8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
1/44
Regimes híbridos
Introdução (1 página)
3ª vaga de democratização
pergunta de partida
defnição de robert dahl e schumpeter
huntington
reedom house
há várias abordagens que exploram este enómeno. ários termos
dierentes sugeridos por autores dierente. !iamond ala das " categorias e
de como se dierenciam# $igell ala de outra%& levints'( et al. )oncentram*seno termo +competitive authoritarianism,& -reedom house ala de
semiconsolidated authoritarian regimes# a'aria reere*se a +iliberal
democracies, e /chendler +electoral authorianisms,
You ask whether Russia is a hybrid regime or not, but the
definition of a hybrid regime itself is not clear. It mixes democratic
and authoritarian elements, but this mixture can take different
forms.
O que são regimes hibridos (2 páginas)
Tipos de regimes hibridos (texto wige) (2
páginas)
https%00ah'(ee.fles.$ordpress.com0124020levits'(*122*
competitive*authoritarianism.pd
http%00$$$.plataormademocratica.org05ublicacoes05ublicacao67"86em6966122861162"63".pd
https%00$$$.odi.org0sites0odi.org.u'0fles0odi*
assets0publications*opinion*fles07"2.pd
https%00repositorio.iscte*
iul.pt0bitstream0229099"200://56!)56!issertacao6;na
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
2/44
?@ difcil alar em regimes hibridos porque há muitas variaçAesB
!aso "rgentina (2 páginas)
https%00$$$.researchgate.net0publication013C827C996>ender6and6path*shiting6changes6in6a6h(brid6$elare6regime6;rgentina6in6comparative6perspectiv
e
!aso R#ssia (2 páginas)
http%00$$$.sciencedirect.com0science0article0pii0/89C3""42C222214
http%00imrussia.org0en0anal(sis0politics01112*marc*plattner*i*russia*had*become*
democratic*the*$orld*$ould*loo'*ver(*diDerent*no$
http%00carnegieendo$ment.org0fles0overmanaged6democrac(61.pd
!aso $aásia
http%00$$$.amo.cz0$p*content0uploads0124020amocz*rp*12*24.pd
!aso %ene&uea
https%00$$$.amherst.edu0media0vie$032870original02"*27C9*3
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
3/44
*+%I,'-.
Ihe end o the )old Jar posed a undamental challenge to authoritarian
regimes. /ingle*part( and militar( dictatorships collapsed throughout ;rica#post*communist :urasia# and much o ;sia and Katin ;merica in the late C82s
and earl( CC2s. ;t the same time# the ormal architecture o democrac( L
particularl(
multipart( elections L diDused across the globe.
Iransitions did not al$a(s lead to democrac(# ho$ever. Gn much o ;rica
and the ormer /oviet Fnion# and in parts o :astern :urope# ;sia# and the
;mericas# ne$ regimes combined electoral competition $ith var(ing degrees o
authoritarianism. Fnli'e single*part( or militar( dictatorships# postL)old Jar
regimes in )ambodia# Men(a# =ala(sia# =exico# Nigeria# 5eru# Oussia# /erbia#
Iai$an# F'raine# imbab$e# and else$here $ere competitive in that opposition
orces used democratic institutions to contest vigorousl( L and# on occasion#successull( L or po$er. Nevertheless# the( $ere not democratic. :lectoral
manipulation# unair media access# abuse o state resources# and var(ing degrees
o harassment and violence s'e$ed the pla(ing feld in avor o incumbents. Gn
other $ords# competition $as real but unair. Je characterize such regimes as
competitive authoritarian. )ompetitive authoritarian regimes prolierated ater the
)old Jar. E( our count# 33 regimes $ere competitive authoritarian in CC4 L
a fgure that exceeded the number o ull democracies in the developing and
post*communist $orld.1
Ihe stud( o postL)old Jar h(brid regimes $as initiall( mar'ed b( a pronounced
democratizing bias.3 ie$ed through the lens o democratization#
h(brid regimes $ere requentl( categorized as Pa$ed# incomplete# or +transitional,democracies.7 -or example# Oussia $as treated as a case o +protracted,
democratic transition during the CC2s#4 and its subsequent autocratic turn
$as characterized as a +ailure to consolidate, democrac(." Ki'e$ise# )ambodia
$as described as a +nascent democrac(, that $as +on the road to
democratic consolidation,9& )ameroon# >eorgia# and Maza'hstan $ere labeled
+democratizers,8& and the )entral ;rican Oepublic and )ongo*Erazzaville $ere
called +$ould*be democracies.,C Iransitions that did not lead to democrac(
$ere characterized as +stalled, or +Pa$ed., Ihus# ambia $as said to be +stuc'
in transition,2& ;lbania $as labeled a case o +permanent transition,& and
Haiti $as said to be undergoing a +long#,1 +ongoing#,3 and even +unending,7transition.
/uch characterizations are misleading. Ihe assumption that h(brid regimes
are ?or should beB moving in a democratic direction lac's empirical oundation.
H(brid regimes ollo$ed diverse traQectories during the postL)old Jar period.
;lthough some o them democratized ?e.g.# >hana# =exico# and /lova'iaB# most
did not. =an( regimes either remained stable ?e.g.# =ala(sia and IanzaniaB or
became increasingl( authoritarian ?e.g.# Eelarus and OussiaB. Gn other cases#
autocratic
governments ell but $ere succeeded b( ne$ authoritarians ?e.g.# >eorgia#
=adagascar# and ambiaB. Gndeed# some regimes experienced t$o or more
transitions
$ithout democratizing.4 ;s o 122# more than a dozen competitive
authoritarian regimes had persisted or 4 (ears or more." Oather than +partial#,
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
4/44
+incomplete#, or +unconsolidated, democracies# these cases should be
conceptualized
or $hat the( are% a distinct# nondemocratic regime t(pe. Gnstead
o assuming that such regimes are in transition to democrac(# it is more useul
to as' $h( some democratized and others did not. Ihis is the goal o our
stud(. Ihis boo' examines the traQectories o all 34 regimes that $ere or became
competitive authoritarian bet$een CC2 and CC4.9 Ihe stud( spans fve regions#
including six countries in the ;mericas ?the !ominican Oepublic# >u(ana# Haiti#
=exico# 5eru# and NicaraguaB& six in :astern :urope ?;lbania# )roatia# =acedonia#
Oomania# /erbia# and /lova'iaB& three in ;sia ?)ambodia# =ala(sia# and
Iai$anB& six in the ormer /oviet Fnion ?;rmenia# Eelarus# >eorgia# =oldova#
Oussia# and F'raineB& and 7 in ;rica ?Eenin# Eots$ana# )ameroon# >abon#
>hana# Men(a# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ali# =ozambique# /enegal# Ianzania#
ambia# and imbab$eB.
Ihe boo' as's $h( some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized
during the postL)old Jar period# $hile others remained stable and authoritarianand still others experienced turnover $ithout democratization. Rur central
argument# $hich is elaborated in )hapter 1# ocuses on t$o main actors% ties to
the Jest and the strength o governing*part( and state organizations. Jhere
lin'age to the Jest $as high# competitive authoritarian regimes democratized.
Jhere lin'age $as lo$# regime outcomes hinged on incumbentsS organizational
po$er. Jhere state and governing part( structures $ere $ell organized and
cohesive# regimes remained stable and authoritarian& $here the( $ere
underdeveloped
or lac'ed cohesion# regimes $ere unstable# although the( rarel( democratized.
Ihis introductor( chapter is organized as ollo$s. Ihe frst section defnes
competitive authoritarianism and presents the case or a ne$ regime t(pe. Ihesecond section examines the rise o competitive authoritarianism. Gt attributes
the prolieration o competitive authoritarian regimes to the incentives and
constraints
created b( the postL)old Jar international environment. Ihe third section
sho$s ho$ competitive authoritarian regime traQectories diverged ater CC2
and provides an overvie$ o the boo'Ss central argument and main theoretical
contributions.
what is ompetiti/e authoritarianism0
+5olitics . . . is not li'e ootball# deserving a level pla(ing feld. Here# (ou tr( that and
(ou
$ill be roasted.,L !aniel arap =oi# 5resident o Men(a8
)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in $hich ormal democratic
institutions exist and are $idel( vie$ed as the primar( means o gaining
po$er# but in $hich incumbentsS abuse o the state places them at a signifcant
advantage vis*Ta*vis their opponents. /uch regimes are competitive in that
opposition
parties use democratic institutions to contest seriousl( or po$er# but the( are
not democratic because the pla(ing feld is heavil( s'e$ed in avor o incumbents.
)ompetition is thus real but unair.
'ituating the !onept
)ompetitive authoritarianism is a h(brid regime t(pe# $ith important characteristicso both democrac( and authoritarianism.C Je emplo( a +midrange, defnition
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
5/44
o democrac(% one that is procedural but demanding.12 -ollo$ing !ahl#
scholars have converged around a +procedural minimum, defnition o democrac(
that includes our 'e( attributes% ?B ree# air# and competitive elections&
?1B ull adult suDrage& ?3B broad protection o civil liberties# including reedom
o speech# press# and association& and ?7B the absence o nonelected +tutelar(,
authorities ?e.g.# militaries# monarchies# or religious bodiesB that limit elected
oUcialsS po$er to govern.1 Ihese defnitions are essentiall( +/chumpeterian,
in that the( center on competitive elections.11 Ho$ever# scholars have
subsequentl(
+precised, the concept o democrac( b( ma'ing explicit criteria L such
as civil liberties and eDective po$er to govern L that are implicitl( understood to
be part o the overall meaning and $hich are vie$ed as necessar( or competitive
elections to ta'e place.13
;lthough $e remain committed to a procedural*minimum conception o
democrac(# $e precise it b( adding a fth attribute% the existence o a reasonabl(
level pla(ing feld bet$een incumbents and opposition.17 Rbviousl(# a
degree o incumbent advantage L in the orm o patronage Qobs# por'*barrelspending# clientelist social policies# and privileged access to media and fnance L
exists in all democracies. Gn democracies# ho$ever# these advantages do not
seriousl( undermine the oppositionSs capacit( to compete.14 Jhen incumbent
manipulation o state institutions and resources is so excessive and one*sided
that it seriousl( limits political competition# it is incompatible $ith democrac(.
1"
; level pla(ing feld is implicit in most conceptualizations o democrac(.
Gndeed# man( characteristics o an uneven pla(ing feld could be subsumed into
the dimensions o +ree and air elections, and +civil liberties., Ho$ever# there
are at least t$o reasons to treat this attribute as a separate dimension. -irst# some
aspects o an uneven pla(ing feld L such as s'e$ed access to media and fnance Lhave a maQor impact bet$een elections and are thus oten missed in evaluations o
$hether elections are ree and air. /econd# some government actions that s'e$
the pla(ing feld ma( not be vie$ed as civil*liberties violations. -or example#
$hereas closing do$n a ne$spaper is a clear violation o civil liberties# de acto
governing*part( control o the private media L achieved through inormal prox(
or patronage arrangements L is not. Ki'e$ise# illicit governmentLbusiness ties
that create vast resource disparities vis*Ta*vis the opposition are not civil*liberties
violations per se. ;ttention to the slope o the pla(ing feld thus highlights ho$
regimes ma( be undemocratic even in the absence o overt raud or civil*liberties
violations.
Gt is important to distinguish bet$een competitive and noncompetitiveauthoritarianism.
Je defne full authoritarianism as a regime in $hich no viable
channels exist or opposition to contest legall( or executive po$er.19 Ihis categor(
includes closed regimes in $hich national*level democratic institutions
do not exist ?e.g.# )hina# )uba# and /audi ;rabiaB and hegemonic regimes in
$hich ormal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to acVade
status in practice.18 Gn hegemonic regimes# elections are so marred b( repression#
candidate restrictions# and0or raud that there is no uncertaint( about their
outcome.
=uch o the opposition is orced underground and leading critics are otenimprisoned or exiled. Ihus# in postL)old Jar :g(pt# Maza'hstan# and Fzbe'istan#
elections served unctions ?e.g.# a means o enhancing regime legitimac(#
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
6/44
generating inormation# or distributing patronageB other than determining $ho
governed1C& opponents did not vie$ them as viable means to achieve po$er.
)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished rom ull authoritarianism
in that constitutional channels exist through $hich opposition groups compete
in a meaningul $a( or executive po$er. :lections are held regularl( and
opposition parties are not legall( barred rom contesting them. Rpposition activit(is above ground% Rpposition parties can open oUces# recruit candidates# and
organize campaigns# and politicians are rarel( exiled or imprisoned. Gn short#
democratic procedures are suUcientl( meaningul or opposition groups to ta'e
them seriousl( as arenas through $hich to contest or po$er.
Jhat distinguishes competitive authoritarianism rom democrac(# ho$ever#
is the act that incumbent abuse o the state violates at least one o three defning
attributes o democrac(% ?B ree elections# ?1B broad protection o civil liberties#
and ?3B a reasonabl( level pla(ing feld.32
Elections
Gn democracies# elections are free# in the sense that there is virtuall( no raud or
intimidation o voters# and fair # in the sense that opposition parties campaign on
relativel( even ooting% Ihe( are not subQect to repression or harassment# and the(
are not s(stematicall( denied access to the media or other critical resources.3
Gn ull( authoritarian regimes# multipart( elections are either nonexistent or
noncompetitive. :lections ma( be considered noncompetitive $hen ?B maQor
candidates are ormall( barred or eDectivel( excluded on a regular basis31&
?1B repression or legal controls eDectivel( prevent opposition parties rom running
public campaigns& or ?3B raud is so massive that there is virtuall( no observable
relationship bet$een voter preerences and oUcial electoral results.
)ompetitive authoritarian regimes all in bet$een these extremes. Rn the one
hand# elections are competitive in that maQor opposition candidates are rarel(
excluded# opposition parties are able to campaign publicl(# and there is no massiveraud. Rn the other hand# elections are oten unree and almost al$a(s unair.
Gn some cases# elections are marred b( the manipulation o voter lists# ballot*box
stuUng# and0or alsifcation o results ?e.g.# the !ominican Oepublic in CC7 and
F'raine in 1227B. ;lthough such raud ma( alter the outcome o elections# it is
not so severe as to ma'e the act o voting meaningless.33 :lections also ma( be
marred b( intimidation o opposition activists# voters# and poll $atchers# and even
the establishment o opposition +no*go, areas ?e.g.# )ambodia and imbab$eB.
Ho$ever# such abuse is not suUcientl( severe or s(stematic to prevent the
opposition
rom running a national campaign. Gn other cases ?e.g.# Eots$anaB# voting
and vote*counting processes are reasonabl( clean but an uneven pla(ing feldrenders the overall electoral process maniestl( unair. Gn these cases# unequal
access to fnance and the media as $ell as incumbent abuse o state institutions
ma'e elections unair even in the absence o violence or raud.37 Ihus# even
though =exicoSs CC7 election $as technicall( clean# s'e$ed access to resources
and media led one scholar to compare it to a +soccer match $here the goalposts
$ere o diDerent heights and breadths and $here one team included pla(ers
plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven pla(ers.,34
Civil Liberties
Gn democracies# civil liberties L including the rights o ree speech# press# and
association L are protected. ;lthough these rights ma( be violated periodicall(#
such violations are inrequent and do not seriousl( hinder the oppositionSs capacit(to challenge incumbents. Gn ull( authoritarian regimes# basic civil liberties
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
7/44
are oten violated so s(stematicall( that opposition parties# civic groups# and the
media are not even minimall( protected ?e.g.# :g(pt and Fzbe'istanB. ;s a result#
much opposition activit( ta'es place underground or in exile.
Gn competitive authoritarian regimes# civil liberties are nominall( guaranteed
and at least partiall( respected. Gndependent media exist and civic and opposition
groups operate above ground% =ost o the time# the( can meet reel( andeven protest against the government. Wet# civil liberties are requentl( violated.
Rpposition politicians# independent Qudges# Qournalists# human*rights activists#
and other government critics are subQect to harassment# arrest# and L in some
cases L violent attac'. Gndependent media are requentl( threatened# attac'ed#
and L in some cases L suspended or closed. Gn some regimes# overt repression L
including the arrest o opposition leaders# the 'illing o opposition activists# and
the violent repression o protest L is $idespread# pushing regimes to the brin' o
ull authoritarianism.3"
=ore requentl(# assaults on civil liberties ta'e more subtle orms# including
+legal repression#, or the discretionar( use o legal instruments L such as tax# libel#
or deamation la$s L to punish opponents. ;lthough such repression ma( involvethe technicall( correct application o the la$# its use is selective and partisan
rather than universal. ;n example is 5utinSs Oussia. ;ter =i'hail Mhodor'ovs'(#
the o$ner o OussiaSs largest oil compan(# began to fnance opposition groups
in 1223# the government Qailed him on tax charges and seized his compan(Ss
propert( and stoc'.39 Rn a more modest scale# the -uQimori government in 5eru
+perected the technique o Xusing the la$ to trample the la$#S,38 transorming
Qudicial and tax agencies into +a shield or riends o the regime and a $eapon
against its enemies.,3C Oivals L oten internal ones L also ma( be prosecuted
or corruption. Gn =ala(sia# =ahathir =ohammad used corruption and sodom(
charges to imprison his chie rival# ;n$ar Gbrahim& in =ala$i# 5resident Eingu $a
=uthari'a had his chie rival# ex*5resident Ea'ili =uluzi# arrested on corruptioncharges& and in F'raine# Keonid Muchma used corruption charges to derail 5rime
=inister 5avlo Kazaren'oSs presidential candidac(.72
5erhaps the most $idespread orm o +legal, repression is the use o libel or
deamation la$s against Qournalists# editors# and media outlets. Ihus# in =ala(sia#
the =ahathir government entered into a +suing craze, in the $a'e o the CC8L
CCC political crisis# ma'ing $idespread use o deamation suits to silence critical
reporting7& in )ameroon# more than 42 Qournalists $ere prosecuted or libel in
the late CC2s and several ne$spapers $ere orced to close due to heav( fnes71&
and in )roatia# independent ne$spapers $ere hit b( more than 132
governmentsponsored
libel suits as o CC9.73 Gn some cases ?e.g.# Eelarus# )ambodia# andOussiaB# the repeated use o costl( la$suits led to the disappearance o man(
independent media outlets. Gn other cases ?e.g.# =ala(sia and F'raineB# the threat
o legal action led to $idespread sel*censorship.
;lthough +legal, and other repression under competitive authoritarianism is
not severe enough to orce the opposition underground or into exile# it clearl(
exceeds $hat is permissible in a democrac(. E( raising the cost o opposition
activit(
?thereb( convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelinesB and
critical media coverage ?thereb( encouraging sel*censorshipB# even intermittent
civil*liberties violations can seriousl( hinder the oppositionSs capacit( to organize
and challenge the government. An Uneven Playing Field
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
8/44
-inall(# nearl( all competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized b( an
uneven pla(ing feld.77 Rbviousl(# a degree o incumbent advantage exists
in all democracies. Gndeed# man( ne$ democracies in :astern :urope and
Katin ;merica are characterized b( extensive clientelism and politicization o
state bureaucracies. Io distinguish such cases rom those o unair competition#
$e set a high threshold or unairness. Je consider the pla(ing feld uneven
$hen ?B state institutions are $idel( abused or partisan ends# ?1B incumbents are
s(stematicall( avored at the expense o the opposition# and ?3B the oppositionSs
abilit( to organize and compete in elections is seriousl( handicapped. Ihree
aspects o an uneven pla(ing feld are o particular importance% access to
resources# media# and the la$.
access to resources. ;ccess to resources is uneven $hen incumbents use the
state to create or maintain resource disparities that seriousl( hinder the
oppositionSs
abilit( to compete.74 Ihis ma( occur in several $a(s. -irst# incumbents
ma( ma'e direct partisan use o state resources. Gn a e$ cases# this unding is
legal. Gn >u(ana and imbab$e in the C82s# governing parties $ere fnancedb( special public ministries and0or oUcial state subventions to the exclusion o
other parties. =ore requentl(# state fnance is illicit. Gn =exico# or example# the
Gnstitutional Oevolutionar( 5art( ?5OGB reportedl( dre$ Y billion in illicit state
fnance during the earl( CC2s7"& in Oussia# tens o millions o dollars in
government
bonds $ere diverted to WeltsinSs CC" reelection campaign.79 Gncumbents
also ma( s(stematicall( deplo( the machiner( o the state L or example# state
buildings# vehicles# and communications inrastructure L or electoral campaigns#
and public emplo(ees and securit( orces ma( be mobilized en masse on behal o
the governing part(. Gn ormer /oviet states such as Eelarus# Oussia# and F'raine#
this mobilization included not onl( lo$*level bureaucrats but also teachers# doctors#and other proessionals.78 Gn underdeveloped countries $ith $ea' private
sectors# such abuse can create vast resource advantages.
Gncumbents also ma( use the state to monopolize access to private*sector
fnance. >overning parties ma( use discretionar( control over credit# licenses#
state contracts# and other resources to enrich themselves via part(*o$ned
enterprises
?e.g.# Iai$anB# beneft cron(* or prox(*o$ned frms that then contribute
mone( bac' into part( coDers ?e.g.# =ala(siaB# or corner the mar'et in privatesector
donations ?e.g.# =exico and OussiaB. Gn =ala(sia and Iai$an# or example#
governing parties used control o the state to build multibillion*dollar business
empires.7C Ihe state also ma( be used to den( opposition parties access toresources. Gn F'raine# or example# businesses that fnanced the opposition $ere
routinel( targeted b( tax authorities.42 Gn >hana# entrepreneurs $ho fnanced
opposition parties +$ere blac'listed# denied government contracts# and Zhad[
their businesses openl( sabotaged,4& in )ambodia# the opposition /am Oains(
5art( ?/O5B $as +starved or unds b( a business communit( told b( Zthe
government[
that fnancing /O5 $as committing economic suicide.,41
Gn these cases# resource disparities ar exceeded an(thing seen in established
democracies. Gn Iai$an# the Y122 million to Y422 million in annual profts
generated b( the Y7.4 billion business empire o the Muomintang ?M=IBgave the part( a fnancial base that $as +unheard o . . . in an( representative
democrac(#,43 $hich allo$ed it to outspend opponents b( more than 42*to*
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
9/44
during elections.47 Gn =exico# the 5OG admitted to spending 3 times more than
the t$o maQor opposition parties combined during the CC7 election# and some
observers claim that the ratio ma( have been 12*to*.44 Gn Oussia# the Weltsin
campaign spent bet$een 32 and 42 times the amount permitted the opposition in
CC".4"
access to media. Jhen opposition parties lac' access to media that reachesmost o the population# there is no possibilit( o air competition. =edia access
ma( be denied in several $a(s. -requentl(# the most important disparities exist in
access to broadcast media# combined $ith biased and partisan coverage. Gn man(
competitive authoritarian regimes# the state controls all television and most L i
not all L radio broadcasting. ;lthough independent ne$spapers and magazines
ma( circulate reel(# the( generall( reach onl( a small urban elite. Gn such cases#
i radio and television are state*run and state*run channels are biased in avor o
the governing part(# opposition orces are eDectivel( denied access to the media.
Ihus# even ater the Eanda dictatorship in =ala$i gave $a( to elected 5resident
Ea'ili =uluzi# incumbent control o the media $as such that one Qournalist
complained# +Eeore it $as Eanda# Eanda# Eanda L ever( da(. No$ it is =uluzi#
=uluzi# =uluzi.,49
Gn other cases# private media is $idespread but maQor media outlets are lin'ed to
the governing part( L via prox( o$nership# patronage# and other illicit means. Gn
F'raine# or example# 5resident Muchma controlled television coverage through
an inormal net$or' o private media entities. Ihe head o the 5residential
;dministration# $ho also o$ned the popular \ television station# issued orders
?+temn('i,B to all maQor stations dictating ho$ events should be covered.48 Gn
=ala(sia# all maQor private ne$spapers and private television stations $ere
controlled
b( individuals or frms lin'ed to the governing Barisan Nasional ?ENB.4C
Gn ;lberto -uQimoriSs 5eru# private television stations signed +contracts, $ith the
state intelligence service in $hich the( received up to Y.4 million a month in
exchange or limiting coverage o opposition parties."2
biased reerees% uneven access to the la$. Gn man( competitive authoritarian
regimes# incumbents pac' Qudiciaries# electoral commissions# and other
nominall( independent arbiters and manipulate them via blac'mail# briber(#
and0or intimidation. ;s a result# legal and other state agencies that are designed to
act as reerees rule s(stematicall( in avor o incumbents. Ihis allo$s incumbents
to engage in illicit acts L including violations o democratic procedure L $ith
impunit(. Gt also ensures that critical electoral# legal# or other disputes $ill be
resolved in the incumbentSs avor. Ihus# in =ala(sia# a pac'ed Qudiciar( ensured
that a schism in the ruling Fnited =ala(s National Rrganization ?F=NRB $asresolved in 5rime =inister =ahathirSs avor in C88& a decade later# it allo$ed
=ahathir to imprison his main rival# ;n$ar Gbrahim# on dubious charges. Gn
5eru# -uQimoriSs control over Qudicial and electoral authorities ensured the
legalization
o a constitutionall( dubious third term in 1222. Gn Eelarus in CC"#
the constitutional court terminated an impeachment process launched b(
parliamentar(
opponents o 5resident Ku'ashen'a# $hich acilitated Ku'ashen'aSs
consolidation o autocratic rule. Gn enezuela# the electoral authoritiesS 1223
ruling invalidating signatures collected or a recall reerendum against 5resident
Hugo )havez dela(ed the reerendum long enough or )havez to rebuild publicsupport and survive the reerendum.
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
10/44
Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty
in Nondemocracies
Iable . summarizes the maQor diDerences among democratic# ull authoritarian#
and competitive authoritarian regimes ?or a ull operationalization# see ;ppendix
GB. ;s suggested in the table# a distinguishing eature o competitive
authoritarianismis unfair competition. Jhereas ull authoritarian regimes are characterized
b( the absence o competition ?and# hence# o uncertaint(B and democrac( is
characterized
b( air competition# competitive authoritarianism is mar'ed b( competition
that is real but unair. Rpposition parties are legal# operate aboveground#
and compete seriousl( in elections. Ho$ever# the( are subQect to surveillance#
harassment# and occasional violence& their access to media and fnance is limited&
electoral and Qudicial institutions are politicized and deplo(ed against them&
and elections are oten marred b( raud# intimidation# and other abuse. Wet such
unairness does not preclude serious contestation L or even occasional opposition
victories." /tated another $a(# $hereas oUcials in ull authoritarian regimes
can rest eas( on the eve o elections because neither the( nor opposition leaders
expect an(thing but an incumbent victor(# incumbents in competitive authoritarian
regimes cannot. >overnment oUcials ear a possible opposition victor(
?and must $or' hard to th$art itB# and opposition leaders believe the( have at
least some chance o victor(. Gn competitive authoritarian regimes# incumbents
are orced to s$eat.
Jhat this suggests is that uncertaint( and even incumbent turnover are not
defning eatures o democrac(. GnPuential scholars# particularl( ;dam 5rze$ors'i
and his collaborators# have argued that uncertaint( o outcomes and the
possibilit( o electoral turnover are $hat distinguish democratic rom nondemocratic
regimes."1 /uch a conceptualization ignores the real possibilit( that seriousviolation o democratic procedure ma( occur in competitive elections. ;t times
during the CC2L1228 period# elections in ;lbania# ;rmenia# Eelarus# )ameroon#
)ambodia# >abon# Men(a# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ozambique# Oussia# F'raine#
ambia# and imbab$e $ere characterized b( considerable uncertaint( and# in
some cases# incumbent deeat. Ho$ever# none o them $as democratic and some
$ere not even remotel( so. Je thereore must be able to conceptualize regimes
that are suUcientl( competitive to generate real uncertaint( ?and even turnoverB
but $hich all short o democrac(. ;s this boo' demonstrates# such regimes $ere
$idespread during the postL)old Jar period.
"ternati/e !oneptuai&ations o 3brid Regimes4 5o 6e ,eed
a ,ew 'ubt3pe0/cholars should create ne$ regime subt(pes $ith caution. /tudies o
democratization
in the C82s and CC2s generated hundreds o ne$ subt(pes o democrac(."3
;s )ollier and Kevits'( $arned# such an +excessive prolieration o ne$ terms and
concepts, is li'el( to result in +conceptual conusion.,"7 /imilarl(# Oichard /n(der
has called or a +conservative bias $ith regard to concept ormation., Oather
than all pre( to the +naturalistsS temptation to proclaim the discover(# naming#
and classifcation o ne$ political animals#, /n(der argues# scholars should
+careull(
evaluate the null h(pothesis that the political phenomena o interest . . . are
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
11/44
actuall( not suUcientl( novel to $arrant ne$ categories and labels.,"4
Je contend that competitive authoritarianism is a ne$ phenomenon and that
no existing term adequatel( captures it."" -irst# these regimes routinel( proved
diUcult or scholars to categorize during the postL)old Jar period. -or example#
the /andinista regime in Nicaragua $as described as +a h(brid perhaps unique
in the annals o political science,"9& -uQimoriSs 5eru $as said to be a +ne$ 'indo h(brid authoritarian regime,"8& and the 5OG regime in =exico $as labeled a
+h(brid# part*ree# part authoritarian s(stem, that does +not conorm to classical
t(pologies.,"C
Jhich existing regime categories might be appropriate or these cases] Rne
scholarl( response has been simpl( to label them as democracies. Oegimes in
>hana# =adagascar# =ala$i# =ozambique# 5eru# Oussia# F'raine# and ambia
$ere routinel( labeled democracies during the CC2s. :ven extreme cases such as
Eelarus# )ambodia# Haiti# and Oussia under 5utin occasionall( earned a democratic
label.92 Ihe problem $ith such a strateg( is straightor$ard% Oegimes $ith
serious electoral irregularities and0or civil*liberties violations do not meet procedural
minimum standards or democrac(. Io label such regimes democracies
is to stretch the concept virtuall( be(ond recognition.
;nother conceptual strateg( has been to use generic intermediate categories#
such as h(brid regime#9 semi*democrac(#91 or -reedom HouseSs +partl( ree#,93
or cases that all bet$een democrac( and ull authoritarianism. Ihe problem
$ith such categories is that because democrac( is multidimensional# there are
multiple $a(s to be partiall( democratic. )ompetitive authoritarianism is onl(
one o several h(brid regime t(pes. Rthers include ?B constitutional oligarchies or
exclusive republics# $hich possess the basic eatures o democrac( but den(
suDrage
to a maQor segment o the adult population ?e.g.# :stonia and Katvia in the
earl( CC2sB97& ?1B tutelary regimes# in $hich elections are competitive but the
po$er o elected governments is constrained b( nonelected religious ?e.g.# GranB#
militar( ?e.g.# >uatemala and 5a'istanB# or monarchic ?e.g.# Nepal in the CC2sB
authorities& and ?3B restricted or semi-competitive democracies# in $hich elections
are ree but a maQor part( is banned ?e.g.# ;rgentina in C49LC"" and Iur'e( in
the CC2sB. Ihe diDerences among these regimes L and bet$een them and
competitive
authoritarianism L are obscured b( categories such as semi*democratic
or partl( ree. -or example# :l /alvador# Katvia# and F'raine $ere classifed b(
-reedom House as partl( ree L $ith a combined political and civil*liberties score
o " L in CC1LCC3.94 Wet# $hereas in Katvia the main nondemocratic eature
$as the denial o citizenship rights to people o Oussian descent# in :l /alvadorit $as the militar(Ss tutelar( po$er and human*rights violations. F'raine possessed
ull citizenship and civilian control over the militar(# but it $as competitive
authoritarian. +/emi*democratic, and +partl( ree, are thus residual categories
that reveal little about regimes other than $hat the( are not.
;nother strateg( is to classi( h(brid regimes as subt(pes o democrac(.9" -or
example# Karr( !iamond used the term electoral democracy to reer to cases in
$hich reasonabl( air elections coexist $ith a $ea' rule o la$ and uneven
protection
o human and civil rights# such as in )olombia# Erazil# Gndia# and the
5hilippines.99 /imilarl(# -areed a'aria applied the term illiberal democracy to
+democraticall( elected regimes, that +routinel( ignore constitutional limits ontheir po$er and Zdeprive[ their citizens o basic rights and reedoms.,98 /ubt(pes
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
12/44
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
13/44
+!onSt (ou 'no$ ho$ these Jesterners are] Ihe( $ill ma'e a uss Zabout electoral
raud[
or a e$ da(s# and then the( $ill calm do$n and lie $ill go on as usual.,
L :duard /hevardnadze# 5resident o >eorgia8"
)ompetitive authoritarianism is a postL)old Jar phenomenon. ;lthough a e$
competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the inter$ar and )old Jar
periods#89 the( prolierated ater the all o the Eerlin Jall. Ihis $as not a
coincidence.
Eeginning in the late C82s# maQor changes in the international environment
undermined the stabilit( o man( closed regimes and encouraged the rise
o electoral ones. -irst# the end o the )old Jar led to a $ithdra$al o external
support or man( superpo$er*sponsored dictatorships. /oviet*bac'ed Keninist
regimes and F./.*bac'ed anti*communist regimes aced a precipitous decline in
external militar( and economic assistance. Gn man( cases# the elimination o )old
Jar subsidies coincided $ith mounting economic crises# $hich undermined the
stabilit( o man( autocracies. /tates became ban'rupt# patronage resources
disappeared#and L in man( cases L coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate# leaving
autocrats $ith little choice but to liberalize or abandon po$er.88
Ihe collapse o the /oviet Fnion also led to a mar'ed shit in the global
balance o po$er# in $hich the Jest L particularl( the Fnited /tates L emerged
as the dominant center o economic and militar( po$er. Gn the postL)old Jar
era# as in inter$ar :astern :urope#8C the disappearance o a militar(# economic#
and ideological alternative to the liberal Jest had a maQor impact on peripheral
states. -or example# it created an +almost universal $ish to imitate a $a( o lie
associated $ith the liberal capitalist democracies o the core regimes#,C2 $hich
encouraged the diDusion o Jestern democratic models.C Wet diDusion $as also
rooted in an instrumental logic% Ihe primar( sources o external assistance $ereno$ located almost exclusivel( in the Jest. :Dectivel( +Zr[eading the hand$riting
on the ?EerlinB $all#, man( autocrats adopted ormal democratic institutions
in an eDort to +position their countries avorabl( in the international contest or
scarce development resources.,C1
Ihe end o the )old Jar $as also accompanied b( a maQor shit in Jestern
oreign polic(.C3 Jith the disappearance o the /oviet threat# the Fnited /tates
and other Jestern po$ers stepped up eDorts to encourage and deend democrac(
through a combination o external assistance# militar( and diplomatic pressure#
and unprecedented political conditionalit(.C7 Gn CC2# the Fnited /tates# Fnited
Mingdom# and -rance announced that the( $ould lin' uture economic assistanceto democratization and human rights. Jestern governments and multilateral
institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding o elections and
respect or human rights.C4 ;lthough it $as never applied consistentl(# the +ne$
political conditionalit(, induced man( autocrats to hold multipart( elections.C"
5olitical conditionalit( $as accompanied b( eDorts to create permanent
international
legal rame$or's or the collective deense o democrac(.C9 Ihus# the
CC2s sa$ the emergence o an +international architecture o collective institutions
and ormal agreements enshrining both the principles o democrac(
and human rights.,C8 Ihese eDorts $ent arthest in :astern :urope# $here ull
democrac( $as a requirement or :uropean Fnion ?:FB membership.CC Ho$ever#the( also $ere seen in the ;mericas# $here the Rrganization o ;merican
/tates ?R;/B adopted ne$ mechanisms or the collective deense o democrac(.22
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
14/44
-inall(# the postL)old Jar period sa$ the emergence o a transnational
inrastructure
o organizations L including international part( oundations# electionmonitoring
agencies# and a plethora o international organizations ?GRsB and nongovernmental
organizations ?GN>RsB L that $ere committed to the promotion o
human rights and democrac(.2 /trengthened b( ne$ inormation technologiessuch as the Gnternet# transnational human*rights and democrac( net$or's dre$
international attention to human*rights abuses# lobbied Jestern governments
to ta'e action against abusive governments# and helped protect and empo$er
domestic opposition groups.21 !ue to the presence o these net$or's# rights
abuses requentl( triggered a +boomerang eDect%, the( $ere $idel( reported b(
international media and human rights groups# $hich oten led Jestern po$ers
to ta'e punitive action against violating states.23 ;t the same time# the gro$ing
number and sophistication o international election*observer missions helped
call international attention to raudulent elections# $hich deterred an increasing
number o governments rom attempting raud.27
Ihese changes in the international environment raised the external cost
o authoritarianism and created incentives or elites in developing and
postcommunist
countries to adopt the ormal architecture o Jestern*st(le democrac(#
$hich L at a minimum L entailed multipart( elections. Ihe change
$as particularl( stri'ing in sub*/aharan ;rica# $here the number o de jure
single*part( regimes ell rom 1C in C8C to zero in CC7#24 and in postcommunist
:urasia# $here onl( one de jure one*part( regime ?Iur'menistanB
endured through the CC2s.
Wet i the postL)old Jar international environment undermined autocracies
and encouraged the diDusion o multipart( elections# it did not necessaril( bring
democrac(. :xternal democratizing pressure $as limited in several $a(s. -irst# it$as applied selectivel( and inconsistentl(# $ith important countries and regions
?e.g.# )hina and the =iddle :astB largel( escaping pressure.2" /econd# external
pressure $as oten superfcial. Gn much o the $orld# Jestern democrac( promotion
$as +electoralist, in that it ocused almost exclusivel( on multipart( elections
$hile oten ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level pla(ing feld.29
;s a'aria observed%
Gnthe end. . . elections trump ever(thing. G a countr( holds elections# Jashington
and the
$orld $ill tolerate a great deal romthe resulting government. . . . Gn an age o
images and
s(mbols# elections are eas( to capture on flm. ?Ho$ do (ou televise the rule o la$]B.28
Ihe international communit(Ss ocus on elections let man( autocrats L both
old and ne$ L $ith considerable room to maneuver.2C >overnments +learned
that the( did not have to democratize, to maintain their international standing.2
5artial liberalization L usuall( in the orm o holding passable elections L $as oten
+suUcient to dePect international s(stem pressures or more complete political
opening., Gn short# the postL)old Jar international environment raised the
minimum standard or regime acceptabilit(# but the ne$ standard $as multipart(
elections# not democrac(.
:ven in the postL)old Jar international environment# thereore# ull democratization
oten required a strong domestic +push., Jhere avorable domesticconditions such as a strong civil societ( and eDective state institutions $ere absent
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
15/44
?e.g.# much o the ormer /oviet Fnion and sub*/aharan ;ricaB# transitions $ere
more li'el( to result in regimes that combined multipart( elections $ith some
orm o authoritarian rule.1 Gn other $ords# the( $ere li'el( to result in
competitive
authoritarianism.
Ihe prolieration o competitive authoritarian regimes in the earl( CC2s $asstri'ing. Gn C84# $hen =i'hail >orbachev became the /oviet leader# onl( a
handul o competitive authoritarian regimes existed in the $orld.3 E( CC4#
nearl( three dozen countries $ere competitive authoritarian. Ihus# although the
end o the )old Jar triggered a $ave o democratization# it also triggered a $ave
o h(bridization. Ihe +ourth $ave, $as at least as competitive authoritarian as
it $as democratic.7
di/erging outomes4 ompetiti/e authoritarian regime
tra7etories8 199:;2::<
)ompetitive authoritarian regimes are mar'ed b( an inherent tension. Iheexistence o meaningul democratic institutions creates arenas o contestation
through $hich oppositions ma( legall( L and legitimatel( L challenge incumbents.
;t times# authoritarian governments manage these arenas o contestation $ithout
diUcult(. Jhen incumbents enQo( broad public support ?e.g.# Eots$ana and
5eru in the mid*CC2sB and0or ace ver( $ea' opposition ?e.g.# IanzaniaB# the(
ma( retain po$er $ithout egregiousl( violating democratic institutions. Ho$ever#
the existence o multipart( elections# nominall( independent legislatures#
Qudiciaries# and media creates opportunities or periodic challenges# and $hen
incumbents lac' public support# these challenges ma( be regime*threatening.
=ost requentl(# opposition challenges ta'e place at the ballot box# as in /erbia
?1222B# Men(a ?1221B# F'raine ?1227B# and imbab$e ?1228B. Ho$ever# the( alsoma( emerge rom parliament ?e.g.# Oussia in CC3 and Eelarus in CC"B or the
Qudiciar(.4
/uch contestation poses a serious dilemma or incumbents. Rn the one hand#
th$arting the challenge oten requires a blatant assault on democratic institutions
?i.e.# stealing elections or closing parliamentB. Eecause such challenges are legal
and generall( perceived as legitimate ?both at home and abroadB# openl( repressing
them ma( be quite costl(. Rn the other hand# i incumbents allo$ democratic
procedures to run their course# the( ris' losing po$er. Gn eDect# such challenges
orce incumbents to choose bet$een egregiousl( violating democratic rules# at
the cost o international isolation and domestic conPict# and allo$ing the challenge
to proceed# at the cost o possible deeat. Ihe result is oten a regime crisis#as occurred in )ambodia and Oussia in CC3# the !ominican Oepublic in CC7#
;rmenia in CC"# =ala(sia in CC8LCCC# 5eru and /erbia in 1222# =adagascar
in 122# F'raine in 1227# Men(a in 1229# and imbab$e in 1228. Gt is perhaps
or this reason that Huntington $rote that +liberalized authoritarianism, is +not
a stable equilibrium. Ihe hal$a( house does not stand.,"
Wet competitive authoritarian regimes $ere not bound to collapse& in act#
man( o them proved stri'ingl( robust. Gn several cases# incumbents either
repeatedl( th$arted opposition challenges or maintained such eDective control
that no serious challenge emerged. Gn other cases# incumbents $ere deeated b(
opposition challenges but successors ruled in a competitive authoritarian manner
L in other $ords# the government changed but the regime did not. Gndeed#
C o our 34 cases remained competitive authoritarian or 4 (ears or more#9
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
16/44
a liespan that is comparable to even the most durable bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes in /outh ;merica.8 Hence# it appears that man( hal$a( houses do
stand.
)ompetitive authoritarian regimes ollo$ed three distinct paths bet$een CC2
and 1228 ? Iable .1B. Ihe frst is democratization# or the establishment o ree
and air elections# broad protection o civil liberties# and a level pla(ing feld.C!emocratization ma( be overseen b( authoritarian governments# as in >hana#
=exico# and Iai$an# or the( ma( occur ater those governments all rom po$er#
as in )roatia# Nicaragua# 5eru# /erbia# and /lova'ia. ;lthough the removal o
authoritarian incumbents is not necessar( or democratization#12 all o our
democratizing cases experienced turnover. Eet$een CC2 and 1228# 4 o our 34
cases democratized% Eenin# )roatia# the !ominican Oepublic# >hana# >u(ana#
=acedonia# =ali# =exico# Nicaragua# 5eru# Oomania# /erbia# /lova'ia# Iai$an#
and F'raine.
Ihe second outcome is unstable authoritarianism# or cases that undergo one or
more transition but do not democratize. Gn these cases# authoritarian incumbents
$ere removed at least once but ne$ governments $ere not democratic. /uccessorsinherited a s'e$ed pla(ing feld and politicized state institutions# $hich the( used
to $ea'en and0or disadvantage their opponents.1 Ien cases ell into the unstable
authoritarian categor(% ;lbania# Eelarus# >eorgia# Haiti# Men(a# =adagascar#
=ala$i# =oldova# /enegal# and ambia.
Ihe third outcome is stable authoritarianism. Gn these cases# authoritarian
incumbents or their chosen successors remained in po$er or at least three
presidential0
parliamentar( terms ollo$ing the establishment o competitive authoritarian
rule.11 Ihis categor( includes cases that became more closed over time
?e.g.# OussiaB. !uring the CC2L1228 period# 2 o our 34 cases remained stable
and nondemocratic% ;rmenia# Eots$ana# )ambodia# )ameroon# >abon#=ala(sia# =ozambique# Ianzania# Oussia# and imbab$e.
Ihis diversit( o outcomes challenges the democratizing assumptions that
underlie much o the postL)old Jar literature on regime change. Neither the
brea'do$n o authoritarian regimes nor the holding o multipart( elections
necessaril(
led to democratization during the postL)old Jar period.13 Gndeed#
most ?12 o 34B o our cases ailed to democratize bet$een CC2 and 1228. Ihese
regime patterns suggest that L contra Kindberg and others L multipart( elections
are not b( themselves an independent cause o democratization.17 Ihe(
also ma'e it clear that electoral turnover L even $here longtime autocrats are
removed L should not be equated $ith democratic transition. Gn man( cases Lrom ;lbania# Eelarus# =ala$i# =oldova# F'raine# and ambia in the CC2s
to >eorgia# Men(a# /enegal# and =adagascar in the 1222s L the removal o
expaining di/ergent outomes4 the argument in brie
Ihis boo' explains the diverging traQectories o competitive authoritarian regimes
since CC2. ;s a starting point# $e assume that incumbents see' to retain po$er
and that the( are $illing to use extralegal means to do so. Je argue that
incumbentsS
capacit( to hold onto po$er L and the ate o competitive authoritarian
regimes more generall( L hinges primaril( on t$o actors% ?B linkage to the West #
or the densit( o ties ?economic# political# diplomatic# social# and organizationalBand cross*border Po$s ?o capital# goods and services# people# and inormationB
bet$een particular countries and the Fnited /tates and the :F& and ?1B incumbentsS
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
17/44
organizational power # or the scope and cohesion o state and governing*part(
structures.
Je ma'e a three*step argument. -irst# $here lin'age to the Jest $as extensive#
as in :astern :urope and the ;mericas# competitive authoritarian regimes
democratized during the postL)old Jar period. E( heightening the international
salience o autocratic abuse# increasing the li'elihood o Jestern response#expanding the number o domestic actors $ith a sta'e in avoiding international
isolation# and shiting the balance o resources and prestige in avor o oppositions#
lin'age raised the cost o building and sustaining authoritarian rule. High
lin'age created po$erul incentives or authoritarian rulers to abandon po$er#
rather than crac' do$n# in the ace o opposition challenges. Gt also created
incentives or successor governments to rule democraticall(. ;mong high*lin'age
cases# not a single authoritarian government remained in po$er through 1228 and
nearl( ever( transition resulted in democrac(. Ihis outcome occurred even $here
domestic conditions or democrac( $ere unavorable ?e.g.# >u(ana# =acedonia#
and OomaniaB.
Jhere lin'age $as lo$# as in most o ;rica and the ormer /oviet Fnion#
external democratizing pressure $as $ea'er. )onsequentl(# regime outcomes
$ere driven primaril( b( domestic actors# particularl( the organizational po$er
o incumbents. Jhere state and0or governing parties $ere $ell organized and
cohesive# as in =ala(sia and imbab$e# incumbents $ere able to manage elite
conPict and th$art even serious opposition challenges ?both in the streets and at
the ballot boxB# and competitive authoritarian regimes survived. Gndeed# in nearl(
all lo$*lin'age cases in $hich incumbents had developed coercive and0or part(
organizations# autocrats or their chosen successors remained in po$er through
1228.
Jhere state and governing*part( structures $ere underdeveloped and lac'ed
cohesion# regimes $ere less stable. Eecause incumbents lac'ed the organizational
and coercive tools to prevent elite deection# steal elections# or crac'
do$n on protest# the( $ere vulnerable to even relativel( $ea' opposition
challenges.
)onsequentl(# regimes $ere more open to contingenc( than in other
cases.
Gn this context# a third actor L statesS vulnerabilit( to Jestern democratizing
pressure ?$hich $e call Western leverageB L $as oten decisive. Jhere countriesS
strategic or economic importance inhibited external pressure ?e.g.# OussiaB# or
$here assistance rom counter*hegemonic po$ers blunted the impact o that
pressure ?e.g.# )ameroon# >abon# and post*CC7 EelarusB# even relativel( $ea'
regimes survived. Jhere Jestern leverage $as high# such governments $eremore li'el( to all. Gn these cases# turnover created an opportunit( or
democratization.
Gndeed# ragile democracies emerged in Eenin# =ali# and F'raine.
Ho$ever# in the absence o close ties to the Jest or a strong domestic push or
democrac(# transitions requentl( brought to po$er ne$ authoritarian governments
?e.g.# >eorgia# =ala$i# and ambiaB. Gn lo$*lin'age cases# thereore# lo$
organizational po$er $as associated $ith unstable competitive authoritarianism.
Ki'e all theories o regime change# ours cannot explain all cases. Oegime outcomes
are inPuenced b( a variet( o actors L including economic perormance#
the strength and strategies o opposition movements# leadership# and historical
contingenc( L that lie outside o our theoretical rame$or'. Gt is not surprising#thereore# that some o the regimes anal(zed in this stud( ollo$ traQectories not
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
18/44
predicted b( our theor( ?e.g.# democratization in Eenin# >hana# and F'raineB.
Nevertheless# lin'age# leverage# and organizational po$er explain a stri'ing number
o cases.
theoretia impiations
Rur research has a range o implications or the stud( o contemporar( political
regimes and regime change. -or example# it contributes to the emerging literatureon the international dimension o regime change. Ihe massive $ave o
democratization that s$ept across the developing $orld in the C82s and CC2s
defed nearl( all established theories o democratization. -ramed in terms o
!ahlSs cost o toleration versus cost o suppression#14 man( leading theories
expect stable democrac( to emerge $hen either ?B increased societal $ealth or
equalit( reduces the cost o toleration1"& or ?1B a strengthening o civil societ( or
opposition orces L oten a product o socioeconomic modernization L increases
the cost o repression.19 Neither o these phenomena occurred on a large scale
prior to the transitions in Katin ;merica# ;rica# or communist :urasia. Jhat
did change $as the international environment. )hanges in the postL)old Jar
international environment heightened the cost o suppression in much o the
developing $orld. Ihus# it $as an externall( driven shit in the cost o suppression#
not changes in domestic conditions# that contributed most centrall( to the
demise o authoritarianism in the C82s and CC2s.18
Ihis boo' presents a ne$ rame$or' or anal(zing the international inPuences
on regime change. Ihe recent literature highlights a dizz(ing arra( o international
inPuences including diDusion# demonstration eDects# conditionalit(#
transnational civil societ(# and ne$ inormation technologies. Je organize these
various mechanisms into t$o dimensions% Jestern leverage and linkage to the
Jest. Ihis rame$or' enables us to capture cross*national variation in the natureand degree o external democratizing pressure. Je fnd that the impact o the
international environment varied considerabl( across cases and regions# and that
this variation $as rooted# to a large degree# in the extent o countriesS ties to the
Jest. Jhere lin'age $as high ?e.g.# :astern :urope and the ;mericasB# regimes
oten democratized L even in the absence o avorable domestic conditions& $here
it $as lo$ ?e.g.# ;rica and the ormer /oviet FnionB# domestic actors
predominated.
=oreover# $e fnd that although political conditionalit( and other orms
o direct ?or leverage*basedB pressure ma( be eDective# the democratizing impact
o conditionalit( is ar greater in countries $ith extensive lin'age to the Jest.
/econd# this boo' highlights the role o incumbent organizational po$er inshaping regime outcomes. Oecent studies o democratization have given
considerable
attention to the role o societal or opposition*centered actors# including
civil societ(#1C organized labor#32 mass protest#3 and opposition cohesion#31
in undermining authoritarianism and0or installing democrac(. Ho$ever# in much
o post*)old Jar ;rica# ;sia# and post*communist :urasia# civil societies and
opposition parties $ere $ea' and ragmented& as a result# the societal push or
democratization $as meager.33 Gn man( o these cases# regime outcomes $ere
rooted less in the character or behavior o opposition movements than in
incumbentsS
capacit( to th$art them. Jhere incumbents possessed a po$erul coerciveapparatus and0or part( organization# even $ell*organized and cohesive opposition
challenges oten ailed. E( contrast# $here incumbents lac'ed the organizational
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
19/44
tools needed to steal elections# co*opt opponents# or crac' do$n on
protest# transitions occurred even $hen oppositions $ere $ea'. Gndeed# this boo'
sho$s that successul opposition movements $ere oten rooted in state and part(
$ea'ness. =uch o the fnancial and organizational muscle behind successul
opposition challenges in ambia ?CC2LCCB# Men(a ?1221B# >eorgia ?1223B#
and F'raine ?1227B $as provided b( ex*government oUcials $ho had deectedonl( $ee's or months beore the transition.
I$o implications are $orth noting. -irst# although strong parties and states
are $idel( L and correctl( L vie$ed as critical to democratic stabilit(# the( also are
critical to stable authoritarianism.37 Jhere incumbents lac'ed strong state and
part( organizations# the( rarel( survived during the postL)old Jar period. Gn a
competitive authoritarian context# thereore# successul state* or part(*building
?e.g.# imbab$e in the C82s# ;rmenia and )ambodia in the CC2s# and Oussia
in the 1222sB ma( contribute not to democratization but rather to authoritarian
consolidation. /econd# man( postL)old Jar transitions $ere rooted more in
the $ea'ness o incumbent governments than in the strength# strategies# or
mobilization o opposition orces. /uch transitions $ere mar'ed b( a paradox% Ihe $ea'ness o state and governing*part( organizations made it more li'el( that
an autocrat $ould be orced rom po$er but less li'el( that the transition $ould
result in democrac(. Iransitions b( collapse generall( occurred in a context o
$ea' states# parties# and civil societies L conditions that $ere hardl( propitious
or democratization. Eecause both institutional and societal chec's on successor
governments tended to be $ea'# transitions oten gave rise to ne$ authoritarian
incumbents.
the distinti/e ogi o ompetiti/e
authoritarian poitis
Ihis boo' also highlights the importance o ta'ing seriousl( the d(namics o
contemporar(authoritarian regimes.39 Fntil recentl(# the assumption that h(brid
regimes $ere +in transition, to democrac( biased anal(ses in important $a(s.
/cholars gave disproportionate attention to actors that shaped the perormance
and stabilit( o democrac(# such as constitutional design# executiveLlegislative
relations# electoral and part( s(stems# and voting behavior. ;s a result# the actors
that contribute to building and sustaining contemporar( nondemocracies#
as $ell as the internal d(namics o these regimes# $ere let underexplored.38 Gn
treating competitive authoritarian regimes as +transitional, democracies# scholars
oten assumed that political processes ?e.g.# candidate selection# electoral
campaigns#and legislative politicsB $or'ed more or less as the( do under democracies.
Wet such assumptions are oten misguided. Ihe coexistence o meaningul
democratic
institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities
and constraints or actors# $hich L in important areas o political lie L generate
distinct patterns o political behavior. Je examine some o these areas in the
ollo$ing sections.
Inorma Institutions
Rne characteristic o competitive authoritarianism is the centralit( o inormal
institutions.3C Gnormal institutions exist in all regimes but# given the disQuncture
bet$een ormal ?i.e.# democraticB rules and actual behavior that is inherentto competitive authoritarianism# their role in such regimes ma( be particularl(
important. Oecent $or' suggests that actors requentl( emplo( inormal
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
20/44
institutions as a +second*best, strateg( $hen the( cannot achieve their goals
through ormal institutions but fnd the cost o changing those institutions to be
prohibitive.72 E( raising the cost o ormal ?e.g.# single*part(B authoritarian rule#
the postL)old Jar international environment created incentives or incumbents
to emplo( inormal mechanisms o coercion and control $hile maintaining the
ormal architecture o democrac(. Eecause inormal means o coercion are morediUcult or international observers to identi( than ormal mechanisms o repression
?e.g.# press censorship or bans on oppositionB# the( $ere oten critical to the
survival o postL)old Jar autocracies.
Ihis boo' highlights a range o inormal rules# practices# and organizations
used b( incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes. Gn the electoral arena#
or example# incumbents $ho cannot cancel elections or ban opposition candidates
requentl( turn to illicit strategies such as vote bu(ing# ballot*box stuUng#
and manipulation o the vote count.7 ;lthough the( are requentl( ad hoc#
practices such as ballot*box stuUng ?e.g.# =exicoB and vote*bu(ing ?e.g.#
Iai$anB ma( be institutionalized.
;nother inormal institution ound in man( competitive authoritarian regimesis organized corruption. Eriber(# blac'mail# prox( o$nership# and other illicit
exchanges are oten critical to sustaining authoritarian governing coalitions.71
-or example# in )ambodia# 5eru# Oussia# F'raine# and else$here# corruption
net$or's pla(ed a central role in ensuring the compliance o state actors during
the CC2s.73 Gn =ala(sia# =exico# 5eru# /enegal# Oussia# and Iai$an#
institutionalized
corruption and patronage and prox(*o$nership net$or's bound 'e(
economic# media# and civil*societ( actors to governing parties.
)ompetitive authoritarian governments also emplo( inormal mechanisms o
repression. -or example# man( o them use +legal, repression# or the discretionar(
use o legal instruments L such as tax authorities and libel la$s L to targetopposition and the media. ;lthough such repression is ormal in the sense that
it entails the ?oten technicall( correctB application o the la$# it is an inormal
institution in that enorcement is $idel( 'no$n to be selective. Ihe value o this
orm o repression is its legal veneer% 5rosecution or tax raud or corruption can
be presented to the $orld as enorcement o the rule o la$ rather than repression.
-inall(# authoritarian incumbents emplo( inormal or +privatized, violence
to suppress opposition.77 Jhen the cost o imposing martial la$ or banning
opposition activit( is prohibitivel( high# incumbents ma( opt or violence that
is +orchestrated b( the state . . . but carried out b( nonstate actors# such as
vigilantes#
paramilitaries# and militias.,74 :xamples include organized $ar veteransin ;rmenia and imbab$e# +ethnic $arriors, in Men(a# miners in Oomania# part(
+(outh $ings, in Men(a and =ala$i# +'ic'*do$n*the*door gangs, in >u(ana#
chim´eres in Haiti# and +divine mobs, in Nicaragua. Eecause such thug groups are
not ormall( lin'ed to state securit( orces# the( provide a +certain invisibilit( as
ar as international opinion is concerned.,7" Ihe( thereore help incumbents
achieve the goal o +containing the broad popular challenge to their government#
$hile attempting to distance themselves rom human*rights abuses.,79
'uession =oitis
)ompetitive authoritarianism also generates distinct challenges in the realm o
executive succession. /uccession poses a serious challenge to most autocracies.78
Fnli'e most democracies# authoritarian succession is oten a high*sta'es game.Rutgoing incumbents oten ace serious ris's# including possible seizure o
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
21/44
$ealth and prosecution or corruption or human*rights violations.7C Gndeed#
man( ormer rulers in competitive authoritarian regimes have been exiled or
imprisoned ater leaving oUce.42 -or this reason# incumbents oten see' a
successor
$ho the( can trust to protect them.4 ;t the same time# ho$ever# the(
ace a challenge that does not exist in other authoritarian regimes% the need to $in
competitive elections. ; lo(al successor is o no value i he or she loses elections.
Irust$orthiness and electabilit( are oten in tension $ith one another. Rn the
one hand# the most electorall( viable candidates are oten fgures $ith independent
resources and0or support bases# $hich ma'e them more diUcult to control.
Rn the other hand# regime insiders L particularl( those $ho lac' independent
stature or resources L are more li'el( to remain lo(al# particularl( i their close
connection to the regime ma'es them vulnerable to blac'mail. Ho$ever# such
politicians oten lac' the voter appeal to $in elections.41
-inding a successor $ho is both electable and trust$orth( is oten diUcult. Gn
=ala$i ?CC7B# Men(a ?1221B# and F'raine ?1227B# outgoing rulers erred on the
side o saet(# choosing lo(al but $ea' candidates $ho lost elections. Gn F'raine#or example# 5resident Muchma chose i'tor Wanu'ov(ch L a corrupt oUcial $ith
a criminal past L apparentl( because he could be controlled via blac'mail# but the
unpopular Wanu'ov(ch lost the 1227 election. E( contrast# in =ala$i ?1227B
and ambia ?122B# successors $on elections but subsequentl( turned on their
patrons. Gn 5eru# the inabilit( to fnd a viable successor contributed to -uQimoriSs
decision to see' an illegal ?and# ultimatel(# ill*atedB third term in 1222.
=art3 >eha/ior
-inall(# part( behavior is distinct under competitive authoritarian regimes. ;s
/cott =ain$aring has noted# standard assumptions about part( behavior L or
example# that parties are vote*maximizing L hold onl( $here elections are the
+onl( game in to$n.,43 Gn such a context# parties ta'e the political regime asgiven and $or' $ithin it% Ihe( participate in elections# see'ing to maximize
votes& i the( lose# the( turn to parliamentar( opposition. Gn unconsolidated
democracies and h(brid regimes# ho$ever# parties oten pla( a +dual game, that
encompasses both electoral and regime obQectives.47 Gn other $ords# conventional
vote*maximizing strategies are complemented L and sometimes trumped L
b( strategies aimed at shoring up or undermining the existing regime.
5arties clearl( pla( a dual game in competitive authoritarian regimes.44 Rn
the one hand# unli'e most authoritarian regimes# parties must ta'e seriousl(
elections
and other democratic institutions& their abilit( to gain or maintain po$er
hinges L at least# in part L on their abilit( to $in votes and control legislatures.
Rn the other hand# ho$ever# competing on a s'e$ed pla(ing feld oten requires
strategies that have little to do $ith vote*maximization. Ihus# in all but a e$ o
our cases#4" opposition parties combined conventional ?i.e.# electoral or
parliamentar(B
strategies $ith extra*institutional ones. -or example# oppositions
ma( bo(cott elections in an eDort to undermine their domestic or international
legitimac(.49 =aQor opposition parties bo(cotted at least one round o presidential
or parliamentar( elections in >hana ?CC1B# )ameroon ?CC1 and CC9B#
Haiti ?CC4 and 1222B# ambia ?CC"B# imbab$e ?CC" and 1228B# =ali ?CC9B#
/erbia ?CC9B# 5eru ?1222B# Eenin ?122B# and /enegal ?1229B.Jhen opposition parties participate in elections# conditions ma( induce them
to adopt strategies that diDer mar'edl( rom those seen in democratic regimes.
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
22/44
Rne is thug mobilization.48 Gn a context o $idespread violence or la$lessness#
candidatesS abilit( to $in votes ma( be Qust as important as their abilit( to
ph(sicall(
protect or deliver them. Ihus# although recruiting and deplo(ing armed
thugs rarel( enhances partiesS electoral appeal# it can be critical to their abilit( to
campaign and protect the vote. ;s oran !ind_ic`# the main architect o /erbiaSs+bulldozer revolution, in 1222# stated# oppositions must +clearl( sho$ the( are
read( to use violence to fght bac' in case o repression. . . . /ecurit( orces must
realize the( cannot resort to violence $ithout ris's.,4C Gndeed# successul
oppositions
mobilized both votes and thugs in Eenin ?CCB# =ala$i ?CC7B# /erbia
?1222B# and Men(a ?1221B.
Rpposition strategies also diDer bet$een elections. Oather than confne its
activities to parliament# oppositions in competitive authoritarian regimes ma(
engage in mass protest aimed at toppling the government ?or orcing it to
underta'e
democratizing reormB beore the end o its mandate. /uch tactics $ere
adopted in )ameroon ?CCB# =adagascar ?CC and 122CB# ;lbania ?CC and
CC9B# F'raine ?CC3B# enezuela ?1221B# Haiti ?1223B# and >eorgia ?1223 and
1229B.
;lternativel(# opposition parties ma( adopt a coalitional strateg(# Qoining the
government in pursuit o state resources# media access# protection# and other
benefts."2 ;lthough oten characterized as +na'ed opportunism#," coalitional
strategies ma( be critical to part( survival. Gn countries characterized b( extreme
underdevelopment ?e.g.# )ambodia and =ala$iB or extensive state control o
the econom( ?e.g.# Eelarus and >abonB# civil societ( and the private sector are
generall( small and impoverished# leaving the opposition $ith limited access to
resources. Fnless parties have a generous external patron ?e.g.# Nicaragua and/lova'iaB or established organizations# identities# and core constituencies ?e.g.#
;lbania# >u(ana# and =ala(siaB# Qoining the government ma( be the onl( viable
means o securing the resources and media access necessar( to remain a viable
political orce.
-rom a vote*maximizing standpoint# coalitional strategies are oten suboptimal.
^oining an unpopular ?and# in man( cases# corrupt and repressiveB government
ma( erode opposition partiesS electoral and activist bases."1 Ho$ever#
$here access to resources is so limited that our or fve (ears in opposition can
be tantamount to political suicide ?e.g.# much o ;rica and the ormer /oviet
FnionB# politicians ma( conclude that Qoining the governments is the best means
o preserving their organizations in order to +pla( another da(.,)oalitional strategies at times have been successul. Gn F'raine# ater oligarch
Wulia I(moshen'oSs ban' accounts $ere rozen in the late CC2s# she abandoned
the opposition and created the progovernment -atherland 5art(. ;n alliance
$ith the government allo$ed I(moshen'o to regain her assets and build a po$erul
organization beore moving bac' into opposition# $here she $ould become
a maQor pla(er in the Rrange Oevolution."3 /imilarl(# the entr( o ;bdoula(e
JadeSs /enegalese !emocratic 5art( ?5!/B entr( into government coalitions in
CC and CC4 brought the part( access to patronage resources that it used or
organization building# $hile other opposition parties languished."7 Jade $on
the presidenc( in 1222. Gn Men(a# opposition leader Oaila Rdinga led his National
!evelopment 5art( ?N!5B into a +partnership, $ith the =oi government duringthe late CC2s in exchange or police protection and access to patronage
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
23/44
resources."4 Gn 122# the N!5 Qoined the cabinet# $hich +permitted Rdinga
to organize dissent rom $ithin.,"" ; (ear later# Rdinga led a massive deection
that helped ensure the 1221 electoral deeat o the Men(a ;rican National Fnion
?M;NFB.
Fnder competitive authoritarianism# thereore# opposition parties pla( a dual
game# tr(ing to $in b( the existing rules $hile simultaneousl( see'ing to change
them. Ihis means that although opposition parties must ta'e seriousl( electoral
competition and vote*maximization# the( ma( also pursue strategies ?e.g.# electoral
bo(cotts# mass protestB aimed at undermining the regime. =oreover# the(
ma( adopt strategies ?e.g.# thug mobilization# alliances $ith unpopular
governmentsB
that L although suboptimal rom a vote*see'ing standpoint L allo$ them
to compete and survive on a s'e$ed pla(ing feld.
ase seetion and methods
Rur stud( examines all 34 regimes in the $orld that $ere or became competitive
authoritarian bet$een CC2 and CC4. Je exclude rom the anal(sis other t(pes
o h(brid ?or +partl( ree,B regimes# including a variet( o regimes in $hich politicalcompetition exists but nonelected oUcials retain considerable po$er# such as
?B those in $hich the most important executive oUce is not elected ?e.g.# Gran#
^ordan# Mu$ait# and =oroccoB"9& ?1B regimes in $hich top executive positions
are flled via elections but the authorit( o elected governments is seriousl(
constrained
b( the militar( or other nonelected bodies ?e.g.# >uatemala# 5a'istan#
Ihailand# and Iur'e( in the earl( CC2sB"8& and ?3B competitive regimes under
oreign occupation ?e.g.# Kebanon in the earl( CC2sB. Gn all o these regimes# the
po$er o actors outside the electoral process generates a distinct set o d(namics
and challenges not ound under competitive authoritarianism. Je also exclude
+illiberal, electoral regimes# in $hich mainstream parties compete on a reasonabl(level pla(ing feld but $idespread human* or civil*rights abuse L oten targeting
nonmainstream political parties or ethnic groups L persist ?e.g.# )olombia and /ri
Kan'a in the earl( CC2sB. Eecause violations do not directl( aDect mainstream
political competition# such h(brid regimes are not competitive authoritarian.
Je also exclude cases in $hich competitive authoritarianism collapses beore
the completion o a single presidential or parliamentar( term#"C as $ell as cases
in $hich state collapse ma'es it diUcult to identi( any 'ind o organized political
regime.92 -inall(# $e limit our stud( to regimes that $ere competitive
authoritarian
prior to CC4 in order to evaluate the impact o our variables over a signifcant
period ?at least 3 (earsB. Ihus# cases that became competitive authoritarian aterCC4 ?e.g.# Nigeria and enezuelaB are excluded rom the sample.9
Rur criteria or scoring cases ?and the actual codingB are elaborated in
;ppendix G. Rur criteria or democrac( are strict. Oegimes +cross the line, rom
democratic to competitive authoritarian i $e fnd evidence o centrall( coordinated
or tolerated electoral manipulation# s(stematic civil*liberties violations
?i.e.# abuse is a repeated rather than an exceptional event and is orchestrated or
approved b( the national governmentB# or an uneven pla(ing feld ?i.e.# opposition
parties are denied signifcant access to fnance or mass media or state institutions
are s(stematicall( deplo(ed against the oppositionB.
Rur method o scoring ma( be illustrated $ith reerence to a e$ cases that allnear the border bet$een competitive authoritarianism and democrac(. !uring
the initial period ?CC2LCC4B# $e scored Eots$ana as competitive authoritarian
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
24/44
due to extreme inequalities in access to media and fnance& the !ominican Oepublic
as competitive authoritarian due to the Ealaguer governmentSs pac'ing o the
electoral commission and large*scale manipulation o voter rolls& and /lova'ia
as competitive authoritarian due to =eciarSs abuse o media and harassment o
parliamentar( opposition. Rn the other side o the line# Erazil and the 5hilippines
suDered serious problems o democratic governance L including extensiveclientelism# corruption# and0or a $ea' rule o la$ L in the earl( CC2s# but $e
ound no evidence o s(stematic electoral abuse# civil*liberties violations against
political opposition# or s'e$ed access to media or fnance. Hence# these cases
$ere scored as democratic and excluded rom the anal(sis.
Iurning to regime outcomes in 1228# $e scored /enegal as competitive
authoritarian due to harassment and arrest o opposition politicians and Qournalists#
and $e scored >eorgia as competitive authoritarian due to harassment
o maQor media in the 1227 elections and closure o television stations during
the 1229 state o emergenc(. Rn the other side o the line# $e scored Eenin
as democratic because the 122" election $as $idel( characterized as clean and
$e ound no evidence o serious abuse under 5resident Wa(i Eoni. Ki'e$ise#
>u(ana# =acedonia# Oomania# /erbia# and F'raine $ere scored as democratic
because L not$ithstanding repeated institutional crises and serious problems o
corruption L elections $ere clean# critics suDered no s(stematic harassment# and
opposition parties enQo(ed access to media and fnance.
Jith respect to the line bet$een competitive and ull authoritarianism# our
main criterion is $hether opposition parties can use democratic institutions to
compete seriousl( or po$er. G parties or candidates are routinel( excluded# either
ormall( or eDectivel(# rom competing in elections or the national executive#91
or i electoral raud is so extensive that voting is essentiall( meaningless# then
regimes $ere scored as noncompetitive and excluded rom anal(sis.93 Eased on
these criteria# )ambodia# /erbia# and imbab$e in the CC2s $ere scored as
competitive because L not$ithstanding $idespread state violence L opposition
parties $ere able to seriousl( contest national elections. Ki'e$ise# =ala(sia
$as scored as competitive because# despite highl( institutionalized authoritarian
controls# opposition parties operated legall( and seriousl( contested nearl( al
parliamentar( seats. E( contrast# /ingapore $as scored as ull( authoritarian
because restrictions on speech and association made it nearl( impossible or
opposition groups to operate publicl( and because legal controls and other
institutional
obstacles prevented opposition parties rom contesting most seats in parliament.
:g(pt $as scored as noncompetitive because the =uslim Erotherhood
$as banned and thousands o its activists $ere imprisoned. ;zerbaiQan $as scoredas ull( authoritarian because all maQor opposition candidates $ere excluded rom
the CC3 election# allo$ing He(dar ;li(ev to $in $ith CC percent o the vote.97
I$o points are $orth noting here. -irst# as in an( stud( o this t(pe# there
exist borderline cases that arguabl( could be included in the sample but that $e
Qudged to be either insuUcientl( authoritarian ?e.g.# Namibia and 5hilippinesB or
insuUcientl( competitive ?e.g.# ;zerbaiQan# /ingapore# and FgandaB or inclusion.
Nevertheless# e$ o these borderline cases appear to run counter to our theor(
?see )hapter 8B. /econd# competitive authoritarianism is a broad categor( that
ranges rom +sot#, near*democratic cases ?e.g.# the !ominican Oepublic and
/lova'ia in the earl( CC2sB to +hard#, or near*ull authoritarian cases ?e.g.# Oussia
and imbab$e in the mid*1222sB. Gndeed# despite considerable political reorm inMen(a and /enegal bet$een CC and 1228# both cases $ere scored as competitive
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
25/44
authoritarian throughout the given period. ;lthough this ma( be unsatis(ing#
the problem is hardl( unique to competitive authoritarianism% >erman(# /$eden#
:l /alvador# and =ongolia $ere all $idel( considered democracies in 1228.
Ihe medium*n anal(sis emplo(ed in this stud( has both limitations and advantages.
Rur anal(sis is bounded in t$o $a(s. -irst# it is bounded b( regime t(pe.
Ihe act that our sample includes onl( competitive authoritarian regimes L andthus is not representative o the broader universe o regimes L limits our abilit(
to ma'e general claims about the eDects o lin'age and organizational po$er. Je
do not# thereore# oDer a general theor( o regime change. /econd# our stud( is
bounded historicall(. Rur theor( o lin'ageSs democratizing eDects is relevant
onl( or periods o Jestern liberal hegemon(. Je do not expect ties to the Jest
to have had similar eDects during the )old Jar period. ;s this boo' suggests#
the causes o democratization changed considerabl( ater C8C# $ith the
international
dimension having a ar more important role than in earlier periods. Hence#
it appears that the actors that explain regime outcomes during the Cth centur(
or the )old Jar era diDer rom those that explain regime outcomes during the
postL)old Jar era. G that is the case# then the generalizabilit( o theories based
on anal(ses o other historical periods also ma( be limited.9
Rur research design also has important advantages. -irst# intensive case anal(sis
(ields greater measurement validit( than is possible in most large*n crossnational
studies.9" Oather than rel(ing on preexisting datasets that $ere not
designed to measure competitive authoritarianism ?e.g.# -reedom House# 5olit(
GB# or prox( variables $hose measurement validit( is oten questionable ?e.g.# per
capita militar( spending as a prox( or coercive capacit(B# $e developed measures
that closel( approximate our concepts. Ihe indicators used or each variable# as$ell as the actual coding o cases# are provided in the appendices. Ihus# although
our coding process is +subQective#, in the sense that $e ma'e the scoring decisions
in each case# it is transparent# consistent across cases and regions# and easil(
alsifable
L characteristics that are not shared# or example# b( -reedom House.99
Ihis method allo$s us to maximize measurement validit( $hile retaining a level
o rigor and standardization that is sometimes lac'ing in more qualitative studies.
/econd# detailed case studies allo$ us to examine and test or causal relationships
in a $a( that large*n cross*national studies generall( ail to do.98 Rur
research design sets a high bar or testing our h(potheses. Oather than simpl(
sho$ a correlation bet$een theor( and outcome among the universe o competitiveauthoritarian regimes# $e must demonstrate that the predicted causal
processes are at $or' in each case. Ihus# our case anal(ses sho$ L over multiple
observations L ho$ lin'age shapes actorsS behavior in $a(s that ma'e democratic
outcomes more li'el(. Ki'e$ise# the case studies demonstrate the causal processes
b( $hich lo$ state or part( cohesion undermines regime stabilit( ?e.g.#
b( preventing governments rom crac'ing do$n or acilitating elite deectionB
during crises. Gntensive case anal(sis also allo$s us to test alternative explanations
b( examining $hether the causal mechanisms posited b( rival approaches ?e.g.#
inequalit(# economic crisis# institutional designB are at $or'.
;t the same time# our medium*n anal(sis (ields considerable variation in terms
o both the dependent variable ?i.e.# regime outcomesB and various potentialexplanator( actors. Jhereas most small* and medium*n anal(ses are limited
to one or t$o regions# this stud( compares cases across fve regions#9C $hich
8/17/2019 Regimes Híbridos
26/44
$OR*I,O
Gt is $ell 'no$n that the principal macropolitical phenomenon o the last hal
centur( or thereabouts has been democratisation# that is# the transition rom
nondemocratic to democratic regimes in various parts o the $orld# rom /outhern
:urope to Katin ;merica and rom :astern :urope to man( areas o ;sia and ;rica.
Ihroughout the same period# literature on this topic has become predominant in the
feld o comparative politics. Gn more recent times# the gro$th o democratisation
and the development o associated research has aroused considerable interest in
the more specifc theme o the spread o h(brid or XtransitionalS regimes. ;s a result#
the vie$ o )roissant and =er'el that +partial t(pes o democrac( are the dominant
trend in democratic theor( and democratisation studies, comes as no surprise.
Neither does the assertion b( :pstein and colleagues that Xpartial democraciesS
+account or an increasing portion o current regimes and the lionSs share o regime
transitions,# though the( add that there is little available inormation about +$hat
prevents ull democracies rom sliding bac' to partial democracies or autocracies#
and $hat prevents partial democracies rom sliding bac' to autocrac(, and that
+the determinants o the behaviour o the partial democracies elude our
understanding,.1 Gt is no surprise either that such a variet( o labels have been
coined or these regimes b( diDerent authors% Xsemi*consolidated democraciesS#
Xh(brid regimesS ?in the strict sense o the termB# Xsemiconsolidated authoritarian
regimesS ?-reedom HouseB&3 Xpartial democraciesS ?:pstein et al.B& Xelectoral
democraciesS ?!iamondB& Xilliberal democraciesS ?a'ariaB& Xdeective democraciesS
?)roissant and =er'elB& Xcompetitive authoritarianismsS ?Kevits'( and Ja(B& Xsemi*
authoritarianismsS ?Rtta$a(B& and Xelectoral authoritarianismsS ?/chedlerB. Ihese are
Qust some o man( the expressions used b( scholars investigating the phenomenon
that $il
Top Related