Morse Concepts Qual

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10.1177/1049732304269676QUALITATIVE HEALTH RESEARCH / December 2004Morse / QUALITATIVELY DERIVED THEORY

Keynote Address: Fifth International

Advances in Qualitative Methods Conference

Constructing Qualitatively Derived Theory:Concept Construction and Concept Typologies

Janice M. Morse

Although concepts differ in scope, specificity, and function within qualitativelyderived the-ory (QDT), and the organization and integration of concepts is essential for the attainmentof theoretical integrity, this topic has not been discussed previously in the literature. In this

presentation, the author discusses the derivation and the kinds of concepts that qualitativeinquiry generates. She examines the various positioning of certain types of concepts inemerging theoretical schemes and how the contribution of those concepts to completed the-ory varies according to the researchers agenda and the various roles assumed by differenttypes of concepts.

Keywords: qualitatively derived theory; concept development

Although the goal of most qualitative inquiry is the development of theory, theactualprocess of theoryconstruction hasbeen overlooked. In researchtexts, a

great deal of effort is spent explicating processes of coding and developing catego-ries andthemes, but thetransformation of these categories into concepts, determin-ing the position of concepts in the emerging theory, and the actual structure of thetheory have been poorly described.

The major exception is in grounded theory, which has as its goal the develop-ment of midrange theory. The theoryin grounded theoryhas a particular structure.As it is used to describe a process, a completed grounded theory is usually concep-tualized in stages or phases. However, a thematic central process (that is, the corevariable [see, Glaser, 1978], or theBasic Socialor Psychological Process [see Strauss,1987]) remains integral throughout these stages or phases. It is this core variablethat accounts for most of the variance (Glaser, 1978) and is the focus of the theory.

Ethnographic methods, on the other hand, have been concerned with descrip-tive andexplanatory theorybuthave notdeveloped formal or prescribed processesthat dictate the structure of the theory. With the recent interest in multiple-method

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AUTHORS NOTE:This article waspresented as a keynote address at theFifthInternational Interdisci-plinary Advances in Qualitative Methods Conference, January 2004, in Edmonton, Alberta.

QUALITATIVE HEALTH RESEARCH, Vol. 14 No. 10, December 2004 1387-1395DOI: 10.1177/1049732304269676 2004 Sage Publications


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researchand themovementaway from thesingle project toward researchprogramsthat increase the scope, depth, complexity, and significance of qualitativelyderived

theory (QDT), the role of concepts in the development of QDT requires seriousreconsiderationperhaps even the development as a research method in its ownright.

Of importance to my approach of exploring concept construction and the posi-tioning of concepts withinQDTarethe multiple ways that concepts areused withina theoretical structure. Note that a concept may be used according to the originaldefinition of concept, that is, as a label; it may be subsumed as an internal attributeof a moreabstract concept; or it may beexplored for its role as a concept oras a com-ponentof theory. To add further confusion, the same concept label canbe treated asa subtheory within a larger theory or as a theory in itself. Thus, the structure of theconcept and its position in a theory vary depending on the context and the purposeof its use and how the researcher elects to conceptualize and use it.

Let me explain further: Social support may be considered as (a)a conceptin

fact, it was introduced as a scientific concept by Kaplan in 1974 and has since beendefined consistently in the literature. Social support has antecedents and conse-quences, attributes andboundaries. It can, however, be used in otherways: (b)as anattribute, ora partofanotherconcept,for instance asanattribute ofcoping;or (c) asaconcept within a theory, such as a theory of reciprocity. It can be used as (d) asubtheory, or a theoretical component of larger theory, for instance positioned withina theory of caregiving; or (e) it can be considered as a theory in itselfas a theory ofsocial support. In each of these examples, social support changes its scope and itsrelationship to other concepts and theories, and its role in the theoretical scheme isaltered.

Nevertheless, it is essential forresearchers to be aware ofhow the concept isbeingused and whether it is an isolated entity or linked with other concepts. In each role,theposition of the concept in a theoretical schemeis at some point a deliberate decisionmade by the researcher according to certain conditions. Perhaps the scope of thestudy wasrestricted by certain limitations,such as by concerns of feasibility (limita-tions of cost, time, expertise, and so forth). Its role might have been determined bythe researchers scientific agenda and goal (from researcher interest to the type ofknowledgerequired, outcome/application needed, or purpose,such as theidentifi-cation of an intervention). Or its role and scope may have emanated from the stageof the research program (in which the knowledge about the concept is necessarilyand logically analyzed prior to theory development).

Thus, again referring to the above example of social support, it is evident thatthe concept may be treated with varying degrees of abstraction, from a part of thewhole to the entire theoretical scheme, and it can vary in scope from themicroanalytic to something macro, broad, and comprehensive. It may be analyzed

as a singleentity, as a concept, or analyzed within a cluster of allied concepts. It maybe viewedstatically in a single point in time or within a dynamic interactionsystem,modified over time. Theposition anduseare notfixedby theconcept,but thechoiceremains with the researcher whodetermines howit will be used withina particulartheoretical scheme.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUALITATIVE CONCEPTS

Where do qualitative concepts come from? In qualitative inquiry, concepts may bederived from interview data or imported from the literature. Concepts found in orderived from interview data might be everyday concepts (i.e., lay terms that aredefined in the dictionary or are newly emerging slang terms) or scientific concepts(i.e., concepts developedfor scientific useas operational definitions) that have beenused extensively in qualitative or quantitative research, and adopted into lay lan-guage.Everydayconceptsmay benewslangterms notyet defined inthedictionary,lay concepts that are defined in the dictionary, lay concepts developed to the pointthat they are now used in the scientific literature, or a scientific concept nowadopted into the lay literature. Anemerging lay conceptmay be a slang term. Forinstance, in Canada, a double-double refers to an order of coffee with two sugarsand two creams, and the term has recently been formalized in theCanadian OxfordDictionary(Cotroneo & Hutsul, 2004).Trustis an example of a lay concept that is

nowincreasingly appearing in the researchliterature and maturing into a scientificconcept (see Hupcey, Penrod, Morse, & Mitcham, 2001).

Scientific concepts,on theother hand, aredeveloped in quantitativeresearch tofacilitate inquiry by identifying phenomena, labeling, and creatingoperational def-initions. Usually, scientific concepts are clearly defined and delineated when intro-ducedin theliterature. Alternatively, researchers mightfind a scientific conceptthathas beenusedto the extent that itbecomes aneverydaywordand has beenincorpo-rated into the dictionary (i.e., aneveryday scientific concept). An example of such aconcept is coping. Thus, everyday concepts come from use in language. Althoughthese concepts are developed linguistically, the process is facilitated by science.

Development of Concepts Using Qualitative Inquiry

Concepts are developed within qualitative inquiry by developing data clusters ascategories or identifying commonalities as themes, labeling or namingthecategoryor theme, and then developing a definition for each. Next, the characteristics of thecategories and themes are further identified, the conceptual boundaries delineated,and the attributes identified. This process is identified below.

Step 1: Building Categories and Themes

Principles of induction demand that concepts first be derived by identifying com-mon segments of data, accruing these data to form a category and applying a label,oremic tag. An emic tag is a label derived from the category that actually occurs inthe dataand thatbestdescribes the categoryas a whole.The nextstepis todevelopa

detailed description of the category. If this description fits the description of a con-cept in thelayorpublishedscientific literature, then theconcept label already in usereplaces the emic tag. This is to prevent the proliferation of the same or similar con-cepts with different names, basically referring to the same sets of behaviors, fromcluttering theliterature. Furthermore, duecare must be taken to avoid developing asingle concept with many slightly different meanings applied to the same conceptlabel.

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Step 2: Naming the Concept

If a description of theconcept cannotbe located in theliterature, then theresearcherhas the prerogative of replacing the emic tag with a new name and introducing it asa new concept. Thus, when gaps are discovered in the literature, new concepts can

be identified,developed,published,and incorporatedinto educationand practice.Naminga category does notmake it a concept, or, at best, without further work,

makes itonly animmatureconcept.It is this next step offurther developing thecate-gories that is often neglected in qualitative inquiry, and some authors even use thetermscategoryandconceptinterchangeably, albeit incorrectly.

Step 3: Creating Definitions andIdentifying Boundaries and Attributes

To develop a category into a concept, the category must be saturated, so that the

boundaries are clearly delineated, and the boundaries and concept definition mustbe clear enough for others to be able to recognizewhat is or is not an example of thatparticular concept. The characteristics of the category must be identified to thedegree of certainty that the investigator can recognize noise, or artifactsocca-sional contextual featuresfromthe characteristicsor attributesthat, by definition,must alwaysbe presentfor the exampleto be an instance of the particularconcept.

These requirementsmean that notall categories areconcepts. Althougha singlecategory may be developed into a concept, other outcomes are possible. Two cate-gories maycombineto form a singleconcept,or, ontheotherhand,a broadcategorymight be sorted into two or more concepts. This is important, because concepts donotoccurin thedata independently. Their relationships to otherconcepts,andespe-cially to lower level concepts, must be demonstrated prior to commencing theoryconstruction.1

Presently, in qualitative inquiry, there are two further criteria for developingconcepts. First, a concept must be linked to data, or contextualized.Linked to datameansthat thederivationof a concept canbetracedback to dataand itcanbeillus-trated using these data. That is, instances of the concept in use can be provided. Sec-ond, concepts must be abstract enough to be described and used independentlyfrom the context. This means that the analytic work of identifying attributes, mov-ing beyond emic tag labels and developing careful definitions, transforms the con-cept so it is applicable to many similar situations and contexts and the concept can

be recognized in future occurrences.Although these twocriteria initiallyappearto be contradictory, indeedthey are

not. A concept is technically a label,but that label representsor signifies something,so we must always be able to define itand give examples to illustrate its meaning in

a particular context. Theconceptalso representsmany similar instancesin otherset-tingswhich, incidentally, provides one form of generalizability for qualitativeinquiry. The more abstract, or higher (J. Corbin, personal communication, Decem-

ber 21, 2003), or major (K. Charmaz, personal communication, December 21, 2003)the concept, the less the concept definition resembles a particular instance, hencethe greater its decontextualization and the greater its usefulness for application toother contexts.



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Beginning Inquiry From the Conceptual Level

This occurs when the researcher commences inquiry by identifying the concept ofinterest rather than waiting for the concepts to emerge. Starting a project using layor scientific concepts as the focus of inquiry places the qualitative researcher at riskof violating validity by working deductively rather than inductively. Suppose, forexample, a researcher was interested in social support as a research topic, and ratherthan examining the nature of relationships in the field and waiting for social sup-port to emerge inductively, he or shebegan the project using the concept ofsocial sup-

portas it is defined and with all its assumptions.Qualitative inquiry need not necessarilyor alwaysstart with prior knowl-

edgebracketed.Providedcareis takennotto violate principles of inductivevalidity,inquiry may begin at an advanced stage, in which the concepts have already beenidentified and at least partially explored. In these instances, if the researcher canidentify the boundaries of the concept, these boundaries may be used as ascaffold

with the internal attributes being investigated inductively. Alternatively, if partialinformation is known about theattributes, theinvestigator mayusethis knowledgeas a skeleton, buildingoutfromthoseinternalstructures(Morse& Mitcham,2002).

The Importance of Developing Concepts

Why is it important for qualitative researchers to develop concepts? Why not exitthe research process with the analysis at the descriptive stage of categories andthemes?

The refinement of analysis to the level concepts enables . . .

Synthesis. The development of concepts providesa means to identify the attrib-

utes/characteristics needed to synthesize and reduce data, thus moving analysisbeyond the descriptive level to a higher level of abstraction.

Recognition of patterns. The identification of the concept attributes, enables us toidentify similar instances, similar behaviors, and similar occurrences, within data.These things may be not data that are exactly the samethat is, not identicalinstances nor replicasbut, rather, things that are have similar characteristics.

Comparison or recognition of variation. Being able to recognize thingsthat aresim-ilar enables us to see things that are different and to know whythey are different ordo not fit within a particular category or concept.

Recognition of newinstances. Understanding characteristicsorattributesof a con-

cept enables us to recognize or anticipate new occurrences of the same concept inother contexts, enabling recognition and communication, hence it enables . . .

Expansion of scope. This makes it possible for us to expand beyond the immedi-ate context.

Generalization. This allowsus to apply theconcept to similar problems, in differ-ent contexts.



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The connection to other behavioral sets/concepts. Linking attributes allows us toconnect conceptsvertically, horizontally, or progressively in time as conceptsparal-

lel, intercept, or merge. This enables . . .

Development of QDT. Other authors have considered that concepts are thebuildingblocks of theory(Chinn & Kramer, 1991). I have problemswith this anal-ogy, forconcepts do notstack.They must be theoretically linked, integrated, or con-nected within the theory, more like fitting a (jigsaw) puzzle togetherand one thatis tightly andspecificallyheld inplace with Velcro. Such fitting demands that piecesoverlap according to some commonality and dictates that pieces cannot be placedarbitrarily anywhere in the scheme. Concepts are exceedingly particular aboutwhere and how they fit or are placed within a theory,2 so that a molecular structurewould be a more appropriate metaphor than a brick wall.

Types of ConceptsThus far, we have considered theorigins of concepts in qualitative inquiry andtheirraison dtre for qualitative inquiry. But before we discuss QDT, we must also con-sider the forms or types of qualitatively derived concepts.

Conceptsaccount forphenomena,resulting in varying levels of abstractionandscope, and account for data in different ways. Although I have already also notedthat the researchers placement of concepts in theory may account for its level ofabstraction and scope, and this varies with is use, the scope and level of abstractionalso may arise fromthe very natureof the concept itself and be programmedinto itsdefinition. The scope and level of abstraction are developed primarily from thenature of the phenomenon it represents and its derivation. Furthermore, the lowerthelevelof theconcept,the closerit is to thedata andthemoregroundedits position

in theory; themore abstract theconcept, thehigheritspositionin thetheory, thefur-ther it is from the data, and the greater the number of lower level concepts placedbeneath it. It is these lower level concepts that create the linkages between the con-text (or data) and the abstract concepts, and it is these linkages that are crucial forassessing the validity of the theory. Note that the type of conceptdoes not involveevaluatingits maturity (Morse, Mitcham, Hupcey, & Tasn,1996). Maturity refers tothe concepts level ofdevelopment,3 not to its level ofabstraction.

I have identified the following types of concepts in QDT.

Low-level concepts. Thelowest levelof concepts areparticularconcepts. They arederived directly from data and remain close to the phenomena they represent. Assuch, these concepts are local, and narrow in scope, and hence might have restrictedapplication to other contexts and to new situations, and refer to a particular set of

behaviors. They have limited application and are not widely generalizable. Anexample of such a concept may be sorrow. As particular concepts are close to thedata, theymay bea partof a moreabstractconceptinthis instance, sorrowmay bea part of grief, which, in turn, is part of bereavement and a lower level concept thansuffering (see Figure 1).



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Mid-level concepts. Mid-level concepts are generally specialized to a particularphenomenon. For instance,grief andbereavement aregenerallyappliedto theemo-tional responses to loss associated with death.

High-level concepts. High-level concepts have broad application and oftenencompass lower level concepts. For instance, social support may include the con-cept of reciprocity as an attribute.

Horizontal concepts. These are generally high-level concepts that are extremelyexpansive in scope. Various antecedents may give rise to the same pattern of attrib-utes, and similar outcomes. Suffering, for instance, is ahorizontal concept; it is a

broad, highly abstract concept encompassing many specialized, narrower, andlower level concepts, includinggriefandbereavement.Linguistic tests maybe usedto determinethe position,level of abstraction,and logical fit. In thecaseof suffering,forinstance,you cannotgrieve pain or bereave pain, but you can suffer pain, so suffer-ingis themore dominant,higherlevel concept. In this instance,the concepts of griefor bereavement do not compete with suffering, although clearly those at the samelevel and applying to similar phenomenon (consider grief and bereavement) mayoverlap and compete with each other.

Paradigmatic concepts. Paradigmatic concepts are scientific concepts of a veryhigh level of abstraction that are applied deductivelyto a cluster of concepts or adeveloping theory. It is importantto note that there is no direct link from thecatego-

ries or other concepts used in thedevelopingtheory; rather, theconcept is placedonto the emerging theoretical scheme.For instance, an interesting study was recently published that used cultural

safety as a paradigmatic concept (Anderson et al., 2003). The authors write,

In the conceptual phase andplanning of theresearch, we hadthought it possible toidentifyandnameculturallysafe andculturallyunsafe practices. In fact,in ourinitial attempts to code the data, we developed a category for cultural safety,


FIGURE 1: The Horizontal Concept of SufferingNOTE: The horizontal aspect of suffering encompasses many related concepts, including the mid-levelconcepts of bereavement and grief, and the low-level concept of sorrow. Paradigmatic concepts areapplied deductively rather than emerging from the data.


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suggesting anassumed transparency oftheconcept(p. 204). . . . Thequandary foruswas that cultural safety did not announce itself in the transcriptsit was not athing that could be found,but became interpretative work on our part. . . . As we

reexamined thedata to geta handle on theconcept of cultural safety, it became evi-dentthat any codecategorycouldilluminate theconcept,dependingonour interpre-tation. (p. 206, italics in the original)

Thus, the positioning of the categories in this study under the rubric of culturalsafety was meeting the researchers political agenda rather than emerging from thedata. Could another paradigmatic concept be substituted? Yeswithin limits. Butwe can all think of other concepts that may fit as paradigmatic concepts. Other cul-tural concepts are obvious, such as cultural competence (Canales & Bowers, 2001),or even simply safety or feeling safe. But, of greater concern, concepts that are fur-ther removed from the topic of the study could also be used; for example, caring,social support, and even trust could slide into the most abstract position on the the-ory. Note that the higher the level of the concept, the greater the distance between

data and concept, and the easier it is to apply paradigmatic conceptsbut also thegreater the risk for error or the misattribution of the concept.

TOWARD THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Researchsmoothesoutcontradiction andmakesthings simple, logical andcoher-ent. (Szent-Gyrgyi, 1974)

Qualitative researchers mustworktoward increasinglyabstract and powerfultheo-ries. We have matured to the point that our theories can and must be more than nar-rative descriptions. As we become increasingly sophisticated, so must our theories

become more complex, increasing in scope and maximizing impact. We must start

to develop techniques that will bring together related concepts into a theoreticalwhole. The first step in this endeavor is to develop concepts, so their structure (oranatomy) isclear, andassessthe type ofconceptsto bepositionedwithin thetheory.

Because, when constructing QDT, the researcher deliberately determines howconceptswill be used withinthe emergingtheoreticalscheme, clarifying theorgani-zation, position, and type of concepts used is essential. Furthermore, understand-ing the types of concepts inQDT sets the stage for the evaluation of the theory. Stan-dard criteria for evaluation of QDT consist of six domains: clarity, structure,coherence, scope, generalizability, and pragmatic utility (Morse, 1997). The task ofevaluating the structure, coherence, and scope is facilitated when the conceptualstructure has been deliberately developed and is clear.

What is next in this process of theory construction? Elsewhere, Morse andPenrod (1999) recommended opening the concepts to find common attributes in

two concepts, and if two similar attributesmatch, they will then fit to form a com-mon linkage. As concepts link laterally, horizontally, and vertically in a three-dimensional scheme, so will theory be formed in a process I call theoretical coales-cence. In this way, sets of independent and isolated concepts may be broughttogether to form a broad and significant theory.



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NOTES

1. Corbinconsiders categoriesand concepts to be on a continuum, withthe categoriescloser to thedata than the higher level concepts. Thus, the lower level concepts might provide explanation for thehigherlevelconcepts,and thecorecategoryis theconceptat thehighestlevel, denotingwhatthe researchis all about (J. Corbin, personal communication, December 21, 2003).

2. Incidentally, this is one reasonwhy concepts or subcomponents of theories cannot be borrowedcasually for use in other theories or moved to create a theory without further inquiry or at least carefulconsideration; this is my major criticism of theoretical triangulation.

3. Forthis reason, evaluatingthe phenomenologicaladequacyis not apartofassessingthematurityof a concept.

REFERENCES

Anderson, J., Perry, A., Blue, C., Browne, A., Henderson, A., Khan, K. B., et al. (2003). Rewriting cul-

tural safely within the postcolonial and postnational feminist project.Advances in Nursing Science,26(3), 196-214.

Canales,K. K.,& Bowers,B. J. (2001).Expanding conceptualizationsof culturallycompetent care.Journalof Advanced Nursing,36(1), 102-111.

Chinn, P. L., & Kramer, M. (1991). Theory and nursing: Asystematic approach (3rd ed.). St. Louis, MO: C. V.Mosby.

Cotroneo, C., & Hutsul, C. (2004). Double-double makes the Oxford.Edmonton Journal, July 2, p. C3.Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.Hupcey, J.,Penrod,J., Morse,J. M.,& Mitcham,C. (2001).An explorationand advancement of theconcept

of trust.Journal of Advanced Nursing,36(2), 282-293.Morse, J. M. (1997). Considering theory derived from qualitative research.In J. M. Morse (Ed.),Complet-

ing a qualitative project: Details and dialogue(pp. 163-188). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Morse, J. M., & Mitcham, C. (2002) Exploring qualitatively-derived concepts: Inductive-deductive pit-

falls. International Journal of QualitativeMethods, 1(4), Article3. RetrievedMay 26,2004,from http://www.ualberta.ca/~ijqm

Morse, J. M.,Mitcham, C., Hupcey, J. E., & Tasn, M. C. (1996). Criteria for concept evaluation.Journal ofAdvanced Nursing,24, 385-390.

Morse,J. M.,& Penrod, J.(1999)Linkingconceptsof enduring,suffering, andhope. Image: Journal of Nurs-ing Scholarship,31(2), 145-150.

Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. New York: Cambridge University Press.Szent-Gyrgyi, A. (1974) Research grants.Perspectives in Biology & Medicine,18, 41-43.

Janice M. Morse, Ph.D. (Nurs.), Ph.D. (Anthro.), D.Nurs. (Honorary), is a professor of nursing andScientific Director at the International Institute for Qualitative Methodology, University of Alberta,Edmonton, Canada.


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