociality and historicity of psychology spaces. Psychological space occupies a difficult

borderland, a 'between-space' where the question human confusions of what is 'inner' and 'outer' arerepetitiously experienced, and consciously and unconsciously lived . Indeed, the space psychology is the very site where everyday sensations of what's 'inside' no what's 'outside,' what's 'them' and what's 'us,' what feels safe and seems fatally frightening are culturally (re)produced orresisted; it is tensely border-conscious space. The politics of borders -how they're and unmade, what they come to mean -is one shifting center politics of nationalism, of language, of memory, of race, gender, of terror. What has come in the modern West to be called the logical' plays a dramatic, power-chargedrole within each of these sled political fields. The militarization of psychological space can be led then as a strategic set if psychological border operations aimed at the militarization of civil society for the production of violence. Thehistorically-specific confusion and re-configuration of the borders between the psyche of the soldier and of the civilian, between the practice psychology andthe prosecution of war, is the topic of several recently led studies of World War II and its Cold War aftermath. "New languages for speaking aboutsubjectivity," writes Nikolas Rose, emerged World War II to address the new consensus that "[w]inning was to require a concerted attempt to understandand govern) subjectivity of the citizen." Research on 'attitudes' and 'personality,' on recently developed techniques of public opinion polling; and atmanaging both military and civilian beliefs and behaviors. The human psyche itself became "a possible domain for systematic government in the pursuit of socio-political ends " (Rose 1996: x, 21, 7). According to historian Laura McEnaney, with the end of the war and the rise of the U.S. national security state, the "ambient militarism" of Cold War U.S. culture translated the very meaning of national security into a "perception, a state of mind" -a profoundly psychological state in which thecivilian psyche became a difficult but pervasive variable in military planning (2000: 39, 12-15). Ellen Herman's chronicle of the imbrications of psychological concepts and expertise into the textures of everyday life in post-World War II U.S. society, recounts how efforts at "massemotional control" in the name of national security led , by the late 1960s , to an unprecedented blurring of

boundaries between public policy and private emotions (1995: 241-242). Today, one important contributing factor to civilian-soldiers' willingness to serve may be a sanctioned ignorance of this history of previous campaigns to effectively mobilize 'inner space' in the interests of war and theorganized production of violence. Remembering the militarization of psychic space as part of the full spectrum of tactics deployed in 20th century warfare may help us better grasp the multiple dimensions of danger in the present ,post -September 11 contagion of terrors. "[W]hat one remembers of the past and how one remembers it depend on the social and cultural resources to whichone has access," writes Fred Turner in his recent history of collective memory-making, cultural trauma, and the Vietnam war (1996: xii). Consider this textas one attempt to apply the resources of a critical sociology to a more public remembering of how the inner space of psychology has been already acalculated battlefield, a terrain of cultural combat where the measure of victory includes the possibility, or impossibility, of remembering that a fight took place. If, as Turner suggests, "memory takes place simultaneously in the individual psyche and in the social domain," then what I (want to) recall isintimately tied to what you (are able to) remember (1996: xi). The psychic space of memory is a cultural and collective landscape -nobody moves aroundthere all alone. Is it possible for a critical sociology today to mobilize its scholarly and psychic resources to disrupt what Stephen Pfohl has called "the hegemonic rhythms of public memory in the USA Today" (1992: 42)? Can a contemporary critical sociology -remembering its own insurgent origins 9 -contribute to counter hegemonic memories that are more public and more powerful? An orbiting U.S. doctrine of Full Spectrum Dominance calls for critical terrestrial practices of full spectrum de-militarization. Economy. Culture. Society. Psyche. Perhaps it's time for a few collective flashbacks. How would it be to publicly remember the civilian-soldier as a central, contested figure of 20 century hot and cold wars? What difference could it make to re-frame and refuse today's


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'war against terrorism' as the most recent theater of operations for securing the psychological organization of civil society for the manufacture of mass violence? Insisting on the productive border-crossing between the past and present tense, asking you live briefly in the question of the boundaries between'then' and 'now,' text tries to contribute to an effective history of the present -one that might arrive in time for the fight for less terrorizing future spaces. 10

This militarized mindset is the cause of genocidal violencea politics based in boundedcommunities cannot result in anything save atrocitiesit can only solve wars betweenlike-minded peopleArchibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Princeton University Press, Chapter 2 p. 41-43SG)I previously cited Karl Poppers definition according to which democracy can allow a change of government without bloodshed. More precisely, asBobbio asserts, democracy is a political system in which change is nonviolent. These theoretical tenets have a clear empirical correspondence: in theconsolidated democracies , the number of individuals subjected to violence for political reasons is far smaller thanin nondemocratic systems (if we limit ourselves to internal political violence ). Let us begin by examining the mostserious violence a government caninflict: mass extermination for racial, religious, social, or political reasons.38 Out of the twenty major democides thatoccurred in the world between 1900 and 1987, only one was carried out by a democratic regimeimperial Britain in its colonies.39 Likewise, the list of countries attempting democide starting from 1955 includes only two cases out of forty- one in the West: Bosnia in the period 19921995 and Yugoslavia in19981999. The result is partially tautological: it would be difficult to defi ne as democratic a government that carries out the mass killing of its owndemos because it would be violating the principle of nonviolence. A certain congruency is expected between input and output in the demo cratic pro cessand historical experience tends to confi rm this expectation. This does not mean that a government that carries out democides cannot be an elected one.The case of Adolf Hitler is an example of this. However, by the time the democide occurred, Nazi Germany had long ceased to satisfy the criteria of ademocracy. Statistical analyses are problematic and open to criticism.41 For instance, statistical analyses do not take indirect responsibilities, such asthose deriving from funding, fomenting, or supplying arms to others, into account. The data cited exclude the victims occurring in the course of wars, whileit is historically diffi cult to distinguish between victims in time of peace and those of war, as governments often unleash po liti cal violence, evenagainst their own citizens, in times of war. A demo cratic government can also start wars that cause a large number of victims in other areas, such as thoseinfl icted by the United States during the Korean and Vietnam wars and more recently in Af ghan i stan and Iraq. The observed absence of violence in theinterior is certainly not a reason for satisfaction if the violence carried out in the exterior is very high. Likewise, countries with a long liberal tradition suchas Great Britain, France, and the Nether- lands were embroiled in long and bloody colonial adventures.42 Even if these factors are taken into account, thefact remains that a state that perpetrates or allows a democide involving its own citizens cannot be deemed demo cratic. Important research by MichaelMann has situated the relationship between democracies and genocide in a new context. Mann claimed that po liti cal communities with a highlevel of participation ensure the safety of their own members but can prove dangerously lethal to those who do not

belong to them. This is the often neglected dark side of democracy.43 Typical examples of this dark side are the massacre of the indigenous populations by Eu ro pe an colonists in North America and Australasia. These massacres wereoften carried out by small communities with a high level of internal participation and solidarity (often at localrather than state level) but that did not hesitate to defend themselves and physically eliminate native populations who thosecommuni- ties felt represented dangers or obstacles to them . In many cases simply because those nativepopulations were different. Ethnic cleansing was practiced in the majority of eastern Eu ro pe an countries when those countries established themselves as national states and founded their own legitimacy on the people, which was, however, defi ned in ethnicterms. In recent times we saw in the Balkans how the democracies being set up felt an almost physiological need to emphasize their difference from othergroups, even when the ethnic dividing lines (for instance, between Croats, Serbs, Slovenians, Bosnians, Albanians, Montenegrins, and Macedonians and soon) were anything but obvious. As soon as the homogenization of the community had been obtained by such coercivemeans as forced assimilation, expulsion, or even genocide, those democracies became oblivious to the

blood they had spilt . There is nothing like self- satisfaction for helping to remove the horrors of the pastand to perfect peaceful cohabitation . This confi rms that even though democracies minimize the amount of po liti cal violence inside their boundaries , democracies can be extremely harmful to those they do not recognize as members, whether they be-long to ethnic minorities or other nations . External enemies are useful for developing a common identity on the interior by means of anout- ward pouring of violence repressed on the inside. As Hegel had already observed, successful wars have prevented civil broils and strengthened theinternal power of the state . 44 The risk of this is all the more fre- quent at the stage in which a given demo cratic community is being established.

And, moreover, this psychological emphasis on the nation and the individual community

first can no longer solve problems in the world. Every existential threat humanity faceswar, terrorism, proliferation, population growth and total environmental collapsecan only be dealt with via true international cooperation. The psyche of the status quomakes all of these impacts inevitableSmith, 2003 [Rogers, Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University. Stories Of Peoplehood,

The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 166-169.]

It is certainly important to oppose such evolutionary doctrines by all intellectually credible means. But many have already beenwidely discredited; and today it may well prove salutary, even indispensable, to heighten awareness of humanidentity as shared membership in a species engaged in an ages-long process of adapting to often dangerous andunforgiving natural and man-made environments.20 When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns, we becomeaware that it is gen uinely possible for a species such as ourselves to suffer massive setbacks or evento become extinct if we pursue certain dangerous courses of ac tion . That outcome does not seem to be in any


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human's interest. And when we reflect on the state of our species today, we see or should see at least five major challenges to ourcollective survival, much less our collective nourishing, that are in some respects truly unprecedented. These are allchallenges of our own making , however, and so they can all be met through suitably cooperative humanefforts . The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the extraordinary w eapons of m ass d estruction that we have been buildingduring the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that characterized the Cold War at its worst are nowbehind us, but the nuclear arsenals that were so threatening are largely still with us, and indeed the governments and, perhaps,terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued to proliferate. The second great threat is some sort of environmental disaster , brought on by the by-products of our efforts to achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial production and distribution of an incredible range of good and services. Whether it is global warming, the

spread of toxic wastes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricultural techniques, or somecombination of these and other consequences of human interference with the air, water, climate, and plant and animalspecies that sustain us, any major environmental disaster can affect all of humanity . Third, as oureconomic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the danger thatmajor economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophesmay well increase . Such interdependencies can, to be sure, be a source of strength as well as weakness, as American andEuropean responses to the East Asian and Mexican economic crises of the 1990s indicated. Still, if global capitalism were to collapseor a technological disaster comparable to the imagined Y2K doomsday scenario were to occur, the consequences today would bemore far-reaching than they would have been for comparable developments in previous centuries. Fourth , as advances in foodproduction, medical care, and other technologies have contributed to higher infant survival rates and longer lives, the world'spopulation has been rapidly increasing, placing intensifying pressures on our physical and socialenvironments in a great variety of ways. These demographic trends , necessarily involving all of humanity, threaten toexacerbate all the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts, spawning chronicand acute environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final majorchallenge we face as a species is a more novel one, and it is one that may bring consciousness of our shared "species interests" evenmore to the fore. In the upcoming century, human beings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in waysthat might potentially alter the very sort of organic species that we are. Here as with modern weapons, economic processes, and pop-ulation growth, we face risks that our efforts to improve our condition may go disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entirehuman race. Yet the appeal of endowing our children with greater gifts is sufficiently powerful that organized efforts to create suchgenetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" are already burgeoning, both among reputable academic researchers and lessrestrained, but well-endowed, fringe groups.21 To be sure, an awareness of these as well as other potentialdangers affecting all human beings is not enough by itself to foster moral outlooks that rejectnarrow and invidious particularistic conceptions of human identity . It is perfectly possible forleaders to feel that to save the species, policies that run roughshod over the claims of their rivalsare not simply justified but morally demanded . Indeed, like the writers I have examined here, my own moreegalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influences, not fromany consciousness of the common "species interests" of human beings. But the ethically constitutive story which contends that we

have such interests, and that we can see them as moral interests, seems quite realistic, which is of some advantage in any suchaccount. And under the circumstances just sketched, it is likely that more and more people will become persuaded that today, thoseshared species interests face more profound challenges than they have in most of human history. If so, then stressing ourshared identity as members of an evolving species may serve as a highly credible ethicallyconstitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel politicalarrangements . Many more people may come to feel that it is no longer safe to conduct theirpolitical lives absorbed in their traditional communi ties, with disregard for outsiders , without activeconcern about the issues that affect the whole species and without practical collaborative efforts to confront those issues. Thatconsciousness of shared interests has the potential to promote stronger and much more inclusive senses of trust, as people come torealize that the dangers and challenges they face in common matter more than the differences that will doubtless persist. I think thissort of awareness of a shared "species interests" also can support senses of personal and collective worth, though I acknowledge thatthis is not obviously the case. Many people find the spectacle of the human species struggling for survival amidst rival life forms andan unfeeling material world a bleak and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to combine acceptance of an evolutionaryconstitutive story with religious or philosophical accounts that supply some stronger sense of moral purpose to human and cosmicexistence. But if people are so inclined, then nothing I am advocating here stands in the way of such combinations. Many persons,moreover, may well find a sustaining sense of moral worth in a conception of themselves as contributors to a species that hasdeveloped unique capacities to deliberate and to act responsibly in regard to questions no other known species can yet conceive:how should we live? What relationships should we have, individually and collectively, to other people, other life forms, and thebroader universe? In time, I hope that many more people may come to agree that humanity has shared responsibilities of stewardship for the animate and physical worlds around us as well as ourselves, ultimately seeking to promote the flourishing of allinsofar as we are capable and the finitude of existence permits. But even short of such a grand sense of species vocation, the ideathat we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and thrive across ever-greater expanses of space and time may be one that caninspire a deep sense of worth in many if not most human beings. Hence it does not seem unrealistic to hope that we can encourageincreased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human peoplehood that may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in moreparochial tales of their identities and interests. In the years ahead, this ethical sen sibility might fosteracceptance of various sorts of transnational political arrangements to deal with problems likeexploitative and wildly fluctuat ing international financial and labor markets, destructiveenvironmental and agricultural practices, population control, and the momentous issue of humangenetic modifications . These are, after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with on a near-global


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scale if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily . Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessarily entailincreased willingness to view existing governments at all levels as at best only "semi-sovereign," authoritative over some issues andnot others, in the manner that acceptance of multiple particularistic constitutive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting politicalclimate, it might become easier to construct the sorts of systems of interwoven democratic international, regional, state and localgovernments that theorists of "cosmopolitan democracy," "liberal multicultural nationalism," and "differentiated democracy" likeDavid Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young, William Connolly, and Jurgen Habermas all envision.


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The Plan

The United States Federal government should commit all available resources to developing anetwork of cooperative, internationally accessible environmental monitoring satellites. Wellclarify.


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Contention TwoCosmopolitanismCooperative science projects like the plan make global cosmopolitanism an internationalnecessitythe plan causes a shift in our collective mentalities.


Regime theory provides a manner of analysing sovereignty as de-linked from territory. The next section addresses cosmopolitan sovereignty, focusing on the writings of David Held, which presents a normative approach that assumes teleological progress towards sovereignty as de-linked from the state. As such,this approach also provides a manner of unbundling Westphalian sovereignty, in a time of globalization and outer space exploration. The approach alsoconsiders how traditional conceptions of sovereignty not only apply to outer space, but how those conceptions may also be affecting the way political space and community (and thus sovereignty) is conceived in world politics . According to this approach, and in accordance with wider cosmopolitanism , individual human beings are the primary politicalagents in the system. Cosmopolitanism can be taken as the moral and political outlook that offers the bestprospects for overcoming the problems and limits of classic and liberal sovereignty. It builds upon some of thestrengths of the liberal international order, particularly its commitment to human rights, and democratic

values that apply, in principle, to each and all. (Held 2002: 24) Exploring cosmopolitan sovereignty starts withthe shift from classical (Westphalian) sovereignty to liberal sovereignty . For Held , the liberal sovereignty modelrepresents an attempt to delimit political power and extend the liberal concern with limited government in theinternational sphere (2002: 1). One achievement of liberal sovereignty has been the effort to distribute resources not according to statehood, butrather based on the rights of individuals (2002: 15). The "common heritage of mankind" principle that developed for the high seas, and was later applied for

treaties on Antarctica and outer space, is in part an embodiment of that effort. Common heritage approaches represent the exclusionof a right of appropriation; the duty to use resources in the interest of the whole of humanity; and the duty toexplore and exploit resources for peaceful purposes (Held 2002: 15). Transnational issues that challenge the state'sability to rule within its own borders further inspire the movement away from classical sovereignty (Held 2002: 20). As international law codifies common heritage principles, and transnational issue areas undermine the state, the moral significance of thestate itself is challenged, and states and societies are opened up to judgement by general, if not universal, standards (Held 2002: 20). It isthis moral shift as well as the increased focus on humanity as a whole that represents movementfrom liberal to cosmopolitan sovereignty . However the need to govern areas such as outer space is notsimply a practical, but also a philosophical issue, in not only practically reconsidering governance of transterritorial areas, but alsoconsidering their implications for community, identity and the organization of political space . Cosmopolitansovereignty and outer space politics In relation to outer space, this approach to sovereignty opens up two areas for consideration. First, it warrants adiscussion on the aspects of present outer space politics that can be understood as part of the shift to liberal

and cosmopolitan sovereignty; and second it opens up the consideration of how outer space politicsthemselves may in fact be reinforcing through a feedback loop the sense of cosmopolitanism in wider world society ,9 A liberal and cosmopolitan discourse exists in the wording of ourer spacelaw, with the aforementioned clauses that outer space is "the common province of mankind" and"for peaceful purposes" (Outer Space Treaty, Article IV); based in the accepted principle that outer space is neutral territory; in suggestingthat asuonauts are the "envoys of all mankind" (Search and Rescue Agreement, Article V), and that "The exploration and use of the moon shall be theprovince of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientificdevelopment" (Moon Treaty, Article 4). These laws can be seen as part of the movement rowards "forms of regulation and law-making that creates powers,rights, and constraints that transcend the claims of nation-states and have far-reaching consequences in principle" (Held 2002: 23-24). However the degreeto which behaviour has followed these moral dictums, and will continue do so in the future, is not entirely clear. It is indicative that attempts to violate theselaws are normally undertaken with justifications worded in the context of those laws. For example, attempts by eight equatorial states to claim sovereignty over portions of geosynchronous orbit were justified by asserting that the Ourer Space Treaty did not apply to that region (Bogota Declaration 1976). Weaponization in space has occurred based on the justification that "peaceful purposes" does not imply de-militarization, but only the absence of war. If)China has said it plans to mine the Moon, but, vaguely, for the benefit of all humanity". II Cases such as these could be interpreted as a weakness in theargument that cosmopolitanism sovereignty is nascent in outer space politics, in that states continue to undermine the principles underlying the wording of the laws. Or indeed it could be interpreted as validation of the treaties, in that actors feel that going beyond those rules must be justified in the context of thelaws themselves. The second point raised by cosmopolitan sovereignty regards how outer space itself may becontributing to wider cognitive and societal shifts that generate a stronger sense of globalcommunity and common humanity (and hence cosmopolitanism), which is causing a shift away from

Westphalian sovereignty. The concept of the Overview Effect (White 1987) suggests that outer space is playinga role in forcing into our collective social epistemes a greater sense of our common destiny and humanity.Cosmologist Carl Sagan described this as an awakening from our "slumbering planetary consciousness " (Sagan1994: 215), which is forcing a reconsideration of our relationship to ourselves, and to the universe. The budding field of astrosociology further studies the ways in astrosocial phenomena (such as space exploration and space science) and society are related (Pass 2004) andmutually constitutive. The potential influence of outer space on collective mentalities is said to be achieved


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in various ways : through images of the Earth from space, which impact upon humans the ecologicalunity of our planet , and the arbitrariness of political boundaries; through the meta-experiences of astronauts

which impact upon us the reality that humans can now go into space; through the role of satellites inconnecting us through telecommunications; and shrinking time through real-time images (\XThite 1987) (a la rhe CNNeffect). From this perspective, not only does outer space law embody liberal principles, but outer space activity itself may be contributing to a cosmopolitan shift that emphasizes the commonality of the humancondition [our "overlapping communities of fate" (Held 2002: 35)}, and the arbitrariness of state-centered approaches tosovereignty . The need to cooperate on big science projects, combined with the planetary andcosmological perspectives that space exploration provides, powerfully demonstrate globalinterdependence, and thus potentially make the prospect of a code of universal moral conductseem both required and justified . It can be pointed out that the root of "cosmopolitanism" and "cosmology" are the same "cosmos",meaning "order" and "universe" .

Concentrating on ENVIRONMENTAL problems in space encourages peaceful, cooperative actionas opposed to militarization

Moltz, 08 [ James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of Space Security]

What emerges from this revie\v of the main conceptual roots of space policy analysis over the past fifty years is a mixed picture. Each of the schoolsanalyzed offers some explanatory strengths, but each also has blind spots and weaknesses. In seeking a better means of structuring our thinking about space

security's past and future, we instead return to the discussion of space security that opened this chapter, one that made reference to both man-made andnatural threats. In that context, it might be useful to move space security analysis from its traditional focus on states andtheir militaries to the space environment itself. This shift encourages an emphasis on "softer" tools forachieving space security than military means and refocuses our attention on the "transboundary"environmental problemsc'e represented by space radiation and debris . Viewing space security from theperspective of self-interested actors seeking to protect their access to space in a gradually constricting collective goods environment may offer advantagesover tying space security debates to nuclear and other "hard" security issues, which Cold War competition encouraged. Recent recognition of such problemsas global warming, the depletion of fisheries, watershed shortages, and deforestation has brought new collective action to address challenges faced by un-orunder-protected global commons. To date, space has figured only marginally in these discussions, But growing concern~ about orbital debris may be atipping point in pushing for more attention tc such questions in space. Looking back across history for lessons, we can conclude that neither excessivepessimism nor excessive optimism is warranted for space security. The outcomes to date in space have been mixed in regard to cooperation andcompetition. Yet it is worth observing that surprising levels of restraint emerged during the first fifty years of spaceactivity, despite a global context of political and military hostility. Making sense of these contradictorv trendsremains a work in progress. Changing the focus of traditional analysis regarding space may be fruitful, as a

different lens sometimes brings a new and more accurate perspective to long-studied problems. In the nextchapter, then, we consider what might be gained from viewing space security as an environmental managementproblem. Although space weapons exist today, their impact on the quality of space security is influenced by two parallel sets of factors-one technical, onepolitical. On the technical side, security calculations must take into account the quantity of space weapons, their readiness (including test record), theirdistribution among actors, the nature of their deployment (in storage, on the ground, or in distribution space), and the availability of methods forovercoming or evading them. On the political side, space security is influenced by the breadth, effectiveness, and depth of international support for norms,treaties, and other agreements meant to ban, limit, or control such weapons. But such military calculations alone do not determinespace security. Overlaying these specific operational and political factors is an important and oftenunderappreciated set of environmental factors that affect security in space . As suggested in Chapter One and analyzed ingreater detail in the rest of this chapter , risks from electromagnetic pulse (E.vIP) radiation, the expanding quantity of orbital space debris, and the increasing population of operational satellites and spacecraft must be understoodand taken into account. Failure to do so will affect the accuracy of any predictions about the current or futurestate of space security. Jessica Tuchman Matthews wrote presciently in 1989 about an emerging link between scientific understanding amonggovernments and solving security problems in environmental issue-areas involving mixed sovereignty and multiple actors." Although she did not mentionspace, her prescription that solving environmental security problems will require "far greater technical competence in the natural and planetary sciencesamong policymakers" is highly appropriate.' ~otably, she also called f()r involvement from the private sector in these decisions. The approach, focus, andskill set she invokes are very ditIerent from those traditionally applied to military-security problems, which to date have tended to emphasize nationalresponses and have involved relatiyely limited cooperation with commercial actors. (One notable exception has been in recent efforts at orbital debrismitigation, as will be discussed later.)

Weaponisation is NOT inevitable, but US action is keywe need to take the first step towardsinternational institutionalismMoltz, 08 [ James Clay ,Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies, , Politics of SpaceSecurity]


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A second and sharply contrasting perspective, developed around the time of the International Geophysical Year (lGY) organized by scientists worldwide for1957-58, focused on hopes that space might become a sanctuary from world political conflicts. The IGY had helped bring new attention to space and thedesirability of international cooperation in exploring this exciting new environment. The global institutionalist school emphasizes thepossible role of new forms of shared human and scientific thinking, supported by international cooperation,treaties, and organizations, in providing space security rather than weapons-based approaches. Its adherentstake a far more optimistic view of the lessons of space history and the prospects for future cooperation, seeingspace cooperation as a means of transcending cont1icts on Earth. As British space writer Arthur C. Clarke wrote in 1959, "Only through space-t1ight can Mankind find a permanent outlet tor its aggressive and pioneering instincts."s7 German-born U.S. space enthusiast \Villey Ley similarly hypothesized that " nations might become 'extroverted' to the point where their urge to overcome theunknown would dwarf their historic desires for power, wealth, and recognition--attributes that have so oftenled to war in the past." "' Ley noted in this regard the establishment already in 1959 of the 'U.N. Committee on the Peace- ful Uses of Outer Space. Another early adherent to the global institutionalist investrne: school, physicist Albert R. Hibbs, asked rhetorically in arguing against military lednationalism in space and instead in support of a human-wide approach to the future manned exploration: "Is it not possible that we will help [in this process] simply because we want a man to stand on .Mars?"60 Although global institutionalists rarely mentionedpolitical theory, their assumptions expressed concepts going back centuries within so-called idealist approaches to international relations. Seventeenth-century Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotiu5, for example, observed that man is endowed by his creator with a higher form of reason than animals and argued that"among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling desire for society, that is, for the social life-not of any and every sort, but peaceful and organizedaccording to the measure of his intelligence."61 A supporting elaboration of these views for space could be traced back to Immanuel Kant's assertion that"perpetual peace" could be achieved by universalist thinking and a federation of nations. As applied to space, analysts used similarconcepts to make the case that humans might be able to live peaceably in space through new methods of transnational governance. Indeed, early members of this school saw space as a means of escaping traditional patterns of human conflict, thanksin part to the positive pressures exerted by, on the one hand, international communications and, on the other, a desire to avoid catastrophic war. They depicted cooperation as the more likely outcome in space, compared to competition, and argued that as states

integrated their economies and national identities began to break down, old notions of statecentric realismcould become anachronistic and even fade into history. One especially innovative 1965 book suggested breaking out of superpowermilitary competition via the redirection of defense funding, arguing, "By inviting Soviet cooperation in an intensive program of space exploration ... we would tend to eliminate warlike preparations. This study concluded that heightened space mwstments would "make further armament expendituresimmensely difficult if not impossible. While some of these more fanciful views did not take hold, evidence to support the globalinstitutionalist case began to emerge early in the space age. The 1963 signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty,halting space nuclear tests, showed that cooperation between the two rivals had begun and represented a viablealternative to seemingly inevitable space cont1ict. By the the mid-1960s, the two rivals took another major step toward limiting thescope of their competition by negotiating the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 and opening it to international membership at the United Nations. This agreementapplied existing international law to space, banned all military activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies (on threat of open inspection rights grantedto signatory states), and most importantly, removed the Moon and celestial bodies from territorial ,competition by declaring them to be "the province of allmankind." Soon after, other cooperative efforts followed, including the ABM Treaty and the Apollo-Soyuz joint manned mission. In the commercial area,the Convention on International Liability (1972) and the Convention on Registration of Obiects added further stability and "rules" to space activity.'" As oneanalyst observed in 1976, "The USA and USSR have gone further to achieve arms control in space than in any other area."69 This evidence clearly seems tocontradict space nationalist patterns and predictions. Peter Jankowitsch observed in 1976: In the past [such as with the oceans and the world's airspace],

international cooperation was slow to follow new dimensions of human activity."~o But in '::ace, human activity was "soon followed by the development of new forms , C international cooperation, including the rapid formation of a new body of International law. The global institutionalist school quickly peakedin the early to mid-197OS, ,~cn the decline of U.S.-Soviet detente resulted in a sharp decline in civilian space cooperation and yielded to new military spacetesting in the late 1970S and early 19805. By the late 1980s, however, the school had resumed its development. Now somewhat sobered by pastdisappointments, the global institutionalists had largely abandoned idealist notions for more achievable notions of neoliberalism.~2 In other words,analysts no longer predicted an ultimate philosophical convergence among states in space but instead a form of enlightened self-interest and improved behavior through the benefit of cooperative space treaties, internationalorganizations, and new forms of bilateral and multilateral engagement in space. The rapid growth in U.S.-Russiancollaboration in a number of highly sensitive areas of spaceflight after 1991 seemed to confirm their predictions of a coming new era in space. But Bushadministration policies after 20m, inspired by concepts of space nationalism, explicitly rejected new treaty-based approaches and additional "rules" forspace, thus moving these ideas to the back burner of U.S. policymaking. Today, a growing international pressure for new legalinstruments to prevent conflict in space continues to motivate this school of thought, as seen in the nearly unanimousinternational support at the United Nations for the yearly resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Global institutionalistsemphasize the role of international treaties in preserving the benefits of space and the need for expanded

efforts to close existing loopholes and create strong prohibitions against the testing and deployment of weapons in space. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Bruce DeBlois, for example, rejects the inevitability of space nationalism.He describes the dichotomy of "either defending space assets with weapons or not defending them at all" as a"false dilemma."7; Instead, he argues for broadening the tool kit and abandoning the U.S. "do nothing"diplomatic strategv for space. DeBlois makes the global institutionalist case that a smarter U.S. policy

would be one of undertaking "intense diplomatic efforts to convince a world of nations that spaceas a sanctuary for peaceful and cooperative existence and stabilitv best serves all ." 7.! As Theresa Hitchensargues, new forms of international cooperation "will be ... necessary to ensuring the future security of space.'~5 Among European experts, German legalscholar Detlev Wolter has called for the negotiation of a Cooperative Security in Outer Space Treaty and the formation of a formal international organizationto implement the new agreement.~6 :1The treaty would ban destructive weapons from space, including ASATs, spaceIi strike weapons, and antiballisticmissile technologies. It would also set up an international system for monitoring and verification. Wolter's concept is consistent with treaty proposals at theUnited Nations offered by China and Russia in recent years but goes further to institutionalize decision making and implementation at the internationallevel. In the United States, the 2002 proposal from Congressman Dennis Kucinich (Dem., Ohio) to cut off U.S funding for space defenses and to negotiate a binding treaty to prevent the weaponization of space fits into this school as welF-Political scientist and tonner State De T II partment official Nancy Gallagher


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argues that true space security \vill "require formal negotiations, legally binding agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources andpolitical clout."c8 \formal negotiations, legally binding agreements, and implementing organizations that have both resources and politicalclout."c8

And, now is keywe are at a tipping point. Either you vote aff to endorse a criticalcosmopolitanism or you cede control of outer space to the neo-cons.

Dickens and Ormrod 07 Professors at the University of Essex (Peter and James, August 2007,Outer Space and Internal Nature: Towards a Sociology of the University Sociology volume 41 number 4)

This article has explored some of the past relationships between humanitys internal nature and the universe. We have also suggested some of the moretroubling ways in which these relationships are developing in contemporary society. One development is the trend toward a cosmic narcissism in the waysin which elites and the affluent middle classes relate to the universe as an object for maintaining imperial dominance andsustaining personal fantasies about omnipotence respectively. However, narcissistic relationships with external nature are intrinsically unsatisfying. Objectifying nature and the cosmos does not actually empower the self, but rather enslaves it. Even the wealthy and the technocratic new middle class who relate to the universe in this way become subjected to the objects of their own narcissistic desire. Theother development is a return to a fearful and alienated relationship with the universe, again experienced as afrightening subject controlling Earthly affairs from on high . It is a 21st-century version of the Platonic and Mediaeval universes in which humans are made into repressed objects and thereby brought to heel . This is a relationship experienced by those not in controlof the universe: those on the margins of Western society. Commodification, militarization and surveillance by the socially powerful are again making the universe into an entity dominating human society, as are contemporary cosmological theories divorced from most peoples understanding. Once more, socially and politically powerful people (some even claimingto be on a mission from God) are attempting to make the cosmos into a means by which they can control society onEarth. The combination of these two trends is a Wizard of Oz effect, in which power is maintained by those

with mechanical control of the universe, but hidden by a mask of mysticism that keeps the public in a positionof fear and subservience. Societys relations with the cosmos are now at a tipping point. The cosmos could be explored and used for primarily humanitarian ends and needs. Satellites couldcontinue to be increasingly used to promote environmental sustainability and social justice. They can for example be,and indeed are being, used to track the movements of needy refugees and monitor environmental degradation with a view to its regulation (United Nations, 2003). But if this model of human interaction is to win out over the use of the universe toserve dominant military, political and economic ends then new visionaries of a human relationship with theuniverse are needed . In philosophical opposition to the majority of pro-space activists (though they rarely clash in reality) are a growing number of social movement organizations and networks established to contest human activity in space, including the military use of space, commercialization of space,the use of nuclear power in space and creation of space debris. Groups like the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space and theInstitute for Cooperation in Space are at the centre of this movement. The activities and arguments of these groups, to which we are by and large

sympathetic, demonstrate the ways in which our understanding and use of outer space are contested in pivotal times.


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Contention ThreeReclaiming Psychological Space

Space is an opportunityhow we understand space politics can change the way we view domesticpolitics, and vice versa. Cooperative Space exploration isnt enoughit needs to be combined

with a methodological emphasis on terrestrial cosmopolitanism


Summary and conclusions Regime theory and cosmopolitan sovereignty provide useful theoretical frameworks for unbundling the relationship betweensovereignty, territory and the state in outer space politics. As emphasized above, and by way of summary, regime theory provides useful tools for txplainingthe negotiations and preference formations that lead to cooperative regimes, which creatively de-link sovereignty and territory. However its rationalistapproach to actor behaviour overlooks deeper social and constructivist forces that may be influencing outer space politics. And its conservative approach tothe states system causes shortsightedness in appreciating otber forms of governance and the organization of political space that have preceded the\X'estphalian system, and (especially in the context of outer space) fundamental changes to the system that may come in the future. Cosmopolitansovereignty usefully embraces the normative and teleological dynamics of outer space politics, andoffers an alternative reading of outer space la w. In accepting that classical sovereignty exists in thesystem, but that it may be at play with liberal and cosmopolitan forms of sovereignty too, the approach opensup new interpretations of outer space politics in the present, but also offers clear visions for potentialdevelopments in the future. The constructivist dynamic of the approach also allows us to see how outer spacemay not only be subject to, but also constitutive of, cosmopolitan shifts in the collective human episteme. Inregards to the study of sovereignty, territory and the state in outer space politics, I draw three broad conclusions based on the above analysis. First, it is

obvious that Westphalian sovereignty as a concept is inadequate for analysing outer space politicsThe concept does not provide a language through which to understand spaces outside of the traditionalterritorial state. The concept is as inflexible as the boundaries it prescribes for states, and alternativeapproaches must continue to be developed to unbundle the concept itself. As exemplified by the two approaches taken in thischapter , theoretical approaches that go beyond Westphalian sovereignty can serve to de-link sovereignty,territory and the state from each other in various forms. Second, I conclude that theoretical conceptions such assovereignty precede the meaning with which we infuse outer space politics, and conversely thatouter space exploration is causing cognitive shifts that lead to changes in our key theoreticalconcepts. The different visions of outer space politics that the two theoretical approaches give exemplify how our conceptual frameworks precede our interpretation of events occurring in outer space -that is, analysis of outer space politics is in part dependent on our conceptual frameworks and worldviewsdeveloped in regards to wider world politics . Yet I also argue that the unique opportunities and

events that outer space makes available to humans , and the unconventional political, legal and cognitivedevelopments those opportunities and events inspire , is also influencing political practice andconceptualizations in wider politics. Thinking about outer space governance can partly be understood inthe context of globalization, as one of many contemporary developments that challenge the role of the state andour perception of community. However outer space can also be seen as a new area that is alsoreinforcing changes i n that perception, by providing imagery of the planet as a whole, by providinghumans with information about the status of the Earth environment , and by "shrinking" the planetthrough technological developments such as satellite communications. While the governance of other globalcommons such as the high seas have challenged the conceptualization of traditional sovereignty before, thischapter shows how outer space re-introduces with some urgency those challenges, and providesnew angles to that challenge . In line with the previous conclusion, and as emphasized at earlier points in the chapter, my third conclusionis that exogenous events and human-driven developments in outer space will continue to influence ourunderstanding of sovereignty , both in space and in wider world politics, in the future. A major exogenous event ortechnological development could significantly change outer space politics, and indeed something like an asteroid would then also influence world politicsmore broadly conceived. However, barring such a major event, the relationship between sovereign practice in outer space and our understanding of thatsovereignty are likely to continually and dialectically re-constitute each other, as outer space continues to pose unique governance and conceptualchallenges. Power political trends, such as indicated by George W. Bush's space control policy, could in fact reinforce realpolitik, although likely still in thecontext of increased globalization and diversification of actors in world politics. Or (and particularly in the longer term) outer space may continue to reinforce liberal and cosmopolitan trends that more explicitly undermine

Westphalian sovereignty . The analysis of sovereignty in outer space is dependent on conceptualizations anddevelopments occurring on earth , in outer space , and by the dialectical relationship between the two.The International Space Station exemplifies the complex relationship between power politics and the state on the one hand, and cosmopolitan ideals andinterdependence in outer space politics on the other. The two approaches taken here offer different understandings (and methodologies) for interpreting where sovereignty has been in the past, for how it can be understood in the present, and for where i t is (and should be) going in the future. For thecontemporary theorist, a fair understanding comes from appreciating both, in the context of the complex andunique politics of outer space.


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This means that the role of the ballot is to investigate methodology and psyche before material orempirical arguments rejecting methodological nationalism creates a new research agenda that iscritical to understand the world and advance cosmopolitanism.

Beck and Sznaider, 2006 [Ulrich and Natan,. Professor of sociology at Munich's Ludwig-Maximilian University and the London School of Economics; and professor of sociology at the Academic College of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, Israel. Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a researchagenda, The British Journal of Sociology 57.1, Wiley InterSciences.]

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientificanalysis . It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states andexternally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition betweennation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization. The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions:

[Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies were the currency of social research. Thecore disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated inthe sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the domestic forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000:68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived . One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (asall the research shows see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What,then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that

national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serveas the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer . One cannot even understand there-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitanperspective . In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically andtheoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate thefoundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science . As many authors including the ones in this volume criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately beseparated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodologicalnationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities . In the case of the cosmopolitanWertbeziehung (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred

outlook of sociology appears problematic . In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological andnormative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of politicalactors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination withinthe context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness .Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society andpolitics . These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences .Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory andhistory governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nationstate . That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 13351). This does notmean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different nationaltraditions of law, history, politics and memory . These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The

comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism . This is valid to the extentthat the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted astransdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism. These premises also structure empirical research,for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusivelynational . A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is thereforedifficult, indeed, almost impossible , because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is thereforeof historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodologicalnationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, betheoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed . What is at stake here? Whereas in thecase of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reasonthis correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact,the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of


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reference. Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process throughwhich the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitionsof reality . Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of thenational and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society. This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlookcan be understood and methodologically justified as a positive problem shift (Lakatos 1970), abroadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realitiesencouraging new research programmes (Back and Lau 2005 and Beck, Banss and Lau 2003: 135). Against the backgroundof cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor,correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become de-nationalized, so that the national is no longernational, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time,new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically andempirically researched and elaborated .

This means we need to mix our focus between critical theory and problem-solving --- Only thisfocus on method generates social learning that avoids error replication and changesinternational politics.

Widmaier, 2004 [Wesley W.. Department of Political Science, St. Josephs University. Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: ThePragmatist Constructivist Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith, International Studies Review 6.3,]

This realignment of debate also would contribute to a more engaged IR scholarship if it led scholarsto recognize that they themselves act as agents in such communicative interactions . They mightthen become more inclined to acknowledge concerns, not only regarding explanation and researchdesign, but also for policy relevance and constitutional design. Deliberate reection on constitutional designconfronting andacknowledging the inevitable implications of any scholarly arguments for policy practicesis necessary because every theoretical andempirical argument offers a normative or policy lesson . For example, economists have recognized thatclassical theories teach students to behave in accord with their precepts . Robert Frank and his colleagues(1993) have argued that exposure to contemporary economic theory itself constitutes agents to act more selfishly; indeed, they found students enrolled ineconomics courses come to behave in an increasingly self-help manner. In the IR context, Wendt (1999:377) himself argues that problem-solving theory has the practical effect in the real world of helping to reproduce thestatus quo and suggests that realism, despite its claim of objectivity is best seen in this light as anormative as well as scientific theory. In recent decades, the research design-style structuring of questions and cases has come atthe expense of such constitutional concerns. Certainly , scholarly efforts should not be evaluated exclusively interms of the correctness of their policy views . Academia would not work if subjective political differences becamelegit- imate grounds for dismissing arguments . However, scholars need to acknowledge that their views inevitablypossess normative and policy implications rather than pretending that such implications do not exist. Consider again thatdespite their numerous differences, the constitutive lessons inherent in the analyses of Waltz, Cox, Ashley, and Campbell are quite similar: that state and societal agents must dene their interests incompetitiveas opposed to collectivefashion . One sus- pects that this is not the moral that Ashley or Campbell sought toadvocate. Unfortunately, the absence of a broader focus on such constitutive lessons, a neglectrooted in the structure of IR debate itself, limited their attention to such issues . In contrast ,by more persistently asking questions about the constitutive effects of theoretical or empirical claims, scholars may enable a more relevant study of international relations . They might reclaimthe public space to act as not simply academics in the narrow sense of the term within elite epistemiccommunities or as participant-advisors in the policy process but rather they might aid one another in functioning as public intellectuals, focusing larger public debates in a more constructive, pragmaticmanner . What are the potential benets of such shifts? The resulting academic contri- bution to public policylearning might enable not simply materialist-rationalist styled Bayesian probability updating (Iverson1984), but rather could promote a kind of social learning. Such learning, as Albert Bandura (1962, viii) has argued neithercasts people into the role of powerless objects controlled by environmental forces nor free agents who can become whatever they choose, but ratherrecognizes that both people and their environments are reciprocal determinants of each other. Such social learning requires anability to make sense of intersubjective contexts through a broader dialogue among the public,scholars, and policy agents. International structures , from this vantage, offer no unambiguous lessons . Con-trary to Kissingers (1979:5455) view (noted earlier) that the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high ofce are the intellectual capitalthey will consume as long as they continue in ofce, possibilities for intersubjective variation require a constant monitoring of the prevailingintersubjective mood. Just as balance of power rules are learned in a social context, they can be


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unlearned if states come to expect cooperation instead of conict . Kissinger-like claimsregard- ing the irrelevance of ongoing reection to policymaking seem misguided, as does theapplication of balance of power lessons in an inappropriate social context that may , in turn ,contribute to new policy errors . Put simply, lessons that are applicable in one setting (for example, Europe in 1914) may becounterproductive in another (for example, Europe in 1992). Such variation might, perhaps, be more readily recognized by scholars engaged in a morepragmatic, ongoing social learning. Conclusion Theory constitutes social reality. This realization highlights the needfor a pragmatist-constructivist approach to IR theory, one that involves an ongoing involve- mentin both scholarly and public debates . Unfortunately, the development of such a perspective in IRscholarship has often been impeded by the distinction between long-term critical theory andshort-run problem-solving theory . The present essay has called this distinction into question by describing the ways in which JohnDewey and John Kenneth Galbraith engaged in theoretical debates while also pursuing policy agendas. Both Dewey and Galbraith highlighted theimportance of socially constructed understandings in the issue areas of education and economic policy. More broadly, their work itself provided a bettersense of what it means to act as a public intellectual in both guiding and being immersed in public debates. In addressing the implicationsfor IR scholarship, this essay has, therefore, urged a more explicit stress on both the role of agencyin advancing change and a recognition of the constitutive effects of theory on social reality. Inkeeping with the tradition of pragmatist scholarship, let us conclude that distinctions between critical theory and problem-solving theory need to be relaxed considerably to highlight the potential roles of theory as a factoras well as of theorists themselves as actors in international politics (Edwards 1990).


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***SOLVENCY


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SolvencyCooperation key

Only prioritizing international space cooperation solves for space weaponizationJohnson, 2006 [ PhD at The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (Rebecca, 2006, Space without Weaponshttp://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm ]

RecommendationsSpace can provide unparalleled resources for supporting our security in relation to humanitarian andenvironmental crises and diverse natural, criminal and military threats. Nevertheless, it is important torecognise that potential misuses of space assets could turn outer space into a battlefield: such abuses wouldthreaten global security as well as compromising a range of civilian and security applications on which ourdaily lives now rely. 1. We need to prioritise the collective, cooperative prevention of the weaponisation of space , with timely development of international legal instruments andagreements to ensure that no weapons are tested or deployed for use in, to or from space. Prevention andprohibition of weapons in and from space is cleaner, clearer and safer than belated attempts at disarmament ornon-proliferation would be in left for the future to deal with. Operating within the multilateral framework, it isnow urgent that we develop a strategy to reinforce the outer space security regime and prohibit the

weaponisation of space.[13] 2. Countries with space assets and dependencies need to take seriously their activeprotection, through both technological and political initiatives. Useful approaches would include a. passivedefences such as hardening and shielding, and enhancing space situation awareness capabilities; and b. thedevelopment and coordination of policies and strategies to play a more significant and effective role instrengthening the international legal regime and promulgating 'rules of the road' for space activities and uses.3. More open, transparent, and rational analysis of the actual threats, prospects of, and alternatives to, missiledefences and the weaponisation of space, including analysis - whether in the CD or some other forum - of theimplications of certain policy routes for human, international and space security.ConclusionInstead of turning to the sledgehammer of space weaponisation to deal with thepotential vulnerabilities of space assets, a more sensible approach (and oneconsistent with the United Nations Charter) would combine arms control efforts with thetechnical hardening and shielding of as many satellites as possible, plus space situation awareness, redundancy and other 'passive' defence means . Progress in nuclear disarmament, strengthening the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, further efforts torestrict missile proliferation, building on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Codeof Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) would also contribute to security and reduce thechances of space becoming a battleground - which would be in nobody's interests.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htmhttp://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm


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SolvencyCosmic Viewpoint

A cosmic viewpoint is key to establishing a cosmopolitan society

Patomaki 10 (2 September 2010, Heikki is Professor of World Politics and the Vice Director of the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research at theUniversity of Helsinki, Finland. He is also an Innovation Professor of Human Security Globalisation and Global Institutions at the RMIT University in Melbourne,Cosmological Sources of Cosmopolitanism Review of International Studies p. 191 SG)

For a number of Enlightenment thinkers and their followers, the cosmic viewpoint puts the drama of life and human history on the planetin a very wide perspective . In one sense this is an optical e ffect: the longer the distance, the smaller the within-the-humanity di fferences appear.Moreover, distance and the non-centric Copernican perspective encourage judicious and at times ironic ethico-political sentiment towards ones own particular identity, and this sentiment is a key part of criticalcosmopolitanism . In Kants case, critical cosmopolitanism also opened up a new temporal horizon by constituting an interestin exploring possible futures that can be di fferent and perhaps better than the current realities. The cosmic

vision also suggests that humans are not only dependent on each other but also on the physical processes of theplanet, solar system and the universe as a whole; and on the thin sphere of life on planet Earth. Thus the newcosmological perspective encouraged scientists, philosophers , political theorists and novelists to think of all humans as part of aninterdependent and fragile whole , the development of which has also given rise to consciousness, reason and morality . Awareness of thehuman interdependency and shared fate suggests widening the sphere within which the basic moral principlesapply . Further, the idea of possible cosmic pluralism can also contribute to extending the variety of living and sentient beings with which we can identify. Anyadequate form of morality has to do with the capacity to generalise normative claims in an acceptable way and, most importantly, with the ability to see things fromothers point of view.32


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SolvencyMovements

Seeing environmental risks as truly global undermines the political system and its insistence on bounded problemswe rupture the system and create a new oneBeck, 03 Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich and British Journal of Sociology LSE Centennial Professor in theDepartment of Sociology since 1997, founder of the research centre at the University of Munich (Beck, Conversations With Ulrich Beck,pg ?)

I'll come to that in a second because it's a key point. But first I want to finish up an earlier argument. The explosiveness of risk conflicts lies

in the fact that they delegitimate the political system. Even though its institutions continue to function and continue to deny that therecan be such a thing as an incalculable risk, such risks force their way into institutions like a virus that weakens them from

within. Everyone tries to free themselves from risk, but it continues to multiply and permeate . It's as if we've knockedover a honeypot, and in our efforts to rub it off, we succeed only in getting honey stuck to every part of the social body. It's a self-negatingprocess, in which everything society's institutions do to free themselves only spreads the risk and helps todissolve their legitimacy. Hobbes, in his theory of the state, actually put his finger on the explosive core of risk conflict. If you ask when even thisdeeply' conservative thinker thinks civil resistance is justified, you find a formulation that strikingly if unintentionally anticipates environmental problemsand the spectre of risk as uncertainty. To paraphrase, he says the ultimate resistance is justified when the state can nolonger guarantee its citizens pure air and healthy food and the security that goes with them . When their air is poisoned and their food endangers them, then citizens are justified in rebelling against the state.

What this makes clear is that risk is not something limited to the environment. It doesn't only affect theenvironment of the political system and it does so because it strikes at fundamental rights, institutionalizedfundamental rights, namely the right to life and security, rights upon which both state and citizenry may evenplace a higher value than on freedom. When it's a matter of life and death or health, people stop kidding around. People feel this asan attack on the core of their existence . It is not the size of the danger that makes these risks so politically explosive. It is ratherthe size of the contradiction, between the security that it is the state's raison d'etre to provide - and which we have up until now expected it to provide - andthe systematic injuring of that expectation that takes place in risk conflicts. Diffused poisons are like diffuse enemies, which industry has let in through itssluice gates. And then the state, rather than declaring war on them, declares them to be harmless. I bring up this point because it makes clear bothhow explosive these conflicts are, and that their epicenter is not where people think it is. It lies not in the risksthemselves, but in how strongly they undermine the core of what legitimates state institutions andpolitical action in the first modernity . This crisis of confidence then reacts back to increase risk consciousness. If a risk crisis goes far enough, we eventually reach the point where no one places any trust inthe repeated announcements of the authorities that they have everything under control. At that point they startto have the opposite of their intended effect . Each announcement conjures up another image of imminent catastrophe.


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Solvency--Human security focus

The plan and its mindset disperse political authority and focus on people instead of statesthissolves the root cause of war, poverty, and opression


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Pogge 92-- the Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (Thomas W., October, Ethics by the University of Chicago Press, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, JSTOR)


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The human future suddenly seems open. This is an inspiration; we can step back and think more freely. Insteadof containment or detente, political scientists are discussing grand pictures: the end of history, or the inevitable proliferationand mutual pacifism of capitalist democracies. And politicians are speaking of a new world order. My inspiration is a little more concrete.

After developing a rough, cosmopolitan specification of our task to promote moral progress, I offer an idea forgradual global institutional reform. Dispersing political

Cosmopolitanism Aff UM 7wk

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