villa, rafael antônio duarte; viana, manuela trindade. questões de segurança no governo lula da...

7/31/2019 villa, rafael antnio duarte; viana, manuela trindade. questes de segurana no governo lula da perspectiva reati

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Secty sses dng ls dmnstton:

fom the ectve to the ssetve ochQueses e seguana no goeno Lula:a pespecia eaia paa a afimaia

rAFAEL ANtONIO dUArtE vILLA*

MANUELA trINdAdE vIANA**

intodcton

An analysis o continuities and changes in Brazilian oreign policy duringLulas administration is only possible through careul observation o the twomandates under his power. This assertion stems rom the act that there was,during these eight years, a gradual process o structuring and consolidating the

countrys oreign policy. In this sense, Lulas oreign policy during 2006-2010 canonly be read together with the structural modifcations promoted during his frsttenure1. This is valid or all the issues in the oreign policy agenda, but especiallyimportant or security.

The gradual process mentioned above allowed a new and remarkable eatureon Brazils oreign policy: the movement rom a reactive to a more assertiveapproach towards security issues. Indeed, in Lulas frst mandate there was anemphasis on reacting to proposals related to terrorism presented by United Statesand also those discussed in the Organization o American States (OAS); in the

second one, it is possible to identiy a considerably active role as regards securityissues, such as the deploy o Brazilian troops to join the stabilization mission inHaiti, the negotiations with Colombias Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) orhostage liberation, the mediation on the controversy on nuclear energy involvingIran, among others. It can be argued that, until Lulas frst administration, Brazildidnt have a security policy at the regional level. Due to this vacuum let by

* Proessor o the Deparment o Political Science and o the Institute or International Relations o theUniversity o So Paulo USP, Brazil ([email protected]).

** Masters Degree by the Department o Political Science o the University o So Paulo USP, Brazil, andResearcher in the Center or International Relations at the same university.1 This article passes briey through the main points o inection between Fernando Henrique Cardososand Lulas administration. For a more complete analysis regarding this matter, see: Villa; Viana (2008).

atgo

re. Bas. Pol. In. 53 (special edition): 91-114 [2010]


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Brazil, the initiative towards security issues in South America has been traditionallytaken by the United States.

Furthermore, Lulas second mandate reveals a worldlization o theoreign policy agenda on security in contrast with the regionalization that

has characterized Brazils oreign policy in this area. O course, the countrysinvolvement in debates, or instance, on Middle East security issues has alwaysexisted. Nevertheless, the proactive aspect in Brazils oreign policy constitutesthe main eature that distinguishes Lulas second mandate rom the pastadministrations.

Having these ideas as its undamental base, this paper is structured in oursections. First, it deeply analyzes what we consider to be Brazils reactive approachtowards security issues during Lulas frst mandate (2002-2006). The secondand third sections ocus on the two main elements in relation to which a more

assertive approach can be identifed: the expansion o the oreign policy agendain terms o security towards global issues; and the innovative eatures throughwhich Brazils security policy towards South America was exercised during Lulassecond mandate. The last section o this paper analyses the impacts o the elementsmentioned above over Brazils relations with the United States.

The ectve eod

Lulas frst mandate conserves, in general terms, the major characteristics thathave prevailed since Itamar Francos administration (1992-1993)2 (Villa; Viana,2008) a period known as autonomy through integration. This doctrine wasessentially dierent rom the one called autonomy through distance, attributedto Brazilian oreign policy rom Ernesto Geisels (1974-1979) to Jos Sarneysgovernment (1985-1988).

Autonomy through distance presented as its main pillars: i) thediversifcation o diplomatic and trade relations; ii) the stabilization o Brazilsidentity as a developing and Third World country, as well as the countrys

intensive participation in international regimes related to these categories3

; iii) thecondemnation o international asymmetries in international trade, fnance andnuclear regimes; and iv) the claim or dialogue among nations in the North-Southaxis instead o the East-West axis4.

Ater Itamar Franco, oreign policy is used in a more systematic way inorder to achieve development, an eort made through a model that combinedautonomy o action beore the international scenario with active participation

2 This position is not consensual: some analysts identiy structural dierences in Lulas oreign policy, in

comparison to the past governments. See, or example, Guilhon Alburquerque (2007) e Weintraub (2007).3 For instance, Non-Aligned Movement and G-77 (which congregates developing countries).

4 For more inormation about autonomy through distance doctrine eatures, see: Sennes, 2003; Vizentini, 2003.


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Security issues during Lulas administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach

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in international ora and diversifcation o external relations. This new doctrinewas guided by an attempt to build an identity ocused on Brazils continentalproportions, which stressed regional integration as a new orm o internationalinsertion. Furthermore, autonomy through participation aimed at articulating

the aspiration o being a global trader in the medium term with that o being apolitical global player in the long term.

These goals were ollowed mainly by three means. First, the Third Worldactivism that characterized previous governments was gradually substituted bya more positive approach towards international regimes, which meant an activeparticipation in multilateral organizations such as World Trade Organization(WTO), United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund(IMF). Nevertheless, in all o these ora, Brazils participation included an activecritique about the asymmetries perpetrated by these regimes5.

Secondly, Brazil built a more constructive agenda with United States,maintaining at the same time Brazilian oreign policys autonomy. This positioncan be illustrated by trade liberalization, privatizations o several governmentalcompanies and the signature o the Nuclear Non-Prolieration Treaty (NPT) denounced as unair by Brazilian diplomacy since the 1960s.

Finally, in South America, Brazil gave priority to Mercosur as a special locusor reafrming its regional leadership (Campos, 2000; Vigevani et al., 2004). Thisstage was privileged in Brazils strategy not only in regard to trade and politicalintegration: or security matters, this is also valid.

The security agenda during Lulas frst mandate gave continuity to the sameguidelines perormed by Brazilian oreign policy; specifcally in terms o securityissues, there were no wide ruptures, comparably to the previous administrations,towards some concerns arising within the continent.

The securityreactiveagenda was outlined around three points: i) the positionon the new architecture or security in the Americas; ii) the attempt to stabilizeconicts in some o the neighboring countries, especially Venezuela; iii) the denialto engage the war on terror approach in South American territory, stressing the

need not to securitize regional problems that in act had its roots derived romthe social inequalities, poverty or domestic violence.The debate about a new security architecture o the inter-American system

stemmed rom the need to adjust hemispheric institutional design in order tocombat threats which have a non-estate nature6. As or this point, Brazil reactedpositively to new conceptual bases to think hemispheric security: the country

5 In WTO, or instance, Brazil articulated a coalition with developing countries, with the objective to enjoy abetter position in the negotiations. In the UN Security Council, Brazi ls participation presented an emphasis

on the need or redistributing seats among the Organization members so that it could include developing andleast developed countries in its decision making process. Final ly, a more intense participation in the IMF wasseen as a good strategy to achieve better terms to the negotiation o the countrys debt.

6 These issues were analyzed in Villa, 1999.


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accepted the concept o multidimensional security7 as institutionalized by theOAS in 2003 as well as the new role or regional armed orces. However, Brazilopposed the proposal presented by the US delegation, according to which ArmedForces and national police orces cooperated in the fght against drugs, terrorism

and even migration.As regards South America, Brazils reaction aimed at avoiding that internal

crisis escalating towards political instability in the regional sphere. Defned byItamaratys discourse as non-intervention without indierence (Amorim, 2004)the role played by Brazil can be understood through concepts that entail democracy,political stability, regional security and economic integration, searching, at thesame time, or a political initiative acing the United States.

Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador countries that went through politicalinstability in 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively were objects o Lulas

administration special attention. Brazilian diplomacy led the creation o the Friendso Venezuela Group, an initiative considered to be the frst moment o audacityin Brazils oreign policy (Carvalho, 2003). Gathering the OAS, Chile, UnitedStates, Mexico, Portugal and Spain, the Friends o Venezuela Group acilitated thenegotiation between diverging actors in May 2003 more than a year ater thecoup attempt against Hugo Chvez, in April 2002, which triggered the politicalcrisis in Venezuela. As or the Bolivian crisis, in October 2003, Lulas SpecialAdviser on Foreign Policy, Marco Aurlio Garcia, played an important role inthe negotiations that led to a political solution that resulted in the renouncemento the President Sanchez de Lozada. As regards the 2005 institutional crisis inEcuador, Brazils participation was determinant in the negotiation o a diplomaticagreement that established the exile, in the Brazilian Embassy, o President LucioGutirrez, who was then transerred to Brasilia by Brazilian Air Force airplanes.

In respect to the adoption o the war on terror approach in South America,Brazil neither recognized the presence o terrorist groups in the region, nor acceptedthe denomination o some guerrillas as terrorist groups despite US and Colombiaspressures in this direction8. However, the denial to accept these approaches was

7 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting rom the Special Conerence on Security (OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that states o theHemisphere ace both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, inview o their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature (preamble). Morespecifcally, new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multiacetedresponses by dierent national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the privatesector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, andconstitutional provisions o each state. Many o the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemisphericsecurity are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation (4.k). Availableat: . Access: 7 Aug. 2010.

8 It is worth mentioning that Barack Obamas new national security strategy, launched on May 2010,abandoned the global war on terror doctrine. Despite defning Al-Qaeda as the main threat to United Statessecurity, the Obama doctrine defnes American partnerships beyond United States traditional allies andincludes countries such as China and India.


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not ollowed by an alternative proposition, leading to a vacuum o initiative inthe region, which was historically flled by the United States especially in theAndean countries.

The wodzton of bzn foegn ocy

By the end o Lulas frst mandate, it was possible to notice that the completerupture expected when he was elected did not happen. Instead, the presidentconducted oreign policy according to the same pillars that characterized theautonomy through participation. During Lulas second mandate, the initialeorts to dierentiate Brazils oreign policy resulted in the expansion o somedierences, beyond the institutional and multilateral spheres. In this period,Brazils security oreign policy presented a more active approach while Lulas

administration took advantage o the initiatives both in global and regionalmultilateralism. Particularly, this approach was evident through Brazils claimo a UN Security Council permanent membership; in the proposal to createan autonomous regional deense council at Unasur; and in the technologicalmodernization o Brazilian military orces. All o these actions were underlinedby the search or political objectives under a regional label.

Although the claim or a permanent seat in the UN Security Council doesnot constitute a new goal it has been in Brazils oreign policy agenda sinceItamar Francos government (1992-1993) , Lulas second mandate approach to thismatter presents discontinuities in comparison to past administrations regardingthe intensity and methods applied to accomplish this goal.

Since 1992, Brazilian diplomats have emphasized the importance oimplementing a reorm in United Nations structure so that the organization canreect the changes observed in power distribution in the international scenario.Assuming the existence o a dierent international order, Brazilian governmenthas since then put the incorporation o new actors as an indispensable measureto maintain the efciency and reliability o the United Nations. Put dierently,

this doctrine associated Brazils aspiration with the process o democratizationo international relations, suggesting that the incorporation o Brazil as thedeveloping world representative in the permanent group o countries in the SecurityCouncil would contribute to minimize the legitimacy defcit in this internationalorganization (Silva, 2004).

Despite essentially presenting elements o continuity in comparison to thedoctrine established by previous governments, Lulas oreign policy approachpresented important discontinuities. Firstly, the reerence on the democratizationo international relations is as strong an idea as a political interest. Quoting Lula:

It is not enough to watch world events distantly and subordinately: we want ourvoice to be heard and respected. We are taking big steps on this direction. (Silva,2004) In this sense, the president and the diplomats explicitly communicate the


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means applied in order to pursue what this administration considers the countryspolitical interests to be. A similar conduct was taken towards the announcementso Brazils regional and global preerences.

Secondly, there is very strong belie that Brazils respectability throughout the

world undergoes participation in the UN Security Council and that developingcountries leaders are avorable to the Brazilian claim. This sel-perception isreinorced by the presidential fgure: Our partners recognize that Brazil assumedits weight and importance in the community o nations, afrms Lula (Silva, 2004).

It is possible that Brazils relative power in the international arena ismisrepresented according to developing countries perceptions. However, there is nodoubt that these actions aiming at adequate means and ends have led to some novelaspects o Brazils oreign policy. First, the action through coalitions was one o themain methods applied by diplomats during Lulas administration, a trend in which

the claim or a seat in the Security Council also fts: Brazil led the articulation oG-4 (constituted by Brazil, Germany, Japan and India), whose members considerthemselves potential occupants o a permanent seat in the Council. Even in thecase o a negative result ater United States and China blocked the possibilityo reorm in the Council , Brazil was supported by a considerable number oSouth American countries and some important medium powers, such as France,Russia, Spain and China. As the Chinese vice-minister recognized, Brazil is thegreatest developing country in the Western Hemisphere and we attribute a greatimportance to its role in regional and international issues () China is disposedto intensiy its collaborations with the Brazilian part as regards the reorm on theSecurity Council (Trevisan, 2004, A10)

Brazils eorts to participate on UN peace operations notably in Haiti can also be understood as a strategy circumscribed in the countrys aspiration oparticipating in the Council as a permanent member. It is relevant to underlinethat Brazil joined UN peace missions in East Timor and Angola during Cardososgovernments. Nevertheless, the activism in the Haitian case reveals a more explicitway to aspire or a seat in that body9.

The consequences o this more active involvement towards regional securityissues can be seen as a paradox. On one side, there is the Brazilian perspectiveo a multipolar world with strengthened regional powers. Brazils aspirationo afrming its autonomy and neutralizing United States military goals in theregional sphere can also be understood in this involvement, especially ater PlanColombia, considered by Brazilian government to be the main responsible or themilitarization observed in the Andean and Amazon regions. On the other side,sending troops to Haiti can be understood as a message to the United States that

9 As put in an article published in The Economist, Brazil has long been a gentle and introverted giant, contentto be a bystander on the world stage. Now that is changing. Available at: . Access:30 Oct 2009.


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Brazil is able to share political and economic costs related to peace missions. Thismessage is positive to the United States, since they are looking or partners withwhom to share the costs o regional security.

Anyway, Brazilian action is innovative it cant be orgotten that it reused

to send troops to Haiti in the beginning o the 90s, when this country was acinga crisis. However, this action lacks some necessary legitimacy degree (Soares deLima, 2006), having all the decision processes been concentrated on the Executive,especially on the Presidency and the Deense Ministry.

Thereore, Lulas multilateral action moves in the normative sphere throughthe re-afrmation o a discourse that can be summed up as ollows: be attentiveto the need o those who are more vulnerable, deending a ree, air and egalitarianinternational trade, and democratization o deliberative instances. Our compromisewith democracy and with popular participation is reected in the purpose o

working together to strengthen multilateralism, stimulating more transparentand legitimate orums, which are representative o international cooperation(Amorim, 2004b). As regards these principles, it seems to exist no innovation,since diplomacy continues to have its traditional doctrinaire motivations: thepacifst discourse backed by negotiation and international intermediation as away o resolving conicts; and the re-afrmation o a juridicism that dates backto the 20th century. By adding to these two characteristics the democratization othe international system, in which prevails the existence o politically autonomousunits, not subordinated to any superior, it is possible to understand why Laer(2001) considers Brazils oreign policy to be Grotian .

To sum up, i the plea or a permanent seat in the Security Council wasalready present in Cardosos administration (Amorim, 1994; Guimares, 1999),it was maniested with greater intensity during Lulas government. Moreover, thedeployment o Brazilian troops and command orces in Haiti reveals the rising oa new actor in Brazils oreign policy on security: the Ministry o Deense. All othe activities in Haiti rom training and sending troops to the coordination oBrazilian military and civil personnel are in charge o the Ministry o Deense.

Recently, a cooperation agreement signed by United States Department o Deenseand Brazils Ministry o Deense also reveals a greater participation o this latterMinistry in oreign policy on security10. This could mean that the conductiono Brazils oreign policy agenda on security is not anymore monopolized byItamaraty.

However, the most important income that derived rom the emerging roleo the Ministry o Deense was that global goals were associated to the goal ostrengthening the national deense agencies, especially the Armed Forces andthe construction o a collective and regional body on security. This idea can be

10 The content o the agreement is available at: . Access : 15 Aug. 2010.


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accentuated i we singularize two measures taken by Lulas administration whichconnected directly deense and security policies: the gradual modernization onational armed orces; and the proposal o creating a South American DeenseCouncil. In September 2007, President Lula announced the creation o a working

group which, under the direction o the Ministry o Deense and coordinationo Mangabeira Unger, then Secretary o Strategic Aairs, would ormulateguidelines or a modernization plan directed to the Armed Forces. The StrategicPlan o National Deense or Plan to Accelerate Growth (PAC, in Portuguese)in Deense, as it became known in the media takes into account three broadgoals: i) to review deense strategies; ii) to reactivate the domestic arms industry;iii) to assure the autonomy o deense policy. Directly linked to these goals, thePAC in Deense aims at addressing the ollowing concrete concerns: i) what arethe best strategies or peacetimes and war; ii) how to organize the Armed Forces,

operationally equipped with cutting-edge technologically; iii) how to reactivatethe national industry o armaments accordingly to the autonomy in deense; iv)how to identiy the Armed Forces with the nation, especially on the deense oborders in the Amazon as a priority, compulsory military service and social tasks;and v) how to establish lines or the Armed Forces in situations o maintenanceo order and the rule o law.

Additionally, it doesnt seem plausible that the modernization project oBrazilian armed orces is derived rom an analogous modernization ongoing inany neighboring country. Instead, Brazils main motivation seems to reside in theprojection o its hemispheric and global role, that is, in the search or adequacywith the countrys status o emerging global and multidimensional actor whichinclude not only economic but also political and security aspects.Brazil is well-positioned to initiate a sustained arms buildup increasingly supported by its owndomestic industries () The choice o the three fnalist aircrats signifcantly,two are rom NATO member states and one is rom a state that might as wellbe suggests something o essential importance about the way Brazil views itsuture. Despite shiting geopolitical realities around the world and its own rise

to regional prominence over the next decade, Brazil does not appear to oresee amajor conict or even an adversarial relationship with the West (Strator, 2008)11.The proposal presented by Brazilian Unasur delegation to create a

regional body o deense can also be interpreted as a measure aligned with thecountrys political goal towards the region. In this sense, the process o SouthAmericanization could be understood as an important leverage to build upBrazils national development project (Monteiro, 2001, p. 2) in which collectivesecurity complements national security, (Idem, p. 4). As Medeiros points out,The emerging question is: to what extent is regional integration as proposed by

11 This note reers to an international bidding process reerring the purchase o military aircrats by theBrazilian Air Force


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Brazil an end in itsel (i.e., an aim to promote the interests o the whole region) or is it a means to achieve the objectives o Brazilian oreign policy? (Medeiros,2010, p. 175)

This reection becomes more striking when one observes that, especially

in Lulas second mandate, the country adopts a oreign security policy with amore incisive character. Two events can be cited in this direction. Firstly, theSouth American Deense Council could be seen as an instrument o collectivedeense. The idea is considered to be strategic or Brazils uture in the region,according to the Presidencys Center or Strategic Aairs (Ncleo de AssuntosEstratgicos da Presidncia da Repblica NAE, in Portuguese). Secondly, theDeense Minister, Nelson Jobims, campaign throughout South America, at theend o 2007, to promote the establishment o a regional collective deense body(Medeiros, ibid., p. 176).

More recently, one o the steps orward taken by Brazilian diplomacy onsecurity issues was the recent mediation played by Brazil and Turkey on anagreement with Iran. On May 2010, the three countries signed a document known as the Tehran Declaration through which the Iranian governmentcommitted itsel to send 1,2 ton o Uranium to Turkey, where the material wouldbe enriched and sent back to Tehran in order to be applied to medical research.

The agreement represented an eort o Brazilian diplomacy to avoid therenewal o sanctions towards that Persian country in the UN Security Council.However, the initiative can also be interpreted as an attempt to leap urthertowards international recognition o Brazils capability to build dialogues on hardtopics on the world security agenda and, in this sense, to advance on its quest or apermanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite the UN Security Councilsreusal to accept the agreement as a confdence building move, it is worth sayingthat it was the frst time that a developing country assumed a proactive positionin core negotiations on world security and stability.

Soth amec: st on the to, t wth dffeent emhss

South America has always been on the top o Brazils oreign policy agenda(Almeida, 2008; Bandeira, 2006; Onuki, 2006). Indeed, the country has alwaysseen the region as an area o its natural inuence, given its proportions on territory,population and economy (Bandeira, 2006). Nevertheless, Brazilian governmentsmain eorts were more oten directed to intraregional trade relations.

As or the political dialogues, these rarely evoked the multilateral coordinationbetween South American countries in security matters. Moreover, the predominantapproach towards security issues was characterized by bilateral geometries and

by a reactive position.It can also be argued that United States inuence in some o South Americancountries notably Colombia and Peru avored a more militarized treatment


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towards some o the problems aced by these countries. The most evident examplecan be ound in anti-drug policies led by the United States in Andean countries.Indeed, Plan Colombia considered to be the highlight o American oreignpolicy to fght drug production has presented an unequivocal solution to the

problem: the military one. The securitization o the drug problem was graduallydeepened and culminated with the creation o battalions specialized on assuringthe success o umigation operations in Colombia. Even US involvement with theColombian armed conict was read through the narcotized and securitized lensesthat characterized American oreign policy towards the region12.

In this context, Lulas administration represents a watershed regarding thepromotion o an approach based on pillars dierent rom the bilateral-reactive-militarized tripod prevailing in the previous period. An emblematic initiativein this sense is the creation o Union o South American Nations (Unasur, in

Spanish), in 2008.Stemmed rom a Brazilian proposal, the Unasur project resulted rom

numerous summits13 involving South American chies o State and governmentrepresentatives. The initiative was ormalized in the Cuzco Declaration (December8th, 2004), a document in which the participants afrmed their determination togradually build a South American identity and citizenship as well as to developa regional locus o integration in political, economical, social, cultural andenvironmental issues, besides its emphasis on inrastructure as a channel to reduceasymmetries among the countries o the region. The project was then temporarily

called as South American Community o States (CASA, in Spanish), until the IslaMargarita Summit (Venezuela), in 2007, when it was renamed Unasur.

Despite the modifcations on the initial drat, its main innovative traitsremained intact: i) rupture with the bilateralism that has prevailed up to thatmoment in South American countries intra-regional relations; and ii) rupturewith the priority given to trade in previous integration processes developed withinthe region. These two characteristics are directly related to the approach givento security issues by Lulas administration, especially ater his second mandate(2006-2010).

Firstly, Unasur is essentially a multilateral project, an aspect which isreinorced in its constitutive treaty: [Unasur is seen as a] decisive step towardsthe strengthening o multilateralism and the orce o law in international relations,in order to achieve a multipolar, balanced and air world (Tratado Constitutivoda Unasul, Prembulo).

12 For more inormation, see: Viana, 2009.

13 The frst dialogue that promoted a closer cooperation between South American countries happened in2000, at the frst Summit o South American Presidents, in Brasilia (Brazil). It is worth mentioning that this

attempt to approximate South American leaders happened in a context o regional apprehension because ocontroversies surrounding Plan Colombia. On the third summit, the participants o Cuzco Summit (Ecuador,2004) decided to create the South American Community o States (CASA). From 2000 to 2008 there wereseven summits o South American presidents.


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It was the frst time that an institutional and multilateral initiative waslaunched in South America. Thus, with its 12 State members14, Unasur representsa rupture with the bilateralism or unilateralism that has since then characterizedthe relations between the governments o the region.

Furthermore, the emerging South American bloc constituted a multilateralproject which, or the frst time, did not privilege the trade agenda among itsmembers. Among the multiple goals upon which Unasur is structured15, threeo them open room or debates related to security issues: i) to strengthen thepolitical dialogue between State members, aiming to assure a coordination spacein order to reinorce South American integration and Unasurs participation in theinternational scenario; ii) to stimulate the coordination between South AmericanStates specialized agencies, respecting international norms, with the objectiveo strengthening the fght against terrorism, corruption, the world problem o

drugs, human trafcking, weapons trafc, transnational organized crime andother threats, as well as to address disarmament, non-prolieration o nuclear andmassive destruction weapons and mines removal; and iii) to exchange inormationand experience in deense matters.

Some elements are noteworthy on this excerpt. First o all, it seems plausibleto argue that the choice or the terms the world problem o drugs reveals a SouthAmerican historical claim to a broader understanding o the fght against drugs.Indeed, many governments in the region especially those whose internationalimage has been aected by this problematic have protested against the supply-

side-approach16 underlying developed United States policies to combat the problemo drugs, that is, the idea that the most efcient way to fght it is to eradicate theproblem on the source axis, not on the demand one. South American presidentshave insisted that the responsibility on the existence o narcotrafc lies also onthose countries whose citizens largely consume drugs. Thus, the emphasis on thedrug problem as a world problem must be read in this context.

Another interesting aspect related to the goals highlighted above is theormalization o the cooperation in deense matters between South AmericanStates. This is an ongoing practice in some countries o the region, notablyBrazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, initiatives which were also intensifedduring Lulas mandate. Brazils Federal Police has promoted joint operationswith neighboring countries police orces to fght organized crime, oten relyingon the United States support as regards logistics, personnel and fnance. In early

14 UNASUR members are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.

15 Unasurs Constitutive Treaty presents 21 goals or the integration project, which include economical,political, social and cultural spheres. These are specifed in the second and third articles o the above

mentioned treaty, available at: . Access :August 9th, 2010.

16 To see how this approach was used by United States in its anti-drug policy, visit the Ofce o NationalDrug Control Policy website, at: . Access : 14 Aug. 2010.


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2006, there were nine operations17 along the boundaries with other countriesnearby the Amazon orest. Additionally, through the establishment o theAmazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) in 2001, which includes surveillance andalarm units, the Brazilian government shared data collected by the system18 with

Colombia, so that this country could expand its military, police and environmentalcontrol over the Amazon region (Uriguen, 2005, p. 182; Guzzi, op. cit). Similarmeasures were also taken towards Peru and Ecuador with whom Brazil signedmilitary cooperation agreements, which a schedule o annual meetings betweenthe Parties.

As regards security, there is another interesting aspect in the process oconsolidating Unasur. A careul analysis o the documents on the initial periodo South American integration reveals that there was an attempt to associate theemphasis on poverty and social inequality eradication with the de-securitization

o some problems aced by the countries in the region. More specifcally, thedocuments oten invoked the terms citizen security to reer to the need orStates to deliver better lie conditions and economic development to their citizens.This development is here broadly understood, involving income air and balanceddistribution, access to education, promotion to social inclusion and cohesion,as well as the environmental protection19. Ater an inter-ministerial meetingin 2005, involving Ministries o Justice, Deense and others in charge o issuesrelated to this concept o security, South American leaders recognized that socialinequality is one o the causes o violence and insecurity in South America, at thesame time that the latter hampers better levels o social equality (Declaration onCitizen Security in South America, 2005, preamble). Regardless o the attemptto ormalize regional cooperation on a new approach towards security, the termcitizen security was gradually removed rom the ofcial documents, which may

17 These are COBRA and CRAF operations, on the border with Colombia; PEBRE (Peru); and VEBRA(Venezuela). Besides these, in the regions defned as a second priority, the operations perormed were: GUISU(Guyana and Suriname); BRABO (Bolivia); Ribeirinho, along all Amazon border; Alliance (Paraguay);and the Southern Cone (Argentina and Uruguay).

18 Seeking to respond to a challenge identifed by surveillance systems data according to which most othe drug entering Brazil was carried by small planes , the government approved, through the Decree N.5.144/2004, the Destruction Shot Law (Lei do Tiro de Destruio, in Portuguese, which regulates a 1988law on aircrats intercepting in Brazilian aerial space, in case these are suspected to be carrying illegal drugsinto the country. The previous law Law N. 9.614/1998 determined that Once legally specifed means ocoercion are exhausted, the aircrat will be classifed as hostile, thus subjected to destruction. The Decreeapproved in 2004 specifes concepts such as means o coercion, hostile aircrat and destruction. The ullcontent o the Decree N. 5.144 is available at: . Access: 07 Aug. 2010.

19 See: Declarao de Ayacucho (available at: ; access: 14 Aug. 2010); Declarao Presidencial e Agenda Prioritria (available

at: ; access: 14 Aug. 2010) and Declarao sobre Segurana Cidad na Amrica do Sul (available at:; access: 14 Aug. 2010).


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illustrate the difculty to fnd a common ground on de-securitization mattersbetween South American countries, as well as the lack o priority o this approachin some o the oreign policy agendas.

Despite the broad range o themes on Unasurs scope, it can be argued that

the South American integration project dedicated a privileged space or deenseand security issues. More specifcally, beside the our-body institutional structure20approved in the fnal version o the blocs constitutive treaty, State membersaccepted, in 2008, Brazils proposal to create the South American DeenseCouncil (CDS, in Spanish). The objective o the new institution is to promote thecooperation between Unasur members in security issues, the coordination on jointdeense policies, the exchange o armed orces personnel, the joint participationon United Nations peace operations, among others.

Thereore, the CDS does not assume a conventional military alliance

between South American countries such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). With the objective o clariying the traits that dierentiate CDS rompast international initiatives on security, Brazils Minister o Deense, NelsonJobim, visited South American countries beore the Brasilia Summit (May 2008).According to the Brazilian government, a orum specifcally dedicated to deenseand security matters in the region could avoid crises such as the one that involvedColombia and Ecuador in 2008. Moreover, CDSs institutional deepening couldcontribute to deend the region rom potential external interventions. Nevertheless,South American leaderships did not reach a consensus on that occasion: theBrazilian proposition was only immediately accepted by Argentina, Bolivia,Venezuela and with some reservations by Uruguay. Beside the disagreementbetween Andean countries on the decision-making procedures to be incorporatedto the Council, Colombia also insisted that OAS constituted the appropriate orumto discuss issues related to regional security.

Despite the approval o the CDS by Unasurs members on December 2008,the possibility that the proposal is interpreted by South American countries as aninstrument or Brazils projection may become an obstacle or consolidating the

CDS. This deense body could certainly improve Brazilian military capability.However, being a mechanism o deense cooperation, it doesnt seem plausible tohold that the CDS could induce regional suspicion as regards Brazils motivations,or that it could trigger an arms race in South America (Amaral, 2004, p. 32).

Anyhow, Unasurs CDS flls a vacuum related to autonomous initiativestowards South America security issues, in which United States usually takesthe lead (Hirst, 2003; Villa, 2007). Its most distinguishing trait is the questor multilateral solutions to conicts in the region, which downplays unilateralmeasures as well as the role o OAS in South American security issues, considered

20 The South American bloc is composed by the Chies o State and Government Council (UNASURs maindecision body); the Ministers o Foreign Aairs Council; the Delegates Council; and the General Secretariat.


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to not sufcient or the current challenges and threats presented in the continent(Cepik, 2009, p. 230).

The mediation played at the end o 2008 by Unasur on the Bolivian crisisinvolved Evo Morales administration and indigenous groups on one side, and

governors o Eastern provinces on the other. The conict threatened to triggera conict escalation and, then, the destabilization o Bolivias political scenario.As put by Emilio Mendez do Valle (2008), Unasurs mediation meant, frstly,that South American countries could ormulate solutions through their ownmeans, that is, without United States mediation; secondly, the strong support toMorales and to the democracy on the country represented a joint South Americaninitiative towards Andean countries. To Brazil, this meant an assertive reaction tothe critique that its security policy as well as the radius o this one is limitedto Mercosur (Pagliari, 2009).

Despite the optimism surrounding Unasur, the region still aces thepersistence o bilateral problems between some o its members or instance, thoseinvolving Colombia and Ecuador, or Venezuela and Colombia.

One o the frst challenges aced by the South American bloc consists o theclose relations between Colombia and the United States. The history and natureo these relations conict directly with one o the main motivations underlyingthe CDS: the autonomous conduction o South American security agenda.The dynamics o the presidential meeting in Bariloche (Argentina), on August2009, was aected by the announcement made by Colombian government o acooperation agreement with the United States through which Bogot authorizedAmerican troop presence in seven military bases in the Andean country. Theinitiative was justifed as a continuity o the bilateral eorts to fght narcotrafcand terrorism in the Andean region, as well as a necessary measure ace the removalo American troops rom Manta military base (Ecuador). Brazil21 and Venezuelacritiques considered the measure a threat to regional stability, once it could resultin the permanent presence o US troops in the region. Moreover, Brazil accused theagreement o being incompatible with the Colombian governments declarations

that the guerrillas were signifcantly weakened during Uribes administration.During the discussions, South American Presidents pressured Colombia to revealthe content o the agreement which had not been signed at the time as well asto accept a proposal related to transparency on cooperation in military matters.However, divergences observed in the Bariloche presidential summit were notreected in the declaration fnally approved by all Unasur members.

This was not the frst occasion in which Colombia was considerably isolatedin multilateral talks with its South American neighbors. Indeed, the military aspecto United States presence in Colombia constitutes a constant topic o concern

21 One o these military bases is about 50km distant rom the boundaries with the region known as Cabeade Cachorro, on Amazon Northwest.


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gas. The episode involving the Bolivian government also arose more problemsby the Brazilian government because it meant the participation o other regionalactors with political projects that, at frst sight, seemed to be competing withBrazil. Especially the Brazilian sectors, inside and out o the government, saw

in the episodes that ollowed the Bolivian nationalization a strong inuence othe Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez, as well as the Venezuelan oil companyPDVSA Venezuelas Petroleum. Despite the exaggeration in the afrmation oChvezs regional leadership potential, it is true that his administration took theregional leading role rom Brazil, contributing to an uncomortable diplomaticatmosphere between both countries24. However, this crisis involving Bolivia hasalso revealed that old negative images, as that o Brazilian sub-imperialism, arestill strong in the imagery o nationalist sectors in South American countries.However, the Brazilian nationalistic wave erected by the Bolivian nationalization

accused Lulas administration o not being frm in deense o the nationalinterest and Petrobras interests in Bolivia; Lulas government maintained onemoderated position and continued to manage the situation inside the boundarieso the diplomatic treatment. The main example o that moderate position wasthe delay o some military maneuvers that the Brazilian army had scheduledexactly or the weeks when the nationalization happened. The rationale o theBrazilian government seems to have been action in a pragmatic way, so that theprocess o integration would be preserved and, in the medium range, could haveaccommodated Brazils, the Petrobrass and the Bolivian governments interests.That in act happened when the Petrobras signed an agreement o compensationby the investments that Brazilian companies, all in the inra-structure sector, likerefneries, made in Bolivia since 1996. At the same time, negotiations on newBrazilian investments were retaken25.

Bolivia, on the other hand, also brought to Unasurs multilateralism itsfrst diplomatic victory when, in the end o 2008, the new institution avoidedescalation and greater instability o Moraless government. Reinorcing democracy,Unasur avoided a new delay in the process o regional integration26. As a lesson

24 This major initiative drives o the Venezuelan government was maniested under, at least, two aspects:the purchase o public securities o Argentinas and Ecuadors external debts ; and the polemical proposal obuilding a South American pipeline whose extension would be rom the South o Venezuela until Patagonia(Argentina). On the other side, addressing the Brazilian Congress, Chancellor Celso Amorim expressed hisdispleasure with Venezuelas behavior during the nationalization o the Bolivian gas.

25 On this matter, check: Brasil dever anunciar a retomada de investimentos na Bolvia, available at: http ://tv2.rtp.pt/noticias/?article=90184&visual=3&layout=10. Access on 08/15/2010.

26 In Moraless government the conict had its starting point in the claim o the Bolivian Eastern provinceso managing o autonomous way the resources that derived the exploration and commerce o the gas andpetroleum. As it is well known in the Eastern provinces o Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Sucre and Tarija

concentrate greater dynamism o the Bolivian economy because these provinces are the producers o gas andpetroleum. Thus it is very common amid local elites according to claim to their provinces a huge part oBolivian welare and, thereore, the Bolivian East would have more rights rom the profts that are derivedrom the exploration o gas and oil. This idea is rejected both by Morales administration and by poorest


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rom experience, the agility o the South America reaction signaled to otherscountries that South America would not accept any separatism , as well as anyexternal intervention in the continent (Cepik, 2009, p. 238). In others words,Unasur gave an autonomous answer within South Americas security complex,

addressing a problem whose dynamics is internal to that complex. For countrieslike Brazil and Argentina the solution through Unasur was an excellent result inpolitical terms and in security terms. In the case, mainly or Brazil, the success oUnasurs mediation passed the frst test, and confrmed its conviction accordingto which the process o regional integration needs multilateral mechanism to bespeedily accessed in particular moments o crisis which threaten the process ointegration. In the second case, because Brazil (and Argetina too) depends so muchon the supply o the Bolivian gas, national interest was delivered rom a collectiveinitiative. It is necessary to remember that the rebel groups in the Bolivian Easternprovinces in a given moment began to attack the gas inra-structure, which aectedproduction and supply.

ptnesh nd dste nvovng the unted Sttes:mcts of n ssetve och

Studies on American security policy towards Latin America agree that thisregion does not fgure as a strategic priority to United States interests (see Vilas,

2005; Bonilla, 2004; Messari, 2004). In general, this assertion is correct but it isimportant to mention that it neglects one important point: although, since theCold War, South America is not as relevant in strategic terms as other regions such as the Middle East, Western Europe and Asia , the United States has kept acoherent security policy or the region27. This is possible due to a solid consensusamong Democrats and Republicans that guarantees the continuity o goals

At the same time, dierently rom the past, now the United States has todeal with threats o a distinct nature in the region: communist states, parties ormovements are not anymore perceived as actual threats, but actors and processessuch as drug trafckers, migration, political instability, weapons trafc, moneylaundry, terrorism all o them o non-estate nature.

social groups (and their organizations), which cla im that that the resources must be managed and distributedbroadly in the Bolivian state, beside the State would have the control over supplies. The top point o thispolarization came in September 2008, when the governors o the these provinces, all opposition, stimulatedlocal groups to violent actions against indigenous groups and gas inra-structure that resulted in more o twodozen o deaths, mainly between indigenous and peasant groups. By earing the escalation o the conict,Unasurcalled or an emergency meeting, held in Santiago de Chile, on September 15 th. The strong support

and pressures rom Unasurto the Morales government and the internal democratic process were decisive tostabilize and to pace, at least temporarily, the Bolivian political conict.27 Plan Colombia, the allocation o military bases, anti-drug policies and anti-terrorist initiatives are someo the measures that validate this assumption.


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In this sense, September eleven has presented impacts over the security policytowards South America. Indeed, one important change was the emergence oconceptual and political changes in the way American decision-makers perceivedthe relation between threat and terrorism. Particularly, the United States global

strategy ater September eleven propelled a conceptual and material overlapbetween the war against narcotrafc and the war against terrorism whichwas strongly supported by lvaro Uribes administration. Thereore, rom theconceptual and practical perspective, the Colombian guerrilla, as well as theparamilitaries, became synonymous o terrorism (Villa, 2007).

Brazilian government and its diplomacy diverged rom the Colombian andAmerican approach towards guerrilla groups and decided not to consider thesearmed groups as terrorists, earing this association could block any possibility odemobilization negotiations. Instead, Brazil oered to participate as a mediator

o peace talks, i invited by the government o Colombia. However, this callwas never made, so Brazil had no active participation in negotiation processes(Homeister 2003).

Another aspect that was subjected to disagreement between Brazil and UnitedStates particularly regards the new architecture o inter-American system in orderto combat threats which have a non-estate nature. One o the frst steps towardsthis new system was the institutionalization o the Conerence o Ministers oDeense, in 1995. On the frst meeting, the US delegation presented as one oits objectives the wish that South American countries Armed Forces cooperatedwith their national police orces to combat coca crops and other perceptions onon-territorial threats, terrorism and even migration.

The decision to associate Armed Forces and Police in the fght againstdrug trafc has not been consensual among most o South American countries.Brazil, or example, accepts the concept o multidimensional security28 asinstitutionalized by the OAS in 2003 as well as the new role or regional armedorces, but it disagrees with the United States on the idea that those should beused primarily to combat threats as drug trafc and terrorism.

The Sixth Conerence o Ministers o Deense (2004), held in Quito(Ecuador), exposed the tensions between these two perspectives. Especially dueto Brazilian pressure, the meeting, which aimed at ormulating a type o security

28 The Declaration on Security in the Americas resulting rom the Special Conerence on Security (OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII.CES/DEC.1/03 rev. 1), held in Mexico City in October 2003, recognizes that states o theHemisphere ace both traditional threats to security and new threats, concerns, and other challenges that, inview o their complex characteristics, have meant that security is multidimensional in nature (preamble). Morespecifcally, new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multiacetedresponses by dierent national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the privatesector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and

constitutional provisions o each state. Many o the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to hemisphericsecurity are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation (4.k). Availableat: . Access: 7 Aug. 2010.


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architecture or the continent, culminated with the rejection, by most o theparticipant countries, o the proposition that the Armed Forces were turned intoa security agency, with police unctions (Guzzi, op., cit, 2007, p. 43)

It is noteworthy that the United States proposal may have been motivated not

only by changes in perception o threats since the end o the Cold War, but also bythe anti drug policies implemented in Bolivia and Peru during the 1990s and inColombia since 1980s (Thoumi, 2003). In these countries, the illegal productiono drugs has been ought both by security agencies (police) and deense agencies(mainly the army). Since late 1990s, however, the case o Colombia experienceda more dramatic change in this direction, especially as regards the involvement omilitary personnel with security issues (Thoumi, 2002; Viana, 2009).

This approach was gradually materialized through United States narcotizedoreign policy towards Colombia (Crandall, 2002) and culminated with the

approval o Plan Colombia, a package o US$ 1,2 billion implemented in 1999.Initially thought by President Pastrana as a Colombian Marshall Plan, the versionand budget fnally approved by American Congress directed 80% o the resources until now, approximately US$ 3,8 billions to intelligence, training, personnel,arms and equipments dedicated to combat drug trafc in Colombia (Isacson, 2006).

Brazils reservations towards Plan Colombia are related to the emphasis onmilitary strategy to solve the drug problem and the protracted conict in theAndean country. Expressed since Fernando Henrique Cardosos administration,these objections to Plan Colombia sustained the thesis that the United Statespolicy may have spill over eects on other South American countries, that is, theexecution o Plan Colombia could result not only in the displacement o drugcrops, but also o the refning activities (Homeister, 2003, p. 51). Moreover, thestrength o the positions o the United States implies obstacles to the project oSouth American integration promoted by Brazil (Castro, 2003, pp. 69-70).

The idea that the strengthening o American presence in Colombia couldrepresent a precedent or United States military engagement in South America wasstressed with the installation o seven United States military bases in Colombia,

announced in 2009. The cooperation agreement signed between these twocountries was seen as an alternative to the withdrawal o bases rom Panama(Howard air orce base) in 1999, rom Puerto Rico (Vieques naval base) in 2003and rom Ecuador (Manta air orce base) in 2009. United States removal romthese countries demanded that its Department o Deense sought, through theSouthern Command, alternatives or American military presence in the regionnot only to monitor the Caribbean drug transit zone and the production area(Bolivia, Colombia and Peru), but also to support United States war on terror.

Moreover, it can be argued that the United States took advantage o the

absence, o regional security initiatives rom the main states in the region. TheParaguayan Congress approval to the temporary allocation o United Statestroops can also be interpreted as a result o the security and deense vacuum,


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considering Mercosur main members omission in relation to the perception othreats in the region known as Triple Border a reerence to the geographicallimits between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (Flores, 2005/2006, p. 37). Inthis regard, the negotiations aiming at the allocation o troops in Paraguay and

Peru were responded by Brazil and Argentina through an outline o some militarymeasures by the end o 2006.

However, it is important to mention that there were some security issuestowards which Brazilian and American governments agreed. Interestingly, ormerpresident Cardoso (1994-2002) shared with the United States the perception thatdrug trafcking and weapon smuggling posed a threat to national sovereignty.This announcement, made in 1996, as aligned with the bilateral Agreement toCombat Drug Trafcking, signed in April 1995, which launched a fnancial andtechnical cooperation between United States Drug Enorcement Administration

(DEA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Brazils Federal Police (MartinsFilho, 1999).

During this period which we consider to be the reactive phase oBrazilian oreign policy o Lulas administration , there were other moments ocooperation between the two countries, especially involving the Triple Border.Once identiying threats related to money laundry in this region, the UnitedStates with Argentinean support has suggested that Brazil established a regimeto regulate fnancial and bank operations in the Triple Border.

Ater 9/11, the suspects towards the possibility o terrorist groups activitiesin the region added to the perception that they were not being careully guardedby the police and intelligence agencies o the countries comprehended in the TripleBorder were accentuated. Thus, the United States State Department announced,in March 2006, that the Agency o Immigration and Customs Inspection wouldjoin the Argentinean, Brazilian and Paraguayan governments in order to combatthe money laundry and other fnancial crimes in the Triple Border Area. Moreover,the State Department associated this region to radical Muslim groups unding,such as Hezbollah and Hamas, link assumed to date back to July 1994, when there

was a terrorist attack against the Mutual Israeli Argentina Association (AMIA,in Spanish).In this context, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay signed an Antiterrorist

Agreement to patrol their common boundaries. Additionally, Brazil created, inNovember 2005, the Regional Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguau, which wasthought as a national agency that would gradually evolve towards a pivotal unityor cooperation with its neighbors Argentina and Paraguay.

Fn remks

The analysis o Brazils oreign policy security agenda during Lulasadministration leads to the observation o a heterogeneous approach through the


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Presidents two mandates. While the frst tenure (2002-2006) revealed a morereactive approach towards security issues, the second one (2006-2010) presentedan assertive position.

Brazils security agenda during Lulas second mandate was signifcantly

changed in terms o its geographical scope and instruments through which itwas exercised. Indeed, this article sustained that the oreign policy on this sphereincorporated more systematically global issues, such as the Iran nuclear weaponsnegotiations and UN peace missions as a channel to accelerate the countrys questor a permanent seat in the Security Council o this Organization.

South America which has constantly been an object o Brazils oreignpolicy attention was also approached dierently by Lulas administration. Despitebeing a geographical space historically privileged in Brazil oreign relations, SouthAmerica was oten regarded as alocusor economic exchange. Thus, the emphasis

on security underlying the regional integration project through Unasurs CDS can be read as a thematic undamental dierence in comparison with pastadministrations. Moreover, the multilateral answer to security problems aced bySouth American countries also represents a shit in relation to the bilateral approachthat has characterized dialogues on security in this region. It also implies thatinter-American institutions, like the OAS and its concept o new architecture osecurity, do not oer answers that take into account a regional, more autonomousperspective. The OAS () is not sufcient or the current challenges and threatsthat are present in the continent. In this sense Unasur draws a dierent approachrom that which has been asserted rom the OAS () (Cepik, 2009, p. 230)

It is, thus, interesting to stress how the promotion o a security agendacan be read through the lines o the development o integration projects in theSouth American experience. In other words, threat perception was not perceivedthrough security lenses only: it was interpreted as a challenge to the integrationeorts in the region.

Once the CDS was structured on the idea that the region should develop amore autonomous agenda on security, United States presence in some o South

American countries is interpreted by Brazil as a threat to the integration eorts inthe region. At the same time, the creation o the South American Council aimsat ulflling a vacuum let by Brazils lack o initiative towards South Americansecurity topics a space that has been historically taken by the United States. Thus,it seems plausible to suggest that the consolidation o South American integrationproject will conict with the external relations that some o the countries in theregion namely Colombia and Peru present with the United States. This scenariowill certainly lead to urther challenges in the quest or Unasur to perorm a morepreeminent role in international scenario.


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GUIMARES, Samuel Pinheiros (1999). Quinhentos Anos de Perieria. Porto Alegre:Universidade Federal de Porto Alegre.

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Received August 16, 2010Accepted November 11, 2010

astct

Brazils security agenda during Lulas administration was not homogeneous through thetwo mandates: the first tenure (2002-2006) revealed a reactive approach towards securitytopics, while the second one (2006-2010) was more assertive. More specifically, the shiftoccurred in terms of both its geographical scope once it incorporated global issues in amore systematic way , and instruments through which the security agenda was exercised,given the multilateral initiative of Unasurs CDS.

resmo

A agenda de segurana do governo Lula no foi homognea durante os dois mandatos:o primeiro perodo (2002 2006) revelou uma postura reativa quanto s questes desegurana, enquanto o Segundo mandato (2006 2010) foi postura mais assertiva.Mais especificamente, a mudana ocorreu em termos de escopo geogrfico umavez incorporadas as questes globais de maneira mais sistemtica e em termos deinstrumentos por meio dos quais a agenda de segurana foi exercida dada a criao doConselho de Defesa Sul-Americano.

Key-wods: Lulas security agenda; assertive approach; South American Defense Council (CDS).pvs-chve: agenda de segurana de Lula; poltica externa afirmativa; Conselho deDefesa Sul-americano.

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